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IMPACTS OF DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
ON THE LABOUR MARKET AND BEYOND  
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The 16 publications included in this thesis are the results of a programme of research between 
1993 and 2009 into the labour market and labour market-related impacts of the large-scale 
spatially concentrated losses of industrial jobs in Great Britain from the 1970s to the 1990s.  
The British conventional wisdom has been that labour market recovery was relatively quick, 
and that the effects were not particularly profound.  Continuing labour market distress was 
mainly ascribed to labour ‘supply-side’ factors rather than to locally deficient labour demand.  
The research challenges these views.  It draws particularly on the British Keynesian tradition, 
and on authors such as J. F. Kain, John Kasarda and William Julius Wilson from the USA, 
which experienced similar job losses around a decade earlier.  Issues covered include the 
statistical measurement and spatial variation of unemployment and related economic 
disadvantage, unemployment disguised as sickness, long-term unemployment, migration and 
lone parenthood, and there is also analysis of policies on employment and social inclusion. 
 
The research shows that ‘Travel-to-Work Areas’ (TTWAs) do not correctly identify the 
employment ‘fields’ of residents of areas of high unemployment.  They have biased errors due 
to imbalance between commuting inflows and outflows, and obscure the main variation in 
unemployment on the urban-rural dimension.  Three papers on Incapacity Benefit (IB) analyse 
the dynamics of change in the stock of claimants, investigating the roles played by health 
status and labour market conditions.  The most recent of these papers examines whether the 
striking fall in IB claims in Glasgow and other former industrial areas in 2003-08 was the 
result of official interventions or of improving labour market conditions, concluding that it 
was mainly the latter. 
 
A key ‘supply-side’ assumption was that being unemployed in itself makes people less 
‘employable’ – the theory of ‘state-dependence’.  The paper on long-term unemployment   3
radically challenges this interpretation.  It points out that the literature on the relationship 
between long-term and short-term unemployment has generally failed to consider the 
appropriate time-lags or the behaviour of the standard measure of long-term unemployment.  It 
shows that the phenomenon which the theory of state-dependence purports to explain does not 
occur to any significant extent.   
 
Outmigration and housing abandonment are significant effects of local job loss.  The paper on 
housing abandonment demonstrates a statistical relationship across England in 1997 between 
social housing surplus and ‘real unemployment’, while a further paper challenges the view that 
there was no longer a deficiency of demand for labour in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley in the 
1990s by investigating migration patterns.  It demonstrates that net flows between individual 
Scottish areas and the rest of the UK were to a substantial extent determined by changes in 
labour demand.  A new finding is that little adjustment to employment change occurs through 
migration within Scotland.   
 
The large increase in lone parenthood in Great Britain since the 1960s has been strongly 
correlated across areas with male worklessness.  The US literature suggested that this 
relationship is causal, and this thesis is investigated in two papers.  The earlier of these was the 
first comprehensive published application of this interpretation to the modern British case.  A 
further paper concludes that falling male employment accounted for around half the rise in 
lone parenthood in Great Britain in 1971-2001.   
 
Two of the papers present a comprehensive picture of the geographical distributions of the 
different groups of disadvantaged people in the labour market, showing that they all conform 
to a similar pattern which in turn is related to deficient labour demand.   
 
Keywords:  Unemployment, long-term unemployment, worklessness, economic inactivity, 
Incapacity Benefit, migration, lone parenthood,.employment policy, social inclusion.  4
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SECTION 1 
 
 
 
  
 
EXPLANATORY ESSAY 
 
 
References to the publications submitted are in square brackets [  ].  References to other 
papers by the author and to papers by other authors are in round brackets (  ). 
 
 
The 16 publications submitted present the results of a programme of research since 1993 into 
the labour market and labour market-related impacts of the large-scale spatially concentrated 
losses of industrial jobs in Great Britain from the 1970s to the 1990s.  When this research was 
begun, the British conventional wisdom was that labour market recovery had been relatively 
quick, and that the effects had not been particularly profound.  Continuing labour market 
distress was mainly ascribed to labour ‘supply-side’ factors rather than to locally deficient 
labour demand.  Prevailing assumptions were that adjustment to job loss through commuting 
or migration was relatively easy, that jobs were easy to find everywhere, and that if there were 
local concentrations of unemployment these were due to uncompetitiveness of the local labour 
force, which would often be due to a previous unemployment shock having made the 
unemployed less ‘employable’.  Additionally, it was assumed that major changes in British 
society such as the widespread breakdown of the family were autonomous social trends 
unconnected to deindustrialisation.  The author’s perception was that none of these 
assumptions was correct.  However, they yielded many falsifiable predictions, and the 
research set out to falsify them.  It drew particularly on the British tradition of Keynes and 
Beveridge (e.g. 1930), and on authors such as Kain, Kasarda and William Julius Wilson from 
the USA, which had experienced similar job losses around a decade earlier.  The earlier   11
literature yielded a causal model [16, p.37], and the research set out to test key linkages in this 
model.   
 
Measurement of Unemployment 
 
The first requirement was to identify the true spatial variation of unemployment.  When the 
research programme began, British official statistics did not present an accurate picture either 
of the scale or of the geographical pattern of unemployment.  In particular they obscured its 
most striking feature, namely its variation on the urban-rural dimension.  The earliest paper [1] 
drew on the author’s work on commuting patterns in the 1981 and 1991 Censuses to show that 
‘Travel-to-Work Areas’ (TTWAs), then the main reporting unit for British unemployment 
statistics, do not correctly identify the employment ‘fields’ of residents of areas of high 
unemployment.  They have large biased errors due to imbalance between commuting inflows 
and outflows, and conceal the concentration of unemployment in the cities.  Published in 
March 1997, this paper was a joint development with Professor Ivan Turok from the single-
authored conference paper (Webster 1997a) of January 1997.  The conference paper had also 
shown that the ‘workforce’ claimant unemployment rates for local authority areas introduced 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in 1996 suffered from even larger biased errors 
than the TTWA rates.  Both papers pointed out the serious implications for economic research 
of the biased errors, and loss of variation through excessive aggregation, of TTWA 
unemployment rates.  
 
The Radical Statistics paper (2002) [2] was also developed from a conference paper (Webster 
2001).  It took the critique of the official statistics much further, presenting a comprehensive 
view of their deficiencies in capturing the key features of contemporary unemployment, and 
discussing the way these deficiencies had arisen.  It included corrected claimant 
unemployment rates for local authorities produced by the author, based on the published ONS 
rates and using the 1991 Census to correct for commuting error.  It also considered the issues 
of government trainees, ‘discouraged workers’ and Labour Force Survey evidence on the 
desire to work, as well as introducing new analysis of unemployment disguised as long-term 
sickness. 
   12
It was partly as a result of the analysis in [1], [2], Webster (1998c) and Webster (2000), and of 
dialogue expanding on this, that ONS accepted the invalidity of the local authority ‘workforce’ 
rates and agreed to discontinue their publication as from January 2003.  More detail of the 
author’s role in relation to these statistics is available at 
http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/unemployment-research.   
 
The papers on measurement of local unemployment and on TTWAs were important in 
developing and validating the methodology used in other parts of the research programme 
presented here.  This normally used local authorities or combinations of local authorities as the 
spatial unit of analysis.  In attempting to explain the observed spatial pattern, these papers 
were also innovatory in replicating for Britain the analysis of the impact of urban job loss on 
unemployment developed for the USA by Kasarda (1989), presenting estimates of job loss by 
socio-economic group for major British cities.  Fuller results were presented in Webster 
(1998c) and in [16].  These estimates were constructed from the Census Workplace data, 
which are rarely used for this purpose.  Because these estimates disaggregated the data by 
socio-economic group, they were an essential complement to the ‘labour market accounts’ 
produced by authors such as Beatty et al. (1997b) for the coalfields and Turok & Edge (1999) 
for the cities. 
 
Economic Inactivity and Long-Term Sickness 
 
Other authors had already argued that much of the increase in economic inactivity in the 1980s 
and 1990s, particularly long-term sickness, was a form of disguised unemployment, and that 
true unemployment was therefore much higher than shown in the official figures.  A 
systematic statement of this view is by Beatty et al. (2000).  [3] contributed to the analysis of 
this issue by introducing a new methodology to show that geographical aggregations of data 
from the Labour Force Survey could be used to analyse relationships across areas on the 
urban-rural dimension between employment change, unemployment, economic inactivity and 
population change, thus overcoming the deficiencies of the official local claimant 
unemployment rates.  It showed that over the 5 years 1993/94 and 1998/99, when the 
definition of unemployment was widened to include economic inactivity, convergence had not 
occurred across types of area, in spite of a substantial degree of general economic recovery.   
   13
Although the importance of long-term sick claimants was increasingly recognised during the 
period of the present research, for many years it was not possible to analyse at local level their 
characteristics or the dynamics of flows into and out of the sick status.  Improvements in the 
Department for Work and Pensions databases, and availability of funding, made it possible for 
a group of researchers at the University of Glasgow to undertake this type of analysis from 
2006 onwards.  The present author has taken part in the work of the group throughout by 
contributing to the theoretical framework and suggesting specific analyses.  The papers on 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) [4] and [5] analysed the dynamics of change in the stock of claimants 
in Glasgow – an area with a particularly high level of claims - and Scotland, and investigated 
the roles of health status and labour market conditions.  They are part of a series of 
publications which also includes Brown et al. (2007) and [6].  [4] was a summarisation for 
academic journal publication of Brown et al. (2007), to which the present author contributed 
specific analyses (in particular the use of the 2001 Census long-term illness data as a 
benchmark) and portions of text, as well as contributing to the editing.  It showed in particular 
that the fall in IB claims in the present decade was almost entirely due to a fall in inflows to 
this benefit status rather to an increase in outflows from it.  [5] was an extension to this work, 
using the same analytical framework.  It provided a detailed profile of the fastest-growing 
category of IB claimants, those claiming by reason of mental ill-health, showing the 
dominance of mild to moderate conditions and the relative youth of those claiming on account 
of alcohol or drug abuse.  
 
[6], which was mainly written by the present author and includes substantial statistical 
analysis, examines the question whether the striking fall in IB claims in Glasgow and other 
former industrial areas since around 2003 is a result of official interventions or of improving 
labour market conditions, concluding that it is mainly the latter.  This conclusion has already 
been cited and supported by McVicar (2009).  
 
Taken together, these papers provide strong support for the view that excess IB claims are a 
form of disguised unemployment.  
 
 
 
   14
                                                
Long-Term Unemployment 
 
In the UK literature from the mid-1980s onwards, a key assumption supporting a supply-side 
view of unemployment persistence was the belief that the state of being unemployed in itself 
makes people less ‘employable’ – the theory of ‘state-dependence’.  A corollary was that any 
lengthy period of high unemployment would create pools of long-term unemployment which 
were due to reduced ‘employability’ and which would not respond to increased labour 
demand.  The paper on long-term unemployment [7] and its predecessors (Webster 1996, 
1997b, 1997c) radically challenged this interpretation.
1  These papers show that, going back to 
Beveridge (1937), most economists have made fundamental errors in analysing the statistical 
evidence on the relationship between long-term and short-term unemployment, in particular by 
failing to consider the appropriate time-lags or the peculiar behaviour of the conventional 
measure, namely the proportion of the unemployed who are long-term.  This has led them to 
believe that, following an episode of high unemployment, long-term remains higher in relation 
to short-term unemployment than it did before (in other words it exhibits ‘hysteresis’).  
However, when correctly interpreted, the statistical evidence shows that the phenomenon 
which the theory of state-dependence was developed to explain does not occur to any 
significant extent;  the theory is therefore not only incorrect but redundant.  The findings of 
these papers also undermine several other less-widely supported theories which have been 
developed to account for supposed ‘hysteresis’:  welfare benefit dependence, changes in 
labour force characteristics, and ‘insider-outsider’ theories. 
 
These papers undertook a very wide-ranging review of the literature and the statistical 
evidence, on a national and international basis and over a long period dating back to 1909.   
 
Because of the centrality of the issue of unemployment persistence to the working of the 
economy as a whole, these papers have potentially wide theoretical implications, for instance 
for the ‘NAIRU’ (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), which have been taken up 
by Mitchell & Muysken (2008, pp.92, 100).  They are also fundamentally important in relation 
to ‘welfare-to-work’ policies, whose large-scale adoption in Britain in the mid-1990s was 
primarily based on acceptance of the theory of ‘state-dependence’. 
 
1 The first written account of the long-term unemployment analysis was in Webster (1996).  This remained 
unpublished but was quickly cited by Machin & Manning (1998, pp.10-11).  Webster (1997b) was a shorter and 
improved version and (1997c) set out the argument in brief.     15
 
Vacancies 
 
Although in investigating the impact of job loss it is vital to measure the true level of local 
unemployment correctly, a high level of unemployment does not by itself establish whether 
there is deficient local demand for labour.  It could be due either to deficient labour demand, 
or to an uncompetitive local workforce. Advocates of supply-side interpretations have been 
aware of this, and have therefore attempted to use the level of local job vacancies as a further 
indicator.  Their argument has been that if an area has both a high level of unemployment and 
a high level of unfilled vacancies, then the unemployment must be substantially due to 
uncompetitiveness of the local labour force rather than to deficient local labour demand.  
 
[12], pp.121-3, drawing on Webster (1999), rebutted three arguments that had been advanced 
by HM Treasury to support a supply-side view:  decline over time in the ratio of unemployed 
workers to unfilled job vacancies (U/V ratio);  geographical convergence in this ratio;  and 
geographical invariance in the ratio of vacancies to total jobs with respect to the local 
unemployment rate.  This rebuttal drew on earlier work on economic inactivity and on TTWA 
unemployment rate methodology.  [2], pp.111-2, and [13], pp.112-3, included further 
commentaries on these issues. 
 
The ‘Characteristics’ Approach to Unemployment 
 
The ‘supply-side’ view that area concentrations of unemployment are due to lesser 
competitiveness of the unemployed workforce can be tested directly by examining available 
data on their characteristics.  This possibility was investigated for the former Strathclyde 
Region, in an early paper (Webster 1995) by the author which was never published.  This 
showed that the available evidence did not support the ‘characteristics’ approach.  An 
equivalent analysis was later carried out for Great Britain by Erdem and Glyn (2001, earlier 
version published 1999) and the author thereafter cited that work rather than pursuing his own. 
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Labour Market Adjustment through Commuting 
 
At the outset of the research programme, much of the existing literature assumed that people 
losing their job would readily be able to get another one by travelling further, to an area of 
employment growth or at least of lesser job loss.  It was assumed that failure to do so was 
evidence of uncompetitiveness of some kind.  The earliest project within the programme was 
an empirical analysis of commuting patterns in the Clydeside conurbation in 1981 (Webster 
1994).  Parts of the analysis, which was later repeated using the 1991 data, appeared in several 
of the papers presented here: [1], [15], and [16].  It produced two key findings.  First, the 
effective ‘employment fields’ of people living in a given small area were always relatively 
restricted.  Second, when the employment fields of the residents of different areas were 
examined systematically across the whole conurbation, they were shown to fit the well-known 
‘gravity model’, with the values of the exponents of distance themselves following a clear 
spatial pattern (it was later found that the latter result replicated that of Fotheringham (1984)).  
These findings implied that adjustment to job loss via any radical departure from this pattern 
was unlikely to occur.  This work represented an unusual test for Britain of the ‘spatial 
mismatch hypothesis’ which has been heavily researched in the USA (e.g. Kain 1992).  
Probably for this reason, the author’s 1994 paper, although unpublished, has been cited in the 
literature in its own right, for instance by Houston (2005, pp.222, 233), Morrison (2005, 
p.2275) and Green et al. (2005, p.302).  In the event an elegant paper by Shen (1998) made 
essentially similar findings for Boston, Massachusetts and the author thereafter cited this paper 
rather than pursuing his own analysis through to full publication.   
 
In line with this analysis, the author cited [12, p.124] Turok & Edge’s labour market accounts 
(1999, Table 17) as showing the small contribution made by increased net outcommuting to 
labour market adjustment in British cities in 1981-91.  This observation was criticised by 
Gordon (2003, pp.66-7, 77-8) on the basis that inward commuting had increased for unrelated 
reasons, and that the responsiveness of net outcommuting to differences in job loss between 
cities was very high.  In fact both these points had already been noted by the present author in 
an unpublished note (Webster 1998a) re-analysing labour market accounts for the British 
coalfields over the same period by Beatty et al. (1997b).  As pointed out in the 1998 note, 
although the slope of the regression line relating change in commuting to change in 
employment is quite steep, the intercept is low – in the coalfields case, any area with an   17
increase in job deficit of less than 11.5% saw increased net in-commuting.  Essentially, 
commuting adjustment can only help to the extent that there are nearby areas with job growth.  
This was often the case in the south east – Gordon’s primary focus – but has rarely been so in 
the former industrial cities or generally in the north and west of Britain. 
 
Labour Market Adjustment through Migration 
 
One of the most important local consequences of employment loss is outmigration of 
population.  People leave areas where employment is falling and move to those where it is 
increasing.  In the long run, this is usually the main and in many ways the most satisfactory 
form of adjustment to employment change.  However, it is often a slow and inefficient process 
and can have adverse effects on both the exporting and importing areas.   
 
One of the significant adverse effects on exporting areas is housing abandonment, which 
occurred on a spectacular scale in the USA in the 1970s and 1980s but also manifested itself in 
former industrial areas of Britain in the late 1970s to the 1990s, leading in England to the 
Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder programme, launched in 2002, and in Glasgow to 
extensive housing demolitions.  [8] took advantage of the availability of a measure of social 
housing surplus in 1997 developed by Bramley (1998), together with Beatty et al.’s ‘real 
unemployment’ for the same date (Beatty et al. 1997a), to demonstrate the close relationship 
across English local authority areas between low demand for social housing and high 
unemployment.  Measures of job loss and private house price change were also used to the 
extent available.  The point of this paper, as its title indicated, was to show that low demand 
had structural causes which lay in the labour market and was not simply – as often suggested – 
due to the unpopularity of particular neighbourhoods or types of house.  This paper also 
revealed an important geographical pattern whereby areas which had social housing surpluses 
accompanied by high unemployment were all on the coast, or in London.  This gave support to 
the thesis originated by Beatty & Fothergill (later published in final form in 2004) to explain 
the paradox that seaside towns had systematically higher unemployment than could be 
explained by their job loss.  They hypothesised that unemployment in seaside towns was being 
boosted by inward migration by unemployed people wanting to live somewhere attractive.  
This explanation was important in countering a potential ‘supply-side’ argument that the view   18
that the observed geographical pattern of unemployment was primarily due to local job loss 
could not be reconciled with the facts of the seaside case.   
 
[8] was described by the Housing Corporation (2005, p.8) as ‘the single recent paper in the 
UK that does attempt to construct (the) formal link’ between the geography of employment 
and housing demand in a statistical way.  Wilcox (1999, pp.82, 84) described it as an 
‘important contribution to the analysis of low demand (for social housing)’, and reproduced 
the author’s map. 
 
[9] challenged the view that there was no longer a deficiency of demand for labour in Glasgow 
and the Clyde Valley by investigating migration patterns.  It took advantage of the availability 
of a long run of data going back to 1974 for Health Board Areas (HBAs) and seems to have 
been the first to investigate the working of the Scottish migration system at this level.  An 
important, and apparently new, finding was that very little adjustment to employment change 
occurred through migration within Scotland.  In relation to net migration, the east and west of 
Scotland were shown to have disconnected migration systems, relating separately to the rest of 
the UK but not to each other.  Apparently large internal Scottish net migration flows were 
almost entirely due to suburbanisation.  The main destination for net outmigration from all 
parts of Scotland was shown to be the south of England.  This is a different picture from that 
which had been assumed by Scottish policy-makers, who thought that people becoming 
unemployed due to job loss in one part of Scotland would have a strong tendency to migrate or 
commute to new jobs in other parts of Scotland.  The paper was then able to draw on the 
approach developed by Jackman and Savouri (1992) to demonstrate that the amount and 
direction of net flow between individual Scottish HBAs and the rest of the UK were to a 
substantial extent determined by the change in the difference in unemployment levels between 
the individual HBA and the south east of England – in other words by the greater availability 
of job vacancies in the relatively improving area.  This was particularly true for areas such as 
Greater Glasgow with the highest unemployment, where job availability would be expected to 
have the most influence on migration.  The paper also showed that the temporary 
improvement in the Scottish migration position in 1989 to 1993 was merely a repeat of what 
had happened in 1932-33:  Scottish people losing jobs as recession took hold in the south 
returned to their place of origin. 
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The Scottish population outlook has changed substantially since this paper was written, as a 
result of the continued expansion of the service economy, particularly in Glasgow, and the 
sponsored in-migration of asylum seekers since 2000.  However its analysis could readily be 
updated using the methods it developed. 
 
Male Worklessness and Female Lone Parenthood 
 
One of the most fundamental demographic changes during the period of deindustrialisation in 
Great Britain has been the huge increase in lone parenthood:  from 4.3 per cent of families 
with dependent children in 1961 to 25.6 per cent in 2001.  Across areas, and over time, this 
increase has been strongly correlated with male unemployment, particularly with the broader 
measure of non-employment.  
 
Some writers such as Charles Murray (1990) who have noticed these correlations have 
deployed them in support of a supply-side explanation of unemployment persistence.  Their 
argument is that both family breakdown and worklessness (and in Murray’s version, crime 
also) are caused by moral deterioration.  If correct, this would be an important argument 
because it would tend to support the ‘characteristics’ approach to unemployment, and lead to a 
policy focus on social control and re-education.   
 
Other writers who have not noticed the correlation across areas between unemployment and 
lone parenthood have argued – or simply assumed – that the increase in lone parenthood is a 
demographic phenomenon unrelated to the labour market.  This view also has policy 
consequences.  In particular, it leads to a focus on attempting to raise the employment rates of 
lone parents themselves, rather than considering the position of the non-resident fathers. 
 
The two papers on lone parenthood [10], [11] resulted from the author’s desire to explain the 
correlation across areas of lone parenthood with unemployment.  This led to a wide-ranging 
exploration of the literature.  It emerged that there was already a well-developed stream of 
analysis for the USA which interpreted increases in lone parenthood as being causally related 
to male unemployment.  The most important single author in this tradition was Moynihan 
(1965), although there have been many other writers, including Wilson (1987), who have used 
both statistical (time series, longitudinal and cross-section) and ethnographic analysis.                 20
 
The 2000 paper [10], which used 1981 and 1991 Census data among other sources, was the 
first comprehensive published argument that this interpretation could be applied to the modern 
British case, although a handful of individual analyses, cited in the paper, had pointed to it, 
and the present author had already published a short paper outlining the thesis (Webster 
1997e).  In addition to these papers, the author produced a further, unpublished paper 
(Webster 1998b) containing a regression analysis of the 1991 Census data, taking the rate of 
lone parenthood as the dependent variable and examining various potential explanatory 
variables in relation to it.  Circulation of this paper led to the suggestion by Professor Robert 
Rowthorn that while the analysis was persuasive, potential objections could be countered by 
using more complex regression procedures.  It was agreed to undertake a joint paper in which 
Professor Rowthorn would contribute the regression analysis while the present author would 
contribute an enhanced database.  The 2008 paper [11] was the result.  This used a panel of 
data for Great Britain drawn from all four Censuses 1971-2001.  It produced strong findings, 
in particular that the fall in male employment accounted for between 38 per cent and 59 per 
cent of the rise in the proportion of families headed by a lone parent over the 30 years 1971-
2001, in other words around half.  The impact was greatest in the areas which had suffered 
most from industrial decline.  The analysis indicates that the effect is reversible, in other 
words a rise in male employment leads, ceteris paribus, to a fall in lone parenthood.   
 
This paper also made a pioneering analysis of the data on stepfamilies which were collected 
for the first time in a British Census in 2001.  This analysis has been developed further in the 
unpublished papers Webster (2006) and Webster (2008).   
 
The Geography of Labour Market Disadvantage 
 
[12] drew together several lines of analysis to present a comprehensive picture of the 
geographical distributions of the different groups of disadvantaged people in the labour market 
– youth unemployed, long-term unemployed, lone parents, the long-term sick, and partners of 
the unemployed - showing that they all conformed to a similar pattern which in turn was   21
                                                
related to deficient labour demand.  This paper has become a standard reference, with at least 
47 citations.
2  [13] updated the analysis.   
 
Policy Implications 
 
The body of research presented here has significant implications for policies on employment, 
urban regeneration and social inclusion, which were spelled out in [14], [15] and [16].   
 
The jointly authored paper [14] was a critique of the supply-side assumptions underlying the 
New Deal programme launched in 1997, which provided employment or training to everyone 
in certain defined groups, particularly young people unemployed over 6 months.  This paper 
has since become a standard reference with over 50 citations.  Its starting point was an earlier 
unpublished paper (Webster 1997d), and the present author’s main contribution was the 
statistical analysis.  The conclusions of this paper have been supported by later work by 
authors such as Sunley et al. (2001) and Field & White (2007).  The New Economy paper [15] 
offered a concise overview of the case for a labour demand-side approach to urban 
regeneration, with a brief reinterpretation of the development of British urban policy in the 
light of the work on the local impact of job loss by the present and other authors.  The Scottish 
Affairs paper [16] covered similar ground but had a more specific focus on Scotland, both in 
terms of data and in presenting a reinterpretation of the development of Scottish rather than 
British urban policy.  This reinterpretation was further developed in Webster (2002).     
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The papers submitted have made a significant contribution to establishing the existence of, and 
reasons for, extensive non-adjustment of the British labour market to the loss of industrial 
jobs, and to investigating the economic and social consequences.  The research has established 
important linkages and refuted some assumptions of the ‘supply-side’ approach.  It has been 
drawn upon widely by other authors, with a total of well over 150 citations.  Significant 
innovations have been made in each of the areas considered;  this is primarily because the 
research was based on an unfashionable paradigm, which generated many hypotheses which 
 
2 Counts of citations are taken from ISI Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar as at 19-20 February 2009 and 
exclude duplicates and self-citations.   22
had been under-researched. Also, much of the research on which the orthodoxy was based 
took place before the results of the 1991 Census - the first to track the effects of the great 
recession of 1979-84 and the only data source capable of recording changes with sufficient 
local detail - became available in 1993 and 1994.  By contrast, the present research has made 
extensive use of the Census data on employment, unemployment, commuting and family 
structure.   
 
[1], [2], [12] and [13] have helped to create a better understanding of the true geographical 
pattern of worklessness in Britain and of its linkage with deindustrialisation.  [1], [15] and [16] 
and the unpublished work on which they drew have contributed a systematic study of urban 
commuting patterns and sparked a debate on the effect of job proximity on employment levels.  
[4], [5] and [6] have enhanced understanding of the relationship between long-term sickness 
and local labour market conditions.  [8] is the only British statistical study of the geographical 
relationship between employment change and social housing demand and its conclusions have 
been generally accepted.  [9] seems to have been the first to investigate the Scottish migration 
system at Health Board Area level, and has increased understanding of its functioning.  The 
argument on long-term unemployment [7], which is entirely original, has significant 
implications for some areas of macroeconomic analysis as well as for labour market policy 
and been taken up by several other authors.  The work on the British linkage between 
declining male employment and rising lone parenthood has major social and economic 
implications.  Finally, the papers presented here have contributed to analyses of the Glasgow 
economy, by authors such as Kantor (2000, pp.80, 806, 813, 816), MacLeod (2002, pp. 265, 
267-8), Foster (2003, p.60) and Turok & Bailey (2004, pp.36, 50, 53).   
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THE FUTURE OF LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS: 
THE CASE FOR REPLACING TTWAs 
 
David Webster and Ivan Turok  
 
 
The main geographical unit for official 
unemployment rates below regional level is the 
Travel-to-Work Area.  TTWAs sub-divide Britain 
into a single set of mutually exclusive areas.  Each is 
supposed to constitute a fairly self-contained labour 
market, i.e. most of the workforce living and working 
within the same area.  The definition of these areas is 
currently based on commuting data from the 1981 
Census.   
 
TTWAs are intended to provide a uniform, unbiased 
method of reporting unemployment differences across 
the country.  They are officially regarded as the 
smallest areas for which valid unemployment rates 
can be quoted, and for which meaningful economic 
comparisons can be made (Coombes et al. 1997).   
 
Consequently, they are used as building blocks for 
defining assisted areas under UK and European 
spatial policies.  They are also key spatial units for the 
evaluation of urban regeneration and regional 
development projects, and for the identification of 
local labour markets for research purposes.  Indeed, 
their full significance is not widely appreciated. 
 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is currently 
undertaking a review of unemployment statistics to 
see whether the requirements of users such as local 
authorities and TECs/LECs are being met. (1)  One 
option is to update the TTWA boundaries using the 
1991 Census to reflect recent changes in commuting 
patterns.  Another option is to replace TTWAs with a 
reporting system based on smaller or different areas.  
This is a vital decision for economic researchers and 
policy-makers. 
 
The Arguments for TTWAs 
 
Advocates of the TTWA system claim several merits 
for it.  First, it is argued that TTWAs provide a 
statistical method for defining spatial units which is 
reasonably consistent across the country.  Boundaries 
reflecting political or administrative considerations 
have little influence.  The single central system for 
reporting unemployment rates reduces local attempts 
to manipulate these high profile statistics and avoids 
unnecessary disputes. 
 
Second, each TTWA is said to be an approximation to 
a distinct local labour market, enabling conditions in 
different local economies to be compared, like with 
like.  This is important for several reasons, including 
the objective definition of priority areas for regional 
policy.   
 
Third, TTWAs are said to provide a useful geography 
for labour market analysis because they identify 
localised commuting clusters and the important links 
between people's workplace and residence.  The 
TTWA boundaries at least need to be revised to 
reflect increases in average commuting distances 
since 1981 as a result of suburbanisation, rising car 
ownership, improvements in the road network and the 
decline of traditional industries, such as mining, 
which overwhelmingly employed people living 
nearby (Coombes et al. 1997).    
 
The Case Against TTWAs 
 
These supposed advantages are open to challenge.  In 
brief: 
 
* TTWAs do not provide a balanced description of 
spatial differences in unemployment.  They conceal 
concentrations of high unemployment in the major 
employment centres within average rates for large 
areas, but provide much more detailed coverage of 
some small town and rural areas with relatively few 
employment problems. 
 
* TTWAs misrepresent labour markets, emphasising 
one aspect - self-containment - at the expense of the 
other essential feature, internal integration. 
 
* TTWAs focus on the ‘commuting sheds’ of 
employment centres, which are mainly defined by 
white collar workers’ movements, rather than the 
‘employment fields’, or commuting ranges, of the 
blue collar workers who are most likely to be 
unemployed.  They therefore provide a poor 
indication of the commuting patterns most relevant to 
unemployment.  
 
These features make TTWAs unsuited to the purpose 
of defining priority areas for urban and regional 
policy.  In addition, TTWAs have a further major 
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defect which has not been widely appreciated:- 
 
* The method used to estimate unemployment rates 
for TTWAs creates large errors where there is 
significant net commuting across the area boundary.  
Unemployment is underestimated in areas with net in-
commuting (conurbations and employment centres) 
and overestimated in areas with net out-commuting 
(rural and semi-rural dormitory areas).   
 
These data errors, and the averaging out of 
unemployment rates across wide areas, also make 
TTWA data unsuitable for use in economic research, 
although many users are probably unaware of their 
defects. 
 
Taken together, these problems create doubts about 
the fundamental validity and continued existence of 
the system.  Although there have previously been 
criticisms of the TTWA system (e.g. Ball 1980), there 
does not seem to have been any previous evaluation 
considering all of these aspects.  This article 
elaborates these points and illustrates their 
significance with evidence from Scotland. 
 
Origins 
 
Some of the problems reflect the distant origins and 
contradictory purposes of TTWAs.   They originated 
in the 1950s from a need for regular statistics on 
unemployment rates below regional level.  The only 
way these could be produced at the time was by 
combining two different data sources: the number of 
people unemployed (obtained from the claimant count 
as recorded by Employment Exchange area) was 
divided by the size of the labour force (obtained from 
workplace records of people employed plus the 
unemployed).  The same basic hybrid method is still 
used today.   
 
TTWAs were devised purely to provide a set of areas 
for which this hybrid method would work reasonably 
well.  Their boundaries were therefore driven by 
statistical considerations (i.e. the need for a fair 
degree of self-containment), rather than policy 
concerns or efforts to understand the workings of the 
labour market.  Local authority boundaries were not 
used because many of them were very small and 
irregular at that time and because in its origins the 
system was an internal Department of Employment 
resource which naturally used Employment Exchange 
areas as building blocks.  
 
Self-Containment Versus Internal Cohesion 
 
The emphasis on self-containment has been at the 
expense of the internal cohesion and strength of 
interactions within designated areas.  This vital 
property of local labour markets has been consistently 
downplayed.  Although the need for internal cohesion 
was understood at least by some (Goodman 1960), the 
record shows that as the Department of Employment 
formalised the system during the 1960s, it was 
increasingly ignored in favour of self-containment 
(Smart 1974).  Over time, computers have facilitated 
increasingly sophisticated techniques for devising 
boundaries which maximise self-containment, but 
these have all been refinements of the basis algorithm 
laid down in the 1960s.  There has been little or no 
reconsideration of the theoretical basis of the system, 
nor any attempt to incorporate a requirement relating 
to internal cohesion.   
 
Maintaining the principle of self-containment has 
become more difficult over time for the authors of 
TTWAs because of longer distance commuting by a 
minority group of car-borne white-collar workers.   
The effect has been progressively to reduce the 
number of TTWAs from 642 in 1960 to 322 in 1984, 
making them ever larger and less useful.  A simple 
updating using the 1991 Census would lead to a 
further loss of up to a fifth of existing TTWAs 
(Coombes et al. 1997).  
 
 
Consequently, there are already many large TTWAs 
which are weakly integrated in labour market terms.  
Their boundaries are best described in the 
terminology of Vance (1960), as ‘labour sheds’ (on 
the analogy of ‘watersheds’).  They represent the area 
from which the labour supply of a given employment 
centre is drawn, rather than the area over which the 
residents of a given community range to find jobs 
(their “employment field”).  Vance showed in a 
detailed historical study of Natick,  Massachusetts, 
that while labour sheds and employment fields both 
change over time with changes in transport 
technology, the latter are usually smaller than the 
former.  This is certainly true today of a city like 
Glasgow, which has a very large labour shed (with 
well over 40% of its jobs being held by in-
commuters) but a much more restricted employment 
field (with only 16% of its workforce commuting 
out).  Employment fields for individual areas such as 
Greater Easterhouse or Drumchapel are even smaller 
(Glasgow Regeneration Alliance 1994).   
Consequently a shed-based system such as TTWAs 
misrepresents most commuting patterns, which are 
generally very localised.  In 1991 nearly half (44%) of 
men commuted less than 5 kms, 53% of full-time 
women and 70% of part-time women (Coombes et al. 
1997).  Yet the average radius of many TTWAs is 
over 10 kms and for some areas it is over 30 kms.  
Coombes et al. note that if TTWAs were defined in 
terms of manual workers’ commuting patterns, there 
would be substantially more of them. 
 
 
Concealing Local Concentrations of 
Unemployment   
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TTWAs for the major cities tend to be relatively large 
geographically, so they contain a very sizable share of 
the national workforce (Figure 1). The size 
distribution of the 60 Scottish TTWAs is so skewed 
that 42 of them each have less than 1% of the Scottish 
workforce while the largest three account for nearly 
half (47%).  The largest TTWAs conceal enormous 
diversity of labour market conditions and processes 
within them, because they incorporate many of the 
wealthiest and poorest areas in the country.   
 
They also reveal none of the differences between 
socio-economic groups such as car-borne commuters 
and public transport users, blue- and white-collar 
workers, men and women, and full- and part-time 
workers.  Many of these have widened over the last 
two decades as a result of growing job market 
fragmentation and social polarisation. 
 
Severe concentrations of unemployment in the inner 
cities and peripheral estates are obscured by averaging 
out unemployment over wide areas including 
neighbouring towns and prosperous suburbs.  The 
important contemporary phenomena of urban 
industrial decentralisation, selective outmigration and 
debates about environmental sustainability and 
greenfield versus brownfield development are 
concealed in the process.  Proper analysis, 
understanding and policy responses are all impaired 
as a result. 
 
The TTWA for Glasgow, for instance, encompasses 
the prosperous areas of Eastwood, Bearsden, 
Milngavie, Strathkelvin, Paisley, Cumbernauld and 
East Kilbride.  A recent study of the Geography of 
Poverty and Wealth (Green 1994) showed that the 
former local authority Districts of Bearsden & 
Milngavie and Eastwood are among the wealthiest 
localities in Britain in several respects, whereas 
Glasgow is one of the poorest. 
 
The Glasgow TTWA  reveals nothing of the stark 
contrasts between these prosperous outlying areas and 
sizable localities with very high unemployment within 
the City of Glasgow, such as the East End, 
Springburn, Easterhouse and Drumchapel.  The 
estimates of claimant unemployment rates for 
individual communities produced by the former 
Strathclyde Regional Council show that they ranged 
from only 4% in Gryffe (Renfrewshire) to over 20% 
in five areas of Glasgow (City Centre, Drumchapel, 
Springburn/Balornock, Easterhouse/ Garthamlock and 
Bridgeton/Dalmarnock) in January 1996.  None of 
this variation, by a factor of more than five over a 
distance of more than 13 miles, is captured by the 
TTWA unemployment rate.  These areas are not 
small; their labour forces range from 3,580 (City 
Centre) to 11,113 (Springburn/Balornock). 
 
As a result of this aggregation and concealment, 
economic development efforts are dissipated and 
attention is diverted from localities where jobs are 
needed most. 
 
In some cases the concealment problem affects whole 
districts.  The Glasgow City Council area with a 
population of 685,000 had an unemployment rate of 
16.3% in Winter 1995/96, double the GB average of 
8.2% and higher than for any major city outside 
London.  However, the rate for the Glasgow TTWA 
was only 9.0% at the time.(2)  Other districts with 
high unemployment concealed within large TTWAs 
are Motherwell, Monklands and Clydebank. 
 
Comparison of a map of unemployment rates by local 
authority district as recorded by the Census in April 
1991 with a map of the TTWA unemployment rates at 
the same date shows how the TTWA system makes 
the problems of the Clyde valley virtually disappear 
(Figures 2 and 3).  At the same time, it gives greater 
prominence to other areas as unemployment 
blackspots which have a comparatively small total 
number of claimant unemployed.  For instance, 
Cumnock and Sanquhar TTWA had only 2,748 
unemployed at April 1991, compared with Glasgow's 
55,165 and Motherwell's 9,861. 
 
Disturbingly, the differences between the TTWA map 
and the Census map of unemployment rates are due 
not only to aggregation effects but also to outright - 
and serious - errors in the TTWA rates. 
 
Errors in Unemployment Estimates 
 
It has traditionally been assumed that 'self-
containment' will ensure that there is a balance 
between commuting inflows and outflows in TTWAs. 
 This is not the case since levels of self-containment 
never reach 100% (they are below 75% in some 
cases).  Most areas naturally have an imbalance in 
commuting flows because they perform different 
economic and social functions.  Yet this creates 
systematic errors in unemployment estimates, 
depending on the scale of imbalance.   
 
TTWAs with net out-commuting, such as rural areas 
acting as a dormitory for proximate cities, have their 
unemployment overestimated.  In contrast, major 
employment centres tend to have their unemployment 
underestimated.  These errors have been found to be 
as much as 30% - the estimated error for the Peebles 
TTWA in 1991 (Webster, 1997). Figure 4 shows the 
geographical pattern of estimated errors for 1981; it 
should be borne in mind that the evidence suggests 
that increased commuting imbalances will have 
increased the size of many of the worst errors since 
then.  Even for 1981, TTWA unemployment rates 
would have been overestimated by as much as 20% in 
Crieff, 18% in Wick, 17% in Blairgowrie & Pitlochry,  
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17% in Buckie, 16% in Bathgate and 14% in Huntly.  
Conversely, unemployment would have been 
systematically underestimated for the cities of 
Edinburgh (9% underestimate), Glasgow (8%), 
Aberdeen (6%) and Dundee (4%), and for smaller 
employment centres such as Thurso, Inverness, 
Stirling, Perth and Dumfries. 
 
This problem was actually noticed a decade ago and 
some evidence given that certain areas had been 
incorrectly assigned to particular categories of 
Assisted Area status as a result (Green & Coombes 
1985).   
 
Errors are also created by the treatment of armed 
forces personnel.  In calculating the ‘workforce’ for 
each TTWA, they are not attributed to the areas in 
which they actually work, but are shared out between 
all the TTWAs pro rata according to the size of their 
workforces.  For the minority of TTWAs which have 
such personnel, this procedure results in an 
overestimation of the unemployment rate.  The 
outstanding example of this problem in Scotland is 
the Forres TTWA, which has the smallest labour 
force of all, but a military base (RAF Kinloss).   
Forres’s unemployment rate is also overestimated 
because out-commuting exceeds in-commuting.  The 
result of these two factors was to give Forres, with its 
542 claimants, the third highest unemployment rate 
among TTWAs in Scotland in January 1996.  This 
was spurious, as anyone who has visited this lovely 
area will know.  
 
Appropriate corrections for these errors have never 
been made to the official TTWA unemployment 
figures, nor has any ‘health warning’ been issued to 
their users.  
 
It is apparent that urban areas are penalised by the 
TTWA system on at least three counts.  Their 
TTWAs are particularly large and diverse so average 
unemployment rates mean little; errors understate 
their problems relative to surrounding dormitory 
areas; and localised concentrations are concealed.   
The bias has been compounded by the recent 
publication by ONS of unemployment rates for 
unitary authorities using the same hybrid method.   
Use of this method for areas that have large 
imbalances between in- and out-commuting has 
resulted in extreme overestimates for commuter areas 
of over 100% and underestimates for employment 
cores of over 30% (Webster, 1997). 
 
 
Defining Priority Areas 
 
TTWAs are also unsuitable for defining priority areas 
for policy, since the feasible travel-to-work distances 
of manual workers, who are most prone to 
unemployment, are much shorter than average.  They 
rely more on public transport, cannot afford to spend 
much on job searching and travel costs, and face 
stiffer competition for jobs the further away they look. 
 Definition of priority area boundaries should depend 
upon examination of the actual and potential travel-to-
work patterns of low skilled residents of 
disadvantaged areas, drawn from Census data or other 
sources such as transportation surveys, as well as 
details of planned public investment projects.  This 
would be more satisfactory than the current 
assumption that new jobs anywhere within the TTWA 
will benefit the poorest areas and residents. 
 
TTWA Data in Economic Research 
 
TTWA unemployment rates are often used in 
economic research, as a measure of local labour 
supply-demand imbalance or for other purposes.  It 
seems to have been generally assumed that although a 
degree of approximation is involved, these data are 
quite good enough.  Our examination of the size of 
the errors for the Scottish TTWAs leads us to 
challenge this assumption;  we doubt that these data 
would be much used if researchers were fully aware 
of the errors.  A further problem is the elimination of 
so much of the range of variation in unemployment by 
including so much of the labour force in a few large 
TTWAs (Figure 1).   This loss of variation would of 
course have to be accepted if it were really true that 
each TTWA represents an integrated local labour 
market;  it would then indeed be meaningless to 
subdivide it.  But we have already shown that this 
view is unsustainable. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
There is no such thing as a single set of mutually-
exclusive and self-contained labour market areas.   
TTWAs are arguably trying to serve too many 
purposes at once, which means doing none of them 
well.  It is becoming increasingly apparent that 
attempts to define them require far-reaching 
compromises which often result in large, unrealistic 
areas that are not very useful for policy or analytical 
purposes.  However, improvements in the Labour 
Force Survey now seem to offer the prospect of 
avoiding the large self-contained areas required by the 
hybrid method, as indeed is indicated by the ONS in 
its consultation paper.    
 
An obvious requirement expressed by many users is 
for unemployment data relating to smaller areas, and 
for at least two spatial scales:-   
 
  * One might be a regular set of unemployment 
rates for local authority districts, covering the whole 
country.  Local authority areas are larger and less 
irregular than such areas were before the 1974 
reforms (1964 in London).   
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  * This set of rates would still have the 
drawback of concealing concentrations of 
unemployment, especially within the larger local 
authority areas, such as Highland or Fife.  This 
problem could be met directly, by producing rates 
specifically for localised concentrations of 
unemployment (‘unemployment highspots’).  This 
would require a standardised definition and method of 
analysis, specifying minimum thresholds for both the 
size of areas and their unemployment rate.  These data 
would be primarily intended to assist in defining 
priority areas and targeting policy interventions.  It 
would therefore not be necessary to produce them on 
a monthly basis;  annual publication would probably 
be quite sufficient.   
 
Notes 
 
1. Details of the Review of Unemployment Statistics 
for Travel-to-Work Areas and Smaller Areas in 
the UK are available from ONS, B.4.12, 1 
Drummond Gate, London SW1V 2QQ, tel. 0171-
533 6113.  
 
2. The estimate for Glasgow City is from the Labour 
Force Survey and the TTWA figure from the 
claimant count, but the GB figure was the same 
for both sources at the time.  See Webster (1997). 
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The current state of British official unemployment statistics fully vindicates the concerns 
of the statisticians who launched Radical Statistics 27 years ago - “a common concern 
about the political implications of their work and an awareness of the actual and potential 
misuse of statistics”.  Indeed this is probably a more graphic example than any 
contemplated at that time, which was something of a golden age for British official 
statistics. 
 
The official statistics represent British unemployment as much lower than realistically it 
is, by concealing the scale of disguised unemployment.  They also misrepresent its 
geography, obscuring its high degree of concentration in the former industrial cities and 
coalfields.  These twin misrepresentations in turn obscure the scale of the impact of 
industrial job loss, and particularly of Britain’s exceptionally poor performance in 
manufacturing and of the disproportionate loss of manufacturing jobs from cities.  These 
basic misrepresentations have in turn made it easier, over the last few years, to deploy 
invalid job vacancy data to argue that employment opportunity is equally distributed 
throughout the country, although to its credit ONS has acted relatively quickly to attempt 
to prevent this particular misuse. 
 
The effect of these various misrepresentations is systematically to undermine the ability 
of the political system to produce relevant policy action, even though the present 
government has made unemployment a priority.   
 
The two issues of the level of unemployment, and its geography, are interlinked and it is 
difficult to understand one without the other.  It is best to start with the geography.   
 
How the statistical misrepresentations work - the geography of unemployment 
 
It is well known that the claimant count is misleadingly low.  It includes only people 
entitled to unemployment-related benefits;  it has been reduced substantially since the  
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1970s by successive administrative changes;  and very large numbers of unemployed 
people have moved out of “unemployment” into other categories, particularly sickness.   
Nevertheless, because it is a count rather than a sample, claimant unemployment delivers 
usable information about every area.  More important, it is generally a good guide to the 
relative level of unemployment between areas.  In this respect it does not differ much 
from the ILO measure, which includes people looking for work but not entitled to 
unemployment-related benefits.  Across local authority areas, the correlation between the 
two measures is 0.88.   
 
At January 2001 claimant unemployment varied across the 408 local authorities in Great 
Britain by a factor of 30, from 0.4% in Mole Valley, Surrey to 11.8% in Knowsley on 
Merseyside (Webster 2001a).  Not only are these differentials very great;  they are almost 
completely static.  The correlation across local authorities between Census 
unemployment in April 1991 and claimant unemployment in July 2000 was 0.92.  In 
other words, with few exceptions, if an area had high unemployment a decade ago then it 
still has high unemployment now.  There has been little or no “convergence” in terms of 
rankings. 
 
MAPS 1A and 1B show the geography of claimant unemployment in England and 
Scotland at January 2000.  The categories have been chosen to distinguish areas with an 
average level, those with more than double or less than half the average, and those in 
between.  The areas with more than double the national rate are mainly industrial 
conurbations, including inner east and south London, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Liverpool, Hull, Tyneside, Teesside, Glasgow, Clydebank and Dundee.  Over 90% of all 
the unemployed people living in areas with unemployment more than double the national 
average are found in cities;  because these are populous areas, the number of people 
involved is very large.  Some seaside areas are also relatively bad, partly because in 
January their unemployment is seasonally high.   
 
The pattern of unemployment in MAPS 1A and 1B is quite different from that shown by 
the ONS statistics for local authorities and parliamentary constituencies published in the 
official Labour Market Trends.  The latter, introduced from 1996, use an invalid 
denominator compounded of unemployed people who live in the area and employed 
people who work in it but often live elsewhere.  The resulting figures have no meaning 
and cannot validly be used for any purpose, as indeed was recognised by the Department 
of Employment (DE) and its predecessors and clearly stated in print in 1960, 1968, 1978 
and 1979.  In the present context, their most important feature is that they greatly 
understate unemployment in the cities, precisely where the problem is greatest.  For 
instance, in the Glasgow area they regularly make the prosperous suburb of East 
Renfrewshire appear to have a higher unemployment rate than the city itself.  This is 
because cities have net in-commuting, so that the resident unemployed are shown as a 
percentage of an employed workforce which is inflated by people working in the area but 
resident elsewhere. 
 
Because the invalidity of the “workforce” rates is so blatant, one might hope that they 
would be widely ignored.  Unfortunately this is not the case.  Journalists take them from  
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“NOMIS” (which does not carry an effective health warning) and they are used regularly 
even in heavyweight papers such as the Financial Times.  No newspaper has adopted a 
policy of not using them.  Also, individual local authorities often quote these rates when 
it is in their interest to do so:  being able to say, for instance, that the area has “the 
highest unemployment rate in Scotland” is useful in arguing for resources.  Even a local 
authority consortium such as SLIMS (Strathclyde Labour Market Information Service) 
feels obliged to carry the figures.   
 
The misrepresentation created by the “workforce” rates is mitigated by the publication of 
International Labour Office (ILO) rates, produced from the Labour Force Survey, for 
local authority areas.  These do show very high rates in the cities.  But the ILO rates only 
partly undo the damage because they are available quarterly for only about 30 authorities 
and annually for 120, and the figures have substantial sampling errors for individual 
years and quarters.   
 
In practice, also, government departments do actually use the “workforce” rates.  One 
recent use was in the recent review of UK Assisted Areas, as one of four indicators to 
select eligible wards (some subsequent adjustments did not alter the fundamental 
methodology) (DTI 1999).  Since one of the other indicators was the percentage of 
manufacturing employment, with more manufacturing treated as an indicator of 
economic weakness, the overall effect was to divert Regional Selective Assistance away 
from cities with high unemployment to areas such as new towns with relatively low 
unemployment.   
 
Another use was by HM Treasury (2000) in attempting to construct an argument that 
high unemployment in the inner London “scimitar” could not be due to lack of labour 
demand because “two of the ten areas of lowest unemployment in the country” - the 
Cities of London and of Westminster - also lay nearby.  Both are very badly affected by 
the errors in the “workforce” rates, having respectively 109 times and 6 times as many 
workers as employed residents in 1991 (Webster 2000b).  Westminster was shown as 
having 1.1% unemployment in July 1999, but the true resident rate was actually about 
6.2%, well above the national average.  The City of London’s rate was shown as “0.0”, 
its 94 unemployed claimants being swamped by the huge in-commuting “workforce”, but 
its true rate was about 3.6%, below the national average but nowhere near the lowest 10.   
 
A further use by HM Treasury, with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), in 
connection with lone parenthood, will be discussed below.   
 
Since Summer 2001, ONS has been reviewing the “workforce” rates using a working 
group with external membership.  It is understood that it will now move to withdraw 
them, although no public announcement has yet been made.  To its credit, the Scottish 
Executive has already parted company from Whitehall during the past 2 years, by largely 
replacing the “workforce” rates with its own rates using as denominator estimates of 
economically active persons derived from the LFS. 
 
“Travel to Work Areas” (TTWAs)  
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A further misrepresentation of the geography of unemployment arises from the use of 
“Travel to Work Areas” (TTWAs) to report claimant unemployment.  It remains the case 
that no sub-regional claimant unemployment data are available for any date prior to April 
1996 for any geography other than TTWAs, and many researchers are forced to use them. 
 But TTWAs misrepresent the extent of local labour markets for the kind of people who 
are unemployed, conceal city concentrations of unemployment within larger areas, and 
understate unemployment for areas containing cities (Thomas 1998a, Webster & Turok 
1997).  
 
The “workforce” methodology which produces the invalid local authority and 
parliamentary constituency “rates” was invented in the 1920s as the only practical way of 
using the primitive data sources and information technology then available to produce 
approximate local unemployment estimates, originally for labour exchange areas in the 
Ministry of Labour’s Local Unemployment Index of 1927-39 (Garside 1980).  TTWAs 
were first developed in the 1950s to reduce the inaccuracies in the “workforce” rates by 
grouping labour exchange areas where necessary to produce areas which had a 
reasonable balance of in- and out-commuting, or (less accurately) were “self-contained”. 
  
 
However, when TTWAs were put on to a systematic basis in 1968, the criterion of self-
containment was pursued at the expense of internal cohesion.  In other words, two places 
could be put in the same TTWA even if there was little or no commuting between them, 
as long as there was little commuting between either of them and other places.  The claim 
that they constitute “approximations to local labour markets” has therefore always been 
spurious.  With the growth of long distance white collar commuting into city centres, 
TTWAs centred on cities have become very large  - indeed, even in 1961, the 
methodology was incapable of producing an unemployment rate for Greater London.  
Most of the important concentrations of unemployment have consequently been 
concealed.   
 
ONS has not yet reformed DE’s practice of concealing the errors in the TTWA rates from 
users.  Commuting patterns are such that it is impossible to devise any mutually 
exclusive set of TTWAs of which a large number do not have serious imbalances 
between in- and out-commuting and therefore large errors in the resulting unemployment 
rates.  Of the 297 current (1998) TTWAs in Great Britain, on the basis of the 1991 
Census data used in their compilation, 60 had their July 1998 unemployment rate 
misstated by 0.5 percentage points or more.  It is cities whose TTWA rates are most often 
understated.   
 
Although estimates of these errors have been independently published (Green & 
Coombes 1985; Webster 1999), the Employment Gazette and Labour Market Trends have 
discussed the existence of this type of error only in general terms and have never carried 
any warning about particular TTWAs for which the errors are likely to be serious.  As a 
result, certain places appear to have received government grant aid in respect of their 
purported unemployment which they should not have done.     
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There is also a longstanding problem about the treatment of armed forces personnel.  In 
calculating the "workforce" for each TTWA, they are shared out between all the TTWAs 
pro rata to the size of their workforces.  Most TTWAs have no armed forces personnel, 
but for the minority which do, this procedure results in an overestimation of the 
unemployment rate.  The outstanding example of this problem used to be the Forres 
TTWA, whose labour force was the smallest in Scotland but which had a major military 
base (RAF Kinloss), as well as an excess of out-commuting over in-commuting. The 
result was to give Forres the third highest TTWA unemployment rate in Scotland at 
January 1996, and entitlement to government grants to address its supposed 
unemployment.  However the Forres "unemployment blackspot" never existed.  The 
Forres TTWA was merged into a larger area in 1998, but the problem still remains to a 
significant degree in this and other areas. 
 
TTWAs and “workforce” rates have caused widespread damage to research on 
unemployment, both through their undisclosed errors and, in the case of TTWAs, by 
washing out variation within a small number of overlarge TTWAs accounting for a large 
share of the population.  Many regression studies which have come up with the finding 
that local labour demand is not an important factor in unemployment, cannot be trusted 
for these reasons.  Similarly, the purported investigation of  geographical mismatch as a 
factor in unemployment by Layard et al. (1991, p.310) will have substantially 
underestimated mismatch, consequently giving too much support to the authors’ “supply-
side” view.   
   
How the statistical misrepresentations work - the level of unemployment 
 
Under pressure particularly from the Royal Statistical Society (RSS), the present 
government in 1997 gave “preferred” status to the ILO measure of unemployment.  This 
gives numerically a much higher figure than the claimant count - 0.61m greater at 
Autumn 2001.  The switch has not resolved the problem of understatement of 
unemployment.  This is partly because the government and Bank of England have 
subsequently taken to using the claimant count to make unqualified historical 
comparisons of the type “unemployment is now the lowest for a generation”, ostensibly 
because the ILO measure is not available on the same basis prior to 1984.  These 
comparisons are invalid because claimant unemployment does not mean the same now as 
it did in the 1970s.  However, this is not the main issue, which is that the ILO measure 
itself is now very misleading.  In Britain and many other countries, it excludes large 
numbers of people who on any reasonable view are unemployed. 
 
Government Trainees 
 
The ILO definition treats people on government training schemes for the unemployed as 
being employed.  But if they were not unemployed, they would not be on a training 
scheme.  This treatment both reduces the ILO figure, and distorts the geographical 
pattern.  FIGURE 1, based on analysis of unpublished LFS data for 1998 and 1999, 
shows that the proportion of the “economically active” (i.e. employed or unemployed)  
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who are on government schemes is greater, the higher is the level of unemployment.  At 
the lowest levels of unemployment, adding those on government schemes would raise the 
ILO unemployment rate by under 0.5%;  but at the highest level, it would add almost 
1.0%.  The LFS is known to undercount the number of people on schemes, by about half. 
 So these figures should be approximately doubled.  
 
“Discouraged Workers” 
 
To be ILO unemployed, a person must be looking for work.  But what about people who 
want a job but have given up looking because they have decided the search is hopeless?  
There is international agreement that such “discouraged workers” - those who are not 
looking because they believe there are no suitable jobs available in their area - are really 
unemployed.  FIGURE 1 shows that these workers’ views of their prospects are quite 
realistic:  there are a lot more of them in high than in low unemployment areas.  They 
would add only 0.2% to the ILO unemployment rate in the latter but over 0.5% in the 
former areas.  
 
Together, government trainees and discouraged workers would add about 0.7% to the 
ILO unemployment rate in low unemployment, and around 1.5% in high unemployment 
areas.  These figures would rise to around 1.0% and 2.0% respectively when allowance is 
made for undercounting of government trainees.  These are significant amounts. 
 
Unemployment disguised as sickness 
 
Most of those discouraged by the state of their local labour market are to be found in the 
category of sickness.  The evidence that a very large number of unemployed people in 
Britain are disguised as sick is very strong. 
 
  1. Aggregate comparisons over time show a large increase in sickness in Britain 
which it is generally agreed cannot be explained by real change in health (NAO 1989; 
Gregg 1994;  MacKay 1999;  Fothergill 2001;  HM Treasury 2001;  Nickell & Quintini 
2001).  FIGURE 2 shows the huge increase of 1.6m since the later 1970s in the number 
of people claiming long term sickness benefits.  Since 1996, the number of men claiming 
has begun to fall again, but the number of women is still rising and overall by February 
2001 there had been a fall of only 53,000 from the peak.  HM Treasury (2001) 
exaggerates the fall by pointing to Incapacity Benefit (IB) claims, when the real growth 
appears to be in the Disability Premium to Income Support.  
 
  2. The UK has the highest rate of working age sickness of all 15 European Union 
(EU) countries.  The UK rate of 7.0% compares with only 2.1% in Germany and 0.3% in 
France.  FIGURE 3 shows that, as commentators frequently point out, Britain compares 
favourably with the rest of the EU in terms of ILO unemployment, with 8 countries 
having a higher rate.  But if the working age sick were to be added to the unemployed, 
Britain would become the third worst, after Finland and Spain.   
 
  3. Labour market accounts for the coalfields by Beatty et al. (1997) and for the  
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cities by Turok & Edge (1999) and Bailey & Turok (2000), as well as a longitudinal 
study of coalminers by Fieldhouse & Hollywood (1999), have shown that for a high 
proportion of people affected by job losses, the consequence is not unemployment but 
economic inactivity, often sickness.  Recent longitudinal analysis of the LFS (Young 
2001, Figure 7) suggests that the propensity of the unemployed to move into inactivity 
rose steadily during the 1990s, from about 8% to 13% per quarter, while Erdem & Glyn 
(2001) separately show that employment rates for the least qualified quartile of men in 
the north and west of Britain continued to fall during the 1990s upswing even though 
unemployment rates were falling.  
 
  4. The levels of sickness of the inactive sick are often similar to those of many 
people who are classed as employed or unemployed.  In the 1991 Census, there were 
1.286m people who had a self-reported limiting long term illness (LLTI) and were 
inactive due to permanent sickness.  But there were also 0.701m employed people, 
0.185m unemployed, 0.027m government trainees and 0.403m other inactive who had a 
LLTI.  Surveys of male IB claimants (Beatty & Fothergill 1999) indicate that only one 
quarter (25%) say they cannot do any work, while two thirds (69%) say there are some 
types of work they cannot do.  Among Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants, the 
corresponding figures are 2% and 20%.  Of course it is well established that prolonged 
unemployment does itself worsen people’s health (Bartley 1994, Shaw et al. 1999), and 
this must to some extent reduce the capacity of the long-term workless to return to work. 
 This is particularly the case where, as in Britain, benefit levels are low (Sinfield 2001, 
Strandh 2001).  But the evidence suggests that most sick workless people remain capable 
of taking jobs should they become available. 
 
  5. There is a strong correlation across local authority areas (0.72 at May 1999) 
between the claimant unemployment rate and the proportion of the working age 
population claiming sickness or invalidity benefits (FIGURE 4).  The areas with the 
highest sickness are former coal and steel towns where occupational illnesses probably 
are very high.  But even in areas without such obvious problems, there are remarkably 
high levels of sickness.  The DWP statistics show that 15-20% of the working age 
population of the big cities of Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester are claiming sickness 
benefits.  The gravity of the situation is obvious to local observers such as Alan Sinclair 
of the Wise Group who commented that government unemployment figures for areas of 
industrial decline are “hopelessly wrong”.  “In Glasgow, we talk about 22,000 people 
being unemployed.  The figure is easily closer to 86,000” (The Herald, 23 June 2000).  
John Robertson MP, whose constituency includes Drumchapel, commented “The 
officially defined unemployed form only 16 per cent of the total….in (Glasgow)” 
(Hansard, 30 January 2002, col.398).  In Glasgow there has been no fall at all in the 
number of sickness benefit claimants since figures became available in November 1998, 
in spite of a considerable upturn in the local labour market. 
 
  6. Beatty & Fothergill (1999) and Beatty et al. (2000) explain why movement of 
unemployed people on to sickness benefits is likely to be caused by the financial 
incentives created by the social security system.  For those who have a medical condition 
enabling them to claim either JSA or sickness benefits, the latter will normally be the  
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better option.  This differential results from the strong belief of British policymakers, 
which took hold during the 1980s at the urging of supply-side economists such as 
Richard Layard, that unemployment benefits ought to be kept as low as possible in order 
to encourage people to move to employment.  Sickness benefits, though scarcely 
generous, have not been affected in the same way.  In this respect British policy is 
different from that of France and Germany, which have continued broadly to share 
Beveridge’s view that unemployment is as much a misfortune as is sickness.  It does not 
appear to have occurred to the British advocates of lower unemployment benefits that 
people might respond rationally (as economists say they should) by moving to sickness 
benefits instead of jobs, where the latter are unavailable. 
 
Beatty & Fothergill (1999) showed using individual level regression analysis that receipt 
of an occupational pension was a significant predictor of an IB rather than JSA claim.  
This was explained by the fact that because JSA is means-tested, it removed the benefit 
of the pension, whereas IB was non-means tested.   
 
A local authority level regression analysis by the present author adds further evidence 
that the social security system itself is responsible for pushing unemployed people on to 
sickness benefits (Webster 2001b).  The proportion of the working age population on 
sickness benefits at May 1999 can be explained to a significant extent by variations in the 
local level of social housing rents and council tax as well as lowest decile earnings and 
unemployment. The likely explanation is that because sickness benefits are counted as 
income for the purpose of calculating entitlement to Housing and Council Tax Benefit, 
fewer people in areas with high rents and council tax will gain financially from a move 
on to sickness benefits from JSA (or the gains will be smaller).  This appears to be the 
main explanation why London boroughs have so much lower a proportion of their 
working age populations on sickness benefits than would be expected from their level of 
unemployment (FIGURE 4).   
 
Similar effects operate in other countries.  In relation to the Netherlands, Broersma 
(2000) notes that “People above 57 years old are no longer included in (the ILO) figure 
since 1983.  Since then, these unemployed persons were no longer obliged to search 
actively for a job.....This explains the odd phenomenon that more people get an 
unemployment benefit payment than there are unemployed.  By now, there are twice as 
many recipients as there are registered unemployed”.  In the USA, Autor & Duggan 
(2001) show that the large increase in disability benefit claims, especially among 
unqualified people, since 1984 is strongly related to a rise in the value of the benefits 
relative to relevant earnings, and to relaxed criteria for benefit award.  They estimate that 
this has reduced the measured aggregate unemployment rate by at least 0.65 of a 
percentage point.  The processes involved have been similar to those in Britain, although 
the proportions of the labour force involved in Britain appear to be some 50% greater 
than in the USA (Autor & Duggan 2001, Nickell & Quintini 2001). 
 
  7. It is well known that the DE for many years actively promoted the transfer of 
unemployed people on to sickness benefits in order to reduce the recorded level of 
unemployment.  Such reclassification actually formed part of the performance targets of  
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the Employment Service, being treated as a “positive outcome”. 
 
  8. At Spring 2000 just over a third (34.1%) of the 2.3m working age inactive sick 
in Great Britain said they wanted to work.  As a proportion of the UK working age 
population, this is more people than are inactive sick in total in Germany or France.  If 
these people were counted as unemployed, they would add 2.7 percentage points to the 
UK ILO rate, bringing it to the same level as Germany.  However this almost certainly 
underestimates the extent of disguised unemployment among the sick.  Beatty & 
Fothergill (1999, pp.29-30) noticed in their surveys that the more unfavourable the state 
of the local labour market, the lower the proportion of men on IB who said they wanted 
to work.  The LFS evidence confirms this effect in relation to the inactive sick as a 
whole.  In 1998-99 the proportion of the inactive sick wanting to work was about 39% in 
the lowest unemployment areas, but only around 33% in the highest unemployment areas 
(FIGURE 5).  In other words there is a “discouragement” effect among the inactive sick 
as well as among the officially recognised “discouraged workers”.   
 
Even without making any allowance for this discouragement effect, adding the long term 
sick wanting work to the ILO unemployed would raise the ILO rate by 1.5% in the lowest 
unemployment areas, rising to 4.2% in the highest unemployment areas.  The differential 
is large because although discouragement is greater in the high unemployment areas, the 
number of long term sick is very much greater.  This brings the total undercount in the 
ILO rate - including government trainees, “discouraged” workers and the long-term sick 
wanting work - to about 2.5% in the lowest unemployment areas, rising to over 6% in the 
highest unemployment areas.  This latter figure by itself is greater than the UK official 
average ILO rate (4.9% at Spring 2001).   Adjustment for the discouragement effect 
among the sick would raise the level in the high unemployment areas still further. 
 
ONS, Eurostat, the ILO Rate, and Sickness 
 
Unfortunately no official agency has yet been prepared to concede that measured ILO 
unemployment rates are affected by the incentives created by different national social 
security systems to move into other differing categories of worklessness.  ONS, Eurostat 
and the other governmental agencies all claim that ILO rates are comparable between 
countries.  It is true is that ILO rates are estimated using the same procedure in each 
country.  But following the same procedure in different circumstances does not 
necessarily produce comparable results.  Beatty et al. (2000) say “because of the 
interaction with recorded sickness, conventional measures of unemployment are 
distorted.  The distortion varies...from place to place, and probably from country to 
country as well...(it) applies...to the supposedly standardized...(ILO) measure...the 
probability is that vast sums of Objective 2 aid will be misallocated between regions and 
between Member States on the basis of flawed statistics.  Countries where the ILO 
unemployed represent an unusually low share of the broader unemployed are likely to 
lose out.  The UK falls into this category...in the UK the diversion into recorded sickness 
has been especially pronounced”. 
 
A “Want Work Rate” (WWR) can be derived from the LFS.  It is the sum of the ILO  
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unemployed and the economically inactive wanting work divided by the sum of all those 
in work or wanting work.  It has some technical problems (Webster 2001b), but is a 
useful summary measure of the UK’s overall worklessness from both a time series and an 
international perspective.  
 
FIGURE 10 shows that the WWR in Britain is now much higher at over 12% than it was 
before the severe recessions of the 1980s and 1990s.  By 1999 it had not fallen back even 
to the level of 1990, let alone that of 1981 or before.  The UK’s male WWR is the joint 
fourth highest in the EU, and its both-sex WWR in the highest unemployment regions is 
similar to that in the Italian south, rural Spain and the former East Germany.   
 
In 1999, France had almost exactly the same WWR as the UK (13.0% compared to 
12.9%).  But France counts 91% of people not in work but wanting work as ILO 
unemployed, compared to the UK’s 44%.  This, together with the evidence cited earlier, 
strongly suggests that France is much better off in labour market terms than the UK.  
Because it has held on to the Beveridge principle of adequate unemployment benefits, it 
has maintained its unemployed people in a state of greater social inclusion and better 
health;  and, whether overall worklessness is compared in terms of the WWR or of the 
sum of the ILO unemployed and the working age sick, this has led to a true rate of 
unemployment which appears to be no worse than Britain’s and may well be better.  
 
However, by declining to look at overall worklessness rather than at the ILO 
unemployment rate, British official and academic commentators currently give a self-
deceiving picture in which the UK is presented as having a particularly successful labour 
market record compared to other countries.  The high levels of male inactivity due to 
sickness are presented as an incidental anomaly or “imbalance” which is not directly 
related to economic performance.  The key text here is Nickell & Quintini (2001);  the 
weaknesses in their argument are discussed in Webster (2001c).  The same line of 
argument is used by the Treasury and DWP in HM Treasury (2001).  
 
Misuse of vacancy data 
 
During the last 2-3 years there has been an attempt by the government to argue that there 
is no shortage of jobs anywhere in Britain.  This has depended on misuse of job vacancy 
data, in order to sidestep the evidence on the geographical concentration of worklessness 
by suggesting that there are enough vacancies to employ all the unemployed and that 
these vacancies are sufficiently evenly distributed across the country to deal with 
geographical concentrations.  HM Treasury (2000) is the principal text arguing this case, 
but there was also an important 4-part story (“Jobs for the boys, but the boys don’t want 
jobs”;  “Tough Love:  Brown is right to clamp down on the workshy”) placed as an 
“exclusive” in the London Times of 7 February 2000 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and based on an apparent surge in vacancies in the north east which was due to distortion 
by the trial of the Employment Direct scheme.  ONS has now suspended the job vacancy 
series, precisely because of this distortion (Financial Times, 12/9/01), although DWP has 
insisted on continuing to use it.  The weaknesses of the government argument are 
discussed in detail in Webster (2000b).  However, the same type of argument was still  
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being made, in a more muted way, by the Treasury and DWP as recently as last 
November (HM Treasury 2001). 
 
Not all of the government argument on vacancies depends on misuse of statistics.  In part, 
it is simple misunderstanding.  One key point lies in a neglect of the different vacancy 
characteristics of different economic sectors:  many services have higher turnover than 
traditional industries.  The other important misconception - brought out in Codjoe (2001) 
- is based on lack of understanding of the spatial structure of local labour markets.  It is 
argued that because high levels of vacancies are found in cities alongside high levels of 
unemployment, the unemployment cannot be due to lack of labour demand.  But for the 
most part these vacancies merely represent turnover among the commuter workforce.  
Most British cities have central business districts with numerous, mainly white collar 
vacancies.  This is why it is often true that “areas of high unemployment lie within easy 
travelling distance of areas where vacancies are plentiful”.  But the vacancies have to be 
set against the labour force in the city’s whole commuting catchment area.  Interestingly, 
comparisons of vacancies with unemployment are one of the few exercises for which 
TTWAs are in principle the correct geography (Webster 2000b;  see also Webster 
2000c). 
 
Lone Parenthood 
 
As a result of lack of attention to the geography of worklessness, as well as specific 
errors in the statistics, academics and officials have generally failed to grasp the crucially 
important relationship between unemployment and lone parenthood. 
 
There is now overwhelming evidence that the huge rise of British lone parenthood since 
the early 1980s has been caused by the huge increase in male unemployment.  This was a 
repeat of what had occurred earlier in the USA and had been quickly understood there by 
analysts such as Moynihan, Wilson and McLanahan & Garfinkel.  Men without jobs are 
not, in the main, wanted as long-term partners.   The British evidence is summarised in 
Webster (2000a), Holtermann et al. (1999), McKay & Rowlingson (1998), Gordon 
(1996) and Bradshaw et al. (1996).  All of these papers were published after the present 
government, in opposition, worked out its policies, during 1993-95, in the first years of 
the Blair/Brown ascendancy and immediately after the Social Justice Commission report 
(1993).  Lone parenthood can only be thoroughly studied using the Census, and at that 
time no systematic analyses of the 1991 Census results were available.  Throughout its 
first term, the government focused on implementation of its preconceived policies, and it 
is only since June 2001 that some rethinking has started.  This has not yet reached the 
areas of lone parenthood, or welfare, employment and economic policy more generally.  
Consequently the government is burdened with a view of the lone parenthood problem 
which is - because of the Census data delays - approaching two decades out of date. 
 
A graphic example of the difficulties in the analysis of lone parenthood caused by errors 
in the unemployment statistics is contained in HM Treasury (2001).  Understatement of 
the closeness of the relationship between lone parenthood and unemployment enables the 
paper to avoid facing up to its causal nature.  It describes the doubling of lone parent  
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families between the late 1970s and mid 1990s as “demographic” (3.20), i.e. independent 
of the economy.  But the paper uses “workforce” unemployment rates instead of valid 
residence-based rates (which could perfectly well have been constructed for the purpose). 
 According to Chart 3.16, there is a correlation of 0.73 across GB local authority areas of 
lone parents on Income Support (expressed as a percentage of the working age 
population) with the local unemployment rate.  But when the unemployment rate is 
corrected to be a true resident rate, the correlation turns out to be much higher, at 0.83 
(FIGURE 11).  The LFS data show that the very strong relationship between lone 
parenthood and unemployment across local authorities did not weaken between 1991 and 
2000 (FIGURE 7).  
 
The government sees the rise of lone parenthood as something which occurred in parallel 
with the rise of unemployment but not because of it.  Misled like the former government 
of New Zealand (Goodger 1998) by spurious analysis, it has entertained the arguments of 
the US Right that lone parenthood has been encouraged by welfare benefits.  This was 
the reason for its removal of lone parent benefits in December 1997, now seen as a key 
mistake of its first term.  It still believes that welfare benefits for lone parents must not be 
raised to levels which would eradicate child poverty in this group, instead believing that 
an answer can be found by pushing and pulling lone parents into work through measures 
such as WFTC and “work-focused interviews”.  
 
The fact that lone parenthood rose closely in line with unemployment across areas means 
that this approach cannot work.  It was loss of jobs from the affected areas which caused 
family breakdown;  this same loss of jobs means that local labour demand is too weak to 
re-employ the large numbers of lone parents involved, even if this was the right approach 
(in fact re-employing the fathers ought to have much higher priority).  Performance data 
on WFTC is already demonstrating this.  While the overall rate of claim has increased in 
all areas, the increase over Family Credit at August 2001 was 20% of lone parent families 
in the lowest unemployment areas, compared to 10% in the highest unemployment areas 
(FIGURE 9 – details of methodology in Webster 2001d).  This relative position reflects 
the fact that the proportion of lone parents in work was already twice as high in the 
lowest as in the highest unemployment areas, again a position which was unchanged 
between 1991 and 2000 even though the proportion in work rose by around 10% across 
the board (FIGURE 8).  The reality is that without a major increase in labour demand in 
the areas where the bulk of them live, not enough lone parents can be got into work to 
make subsidised employment a viable strategy to address child poverty.  To attain the 
government’s target of a 70% employment rate for lone parents in the next decade would 
require negligible further increase in the most prosperous areas, but a virtual doubling in 
the poorest areas - an increase three times greater than in the last decade. 
 
Failure to register the connection between lone parenthood and unemployment has 
created major problems in official demographic forecasting.  For instance, the official 
Scottish Executive 1998-based projections for Glasgow, based on blind extrapolation of 
past trends, imply a doubling of the current number of lone parent families over the next 
10 years.  This would be a social catastrophe if it were to occur.  But it is extremely 
unlikely.  Because unemployment topped out in the mid-1990s, so did lone parenthood  
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and the current trend is of no increase over a figure one third lower than the 1998 base 
assumed in the projections.   
 
 
 
The consequences 
 
The evidence clearly indicates that Britain has a huge problem of unemployment, 
associated with massive problems of working age sickness and family breakdown, all 
heavily concentrated in areas of industrial decline and caused by a collapse in demand for 
labour caused by that decline (Webster 1998, 2000b, 2001b).  But Whitehall policy 
makers, most academics, and influential sections of the public, are caught in a vicious 
circle.  The various statistical misrepresentations have strengthened the views of "supply-
side" theorists of unemployment.  In so far as the role of deindustrialisation and labour 
demand deficiency is acknowledged at all, it is in terms of a non-spatial decline in the 
demand for “low skilled” labour rather than in the demand for labour overall.  This 
perspective in turn has undermined interest in realistic description of the geographical 
pattern of unemployment at sub-regional level, and made it more difficult to reform the 
statistics.   
 
There is excessive emphasis on supply-side labour market policies aimed in a blanket 
way at all the workless.  These are being pursued at the expense both of urgently needed 
investment in physical infrastructure in areas of industrial decline, and of policies for 
those with genuine labour market handicaps, who have suffered from the withdrawal of 
properly funded programmes such as the Community Programme which previously 
targeted them.  There is too little emphasis on urban and regional policy, leading to a 
combination of excessive labour market tightness in prosperous areas such as the outer 
south east and excessive looseness in areas such as Glasgow (RSA 2001).  Most 
fundamentally, the adverse effects of the decline of manufacturing are being greatly 
underestimated. This decline has been far greater than in other OECD countries; Bob 
Rowthorn notes that since 1973, British and US manufacturing output have increased by 
14% and 114% respectively (Rowthorn 2001; see also Rowthorn 2000).  Consequently, 
overvaluation of the pound is seen as less serious than it is, other policies are 
insufficiently supportive towards manufacturing, and there is too much emphasis on 
monetary as against fiscal policy in managing the economy.   
 
It is hard to see the current set of official policies being effective.  Significantly, Nickell 
& Quintini (2001) are pessimistic about the prospects for the problem of male working 
age sickness.   
 
Why are the official unemployment statistics so misleading? 
 
What are the reasons why British official statistics have come to present such a 
misleading picture of the country’s unemployment problem? 
 
Clearly there are some technical factors at work.  To a considerable extent we are dealing  
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with a novel problem.  There has never previously been such a large group of people 
claiming sickness benefits who in other respects appear to be unemployed;  hence the 
problem of measurement is a new one.  Since this problem emerged only in the mid-
1980s, both in the UK and in other countries such as the USA and the Netherlands, it was 
not unreasonable in 1984 to adopt an ILO definition which did not take account of it.  
Similarly, the problem of defining local labour markets has been greatly exacerbated by 
the huge increase in long distance commuting over the last 40 years;  1961 TTWAs were 
not nearly so bad as those defined in 1998.  Technology has also been a problem.  It is 
difficult to resolve the problems in the local official unemployment series without full 
postcoding of data, which was only introduced in 1993 (although underfunding may have 
played a part here).   
 
Bureaucratic inertia has also played an important part, particularly in the TTWA system 
which has evolved over three quarters of a century.  Inertia has been greatly increased by 
the Whitehall convention of giving “ownership” of statistics to individual departments - 
in this case the DE.  The ILO, OECD and Eurostat, who must share responsibility, also 
appear strongly affected by inertia.  In the case of ILO rates, ONS has succumbed to the 
temptation noted by Thomas (1998b), of claiming that conformity to an international 
standard of itself guarantees statistical integrity, whether or not the statistic actually 
contribute to understanding the conditions of society.  
 
However, these are not full explanations.  Some of the worst misrepresentations are of 
recent origin, with the “workforce” statistics dating only from 1996.  And it can scarcely 
be an accident that the misrepresentations taken together are such as to advance a 
particular supply-side view, namely that UK economic performance has been good, the 
loss of manufacturing does not matter, and worklessness is primarily due to deficiencies 
in the workforce or in the social security system rather than to decisions by investors or 
the government. 
 
The role of the Thatcher administrations was fundamental.  Margaret Thatcher was quite 
open in her disbelief in the value of an independent civil service.  She regarded it as part 
of an outdated establishment which had to be overthrown.  Famously, appointments and 
retirements were used to install people of whom it could be said that they were “one of 
us”.  The internal climate within the civil service became intellectually repressive;  this 
became clear when after a year or two of John Major’s premiership, civil servants 
privately started commenting with relief on the disappearance of what they called the 
“thought police”.  Thatcher’s own thoughts on unemployment were remarkably simplistic 
(Thatcher 1993).  Although she was told about the role of the high pound under Geoffrey 
Howe (p.52), she preferred to explain it in terms of excessive wage rises (p.52), 
demographic factors increasing the labour force (p.154), overmanning and inefficiency, 
strikes, technological change, changes in the pattern of world trade, the international 
recession (p.292) and “council estate culture” (p.671).  In this climate, statistical work in 
government was not going to get very far if it pointed to the role of deindustrialisation in 
promoting unemployment.   
 
Thatcher thought that recovery could be achieved by reducing government (p.148) and  
 
 
 
15
among the reductions were huge cuts in the government statistical service, whose staffing 
was reduced by 53% over her first decade, with “employment etc” cut by 78% (RSS 
1990).  These followed the 1980 Rayner review of the government statistical service.  
Muriel Nissel, in an article commissioned but then dropped from Social Trends as too 
controversial (Nissel 1995), explained the hugely damaging impact which Rayner and the 
associated political changes had on government statistics.  Rayner introduced the doctrine 
that “in general there is no more reason for government to act as universal provider in the 
statistical field than in any other”.  The idea of a general duty to inform public debate was 
replaced by the notion that statistics had to have a paying customer, either the 
government itself or an outside group with the money to buy them.  In relation to 
government statistics, the public were reduced to the status of onlookers through a 
“window”.    
 
Nissel pointed out that statistics divisions within departments were made to focus more 
narrowly on immediate policy needs, statisticians became more cautious, material was 
more carefully screened before going outside and policy branches were given more 
influence over the statisticians.  Overall, the status of statisticians within government was 
greatly lowered.  Nissel singled out DE in particular as insisting on changes to an article 
about unemployment in Social Trends, which failed in those years adequately to disclose 
growing inequality, largely resulting from higher unemployment.   
 
At the same time, the efforts of DE and the Employment Service came to be directed very 
substantially towards the concealment of unemployment.  The junior Employment 
minister Alan Clark, writing in relation to 1983, reveals a good deal in referring to “these 
tacky schemes to get people off the Register” (Clark 1994, p.22), although he does not 
suggest manipulation of the statistics as such.  
 
As Nissel notes, there was a gradual relaxation under John Major.  But the effects of the 
Thatcher period are still powerful today, not least because very little new money has 
come into the government statistical service and much of that has been tied to a policy 
agenda, such as sorting out the gross unreliability of earnings data or introducing national 
“neighbourhood” statistics.  The civil service had come to be strongly influenced by 
Thatcher’s outlook, and in particular found it difficult to acknowledge the damage done 
by deindustrialisation because of its shared responsibility for it.   And the habits of policy 
influence over government statistics which became established in the 1980s have proved 
enduring. The then Employment Minister Tessa Jowell responded to the comments by 
Alan Sinclair in 2000 quoted earlier by saying “Unemployment figures are independently 
audited”.  This may be true in principle but it is not yet the case in reality.  ONS to date 
has re-examined very few issues, and these have not included the question of treatment of 
the sick and its implications for interpretation of the ILO rate.  Good practice is returning 
very slowly.  Thatcher’s legacy was not just mass unemployment on the ground.  It was 
also a government machine unable to describe the problem accurately.   
 
Because of their closeness to the processes involved, local authorities are better able than 
central government to understand the causes of their unemployment problems.  But one 
of the major trends of the past 25 years has been the reduction in their power and status.   
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This started in the mid-1970s as a straightforward rolling back of the financial expansion 
of the 1960s, but under Thatcher and Blair became a much more conscious assault on the 
governmental role of local government.  Local government has been weakened by the 
fact that businesses have become less attached to particular places, as also have 
individuals, who are geographically more mobile.  Local authorities in their weakened 
state are seen by government statisticians as a less important client, so that fewer 
resources have been put into producing good quality statistics at local government level;  
it is striking that development of neighbourhood level statistics – one of whose functions 
is to allow central government to bypass local government - has been given higher 
priority than resolution of the blatant inadequacies of statistics at the local authority and 
local labour market levels.  The government for whose needs Rayner said statistics 
should be produced never included local government (Hoinville & Smith 1982, p.199). 
 
At the same time, the independence of university researchers has been undermined by 
changes in financing.  They have been made much more dependent upon winning 
government contracts, while direct public financing has been made dependent upon the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). This promotes publication at all costs, making it 
difficult for researchers to spend time on unpopular lines of inquiry in which publication 
may be delayed or blocked by referees’ objections, and causing the journals to fill up 
with mediocre material.  
 
Changes in the economics profession have also played an important role.  The last 40 
years have seen the rise to dominance of mathematics and econometrics-based 
economists who are primarily interested in modelling, and the almost complete demise of 
the older type of “applied economist” who had a broad knowledge of business and 
affairs.  Economists have become much narrower and have largely lost such interest in 
spatial matters as they previously had.  The focus on modelling is so strong that inquiry 
into the validity of data sources, or the relevance of models to the real world, are 
regarded as tasks for lesser minds.  The employment of economists has changed, with far 
more jobs concerned with the analysis of financial markets and relatively fewer 
concerned with human welfare;  many if not most economic commentators on 
unemployment are employed by the financial services industry.  At the same time, 
geographers and physical planners have lost status, influence and self-confidence, leaving 
the field of unemployment more completely under the control of non-spatial economists. 
 Economists as a profession have been strong advocates of deindustrialisation, and find it 
difficult to admit its adverse effects.   
 
These trends have left the official statisticians largely without effective academic critics.  
Many influential academics regard local unemployment statistics – which are particularly 
crucial given the nature of the British problem - as being beneath their attention, while 
many of those who do understand them are too depend on government contracts to argue. 
  
Supply-side policies have themselves created groups with an interest in their 
perpetuation.  When Michael Foot as Employment Secretary first introduced temporary 
employment schemes in the mid-1970s, they were not claimed to be a solution.  They 
were simply thought to be better than leaving people with nothing to do.  But as time has  
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gone on, the claims for their efficacy have become more vigorous and harder to 
challenge.  The DE itself owes its survival (in various incarnations) largely to the 
continued government commitment to supply-side policies and has a vested interest in 
justifying them.  
 
Economic theories which attribute responsibility for unemployment to the unemployed 
themselves naturally tend to appeal to many (though of course not all) business interests. 
 This is illustrated by the views of the Institute of Directors (2000).  More specifically, 
the decline of manufacturing has created a vicious circle in which manufacturing interests 
are no longer strong enough within business to protect themselves.  The turning-point 
here was probably Campbell Adamson’s “bare knuckle fight” speech to the 1981 CBI 
conference, which had the unintended effect of revealing that a majority of the 
organization no longer thought that manufacturing mattered.  Not only does the UK now 
have relatively few manufacturing companies;  manufacturing is no longer considered a 
core activity even by most of them. Within those companies power has shifted from those 
involved with production, such as engineers, to those concerned with finance, such as 
accountants.   
 
The unemployed themselves have very little power to influence their treatment.  As a 
result of benefit cuts, they are much poorer and more stressed than before.  Because of 
the nature of the unemployment problem, they are heavily concentrated in areas which 
are seen as unimportant in the political system because their voters “have nowhere else to 
go”.  And  supply-side programmes must affect their own attitudes, by constantly 
delivering the message that their problems are due not to structural factors in society but 
to their own inadequacies. 
 
The current situation is in fact exactly what could be predicted from consistent 
application of the Rayner doctrine that the only statistics that should be produced are 
those that have a “market”, either in or out of government.  There is clearly a substantial 
market for statistics supporting a supply-side view;  a legion of interests are looking for 
them.  But what is the market for statistics truthfully showing the situation of the 
unemployed - poor, predominantly manual workers as they are, living in declining areas 
of the country without effective influence in the political system?   
 
What can be done about it? 
 
In the light of the balance of interests just outlined, it is unlikely that further improvement 
in the official unemployment statistics will come about as a result of specific political 
action aimed at this result, at least until, with the passage of time, the ineffectual 
character of the supply-side policy package becomes too obvious to deny. The only 
realistic immediate way forward is to pursue the general programme for reform of official 
statistics with which Radical Statistics and the RSS are both associated.  This comprises 
an independent government statistical service on a statutory basis, with much better 
funding.  One recent estimate by a lay adviser to ONS from the business community was 
that an adequate suite of labour market statistics would cost an additional £50m per year. 
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There has already been some progress.  Although both inadequate and inadequately 
supported by ministers, the Statistics Commission and the Framework for National 
Statistics (June 2000) are an advance on what went before.  The Framework does 
reinstate the public service principle that the primary aim of the government statistical 
service is to provide “a comprehensive and meaningful description of the UK economy 
and society”, and the influence of the Rayner doctrine is visibly waning.  As noted 
earlier, there have been modest but encouraging specific moves by ONS in relation to the 
vacancy and “workforce” unemployment statistics, involving the assertion by ONS of its 
independent role against the “departmental ownership” claims of DE (now Department of 
Work and Pensions).  
 
There is a general acceptance that, as Nissel said, “Genuine democracy must be based on 
sound and reliable information”.  Although there is not much of a constituency for better 
unemployment statistics as such, there is quite a strong constituency for better official 
statistics in general.  This is where hope must lie.   
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Note to Maps 1A and 1B:  The ONS rates as published in Labour Market Trends have 
been corrected for commuting error. 
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MAP 1A 
Local Authorities - England 
Unemployment January 2000  
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MAP 1B 
Local Authorities - Scotland 
Unemployment January 2000 
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FIGURE 2   WORKING AGE CLAIMANTS OF SICKNESS, INVALIDITY AND INCAPACITY BENEFITS 
LONG TERM (over 6 months)
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FIGURE 1  GOVERNMENT TRAINEES AND "DISCOURAGED WORKERS" AS % OF ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE 
GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES BY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT LFS 1998 AND 1999
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FIGURE 3   ILO UNEMPLOYMENT AND INACTIVITY DUE TO SICKNESS/DISABILITY 
(both as % of working age population) EU COUNTRIES 1999
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FIGURE 4   WORKING AGE POPULATION CLAIMING SICKNESS OR DISABILITY BENEFITS 
GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES BY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 1999
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FIGURE 6   FEMALE LONE PARENTS AS % OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN - EU COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 5   PERCENTAGE OF INACTIVE LONG-TERM SICK WANTING WORK
 GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES BY LEVEL OF CLAIMANT UNEMPLOYMENT, LFS 1998 AND 1999
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FIGURE 7   PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WHO ARE LONE PARENTS 
CENSUS 1991 AND LFS Spring 2000 - GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES  BY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT
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FIGURE 8  EMPLOYMENT RATES OF LONE PARENTS (M. & F.) with dependent children 
CENSUS 1991 AND LFS Spring 2000 - GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES BY LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT
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FIGURE 10   UK WANT WORK RATE AND ILO UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 1977-
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FIGURE 9   INCREASE IN WFTC OVER FC Aug 1999 - Aug 2001 AS % OF FAMILIES 
GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES BY CLAIMANT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
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FIGURE 11  LONE PARENT CLAIMANTS BY "WORKFORCE" AND CORRECTED CLAIMANT 
UNEMPLOYMENT, BY LOCAL AUTHORITY May 2001
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Utility of routine IB data for local evaluation ABSTRACT 
Background 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) is the key contributory benefit for people who are incapable of 
work because of illness or disability.  
Methods 
The aims were to establish the utility of routinely collected data for local evaluation 
and to provide a descriptive epidemiology of the IB population in Glasgow and 
Scotland for the period 2000 to 2005 using data supplied by the Department of Work 
and Pensions.  
Results 
Glasgow’s IB population is large in absolute and relative terms but is now falling, 
mainly due to a decrease in on flow. Claimants tend to be older, have a poor work 
history and suffer from mental health problems. The rate of decline has been greater 
in Glasgow than Scotland, although the rate of on flow is still higher.  
Conclusions  
DWP data can be used locally to provide important insights into the dynamics of the 
IB population. However, to be truly useful, more work needs to be undertaken to 
combine the DWP data with other information.  
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 Introduction 
In recent years the vulnerable population being paid Incapacity Benefit (IB) has 
become a focus for policy makers interested in both employment and health.
1,2 After 
more than a decade of steady improvement in labour market conditions large numbers 
still remain on IB. New initiatives have proliferated
1,3 but, if we are to truly evaluate 
the impact of policy, we need data that can capture changes in the labour market, IB 
claimants, policy interventions and aspects of health over time. This paper describes 
the first steps in what will be a concerted effort to create a dynamic model of the IB 
population for the city in the United Kingdom (UK) with the largest IB problem – 
Glasgow. 
 
Incapacity Benefit is the key contributory benefit in the UK for people who are 
incapable of work because of illness or disability. The number of people claiming 
sickness-related benefits in the UK more than trebled between the late 1970s and the 
mid-1990s as employment in many traditional industries collapsed. It has since 
stabilised at around 2.7 million.
1 The proportion of the working age population 
(WAP) claiming IB varies greatly between different parts of the country, reflecting 
the state of the local labour market and the area’s economic history. It is particularly 
high in former industrial areas, such as Glasgow, Liverpool, Newcastle and South 
Wales although it is now beginning to decline even in these areas. Many claimants 
moved onto IB with no expectation of getting back to work, although about a third 
now say they want to work.
4 Some observers have argued that the large IB population 
in Britain partly reflects disguised unemployment.
5 In practice, many people on IB 
never get back to work. Indeed, after two years on IB, a person is more likely to die or 
retire than find a new job.
2  
 
In 2006 the UK Government set an ambitious target of getting a million people off IB 
within the next 10 years.
1 It has introduced ‘city strategies’ to target areas with the 
highest levels of IB. Health strategists are aware that this is a vulnerable population 
with many complex health needs.
6 The relationship between health and employment 
in this population is interactive and dynamic. Therefore, if the outcome of these 
polices is to be assessed, a variety of input, process and outcome data will have to be 
 collected and analysed in ‘real time’ so that policies and programmes can be rapidly 
adjusted.  
 Methods 
This study was established under the auspices of the Glasgow Centre for Population 
Health, which is a formal collaboration between Glasgow City Council, NHS Greater 
Glasgow & Clyde and Glasgow University – all bodies with an interest in the IB 
population. Glasgow is an IB ‘hot spot’ and has the largest single population of IB 
claimants in the UK.
7 The city is about to launch its ‘city strategy’ to improve 
employment in this group but has already an impressive list of initiatives in this 
area.
8,9  
 
This study was established to create a framework for data collection that will evaluate 
the outcome of this policy over the next five to ten years. Ideally, a ‘dynamic model’ 
of the IB population will be created. However, in this first stage of this work, three 
main questions were addressed: 
1.  What can we learn about the utility of routinely collected data for the ongoing 
analysis of policy? 
2.  What can we learn about the dynamics of the IB population in Glasgow?  
3.  Is Glasgow a special case – how does the IB population in Glasgow compare 
to Scotland as a whole?  
 
To achieve these aims, a descriptive epidemiology of IB claimants (demonstrating 
variability by person, place and time) was created. The study team received 
comprehensive data (100% sample of IB claimants) for Scotland from the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP) Information Directorate Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study for the period 2000 to 2005. Data are presented for two 
geographies, Glasgow City and all of Scotland (including Glasgow). Data has been 
analysed by age, sex, reason on benefit, length of time claiming benefit and benefit 
type (payment and credit only status – see below). 
 
From these data, three groups were identified; the ‘stock IB’ population (those 
claiming IB at any given time), the ‘on flow’ (those starting to claim IB) and the ‘off 
flow’ (those whose claim has terminated).  
 
 Data for stock IB claimants were provided quarterly from June 1999 until February 
2006. Where yearly data are shown, they have been calculated by taking a mean of 
the data from four quarters. For example, yearly data for 2005 were calculated by 
taking a mean of the data from the four quarters commencing December 2004 and 
ending in November 2005. To illustrate the change over the five years of analysis, a 
breakdown by age, reason for those claiming IB and length of time on IB is shown for 
the first and last quarter, i.e. June ‘99 – Aug ‘99 and Dec ‘05 – Feb ‘06 but this was 
only chosen as the approach once it had been established that changes had been 
gradual and constant over the period of analysis. The on flows and off flows to IB 
have been provided quarterly from September 1999 to November 2005. The on and 
off flow data have been presented as yearly data. For example, data for the year 2005 
are the sum of the four quarters from December 2004 to the quarter ending November 
2005.  
 
IB claimants can be divided into two groups – “Payment” IB claimants and “Credits 
only” IB claimants. Together these two categories make up what is commonly 
understood to be a single IB claiming population however there are clear distinctions 
between the two groups. Definitions are complex and the benefit system as a whole 
tries to ensure that individuals receive broadly equivalent amounts from the State – 
but the source may vary. Payment IB claimants must be incapable of work, not 
entitled to Statutory Sick Pay, and have sufficient National Insurance (NI) 
contributions to receive IB payment. Payment IB claimants therefore have a good 
recent work history. Credits only claimants will not have made sufficient NI 
contributions but fulfil all the other qualifying conditions for IB and so receive 
financial support from other sources. They are “credited” with pension contributions 
and gain access to other benefits like Income Support with a disability premium. 
These claimants have less good recent work histories. In this study the stock data can 
be broken down into payment and credits only claimants and where differences have 
been found between the two groups this is highlighted. 
 
 Results 
Utility of data 
The 100% sample of data relating to IB claimants form the DWP proved to be an 
extremely useful tool as is evidenced by the results set out below. Some limitations 
were also identified. It was not possible to cross tabulate the data from different 
categories. For example, over 50% of those claiming IB in Glasgow are doing so 
because of mental health problems. It was not possible to break down this group of IB 
claimants by sex, age, length of time on benefit.   
 
The dynamics of stock, on flow and off flow 
To illustrate the dynamic nature of the stock, on flow and off flow populations, we 
have used a bath water analogy (Fig. 1 and 2). The stock IB population is represented 
by the amount of bath water. The on and off flow populations are represented as the 
tap water and the outflow respectively.  
 
Two bathwater diagrams are presented to compare Glasgow (Fig. 1) and Scotland 
(Fig. 2). Glasgow has a large IB claimant population (61,850 in 2005) but, 
importantly, there has been a sizeable reduction (-9%) in the stock of IB claimants 
from 2000 to 2005 – the level of the bathwater is falling (Fig. 1). In Scotland there has 
been a smaller percentage decrease (-4%) in the number of stock claimants (to 
323,160 in 2005) (Fig. 2). In both Glasgow and Scotland this decrease in stock IB 
populations is mainly due to a decrease in the number of on flow claimants with the 
absolute number of off flow claimants remaining broadly unchanged. Although the 
relatively unchanged numbers in the off flow gives the impression of no change over 
time, analysis of the rate of off flow leads to a different conclusion (see below).  
 
The percent of the WAP claiming IB has decreased between 2000 and 2005 across 
both geographies but there is still a higher proportion of the working age population in 
Glasgow City claiming IB (16.4% in 2005) than Scotland (10.2% in 2005) (Fig. 3).  
 
Characteristics of the stock population 
The percentage of credits only IB claimants (poor work history) in Glasgow is greater 
than for Scotland as a whole (in 2005, Glasgow 44.9%, Scotland 33.5% of total 
claimants). In Glasgow, the largest percentage of claimants are between 40 and 60 
 and the proportion of all IB claimants in this age group has been increasing with time. 
There have been decreases in the younger age categories. This pattern is mirrored in 
all of Scotland. One striking statistic from the age data is the percent of 55-59 year 
olds claiming IB (for Dec ‘05 – Feb ‘06, 34.9% in Glasgow compared to only 18.6% 
in Scotland). There is also a marked difference in age profile between payment (good 
work history) and credits only (poor work history) claimants. In both Glasgow and 
Scotland, more than 50% of payments claimants (good work history) are aged over 50 
compared to under 30% of credits only. The male:female ratio of IB claimants is 
constant over time in both Glasgow and Scotland (around 58% males, 42% females). 
Females are over represented in the poor work history group (credits only claimants) 
in Glasgow and Scotland. The majority of claimants in Glasgow have been claiming 
for greater than 2 years with 58.2% claiming for over 5 years in the quarter Dec ‘05 – 
Feb ‘06. There have been decreases in all duration of claim categories except greater 
than 5 years. Similar trends are observed in Scotland. 
 
Reason for claiming IB – health problems 
The main reason for claiming IB is “mental and behavioural disorders”. This category 
increased from 38.9% between June ‘99 and Aug ‘99 to 50.4% between Dec ‘05 and 
Feb ‘06 in Glasgow (Table 1). More credits only claimants (poor work history) are 
receiving IB because of mental & behavioural disorders than payment claimants in 
Glasgow (For Dec ‘05 – Feb ‘06 payment claimants receiving IB because of mental 
and behavioural disorder was 42.8%, credits only 59.5%). Similar trends are observed 
in Scotland but the percentage share of those with mental health problems in Glasgow 
was slightly greater (For Dec ‘05 – Feb ‘06 the % of total claimants claiming because 
of mental and behavioural disorder in Glasgow was 50.4% and 43.2% in Scotland).  
 
The on flow population  
The rate of on flow is expressed as a percent of the WAP not on IB. This is the 
“population at risk” of moving onto IB. The on flow in Glasgow has decreased from 
4.8% in 2000 to 3.8% in 2005 (Table 2). More of the on flow in Glasgow is made up 
of credits only claimants (poor work history) than payment claimants (in 2005, there 
were 5,310 payment claimants and 6,800 credits only claimants). The rate of on flow 
in Scotland has also decreased from 3.0% in 2000 to 2.5% in 2005. In contrast, the on 
flow population in Scotland has a better work history (in 2005, there were 38,350 
 payment claimants and 32,300 credits only claimants). The rate of on flow in 
Glasgow has declined at a higher rate than for Scotland (in Glasgow the rate of on 
flow has decreased by 21% whereas in Scotland the rate of on flow has decreased by 
16%) however the rate in Glasgow is still higher than Scotland (3.8% v 2.5% in 2005) 
(Table 2) 
 
The off flow population 
The rate of off flow is expressed as a percent of the total stock population. This is the 
“population at risk” of moving off IB. There have only been small changes in the 
absolute numbers of off flow claimants in Glasgow from 2000 to 2005 (an increase of 
340 off flow claimants) however the rate of off flow has shown a small increase from 
21.4% to 24.0% (Table 3). The actual numbers of individuals in off flow and the total 
rate of off flow in Scotland remains largely unchanged (24.4% in 2000, 25.3% in 
2005) (Table 3).  
 
Since the focus of policy is to increase the off flow, greater attention was paid this 
part of the analysis. Although the change in absolute numbers of off flow claimants 
for Glasgow and Scotland remains small the increase in off flow rates has been more 
significant than appears at first sight. Off flow rates in both 2000 and 2005 are higher 
for people under 30 years. There has been a potentially encouraging increase in 
Glasgow for this age group. Whereas in 2000 the off flow rate was 5% lower in 
Glasgow than in Scotland (at 41.0% compared to 46.5%), by 2005 it was 5% higher 
(55.1% in Glasgow compared to 50.0% in Scotland). Off flow rates in 2000 and 2005 
have increased in both Glasgow and Scotland for claimants in every category of 
duration of claim except for those claiming over 5 years, for which they have fallen. 
However, off flow rates have increased in Glasgow relative to Scotland in every 
category of duration of claim, with the result that Glasgow now has higher off flow 
rates than Scotland in every category of duration of claim longer than 6 months. The 
increase in off flow rates in Glasgow has been particularly marked for duration of 
claims 3 - 6 months and 6 months – 1 year.  
 
 Discussion 
Main findings of this study 
The 100% sample of IB claimants provided by the DWP allowed an analysis which is 
more comprehensive than has previously been created for a regional or city 
population. As such, DWP data has been established as a necessary, important but not 
sufficient basis for the type of dynamic model building that is the eventual aim of this 
work.  
 
Glasgow’s IB population is large in absolute and relative terms (61,850 in 2005, 
16.4% of the WAP). Encouragingly, there has been a reduction in IB stock claimants 
from 2000 to 2005, mainly due to a decrease in on flow. Glasgow’s IB population can 
be characterised as being older, having a poor work history and suffering from mental 
health problems. 
 
Glasgow’s IB population is distinctive from the whole of Scotland. It is 
proportionately larger (16% of the Glasgow WAP was claiming IB in 2005 compared 
with 10% in Scotland and 8% in the UK). However, the rate of decline has been 
greater in Glasgow, although the rate of on flow is still higher in Glasgow than 
Scotland. The proportion of IB claimants with a poor work history in Glasgow is 
higher. Higher proportions of claimants in Glasgow suffer from mental health 
problems (in 2005, 50% in Glasgow compared to 43% in Scotland).   
 
What is already known on this topic  
Several reports provide general information on IB claimants in the UK.
1,3,10,11 These 
show important UK trends (e.g. falling total IB claimants, move from musculoskeletal 
to mental health problems
12) but provide insufficient detail about any city or region to 
be truly useful for monitoring the local impact of policy initiatives. One helpful study 
7 examined IB claimants in Scotland but provided insufficient detail to meet the 
objectives set out above. Smaller studies on IB populations in other areas of the UK 
have been undertaken. 
13 
 
What this study adds 
 This study demonstrates how routinely collected data can be used to begin to create a 
simple dynamic model of the IB population for a defined geography. To date, very 
little data have been presented that provide information about the on and off flows. 
This study illustrates the importance of establishing the numerators and denominators 
of these flow populations and charting changes over time.  
 
By creating a simple, early model (the bathwater diagrams) this study shows that 
Glasgow has witnessed a decline in IB claimants for the first time in more than two 
decades but that, to date, this has been achieved mainly by reducing the on flow and 
not by primarily returning existing IB claimants to work. However, by looking at the 
off flows by age and length of time on benefit, there is evidence that Glasgow is 
outperforming Scotland. In recent years, considerable investment has gone into 
increasing the off flow by supporting IB claimants through return to work schemes. 
The time period for this study (2000 – 2005) may be too early to have detected the 
full impact of this more recent investment.  
 
Further, the study provides an important description of the three populations (stock, 
on flow and off flow) and their characteristics (sex, age, reason for claiming benefit 
and employment history). For example, it highlights the rise in mental health 
conditions that now outnumber musculoskeletal disorders. This study also highlights 
the differences between payment (good work history) and credits only (poor work 
history) claimants. The reason why credits only claimants have been increasing 
relative to payments claimants appears to lie in the fact that the national insurance 
contribution conditions for receiving payments were tightened up in 2001 for new 
claimants. Since then, fewer of the people coming on to IB have qualified for 
payments. However, a full understanding requires more research. 
 
Limitations of the study 
This study has two major limitations. First, some categories of data were simply not 
available. For example, no information was obtained about the destination and 
outcomes for those who were in the off flow. There is clearly a big difference between 
people moving into work, transferring onto benefits, retiring or being lost in the 
system. Second, the data had limitations when set against our objectives. For example, 
 with the data provided, we could not break down subcategories (e.g. those with 
mental health problems) by sex, age and length of time on benefit.  
 
This work continues. In the current phase, we are investigating other data sources 
which will place IB claimant analysis within the context of the labour force and the 
whole working aged population. Also, comparison will be made with relevant UK 
populations. 
 
Conclusions  
The DWP data can be used locally to provide important insights into the dynamics of 
the IB population. However, to be truly useful, more work needs to be undertaken to 
combine the DWP data with other information. Glasgow has a significant challenge in 
the size and nature of its IB population but can take some encouragement from the 
trends established up until 2005. Further work should create a tool that can monitor 
the impact of policy on the vulnerable population over time. 
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2000 2005 
61,850 (-9%) 
12,110 (-19%) 
Stock 67,910 
On flow 15,000 
Off flow 14,510 14,850 (+2%)   
 
Fig. 1 Stock IB claimants, On and Off Flows in Glasgow in 2000 and 2005 
The percent change in stock IB claimants, on and off flow is shown in brackets 
  
 
 
2000 2005 
323,160 (-4%) 
70,650 (-17%) 
Stock 335,770 
On flow 84,730 
Off flow 81,870  81,860 (0%)   
 
Fig. 2 Stock IB claimants, On and Off Flows in Scotland in 2000 and 2005 
The percent change in stock IB claimants, on and off flow is shown in brackets 
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Fig. 3 Total stock IB claimants in Glasgow and Scotland as percent of the working 
age population in 2000 & 2005 
  
Table 1 Percent of IB claimants with a mental health problem  
 
 Glasgow  Scotland 
 Total 
claimants 
Payment 
claimants 
Credits 
only 
claimants 
Total 
claimants
Payment 
claimants 
Credits 
only 
claimants
June 99 – 
Aug 99 
38.9% 32.4% 49.9%  32.4%  27.9%  45.5% 
Dec 05 – 
Feb 06 
50.4% 42.8% 59.5%  43.2%  36.9%  55.5% 
 
 
Table 2 On flow rates in Glasgow and Scotland in 2000 and 2005 
 
 Glasgow  Scotland 
Year  Total Claimants   On Flow Rate
a  Total Claimants  On Flow Rate
a 
2000 15,000  4.8%  84,730  3.0% 
2005 12,100  3.8%  70,650  2.5% 
    21% reduction    16% reduction 
 
aOn Flow rate is expressed as a percent of the working age population (WAP) not on IB 
 
 
Table 3 Off flow rates in Glasgow and Scotland in 2000 and 2005 
 
 Glasgow  Scotland 
Year  Total Claimants   Off Flow Rate
a  Total Claimants  Off Flow Rate
a 
2000 14,510  21.4%  81,870  24.4% 
2005 14,850  24.0%  81,860  25.3% 
 
aOff Flow rate is expressed as a percent of the total stock population.  
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Background 
Incapacity benefit (IB) claimants have become a focus for policy makers. Strategies to 
help this group depend on an understanding of the reasons for claiming benefit at a 
local level where variations from a national strategy may be needed. 
Methods 
Data supplied by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) was analysed to 
establish reasons for claiming benefit in Scotland and Glasgow between 2000 and 
2007. 
Results 
There has been a continuing rise in mental health diagnosis and a corresponding fall 
in musculoskeletal diagnosis during this period. More people were claiming because 
of mental health problems in Glasgow than in Scotland. Also those with a poor 
employment history (credits only claimants) are more likely to claim IB because of a 
mental health problem.  This analysis also highlighted the growing importance of 
problems caused by alcohol and drug abuse.  
Conclusions 
DWP data can be used to provide important insights into the trends in reasons for 
claiming IB and should be used at a local as well as a national level to guide and 
evaluate interventions to help this vulnerable group.   
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  2Introduction 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) is the key contributory benefit for people who are incapable of 
work because of illness or disability. In order to qualify for IB, claimants must be 
incapable of work, not entitled to Statutory Sick Pay and have sufficient National 
Insurance contributions. Several reports have provided general information on IB 
claimants.
1-4 These show important UK trends (e.g. falling total IB claimants, 
movement from musculoskeletal to mental health problems) but provide insufficient 
details about the characteristics of the claimants in any city or region to be truly useful 
for monitoring the local impact of policy initiatives.  
 
From the 1960s to the 1990s, musculoskeletal disorders were the main reason for 
claiming sickness benefits in the UK.
5 However, since then there has been a dramatic 
shift in the reason for claiming IB to mental behavioural disorders.
6 The reduction in 
musculoskeletal disorders as a cause of morbidity has accompanied changes in the 
medical management of low back pain to one of encouraging continuing activity 
rather rest.
7 
 
Glasgow is an IB ‘hot spot’ and has the largest single population of IB claimants in 
the UK.
8 Glasgow also has some of the highest rates in the UK of alcohol related 
harm, drug misuse and mental health disorders.
9 Therefore, there may be important 
differences in local trends that may inform interventions.  In this study data for 
Scotland and Glasgow was analysed to characterise the reasons for claiming IB and to 
understand more about the mental health claiming group, in particularly the alcohol 
and drug abuse group.   
 
Six main questions were addressed in the study: 
1. How many mental health claiming IB claimants are there in Scotland and Glasgow 
compared to those claiming because of musculoskeletal problems? 
2. How has this changed over the seven year time period? 
3. Are there differences between payment and credits only
1 IB claimants, in terms of 
claiming IB because of a mental health problem? 
                                                 
1 Distinction explained in methods 
  34. What is the breakdown of the mental health group (in terms of mental health 
category, sex, age and length of time on benefit)? 
5. How does the mental health profile compare with the profile of total IB claimants? 
6. In particular, what are the characteristics of those claiming IB because of 
alcoholism and drug abuse? 
 
 
Methods 
The study team received comprehensive data (100% sample of IB claimants) for 
Scotland and Glasgow from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
Information Directorate Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study for the period 2000 to 
2007. Data for stock IB claimants were provided quarterly from December 1999 until 
February 2007. To illustrate the change over the seven years of analysis, a breakdown 
by reason for those claiming IB is shown for the first and last quarter, i.e. Dec ‘99 – 
Feb ‘00 and Dec ‘06 – Feb ‘07 but this was only chosen as the approach once it had 
been established that changes had been gradual and constant over the period of 
analysis. For simplicity the quarter ending February 2000 will be referred to as ‘2000’ 
and quarter ending February 2007 will be referred to as ‘2007’.  
 
Data on the mental health claiming group of IB claimants was further analysed by 
mental health category, sex, age and length of time on benefit. The groups claiming 
because of alcoholism and drug abuse were investigated further. 
 
IB claimants can be divided into two groups – “Payment” IB claimants and “Credits 
only” IB claimants. Together these two categories make up what is commonly 
understood to be a single IB claiming population however there are clear distinctions 
between the two groups. Definitions are complex and the benefit system as a whole 
tries to ensure that individuals receive broadly equivalent amounts from the State – 
but the source may vary. Payment IB claimants must be incapable of work, not 
entitled to Statutory Sick Pay, and have sufficient National Insurance (NI) 
contributions to receive IB payment. Payment IB claimants therefore have a good 
recent work history. Credits only claimants will not have made sufficient NI 
contributions but fulfil all the other qualifying conditions for IB and so receive 
  4financial support from other sources. They are “credited” with pension contributions 
and gain access to other benefits like Income Support with a disability premium. 
These claimants have less good recent work histories. In this study the total claimants 
can be broken down into payment and credits only claimants and where differences 
have been found between the two groups this is highlighted. 
 
 
Results 
Main Reason for claiming IB in Scotland and Glasgow 
The most common reason for claiming IB in 2000 and 2007 in both Scotland and 
Glasgow was mental and behavioural disorders. In the 2000 there were 333,430 IB 
claimants in Scotland of which 111,930 (33.6% of total) were claiming because of 
mental and behavioural problems. By 2007 the number of total IB claimants had 
decreased to 308,630 however the number claiming because of mental and 
behavioural problems had increased to 136,530 (44.2% of total) (Table 1).  
 
In 2000 there were 67,440 IB claimants in Glasgow of which 27,040 (40.1% of total) 
were claiming because of mental and behavioural problems. By 2007 the number of 
total IB claimants had decreased to 57,300 however the number claiming because of 
mental and behavioural problems had increased to 29,420 (51.3% of total) (Table 1).  
 
There has been a decrease in the number receiving IB because of diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system in Scotland (from 19.9% to 15.4%) and Glasgow (from 
16.8% to 12.5%) (Table 1). 
 
Mental Health IB claimants in Scotland and Glasgow - Payment v Credits only 
claimants  
Table 2 shows total IB claimants claiming because of a mental health problem split 
into payment and credits only claimants. The percentage of payment and credits only 
claimants claiming because of a mental health problem has increased from 2000 to 
2007 in Scotland and Glasgow. There are more mental health claiming credits only 
claimants than payment claimants in both Glasgow and Scotland (in 2007 37.8% 
  5payment claimants, 56.2% credits in Scotland; in 2007 43.8% payment, 60.0% credits 
only in Glasgow).  
 
Breakdown of mental health causes of claiming IB in Scotland and Glasgow 
The mental health claiming group can be broken into 25 categories. In Scotland the 
main reason for claiming IB due to a mental and behavioural problem in 2000 was 
‘depressive episode’ (32.8%) (Table 3a). There was an increase in the number of 
people claiming for this reason in 2007 (37.9%). Claiming because of alcoholism and 
drug abuse has increased, but only modestly, from 2000 to 2007 (alcohol 6.2% to 
6.9%; drug abuse 4.4% to 5.9%). 
 
In Glasgow the main reason for claiming IB due to a mental and behavioural problem 
in 2000 was ‘other neurotic disorders’ (47.3%) (Table 3b). There has been a decrease 
in the number of people claiming for this reason in 2007 (35.2%) but ‘other neurotic 
disorders’ was still the main reason for claiming IB due to a mental health problem. 
Claiming because of a depressive episode, alcoholism and drug abuse have increased 
from 2000 to 2007 (depressive episode 22.4% to 28.9%; alcohol 6.3% to 7.7%; drug 
abuse 4.3% to 4.8%).  
 
Breakdown of all mental health claiming group by sex, age and length of time on 
benefit 
We can breakdown all the mental health categories by sex, age and length of time on 
benefit. Table 4a shows the breakdown of the whole mental health group in Scotland 
and Glasgow in 2000 and 2007.  
 
The ratio of females to males claiming because of a mental health problem is similar 
to those total IB claimants in both Scotland & Glasgow (table 4b shows a breakdown 
of total IB claimants – not sure if we will include Table 4b). 
 
The age profile of the mental health claiming group is younger than total IB 
claimants. For example in 2007 the percentage of total claimants in the 35-44 age 
category was 21.9% in Scotland and 24.5% in Glasgow. In the same quarter the 
percentage claiming because of a mental health problem was 27.3% in Scotland and 
29.7% in Glasgow (Table 4a & 4b).  
  6  
There have been decreases in all the duration of claim categories between 2000 and 
2007 except for the ‘greater than five years’ category where there have been increases 
(for Scotland 39.1% to 53.0%; for Glasgow 41.2% to 56.3%). This is similar to total 
IB claimants. 
 
Breakdown of alcoholism claiming group by sex, age and length of time on 
benefit 
The results for the alcohol claiming IB group are shown in Table 5a. There are many 
more men claiming IB because of alcoholism than women in both Scotland and 
Glasgow (in 2000, 85.4% men, 14.6% women in Scotland; 88.9% men, 11.7% female 
in Glasgow). However there has been an increase in the number of women claiming 
due to alcoholism over the seven year period (for 2007 up to 16.7% in Scotland; up to 
14.5% in Glasgow). 
 
The age profile of the alcoholism group is younger than the total IB claiming group 
(for the alcoholism 35-44 age group, 30.7% in Scotland, 30.4% Glasgow in 2000; for 
the total IB claiming group 35-44 age group, 19.9% in Scotland, 22.6% Glasgow  
in 2000 [data possibly not shown - Table 4b]).  
 
In 2000 the largest claiming groups because of alcoholism were the two categories ‘2 
year and up to 5 years’ (Scotland 33.9%; Glasgow 32.2%) and ‘5 years and over’ 
(Scotland 34.4%; Glasgow 40.4%). However by 2007 there had been a shift with the 
largest group being the ‘5 years and over’ group Scotland 49.0%; Glasgow 52.0%).  
 
Breakdown of drug abuse claiming group by sex, age and length of time on 
benefit 
The results for the drug abuse claiming IB group are shown in Table 5b. There are 
more men than women claiming because of drug abuse (in 2000, 77.1% men, 22.9% 
women in Scotland; in 2000 73.5% men, 26.5% female in Glasgow). The ratio of 
women to men claiming because of drug abuse is greater than alcoholism. Figures 
remain largely unchanged for Scotland in 2007. In Glasgow there is an increase in the 
number of males claiming because of drug abuse (in 2007 up to 78.0%). 
 
  7The age profile of the drug abuse claiming population is younger compared to total 
claimants (for the drug abuse 25-34 age group, 52.1% in Scotland, 55.6% Glasgow in 
2000; for the total IB claiming group 25-34 age group, 14.2% in Scotland, 16.6% 
Glasgow in 2000). The decrease between 2000 to 2007 in the 25-34 age category is 
likely to be due to this group getting older and moving into the next age category (35-
44 age category increases from 15.8% to 32.8% in Scotland from 2000 to 2007; 35-44 
age category increases from 19.7% to 46.1% in Glasgow from 2000 to 2007). 
 
The increase in the number of people claiming because of drug abuse shows a more 
recent increase. In 2000 there are more drug abusers in the shorter duration of claims 
group compared to total claimants. In 2000 the highest group claiming because of 
drug abuse was the ‘2 years and up to 5 years’ in both Scotland (30.4%) and Glasgow 
(30.8%). By 2007 the largest category was the ‘5 years and over’ category (Scotland 
37.0%; Glasgow 46.8%).    
 
Discussion 
Main findings of this study 
This study provides an analysis of the IB population who had a mental health 
diagnosis as a reason for claiming IB in Scotland and Glasgow in 2000 and 2007. This 
paper has been able to show for the first time the breakdown of the mental health 
group by mental health category, sex, age and length of time on benefit. Further, those 
claiming because of alcoholism and drug abuse have been characterised. 
 
There has been a continuing rise in mental health diagnosis and a corresponding fall 
in musculoskeletal diagnosis during this period. More people were claiming because 
of mental health problems in Glasgow than in Scotland. Also more credits only 
claimants are claiming IB because of a mental health problem which suggests that 
mental health diagnosis are more likely in those with a poor work history. The large 
number of individuals diagnosed as having a depressive, neurotic or anxiety disorder 
opens up the possibility that many of these individuals might respond to treatment and 
may not have permanent disability. 
 
  8Alcoholism and drug abuse as a reason for claiming IB are more common in men than 
women and increased over the study period in both Scotland and Glasgow causing 
together 12.8% of mental health problems in Scotland and 12.5% in Glasgow in 2007. 
In 2000 unlike other groups there are more people claiming IB for these reasons with 
shorter duration of claims. However by 2007 the largest claiming group was ‘greater 
than five years’ category.   
 
What is already known on this topic  
In the 1980s the growth in sickness-related benefits was largely due to 
musculoskeletal conditions, which outnumbered two to three times the relatively 
stable numbers with mental health conditions. Since the mid to late 1990s, there has 
been a dramatic shift in the main reason for claiming IB from musculoskeletal to 
mental health diagnoses.  A recent figure for the whole of the UK showed that 37% of 
the stock IB population were claiming IB because of mental health conditions
10 
compared to 16% in 1996.
6 The vast majority of this increase is in mild to moderate 
mental health conditions like depressive symptoms, anxiety, stress or other 
‘neuroses’, with only a small numbers having serious psychiatric illnesses such as 
schizophrenia. Interestingly, there was a geographical dimension to this increase in 
mild/moderate mental health conditions, which started in the south east of England 
and spread progressively to the rest of the country supporting the augment that it is a 
social rather than a biological phenomenon.
6  
 
What this study adds 
This study describes in detail the mental health claiming IB population in Scotland 
and Glasgow in 2000 and 2007. Other studies have provided only broad medical 
diagnostic categories for those claiming IB and have not given an insight into those 
medical reasons for claiming IB because of mental and behavioural disorders. Further 
this study highlights the alcohol and drug abuse claiming groups.  
 
It is known that Glasgow is an IB hotspot but this study also shows that Glasgow’s IB 
population has more claimants with mental health problems than Scotland and the 
UK. It also shows the larger proportion of credits only claimants in this category.  
 
  9Of the different mental health diagnostic categories used in 2000, 69.3% were either 
depressive, neurotic and anxiety disorders in Scotland, compared with 79.8% in 
Glasgow suggesting that in Scotland mental health shows some differences from 
Glasgow in total contribution to IB. Also those with a mental health diagnosis tend to 
be younger in both Scotland and Glasgow compared with the total IB population. The 
large number of individuals diagnosed as having a depressive, neurotic or anxiety 
disorder indicates that many of these individuals would be amenable to treatment and 
may not have permanent disability. Severe mental health problems such as 
schizophrenia and psychotic disorders and mood disorders were relatively small in 
numbers and did not change as a proportion of the whole over the study period.  
  
This study gives detailed information on the alcohol and drug abuse group. Although 
the majority are male there are increasing numbers of females claiming for these 
reasons. These claimants also tend to be younger. The ‘length of time on IB’ profile 
shows that claiming because of drug abuse and to a lesser extent alcohol was a 
relatively new phenomenon in 2000 with relatively short durations of claims. By 2007 
the pattern was more like that of total IB claimants with the largest group of 
alcohol/drug abuse claimants claiming for over 5 years. 
 
Limitations of the study 
There may be limitations associated with the classification of the type of mental 
health illness. Although this study has for the first time shown the breakdown of the 
mental health claiming group in Scotland the classification depends on the 
consistency and interpretation of those doing this (General Practitioners and DWP 
gate keeping doctors) and the results of Personal Capability Assessment (PCA). A 
recent review has been undertaken to consider the impact of the changing pattern of 
mental health problems and treatment options on the effectiveness of the mental 
health component of the PCA assessment.
11 Also, only one illness is required to be 
recorded when claimants may actually have a number of conditions. In the year 2000 
in Glasgow other neurotic disorders were the largest category at 47.3% compared 
with 25.4% in Scotland where depressive episode was the largest category at 32.8%. 
These differences in diagnostic categorisation of individuals with mental health 
continued in 2007. There is clearly a difference in diagnostic labelling, or a real 
difference in psychiatric morbidity in Glasgow when compared to Scotland as a whole 
  10with neurosis being more common in Glasgow, compared with Scotland where 
depression predominated.  
 
Conclusions  
The DWP data can be broken down into twenty five mental health diagnoses. This 
study has highlighted the differences in these categories in 2000 and 2007 in Scotland 
and Glasgow. Having a detailed breakdown of this group of claimants could help with 
policy decisions for this vulnerable population. There is a need for this work to be 
carried out at a local as well as a national level because local differences should 
inform strategy. This study also suggests that the routine DWP data, while important, 
should be supplemented by other studies that provide insight into what is driving 
these trends.  
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Table 1 Percent of total IB claimants with mental health problem or 
musculoskeletal problem in Scotland and Glasgow 
 
  Scotland Glasgow 
Quarter Ending  Mental and 
Behavioural 
Disorders (%) 
Diseases of the 
Musculoskeletal 
system (%) 
Mental and 
Behavioural 
Disorders (%) 
Diseases of the 
Musculoskeletal 
system (%) 
Feb 2000  33.6 19.9  40.1 16.8 
Feb 2007  44.2 15.4  51.3 12.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Percent of total, payment and credits only IB claimants claiming because 
of a mental health problem in Scotland and Glasgow 
 
  Scotland  Glasgow 
Quarter 
Ending 
Total 
claimants 
(%) 
Payment 
claimants 
(%) 
Credits only 
claimants 
(%) 
Total 
claimants 
(%) 
Payment 
claimants 
(%) 
Credits only 
claimants 
(%) 
Feb  2000  33.6  28.8 46.5 40.1 33.5 50.7 
Feb  2007  44.2  37.8 56.2 51.3 43.8 60.0 
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Table 3 Breakdown of mental health IB claiming group in Scotland and Glasgow 
  All Mental and Behavioural Disorders 
  Scotland Glasgow 
  Quarter ending 
Feb 00 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 07 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 00 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 07 
Number (%) 
Depressive Episode   36,750 (32.8%)  51,710 (37.9%)  6,060 (22.4%)  8,510 (28.9%) 
Other Neurotic 
Disorders   28,410 (25.4%)  23,990 (17.6%)  12,790 (47.3%)  10,370 (35.2%) 
Other anxiety 
Disorders   12,480 (11.1%)  14,190 (10.4%)  2,740 (10.1%)  3,000 (10.2%) 
Alcoholism   6,940 (6.2%)  9,380 (6.9%)  1,710 (6.3%)  2,270 (7.7%) 
Unspecified Mental 
Retardation   6,480 (5.8%)  5,590 (4.1%)  540 (2.0%)  520 (1.8%) 
Drug Abuse   4,930 (4.4%)  8,030 (5.9%)  1,170 (4.3%)  1,410 (4.8%) 
Schizophrenia   3,430 (3.1%)  3,870 (2.8%)  470 (1.7%)  570 (1.9%) 
Reaction to Severe 
Stress   2,930 (2.6%)  5,950 (4.4%)  390 (1.4%)  920 (3.1%) 
Specific Development 
Disorders of Scholastic 
Skills   2,490 (2.2%)  5,360 (3.9%)  220 (0.8%)  610 (2.1%) 
Mental Disorder not 
otherwise specified   2,100 (1.9%)  2,910 (2.1%)  180 (0.7%)  380 (1.3%) 
Unspecified 
nonorganic Psychosis   1,560 (1.4%)  1,770 (1.3%)  200 (0.7%)  260 (0.9%) 
Phobic Anxiety 
Disorders   880 (0.8%)  920 (0.7%)  180 (0.7%)  200 (0.7%) 
Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders 
associated with the 
puerperium, not 
elsewhere classified   770 (0.7%)  600 (0.4%)  150 (0.6%)  90 (0.3%) 
Persistent mood 
disorder   520 (0.5%)  280 (0.2%)  70 (0.3%)  30 (0.1%) 
Unspecified mood 
disorder   470 (0.4%)  660 (0.5%)  70 (0.3%)  70 (0.2%) 
Persistant delusional 
disorder   140 (0.1%)  250 (0.2%)  20 (0.1%)  40 (0.1%) 
Eating disorder   130 (0.1%)  180 (0.1%)  20 (0.1%)  40 (0.1%) 
Specific Personality 
Disorders   130 (0.1%)  220 (0.2%)  10 (0.0%)  20 (0.1%) 
Manic Episode   120 (0.1%)  120 (0.1%)  10 (0.0%)  10 (0.0%) 
Recurrent Depressive 
Disorder   110 (0.1%)  190 (0.1%)  30 (0.1%)  100 (0.3%) 
Unspecified Dementia   100 (0.1%)  70 (0.1%)  10 (0.0%)  10 (0.0%) 
Pervasive 
Development 
Disorders   40 (0.0%)  290 (0.2%)  10 (0.0%)  30 (0.1%) 
Dissociative Disorders   10 (0.0%)  10 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%) 
Psychological and 
behavioural factors 
associated with 
disorders or diseases 
elsewhere classified  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%) 
Somatoform Disorders   0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%) 
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Table 4 Breakdown of mental health (MH), alcoholism, drug abuse and total IB 
claiming groups by sex, age & reason on benefit in Scotland and Glasgow 
   Scotland  Glasgow 
   Quarter ending 
Feb 00 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 07 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 00 
Number (%) 
Quarter ending 
Feb 07 
Number (%) 
Sex        
MH group  Female  51,590 (46.1%)  61,880 (45.3%)  11,800 (43.6%)  12,590 (42.8%) 
  Male  60,350 (53.9%)  74,650 (54.7%)  15,240 (56.4%)  16,830 (57.2%) 
Alcoholism 
group 
Female  1,010 (14.6%)  1,570 (16.7%)  200 (11.6%)  330 (14.6%) 
  Male  5,930 (85.4%)  7,810 (83.3%)  1,520 (88.4%)  1,930 (85.4%) 
Drug abuse 
group 
Female  1,130 (22.9%)  1,830 (22.8%)  310 (26.5%)  320 (22.5%) 
  Male  3,800 (77.1%)  6,200 (77.2%)  860 (73.5%)  1,100 (77.5%) 
Total 
claimants 
Female  140,340 (42.1%)  135,700 (44.0%)  27,330 (40.5%)  23,890 (41.7%) 
  Male  193,090 (57.9%)  172,930 (56.0%)  40,110 (59.5%)  33,410 (58.3%) 
Age        
MH group  35-44  28,990 (25.9%)  37,280 (27.3%)  7,530 (27.8%)  8,730 (29.7%) 
Alcoholism 
group 
35-44  2,130 (30.7%)  2,600 (27.7%)  520 (30.4%)  590 (26.0%) 
Drug abuse 
group 
25-34  2,570 (52.1%)  3,900 (48.6%)  650 (55.6%)  540 (38.3%) 
  35-44  780 (15.8%)  2,630 (32.8%)  230 (19.7%)  650 (46.1%) 
Total 
claimants 
25-34  47,300 (14.2%)  38,830 (12.6%)  11,200 (16.6%)  7,420 (12.9%) 
  35-44  66,310 (19.9%)  67,520 (21.9%)  15,270 (22.6%)  14,040 (24.5%) 
Length of 
time on 
benefit 
      
MH group  5 years and 
over  
43,750 (39.1%)  72,330 (53.0%)  11,130 (41.2%)  16,550 (56.3%) 
Alcoholism 
group 
2 years and 
up to 5 years 
2,350 (33.9%)  2,160 (23.0%) 
 
550 (32.2%) 
 
510 (22.5%) 
 
  5 years and 
over  
2,390 (34.4%)  4,600 (49.0%)  690 (40.4%)  1,180 (52.0%) 
Drug abuse 
group 
2 years and 
up to 5 years 
1,500 (30.4%) 
 
2,250 (28.0%) 
 
360 (30.8%) 
 
340 (24.1%) 
 
  5 years and 
over  
760 (15.4%)  2,970 (37.0%)  250 (21.4%)  660 (46.8%) 
Total 
claimants 
5 years and 
over  
146,870 (44.0%) 
 
175,390 (56.8%) 
 
31,200 (46.3%) 
 
34,110 (59.5%) 
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Long-Term Unemployment, the Invention of ‘Hysteresis’  
and the Misdiagnosis of Structural Unemployment in the UK 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates the empirical basis for the belief that unemployment makes people less 
“employable”, and that the existence of a pool of long-term unemployed people is therefore in 
itself a barrier to full employment.  Drawing on data for Great Britain from the 1940s to the 
present day, it shows that this idea has arisen through misinterpretations of the statistical evidence. 
 The resulting policies, besides diverting resources from the demand-side programmes appropriate 
to the true situation of structural unemployment, appear to have created a problem of the kind they 
were intended to address, by encouraging unemployed people to move on to sickness benefits. 
 
Key words:  Long-term unemployment, Unemployment persistency, Hysteresis, 
Employability, State dependence 
JEL classifications:  B22, I38, J64, R23 
 
 
Over the last twenty years, a huge academic literature and a raft of policies have 
grown up on the basis of the idea that an increase in unemployment produces an 
increase in long-term unemployment which is not simply reversible by an increase 
in demand for labour.  Special policies are alleged to be required to “reconnect” 
the long-term unemployed with the labour market.  This is assumed to be because 
being unemployed makes people less “employable”, so that the existence of a pool 
of long-term unemployed people in itself becomes a barrier to full employment.  It 
is argued that there is “hysteresis”, in other words the behaviour of the labour 
market is determined not by the current state of economic variables, but by what 
has happened before.   
 
While there clearly are people who need help to improve their employability for 
various individual reasons, this paper will show that there never has been any 
problem of irreversibility in long-term unemployment in the aggregate and that 
the policies supposedly required to deal with it are therefore unnecessary.  A rise 
in unemployment duration is a natural and unavoidable consequence of a rise in 
unemployment level.  With falling total unemployment, it reverses itself.   The 
belief that it has some special significance is the result of analytical mistakes 
including jumping to conclusions on the basis of very short runs of data, failure to 
examine the relevant lag structures, and failure to consider the geography of 
unemployment and its connection with employment change.  There is a 
straightforward explanation for the persistency of high unemployment in Britain, 
indicated by much previous experience, especially in the interwar period.  
Because it arose mainly from loss of employment in manufacturing and mining, 
which was concentrated in particular places, it is structural.  Adjustment both 
sectoral and geographical has been required, and this takes time.  Furthermore, the 
employment losses were not merely a once-for-all “shock”, but a continuing trend. 
 Jobs have gone on being lost from the same industries in the same places, so that 
adjustment processes could not catch up.  
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In response to the mistaken analysis of long-term unemployment, official policy 
has not only de-emphasised the demand-side urban and regional policies which 
would have helped to address the real problem.  It has also directed large 
resources to “active labour market policies” aimed at shortening unemployment 
durations and addressing “employability”.  The efficacy of these programmes is at 
best doubtful.  Most seriously, the state of being unemployed has been made so 
unattractive, by reducing benefits, shortening their duration, and imposing 
increasingly stringent conditions on their receipt, that large numbers of people 
have been driven into the status of long-term sickness, where they have even less 
chance of getting a job.  Thus economists and policy makers have created a 
problem of the very kind they thought they were addressing.   
 
The paper is laid out as follows.  The first two sections set out what has happened 
to unemployment and unemployment duration in Great Britain from the 1940s to 
the present day, in time series and cross-section, drawing data from the claimant 
count, Labour Force Survey and Census.  The third and fourth sections outline the 
reasons for misinterpretation of the evidence, and the theories around 
unemployment duration which grew from the mid-1980s onwards.  The fifth 
section outlines the policies which were based upon them and shows how these 
policies have led to a real problem of “hysteresis”, of an unforeseen kind.   The 
brief final section draws out some lessons.  
 
The paper’s findings about the relationship between unemployment duration and 
employability are the same as those of Åberg (2001), who examined Swedish data 
on long-term unemployed individuals and concluded that they did not show 
falling employability.  But this paper takes a different approach in focusing on 
unemployment aggregates at national and local levels.  It is probably more 
conclusive, in showing that the supposed phenomena which gave rise to theories 
of unemployment hysteresis did not exist in the first place. 
 
This paper uses the now standard definition of “long-term” as over a year.  
 
 
 
1. Unemployment and unemployment duration since the war 
 
Fig. 1 shows the course of total and long-term claimant unemployment in Great 
Britain since 1948, as percentages of the labour force (the “economically active”). 
 The huge scale of the surge in unemployment in the early 1980s is apparent.  The 
peak of the early 1990s was lower, but also very high.  Total and short-term 
unemployment show marked seasonality, whereas by definition long-term 
unemployment cannot do so.  Otherwise, short- and long-term unemployment 
have moved very closely together, when allowance is made for the time lags.  
Short-term unemployment leads total unemployment (“U”) by about one quarter.  
Long-term unemployment, measured as a percentage of the labour force (“L”), 
lags total unemployment by 3 quarters, and lags short-term unemployment by one 
year.  Long-term unemployment measured as a percentage of total unemployment 
(“LAPU”) lags total unemployment by 6 quarters.    
 
INSERT FIG. 1 HERE  
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Sources:  DEP 1971, Employment Gazette, Labour Market Trends, NOMIS.  
From Jul 1962 the recording dates changed from Mar, Jun, Sept, Dec to Jan, Apr, 
Jul, Oct.  Jan 1974 and Jan 1975 missing. 
 
In measuring long-term unemployment, economists have usually focused on 
LAPU rather than on L.  This has proved unfortunate, in that LAPU behaves 
oddly, as shown in Fig. 1.  Its lag behind total unemployment is double that for L. 
 Unlike L, LAPU is affected by seasonality in U, which is its denominator.  In 
addition, while L tracks U smoothly, LAPU moves in the opposite direction at 
turning points.  This is because a turning point has an immediate effect on short-
term unemployment, which makes LAPU rise or fall, even if the actual level of 
long-term unemployment remains unchanged.  Finally, LAPU is not of intrinsic 
interest since in relation both to policy and to hysteresis-type theories, the issue is 
the actual amount of long-term unemployment, which is only consistently shown 
by L. However, L does have one disadvantage, in that the variability of the 
relationship between long-term unemployment and total unemployment is 
constrained by the fact that long-term is included within total unemployment.  In 
examining this relationship it is therefore worth looking at all the different 
measures. 
 
Allowing for the appropriate lags, Figs. 2, 3 and 4 show that the relationships 
between the different measures of unemployment over the 55 years 1948-2003 
have remained effectively the same.  Although long-term unemployment did 
indeed rise hugely after 1979 and 1990, it has tracked down in relation to short-
term and to total unemployment in almost exactly the same way that it tracked up. 
 In spite of changes in policy, there has been no significant change in the 
relationship at any time, however it is measured.  There is no sign that the pool of 
supposedly less employable long-term unemployed people, which has so 
preoccupied economists and governments, ever existed.  Even the UK 
government’s active labour market programmes (the “New Deals”), introduced 
since April 1998 and aimed particularly at addressing long-term unemployment, 
have had no visible effect at this level. 
 
INSERT FIG. 2 HERE 
 
Sources:  As for Fig. 1.  Jul and Oct 1962, Jan 1963, Jan 1974 and Jan 1975 
missing.  
 
The relationship between L and U (Fig. 2) is the most important, because L 
measures the stock of long-term unemployed people, while U is a good measure 
of the overall balance of supply and demand for labour.  The L-U curve is 
asymptotic to the U-axis, with a pronounced curvature when U is below about 7 
per cent, but almost linear above this.  This form has an obvious explanation.  
First, it must be the case that if unemployment is higher, average duration of 
unemployment will be higher, since more people will be competing for each job 
vacancy and therefore the probability of re-employment in any given time period 
must be lower.  This process was analysed for the USA by Sider (1985), who 
showed that there is a simple linear relationship between unemployment rate and 
unemployment duration.  He estimated that 84 per cent of the impact of a change  
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in unemployment rate resulted in altered durations, and only 16 per cent in altered 
incidence of unemployment.  Machin & Manning’s finding (1998) that the rise in 
long-term unemployment since the 1960s is due to a collapse in outflow rates 
from unemployment at all durations points the same way.  This explains the 
monotonic form of the relationship over its whole length, and its almost linear 
character at higher levels of unemployment.  Second, there are people in the 
labour force who really are less easily employable, as the result of various genuine 
handicaps, such as disabilities, illiteracy, criminal record etc.  These people are 
more likely to be long-term unemployed.  At high levels of unemployment they 
are a small proportion of the total of long-term unemployed people, and scarcely 
affect the almost linear form of the curve at these levels.  But as unemployment 
falls this less employable group forms an increasing proportion of the total, and 
becomes significant.   Hence the curvature, and the approach to the horizontal, at 
lower levels of unemployment.  There is direct evidence to support this.  The 
number of people “classified as unsuitable for ordinary industrial employment” 
was 16.1% of the unemployed total  when it was 217,546 in February 1941, but 
29.2% in November 1941 when unemployment had fallen to 95,335 (ILO 1942).  
Similarly, the registered disabled were only 12.2% of the male unemployed in 
1971, when total unemployment was close to 3%, but 25.9% in 1953, when it fell 
below 2% (Baxter 1972).   
 
There is some scatter of observations about the L-U curve.  In part, this is due to 
fluctuations in U, arising from seasonality, changes in trend, or extraneous shocks. 
 For, although L is independent of short-term unemployment, the L-U relationship 
itself is obviously not.  An example of the effect of a shock is October 1963, 
which is a conspicuous outlier below the curve.  This is because unemployment in 
January 1963, 3 quarters earlier, was boosted by short-term unemployment caused 
by a severe winter.  There was similar turbulence around the turning point of July 
1990 to July 1991. 
 
INSERT FIG. 3 HERE 
 
Sources:  As for Fig. 1.  Jul 1962-Apr 1963, Jan 1974 and Jan 1975 missing.  
 
Fig. 3 demonstrates that the form of the L-U curve is not merely an artefact of the 
chosen measure.  It shows the relationship between long-term and short-term 
unemployment over the same period 1948-2003, using the 1-year lag which is 
appropriate in this case.  This relationship is indeed somewhat less close than in 
the L-U curve, but it has essentially the same form.  Here it could be argued that 
there is some evidence of “stickiness” in the return after the 1984 peak, though 
not after 1993.  However, any such effect has been small and temporary, and is of 
course relative to short-term unemployment.  It does not indicate significant 
“stickiness” in the absolute level of long-term unemployment.   
 
INSERT FIG. 4 HERE 
 
Sources:  As for Fig. 1.  Jul 1962-Oct 1963, Jan 1974 and Jan 1975 missing.  
 
Fig. 4 shows the relationship in 1948-2003 of LAPU with total unemployment, 
with its 6-quarter time lag.  The form of the curve in this case is the mirror image  
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of the L-U curve, with the slope falling as U rises.  This reflects the fact that, as 
seen in Fig. 2, L rises relative to U while U is low, but then develops an 
approximately linear relationship.  The LAPU-U relationship is somewhat less 
close again, but the chart shows that LAPU also has tracked total unemployment 
fairly smoothly, both up and down.  If hysteresis really existed, higher and higher 
percentage values of LAPU would be seen in the downswing, as short-term 
unemployment fell while long-term unemployment remained elevated. 
 
INSERT FIG. 5 HERE 
 
Sources:  As for Fig. 1.  Jan 1974 and Jan 1975 missing.  
 
The LAPU-U relationship is often charted without a lag (e.g. OECD 1987, 
Machin & Manning 1998).  This produces the characteristic “loops” shown in Fig. 
5, which have provoked considerable discussion.  Looking at these loops in a 
short time series, the OECD drew the unwarranted inference that there was a 
“ratchet effect” or “long-term unemployment trap”.  Machin & Manning (1998) 
criticised the OECD, pointing out that the loops are only a cyclical effect.  But 
even they did not identify that there is an omitted 6-quarter lag.     
 
The UK quarterly series for the ILO measure of unemployment has been available 
only since 1992, and therefore is of little use in the present study.  Fig. 6 uses a 
reasonable substitute, namely the annual series for 1979-2003 printed in the 
OECD’s Employment Outlook.  A 1-year lag is used as the best approximation to 
the correct 3-quarter lag.  On the basis of this series also, UK long-term 
unemployment has tracked down in approximately the same way that it tracked 
up.   
 
INSERT FIG. 6 HERE 
 
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook, standardised unemployment and survey-
based long-term unemployment.  Revisions to the OECD statistics can be 
substantial;  the latest published figure has been used in every case.  
 
 
2. Geographical cross-section analyses 
 
Defenders of hysteresis theories might try to argue that the L-U curve would have 
shown downward stickiness but for the fact that they persuaded the British 
government to adopt policies which successfully headed it off.  This would leave 
their position based on an imaginary alternative state.  Moreover, British policy 
towards the unemployed has varied substantially over the period since the 1983 
unemployment peak, so that it is unlikely that policy change could explain a 
consistent absence of downward stickiness.  However, what finally disposes of 
“hysteresis” is that the cross-section data tell the same story as the time series.   
 
Fig. 7 shows the relationship between claimant L and U for British regions for the 
five years 1977, 1982, 1990, 1995 and 2001.  All regions have tracked up and 
down the same curve over this 24 year period, even though some, such as the 
North, have consistently had higher L and U than others.  There is no sign that any  
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region has had consistently elevated long-term unemployment.   
 
INSERT FIG. 7 HERE 
 
Sources:  Oliver and Webb 1982, Employment Gazette, Labour Market Trends  
 
The British “regions” are not much use in analysing the local labour markets 
which are relevant to the kind of people who experience unemployment.  The 
local market level is best captured by local authority boundaries, rather than the 
official Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs), which conceal the high concentrations 
of unemployment in the cities within large areas covering their white collar 
commuting hinterland (Webster & Turok 1997).  Fig. 8 shows the relationship 
between L and U for all British local authorities when L was at its peak in the 
mid-1980s.  L for July 1984 is plotted against U for October 1983, 3 quarters 
earlier.  The denominator is the count of economically active working age people 
in the Census of April 1981.   
 
INSERT FIG. 8 HERE 
 
Source:  NOMIS and as Fig. 2  
 
Remarkably, this shows the same curve as seen in the time series data for Great 
Britain.  This is confirmed by adding the data points for the Great Britain national 
relationship for 1948 to 2003 already shown in Fig. 2 to the chart in Fig. 8, as 
open circles.  They are almost entirely hidden, because the two curves are 
effectively identical.  The main difference between the two data sets is that for 
individual local authorities at the unemployment peak, unemployment and long-
term unemployment ranged up to over double the national average.  The local 
authority data set also has more scatter about the curve, due mainly to the 
existence of high seasonal unemployment in some localities, which boosts the 
unemployment total with people who by definition cannot be long-term 
unemployed.  Confirming this, the outliers, almost all below the curve, are mainly 
seaside places.  Unfortunately no official seasonal adjustments are available at 
local authority level, and they could not be produced for this paper within the 
resources available.  However, an exercise was undertaken earlier to make a 
seasonal adjustment of data for the 60 Scottish Travel-to-Work Areas at October 
1995 (Webster 1997).  This confirmed the nature of the seasonal effect and 
produced a large reduction in scatter about the L-U curve.   
 
Fig. 9 shows that the L-U curve across British local authorities was the same in 
July 1996 as in July 1984.  Although the level of unemployment had fallen greatly 
in most areas, long-term unemployment had everywhere tracked back down in a 
uniform way.   
 
INSERT FIG. 9 HERE 
 
Sources:  NOMIS, Census 2001 (ONS/GRO Scotland) 
 
Fig. 10, by contrast, shows that by July 2001 some change had occurred in the L-
U relationship across local authorities.  The curve had shifted downwards, so that  
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areas with higher levels of unemployment had a systematically lower level of 
long-term unemployment than they would have had on the basis of the 
relationship applying in 1984 and 1996.  This is very likely to be the result of the 
government New Deals.  These will initially have had little effect, because they 
were largely confined to people aged under 25, who are not often long-term 
unemployed.  But they have gradually affected the prime 25-49 age group.  Since 
April 2001 it has been effectively impossible for anyone of this age to be claimant 
unemployed for longer than about 22 months.  However, this does not necessarily 
mean that these people have moved into work.  This issue will be taken up again 
in section 3.    
 
INSERT FIG. 10 HERE 
 
Source:  NOMIS, Census 2001 (ONS/GRO Scotland) 
 
3. Reasons for the misinterpretation of long-term unemployment 
 
It is clear from the data that long-term unemployment has had an almost 
completely unvarying, simple relationship with total unemployment throughout 
the post-war period.  At no time or place has there ever been significantly more or 
less long-term unemployment than would be predicted from this simple 
relationship, other than as a result of incidental factors such as localised seasonal 
unemployment or, since 1998, the New Deals which are specifically designed to 
prevent people from being long-term claimant unemployed.  How then did the 
idea take root that pools of long-term unemployment have wielded significant 
influence on the labour market in their own right?   
 
The most basic reason seems to have been a pre-existing belief that this would be 
the case.  The idea occurs in the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission in 
1909:  “The effect of Unemployment upon the individual workman is to make him 
in course of time Unemployable” (S. & B.Webb, 1909).  Pigou (1933) asserted:   
“If a man is subjected to unemployment for a long period of time, injurious 
reactions on his industrial and human quality are almost certain to result....when 
opportunity comes again, the man, once merely unemployed, is found to have 
become unemployable”.  Beveridge (1937) drew the conclusion from the inter-
war data that long-term unemployment remained on a new higher level after the 
Depression, even though his own data showed a simple relationship between 
unemployment level and duration (Webster 1996).  He commented:  “Nor is it 
possible for most of (the long-term unemployed) to escape physical and 
psychological deterioration through long idleness”.  The wartime analyses by the 
ILO (1942) and Reubens (1945), which contradicted this view by showing that 
long-term unemployment in Britain fell away almost completely when the war 
started, seem to have been ignored.  Reubens noted about data for 1940 that 
“When the depressed areas were ranked for percentage unemployed and for 
percentage of unemployed out of work for a year or more, the correlation was 
perfect”. 
 
From the later 1950s, unemployment began to rise slowly again, and long-term 
unemployment with it.  The pronounced upward curvature in the L-U relationship 
at low levels of unemployment was observed in time series by Simler (1964), who  
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showed that the long-term to total unemployment ratio for the USA in 1958-63 
was underpredicted by the data for 1947-57.  He assumed that the relationship was 
worsening.  Baxter (1972) drew similar conclusions from the British data. 
 
Thus when commentators came to look at the huge upsurge in long-term 
unemployment after 1979, especially if they were writing on the basis of evidence 
before the downswing began after 1986, they were primed to see it as indicating 
the existence of “hysteresis”.  A consensus to this effect rapidly emerged.  Budd et 
al. (1988) wrote:  “The ratio of long-term unemployment is higher than one would 
expect for a given level of unemployment”.  Layard & Nickell (1987) referred to 
“the pile-up of long-term unemployment” and asserted that “If there were now a 
major economic recovery....it is most unlikely that long-term unemployment 
would fall at all rapidly, unless specific measures were taken to encourage 
employers to hire the long-term unemployed”.  The OECD (1988) argued:  
“Long-term unemployment is now more serious than it was in the pre-
recessionary 1979 period and is most unlikely to revert to the levels which 
prevailed at that time.  This suggests that what we are observing is a ratchet-type 
effect”.   
 
A number of other factors contributed to the misinterpretation.     
 
     Neglect of the time-lags  Bean (1994), writing on European unemployment, 
commented:  “Most of the empirical literature is characterised by a distinctly 
cavalier attitude to lag structures”.  In time series analyses, this neglect has led 
commentators to assume that long-term unemployment was downwardly sticky, 
when in fact it was conforming to the normal relationship.  In cross-section 
analyses, especially between countries, neglect of the time lags has led to a 
spurious appearance of variability which was simply due to different places being 
at different points in the cycle (e.g. OECD 1994 and 2002).  The frequency of 
both types of mistake has been increased by the use of LAPU, with its long time 
lag.  It is impossible to obtain even a reasonable approximation to the correct one-
and-a-half-year time lag for LAPU from annual data which are often all that are 
available on an international basis.   
 
     Seasonal unemployment  In geographical cross-sectional analyses seasonality 
can also lead to a spurious appearance of variation, since some areas have far 
more seasonal unemployment, which, as noted earlier, increases the denominator 
but not the numerator of LAPU.  Examples are Green (1985) and Rigg & 
Robertson (1996).   
 
      Institutional differences  There is clear evidence that the long-term to total 
relationship in the inter-war period in the UK was different from that since 1948 
and that this was probably due to the administrative treatment of unemployment 
spells (Webster 1996).  It is therefore almost inevitable that such differences 
should exist between countries.  The OECD (2002) lists some of the differences in 
the operational definitions of long-term unemployment between countries.  
Machin & Manning (1998) point out that these differences probably also affect 
the ILO unemployment measures, even though they are intended to be 
comparable.   
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      Omission of scatter diagrams  Presumably because of their preconceptions, 
investigators have often asserted or implied that their data showed a loose 
relationship between long-term and total unemployment when a simple scatter 
diagram would have shown them otherwise.  Examples are Beveridge (1937), 
Oliver & Webb (1982) and Green & Owen (1990).  Oliver & Webb commented 
that “Broadly speaking, those regions with the highest overall unemployment 
rates also have the highest....rates of long-term unemployment” when their data 
actually showed correlations of 0.98 and 0.99.  It should be remembered that up to 
around 20 years ago, scatter diagrams had to be laboriously drawn by hand.   
 
4. Theories of unemployment duration 
 
This analysis has shown that there is nothing for hysteresis-type theories to 
explain.  The relationship between long-term and total unemployment has not 
changed.  The persistency of both has the same simple explanation, indicated by 
Figs 8, 9 and 10:  the distribution of unemployment between different local labour 
markets is very uneven.  Persistent long-term unemployment is an inevitable 
accompaniment of the high levels of unemployment in the worst areas.  These 
areas are mainly those which have been most affected by deindustrialisation, 
losing large numbers of manufacturing and mining jobs since the 1970s and in the 
main not yet having acquired an alternative economic base.  The spatial 
connection between job loss and unemployment has been spelled out for cities by 
Turok (1999), for the coalfields by Beatty et al. (1997) and at regional level by 
Rowthorn (2000), although it has been much confused by misleading official 
statistics which are only now being rectified (Webster 2002).   
 
The appropriate diagnosis is therefore one of spatially concentrated structural 
unemployment, with a spatial mismatch between the unemployed and job 
opportunities.  However the belief that there was “hysteresis” has led to a variety 
of other theories, some of which have had important consequences in the real 
world.  From a policy viewpoint, the key theories relate to alleged “state 
dependence” and to the role of out-of-work welfare benefits.  “Characteristics” 
and “insider-outsider” theories are also briefly considered. 
   
State Dependence   
 
The most straightforward theory was that pools of unemployable long-term 
unemployed had built up because the exposure of large numbers of people to the 
experience of unemployment as a result of “shocks” to the economy had made 
them less employable.  (The “shocks” were particularly the oil price hike of 1973 
and the Thatcher-Howe recession of 1979-83.)  The probability of exit from 
unemployment was thought to be dependent upon the length of time for which a 
person had been in the state of being unemployed.  This idea was advocated in 
particular by Budd (e.g. 1998), Layard et al. (e.g. 1991) and the OECD (e.g. 1983, 
1988).  It has the obvious implication that it is important to catch people early in 
each unemployment spell and give them work or training to prevent the loss of 
employability.  This has underlain the development of the UK government’s New 
Deals, and of “active labour market policy” in general.   
 
The main evidence adduced for this type of theory has been the secular rise in  
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LAPU.  However, four other main arguments have also been put forward. 
 
 *    The declining probability of re-employment with increasing 
unemployment duration   This is a well established empirical 
phenomenon.  It is universally accepted that much of the decline is due to 
“heterogeneity”, i.e. ex ante differences among the unemployed in their 
personal probability of exit at each duration.  As those with the best 
chance of exit leave the pool of unemployed, the probability of exit for 
those remaining must fall.  In spite of a large literature devoted to this 
topic, there is no conclusive evidence that there is any “state 
dependence” over and above the “heterogeneity” effect.   
  
  Advocates of “state dependence” have cited employer discrimination, 
atrophy of skills, and declining job search intensities as explanations of 
the declining probability of re-employment.  But Layard et al. (1991) and 
Robinson (1991) note that employer discrimination is stronger in areas 
with tight labour markets and weaker in slack ones.  To explain the 
declining probability, it would have to be the other way about.  Bean 
(1994) found a lack of convincing evidence for skills atrophy.  And both 
Layard et. al and Robinson for the UK, and Åberg (2001) for Sweden, 
found that search intensity does not in fact decline with unemployment 
duration. 
  
  By contrast, spatial mismatch can clearly in principle account for that 
part of the declining probability of exit from unemployment which is not 
due to personal heterogeneity.  It takes longer to get a job in Glasgow’s 
Parkhead than in, say, North Yorkshire’s Ripon, because jobs are scarcer. 
 The unemployed of Parkhead must therefore steadily come to account 
for an increasing share of the UK total at each successively longer 
duration, irrespective of their personal characteristics. 
 
As Røed et al. (1999) recently pointed out, a further limitation of most 
investigations of “state dependence” is that they do not separately 
identify exits from unemployment into economic inactivity.  Such exits 
raise the question of the influence of incentives provided by the benefits 
system, considered further below. 
  
  * Changing exit probabilities over time   Budd et al. (1988) attached 
great importance to the fact that over the period 1979-87, the exit 
probability for the 2+ quarters unemployed fell proportionately more than 
that for the newly unemployed.  They argued that this proved that there is 
state-dependence.  But: 
    - The newly unemployed contain more of the seasonally and 
temporarily unemployed than do the 2+ quarter unemployed;  their exit 
probabilities are relatively invariant to the level of unemployment and 
this must reduce the degree of fluctuation in their exit probabilities.   
    - A worsening degree of spatial mismatch would produce 
differential effects on exit probabilities of the type observed.  Spatial 
mismatch did increase sharply in 1979-84, which was the period of most 
rapid industrial employment loss.  Therefore Budd et al. were wrong to  
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state that “the observed pattern of exit probabilities from unemployment 
can only be explained by the existence of state-dependence” (emphasis 
added).   Similar objections apply to the parallel argument of Jackman & 
Layard (1991), based on changes in exit probabilities 1969-85.  Machin 
& Manning (1998) note that this latter argument was dependent on a 
particular unreasonable assumption. 
  
  * The outwardly shifting U-V (“Beveridge”) curve  There is nowadays 
more unemployment (U) at any given level of job vacancies (V) than 
there used to be (Jones & Manning 1990).  Budd et al. (1988) presented 
econometric evidence of a strong association between long-term 
unemployment and the outward shift of the U-V curve and concluded 
that this was due to state dependence rendering the long-term 
unemployed less capable of taking up the vacancies.  Layard et al. (1991) 
shared this view, although more “by a process of elimination” of other 
explanations than because of direct evidence (Jackman et al. 1989).  
However, there is now good evidence that the increase in vacancies is 
largely due to the expansion of sectors which have high labour turnover 
and therefore high vacancy rates, and therefore indicates nothing about 
labour demand (Webster 2000).  In addition, the association noted by 
Budd et al. can be readily explained by spatial mismatch.   
  
  * Non-contribution of the long-term unemployed to wage adjustment 
  There have been recurrent findings from econometric studies that higher 
long-term unemployment is associated with higher rates of wage 
inflation.  Budd et al. (1988), the OECD (1987), and Layard et al. (1991) 
all argued that (in the latter’s phrase) the long-term unemployed are not 
“good inflation-fighters”.  They attributed this to the loss of 
employability of the long-term unemployed.  But it can equally well be 
explained by spatial mismatch.  As shown in Figs 8, 9 and 10, the long-
term unemployed are disproportionately concentrated in areas which 
already have a labour surplus.  Naturally therefore they are not going to 
be effective in relieving labour supply bottlenecks in areas of low 
unemployment.   
  
Layard et al. (1991) looked directly at the question of spatial mismatch as an 
explanation of unemployment persistence.  However, the lowest spatial level 
which they considered was the official TTWAs, which as noted earlier wash out 
the most important spatial variations in unemployment.  This renders invalid their 
conclusion that mismatch of all types (occupational etc as well as spatial) could 
account for at most some two-fifths of total UK unemployment.  
 
Nickell (1997) argued directly that “active labour market policies” (ALMP) have 
cut long-term unemployment, on the basis of cross-national regressions using 
averages of OECD “standardised” ILO unemployment for 1983-88 and 1989-94.  
However replication of these regressions shows that the positive effect of ALMP 
depended entirely on two observations for Sweden.  With a longer run of data now 
available it is clear that the apparent effect of ALMP mainly reflected the fact that 
Sweden had low unemployment.  Up to 1992 Swedish “standardised” ILO 
unemployment had never risen above 4%.  Since then however there has been a  
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rapid escalation, to 9.9% in 1997, falling back only to 5.6% in 2003.  Once 
Sweden’s unemployment had risen to UK levels, its long-term unemployment also 
rose very sharply (Fig.6). 
  
Benefit Dependence Theories 
 
Benefit dependence theories are based on the idea that unemployment durations 
are higher when the ratio of benefits received by people out of work to net wages 
obtainable in work (the “replacement ratio”) is higher, and/or the duration of 
benefits is longer.  Their strongest advocates have been Layard and the OECD.   
 
There is a fundamental implausibility about this idea in relation to the UK.  To 
explain the huge variations in long-term unemployment since the 1970s there 
would have had to be huge variations in replacement ratios and/or benefit 
durations.  Up to the mid-1980s, these had not occurred, and the significant 
changes since then have been in the wrong direction.  Layard et al. (1991) 
conceded that “In Britain neither the replacement ratio nor the duration of benefits 
has altered much since the mid-1960s”.  There is, moreover, a good deal of direct 
British evidence against this type of theory (Bean 1994).  Budd (1988), while 
appearing to give some credence to it, noted that his own empirical evidence 
contradicted it.   
 
Nevertheless this type of theory appears to have had major effects on British 
policy.  Starting in the early 1980s there have been successive reductions in 
unemployment benefit levels and duration.  In part this has probably simply 
reflected the fact that it is an apparently easy way to save money, and the theory’s 
intuitive appeal.  However, it has also reflected a widespread belief that less 
generous benefit regimes have given a handful of countries lower ratios of long-
term to total unemployment.  These countries were the USA and Canada, and to a 
lesser extent Australia and New Zealand.  Otherwise, there is a remarkable 
similarity and constancy in the long-term to total unemployment relationship 
across countries (Webster 1996, 1997).  These international differences could at 
least partly be due to differences in the administrative treatment of unemployment 
duration;  none of those advocating a benefit dependency explanation for long-
term unemployment has actually examined this possibility systematically.  
However, in the context of the present paper, what matters most is that there is 
now clear evidence that the differences are likely to be at least partly due to the 
effect of the benefit system on whether unemployment is classified as such, rather 
than to its effect on true labour market status. This is discussed further below. 
 
“Characteristics” Theories 
 
These theories are based on the observation that long-term unemployment is 
concentrated among people with particular characteristics.  In particular, older 
workers consistently have the highest propensity to be long-term unemployed and 
young workers the least;  and the long-term unemployed tend to be less well 
qualified educationally and to have higher rates of various types of disability.  It is 
reasoned that if the labour force were to come to contain higher proportions of 
these types of people, then this in itself could explain increases in long-term 
unemployment.  This was the “structural hypothesis” of Simler (1964).  There is  
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detailed analysis of this and other similar studies in Webster (1996).  This type of 
theory has not featured much in recent debates since to explain changes in long-
term unemployment on the scale seen since the 1970s, the changes in the 
character of the labour force would have had to be implausibly large. 
 
Insider-Outsider Theories 
 
These theories are based on the idea that re-entry to jobs of the long-term 
unemployed is inhibited by restrictive behaviour by those already in employment. 
 However they apply as much to total as to long-term unemployment and have had 
little effect on policy.  
 
5. Employment and worklessness since the mid-1980s:  the impact of policy 
 
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of the misdiagnosis of long-term 
unemployment on UK economic policy, and also on the subsequent development 
of the unemployment problem itself.  Budd, Layard et al. and the OECD all drew 
from their analysis the corollary that the UK’s high estimated “natural rate of 
unemployment” or NAIRU was substantially the result of its high level of long-
term unemployment.  The OECD (1995) argued “long-term unemployment places 
a high floor on the ‘natural rate’, which will only be effectively addressed by 
raising the labour market skills of the long-term unemployed and/or by increasing 
their attachment to the labour force”.  Budd went on to be the UK government’s 
Chief Economic Adviser, while Layard was largely responsible for designing the 
employment policies of the present Labour government.   
 
An unnecessarily high NAIRU is implied by the evidence of Figs 8, 9 and 10.  But 
this evidence suggests that the issue is not detachment of the long-term 
unemployed from the labour force due to the experience of unemployment, but the 
distance of a large number of the unemployed of all durations from relevant job 
vacancies as a result of spatial mismatch – in other words, structural 
unemployment.  The way to address this problem would have been through 
spatially targeted urban and regional programmes.  But these types of policy have 
been sidelined, while the main policy thrust has been on a “supply-side” package 
comprising “active labour market policy” and reductions in unemployment benefit 
levels and duration. 
 
This policy package has been put into place in the UK in three main stages.  In the 
first stage, in 1986, the level of unemployment benefits was reduced relative to 
sickness benefits, and the Restart programme was introduced which in effect 
made unemployment benefit conditional on the claimant “actively seeking work”. 
 In the second stage, in 1996, unemployment benefits were replaced by the Job 
Seekers Allowance, which lasts only 6 months and is more strongly dependent on 
active job seeking.  The third stage was the present government’s New Deal, for 
which the rationale was put together by Layard (1997).  The principle is to compel 
all claimants at a given unemployment duration to take up a preparatory 
“Gateway” followed by a subsidised or unsubsidised job placement of varying 
quality, or training.  This again has been introduced in stages, with the first stage 
applying mainly to young people aged 18-25.  The bulk of prime working age 
people were brought in only in April 2001 and those aged 50+ are as yet involved  
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only on a voluntary basis.  There is a geographical component to the policy in the 
form of Employment Zones in areas of high unemployment.  These however do 
not recognise any labour demand deficiency in these areas;  they purely comprise 
additional supply-side measures.    
 
There have been other changes along the way, which have together increased 
pressure on the unemployed to move out of this status.  To take only three 
examples:  earnings-related unemployment benefits were abolished in the early 
1980s;  the number of unemployed people having their benefit cut for not meeting 
jobseeking conditions increased from about 100,000 in 1993/94 to over 300,000 
in 1995/96 (Murray 1996);  and in the Budget of April 2003 the maximum length 
of journey to work the unemployed are expected to undertake was doubled from 
half an hour to an hour. 
 
Fig. 10 clearly indicates that the New Deals are now reducing long-term 
unemployment relative to short-term unemployment, in terms of the claimant 
count.  However there are three main problems. 
 
  New Deal outcomes  No evaluation is yet available of the full extension of 
the New Deal to prime age workers.  But the results for the 18-25s suggest modest 
and mixed results.  Estimates indicate an increase in youth employment of only 
8,000 to 20,000 (House of Commons 2002).  Not surprisingly, results have been 
worst in areas of high unemployment (Sunley et al. 2001).  And there is growing 
evidence that a substantial proportion of participants are simply going through a 
cycle of short-term unemployment in entry-level jobs, registered unemployment 
and participation in the New Deal.  By 2003, over one fifth (22.4%) had 
previously participated at least once (Hansard, 17/7/2003). 
 
  Spatial  unemployment disparities  It is evident from Fig. 10 that the 
New Deal has been ineffective in reducing unemployment disparities.  Even on 
the increasingly narrow claimant basis, unemployment at April 2003 (using 
Census 2001 economically active as denominator) ranged up to 10 per cent in 
individual local authority areas.  Many of the high unemployment areas are very 
large population centres, including Liverpool (8.9%), Manchester (8.9%), 
Middlesbrough (8.6%), Hull (8.1%), Birmingham (7.9%), Leicester (7.7%), 
Glasgow (7.4%), Dundee (7.2%) and Nottingham (6.8%).   
 
  Movement into other statuses  The most serious problem however is the 
enormous growth of economic inactivity, especially in the form of sickness, 
among men.  Recently constructed historical series for employment rates (Bell 
2000, Doyle 2003) show that the recession of 1979-83 cut the male rate by 9 
percentage points in only 4 years, and that it has since recovered by only 2 
percentage points.  Most of the fall in employment is due to an increase in those 
economically inactive due to sickness.  The European Labour Force Survey 
results for 2000 showed the UK with the highest working age sickness in the 
European Union, at 6.8 per cent.   
 
Sickness claims lasting over 6 months grew from under 400,000 in 1963 to over 2 
million in 2002 (Webster 2002).  Most of the increase took place in the decade 
following the 1986 package of unemployment benefit changes, and it has been  
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concentrated in areas of high unemployment.  Fig.11 shows the distribution of 
claimant long-term unemployment, sickness or disability, and total inactivity 
across British local authorities at April 2001.  Long-term claimant unemployment 
is clearly a small part of the picture.  Even for men, it reaches a maximum of 3.1% 
of the working age population, in Liverpool.  Sickness is a far bigger element, 
ranging up to 20% for men (13.4% in Liverpool).  It is clearly strongly correlated 
with unemployment.  In 1981, almost no area had more than 5.0 per cent of its 
working age population long term sick. 
 
INSERT FIG. 11 HERE 
 
Sources:  NOMIS, Census 2001 (ONS/GRO Scotland).  Working age 16-64.  Lines 
connecting the points are for visual clarity only. 
 
 
Many commentators argue that the UK has had a highly successful labour market 
performance, with unemployment now relatively low by both national and 
international standards.  But this view depends on downplaying the scale of 
working age sickness.  Nickell & Quintini (2002), for instance, characterised the 
high UK sickness level as an incidental “imbalance”.  However, they did not 
consider the geographical distribution of sickness or any other evidence on its 
direct relationship with unemployment.  Evidence has steadily accumulated that at 
least a large part of the growth of working age sickness is a direct result of the 
relative worsening of unemployment as a status brought about by the hysteresis-
inspired policy changes since 1986, aimed at addressing long-term 
unemployment.  This evidence relates to the large numbers of people in all labour 
market statuses who have a potential sickness claim, the timing and geographical 
distribution of the changes in status, and the direct impact of benefit differentials 
(Autor & Duggan 2003, Boeri & Edwards 1998, Beatty et al. 2000, Webster 2002, 
Bell & Smith 2004).  Bell & Smith now estimate that half a million men left the 
labour force during the 1990s primarily as a result of sickness benefit incentives.  
Like the behaviour of long-term unemployment itself, the shift of unemployed 
people into the status of sickness is a phenomenon which it should not have been 
difficult for economists to perceive.  These people are simply responding to the 
incentives with which the system now presents them.  In areas where it is difficult 
to get work, why should someone with a viable sickness claim stay unemployed, 
when sickness is both more attractive financially, and far more liveable in terms 
of freedom from pressure by the authorities?  Once a claimant is on sickness 
benefits, movement into a job becomes far less likely. 
 
Although the increase in long-term sickness represents an increase in long-term 
unemployment in a disguised form, it does not vindicate “hysteresis” theories.  
These theories were firmly based on the claim, refuted by the evidence presented 
in this paper, that excess and intractable long-term unemployment existed within 
the claimant or ILO unemployment totals.  Consequently they led  to the increase 
in the economically inactive sick for many years being overlooked.  Only now are 
orthodox commentators starting to give due attention to the issue of 
unemployment disguised as sickness. 
 
6. Conclusion  
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This story exemplifies many of the weaknesses of contemporary academic 
economics:  lack of interest in geography or spatial analysis;  pursuit of model-
building for its own sake;  lack of basic analysis of economic statistics, in spite of 
great proficiency in more complex techniques;  uncritical adoption of analysis at a 
“macroeconomic” level without establishing the validity of  the aggregates 
involved;  ignorance of the real situations which ordinary economic actors face;  
and a bias against considering the role of demand in labour markets which appears 
to reflect an ideological stance harking back to polemics of the 1930s.  Most 
fundamentally, there is a constant search for corroboration of the same narrow 
range of established hypotheses, rather than pursuit of the Popperian principle of 
falsification. 
 
The practical consequences of the misinterpretation of Britain’s long-term 
unemployment have been of the utmost seriousness.  Not only have effort and 
resources been directed away from policies which would have addressed 
structural unemployment;  but the policies actually adopted have led to the 
creation of what appears to be a real problem of the very type that the advocates 
of hysteresis theories thought they were addressing.  There now really is a large 
pool of people, on long-term sickness benefits, who are going to be particularly 
difficult to get into employment.   
 
Peter Mathias (1983) pointed out how the Benthamite Poor Law reform of 1834 
sprang from a fundamental misdiagnosis, in which widespread poverty was 
thought to be due to workshy attitudes among the poor rather than to the 
disruption resulting from drastic economic change.  It is sobering to think that a 
century and a half later, in spite of great technical development, economists 
should have made essentially the same mistake.   
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FIGURE 1   GREAT BRITAIN:  TOTAL AND LONG-TERM CLAIMANT UNEMPLOYMENT 1948-2003 
(quarterly data, not seasonally adjusted)
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FIGURE 2   GREAT BRITAIN 1948 - 2003:  
LONG-TERM BY TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 3 QUARTERS EARLIER
(quarterly claimant data, not seasonally adjusted)
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FIGURE 3    GREAT BRITAIN 1948-2003:  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT BY SHORT-TERM 
UNEMPLOYMENT ONE YEAR EARLIER (quarterly claimant data, not seasonally adjusted)
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FIGURE 4   GREAT BRITAIN 1948 - 2003:  LAPU BY U 6 QUARTERS EARLIER
(quarterly claimant data, not seasonally adjusted)
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FIGURE 5   GREAT BRITAIN 1948 - 2003:  LAPU BY U (unlagged)
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FIGURE 6   LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT BY SHORT-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT ONE YEAR EARLIER 
UK AND SWEDEN 1980-2003 according to OECD
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FIGURE 7   GB REGIONS:  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT BY TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
3 QUARTERS EARLIER
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FIGURE 8   GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES:  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT Jul 1984 by TOTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT Oct 1983 (Census 1981 working age economically active denominator)
with GB time series 1948-2003 (as FIGURE 2) for comparison
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FIGURE 9   GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES: LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT Jul 1996 by TOTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT Oct 1995 (Census 1991/2001 mean working age economically active denominator)
with GB LAs Jul 84/Oct 83 (as FIGURE 8) for comparison
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FIGURE 10   GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES:  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT Jul 2001 BY TOTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT Oct 2000 (Census 2001 working age economically active denominator) with GB 
LAs July 1984 (as FIGURE 8) for comparison
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FIGURE 11   GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES, April 2001:  LONG-TERM CLAIMANT UNEMPLOYMENT, 
SICK/DISABLED AND TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE AS % OF WORKING AGE POPULATION, 
BY CENSUS UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
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Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
SCOTLAND’S POPULATION DECLINE 
 
by David Webster
*, Glasgow City Council 
 
 
The population of Scotland is declining, both 
absolutely and relatively to the rest of the UK. 
Decline in the Scottish population relative to the 
rest of the UK is not new.  In fact it has been 
continuous at least since 1851.  But a prolonged 
period of absolute decline such as we are currently 
seeing is new; the only significant previous decline 
was by a rather small 40,000 in the 1920s.  Since 
1974 there has been a fall of about 100,000 and the 
decline is now projected to extend into the 
foreseeable future, accelerating after 2020. 
 
There are several reasons why this is a public 
policy issue.  First, there is clear evidence that 
continuing population decline is due to the failure 
of the Scottish economy to offer reasonable 
opportunities to a large section of the population, 
and that this economic failure affects both the 
migration and natural change (births minus deaths) 
components of population change.  Second, there 
are unfavourable fiscal consequences via the 
“Barnett formula”, under which relative decline in 
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the Scottish population reduces the public 
resources available to deal with the underlying 
problems.  Third, the economic significance of the 
decline appears to have been misinterpreted by 
Scottish policymakers who have drawn incorrect 
conclusions as a result. 
 
This paper analyses the causes and consequences 
of Scotland’s population decline.  It shows that: 
 
•  Recent discussion of Scottish population 
change has been over-sanguine, for two 
reasons: 
 
-The small gains of population through in-
migration to Scotland during the early 
1990s were due to the rare circumstance 
of a recession primarily affecting the 
south of England.  These gains have 
already been reversed and are unlikely to 
recur for a long time to come.   
 
-While there has been a longer term 
reduction in out-migration, it has been 
offset, for the first time in modern Scottish 
population history, by a serious 
deterioration in natural change, reflecting 
both a greater fall in the birth rate and a 
lesser fall in the death rate than in the rest 
of the UK.  
 
•  Net out-migration is continuing to occur 
because of poor relative employment 
performance.  The finding that migration is 
strongly determined by unemployment is well 
established in earlier work.  This paper shows 
that Scottish net out-migration flows continue 
to be strongly related to changes in the relative 
levels of unemployment in Scotland and the 
south east of England. 
  
•  Decline is not general across Scotland, but is 
confined to particular areas, mainly the inner 
Clyde Valley and especially Glasgow.  The 
decline in these areas is due to both migration 
and natural change and is responsible for most 
of the overall Scottish decline. 
 
•  Migration flows from the declining to the 
growing parts of Scotland are small and have 
been falling steadily.  There is therefore little 
labour market adjustment by long-distance 
migration within Scotland.  When jobs are lost 
in the inner Clyde Valley, many people leave 
Scotland altogether. 
 
•  The mortality component of the adverse trends 
in natural change in the inner Clyde Valley,  
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and especially Glasgow, is certainly a 
consequence of employment loss and resulting 
high levels of unemployment and deprivation. 
 It seems probable that the fertility component 
has been affected in a similar way. 
 
•  The current decline in the Scottish labour force 
is due to a combination of localised population 
decline and falls in economic activity, 
particularly in Glasgow, both of which are due 
to declining employment opportunity.  It 
therefore indicates not a shortage of labour, 
but localised surplus.  
 
•  Scottish population decline will intensify the 
fiscal stress already being created by the 
Barnett formula.  Less obviously, excess 
spending on social security, personal social 
services and health caused by the distress of 
Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley is one of 
the principal reasons for the strength of the 
current political pressure to reduce Scotland’s 
share of UK public expenditure. 
 
•  The analysis as a whole shows that Scotland’s 
population decline, out-migration, excess 
mortality, low economic activity and fiscal 
stress are all strongly interlinked and derive 
mainly from the economic distress of the inner 
Clyde Valley and especially Glasgow.  The 
decline in fertility is found in the same areas 
and appears likely to be affected by the same 
causes. 
 
These findings conflict with key assumptions 
generally held by Scottish policymakers, 
particularly in identifying the pivotal role of 
localised employment loss and in showing that the 
parlous state of Glasgow is so damaging to Scottish 
prospects.  They therefore have important 
implications for policy.  It is argued here that the 
distress of Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley is 
to a substantial extent actually the result of policies 
dating from the 1960s.  Scottish policymakers 
adopted a particularly strong version of the 
“growth pole” strategy, which was fashionable at 
that time, attempting to create what was conceived 
to be a more competitive spatial structure for 
central Scotland by concentrating resources on the 
New Towns.  This strategy has dominated policy 
through to the present day.  However, it depends 
upon a number of key assumptions, which in 
Scotland as elsewhere, have proved invalid.  The 
consequence has been to cause economic decline in 
the unfavoured areas without sufficient 
compensating growth in the target areas.  This 
paper concludes therefore that Scottish spatial 
economic development strategy needs to be 
fundamentally reshaped to promote employment 
growth in Glasgow and the inner Clyde Valley.  
 
The statistical analysis in this paper takes the story 
back a quarter century to 1974.  This was the year 
in which the Scottish population peaked, at 
5.241m, after almost continuous growth since 
records began in 1801.  It is also a convenient 
starting point in terms of availability of data.  The 
paper begins with an overview of Scottish 
population change, identifying the respective roles 
played by migration and by natural change.  It then 
goes on to consider migration and natural change 
separately in more depth, analysing the relationship 
with unemployment and the varying picture in the 
different parts of Scotland.  The issue of the 
declining Scottish labour force and the connected 
influence upon it of localised population decline 
and falling economic activity are then discussed.   
The implications for public expenditure via the 
Barnett formula and the debate surrounding it are 
drawn out.  Finally, the paper discusses how 
Scottish policy has come to tolerate, and promote, 
such extreme disparities in prosperity between 
areas.   
 
A one-off upward correction in the mid-year 
population estimate for Glasgow City of around 
12,000 was made in 1998 as a result of an increase 
in the electoral roll produced by a registration 
campaign.  This has affected several of the 
officially published figures for individual areas 
within Scotland.  The issue is discussed in 
Appendix 1.  To avoid confusion, all the tables and 
figures show the official statistics exactly as 
published; the implications of the correction for the 
likely true figures are discussed in the text.   
Sources and detailed issues of methodology are 
discussed in Appendix 2.   
 
Throughout the article, “Rest of Scotland” 
(“RoScot”) means all the Scottish Health Board 
Areas other than the one being considered.  “Rest 
of UK” (“RoUK”) always means England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
 
 SCOTTISH POPULATION CHANGE: THE 
OVERALL PICTURE 
 
The divergence of experience of population change 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK since 
1974 is plain.  In absolute terms, while Scotland’s 
population has fallen by 0.094m, the population of 
the rest of the UK has risen by 2.879m.  Figure 1 
shows these changes in index number terms, with 
Scotland falling to 98.1% of its 1974 population by 
1998 and the rest of the UK growing to 106.1%.  
The rest of the UK has seen unbroken population  
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increases since 1982, but the pattern for Scotland 
has been more variable.  The Scottish population 
fell steadily from 1976 to 1988, then rose at a 
slower rate than the rest of the UK to 1995 before 
resuming its fall.  The 1998-based projections have 
the Scottish population falling further to 97.0% of 
the 1974 figure by 2021, with decline accelerating 
thereafter to 93.0% in 2036.  The population of the 
rest of the UK by contrast is projected to grow 
continuously to 113.2% of its 1974 level in 2021 
with only a levelling off in its growth thereafter, to 
115.4% in 2036.  In consequence, whereas 
Scotland had 9.3% of the UK population in 1974, it 
had only 8.6% in 1998 and is currently projected to 
have 7.5% in 2036, one fifth less than its share in 
1974.   
 
This is a rather worse picture than is acknowledged 
in recent official statements.  The Secretary of 
State (1998) and Scottish Enterprise (1999a) have 
referred to the Scottish population as having been 
“static” “for the past 40 years” or “since 1950”.   
But this overlooks the continuing increase up to 
1974 and the substantial decline of about 100,000 
since then, and also the fact that death of the large 
post-war “baby boom” cohorts is certain to exert 
strong downward pressure on the population after 
2020.  
 
Figure 2 shows how migration and natural change 
have both contributed to the divergence in 
population change between Scotland and the rest of 
the UK since 1974.   
 
MIGRATION 
 
For most of the period migration has been much 
the more important factor, and it is changes in 
migration which explain most of the year-to-year 
fluctuations in the Scottish pattern of population 
change.  The switch to population growth in 1988-
1995 was due to net migration turning positive - 
only the second time this has happened since 
records began, the previous occasion being 1932 
and possibly 1933 (Hollingsworth 1970).  The 
impact of this change has however been modest.  
Although there were six years of migration gains, 
from 1989/90 to 1994/95, in only three of these - 
1989/90, 1992/93 and 1993/94 - did Scotland have 
a better migration experience than the rest of the 
UK.  And since 1995 the historical trend of net out-
migration has resumed, albeit at a lower rate than 
before. 
 
NATURAL CHANGE 
 
While the migration picture has improved, the 
experience of natural change has worsened.  Figure 
2 shows that Scotland and the rest of the UK have 
had similar year-on-year movements in natural 
change, but that there has been a steadily 
increasing divergence between them since 1976 so 
that Scotland’s experience has become 
progressively less favourable.  Natural change has 
now become almost as important as migration in 
explaining the overall divergence in population 
experience between Scotland and the rest of the 
UK.  This is a new phenomenon.  Net out-
migration has been an almost constant feature of 
Scottish life for more than two centuries, since the 
1780s.  But until recently, it has almost always 
been much more than offset by buoyant natural 
increase (Flinn et al. 1977). 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN 
SCOTLAND 
 
Geographical differences in population change 
between the different parts of Scotland are not an 
incidental detail.  They are the heart of the matter.  
Broadly speaking, Scotland might as well be three 
different countries: it has a declining part, a 
booming part, and a stable part.  Geographical 
analysis within Scotland in this paper is in terms of 
the 15 Health Board Areas (HBAs), because they 
are the smallest geographical units for which 
accurate data are available on a yearly basis.  Table 
1 shows the populations of the HBAs in 1974 and 
1998, together with information on employment 
change, unemployment and deprivation which is 
required to interpret migration and natural change.  
The biggest HBAs are Greater Glasgow, Lothian, 
Lanarkshire and Grampian, in that order, each 
having over 10% of the Scottish population.  At the 
other end of the scale, Dumfries & Galloway and 
Borders have less than 3% each and the three 
islands HBAs around a half per cent each. 
 
Total net population change over the whole period 
1974 to 1998 is dominated by the huge loss of over 
a quarter of a million people, 253,806, from the 
Clyde Valley - the combined area of the three 
HBAs of Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Argyll 
& Clyde.  Most of this, 218,187, was from Greater 
Glasgow, with Argyll & Clyde also showing a 
substantial loss of 33,281.  Lanarkshire’s loss was 
much smaller at 2,338.  Tayside - an area which 
unhelpfully from the present point of view 
combines the declining city of Dundee with a 
booming exurban hinterland around Perth - lost a 
net 11,383.  By contrast, Grampian gained 77,265 
and Highland 30,023, with Lothian, Fife, Forth 
Valley and Borders gaining smaller numbers.   
 
Official 1998-based population projections to 2016 
have just been published for the HBAs.  Figure 3  
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shows these and the 1974-98 changes on an annual 
basis so that they can be compared directly.  The 
main changes are that Greater Glasgow’s rate of 
loss is projected to be much reduced, while 
Grampian (reflecting the rundown of jobs in North 
Sea oil) moves from gain to loss, Highland ceases 
to gain significantly, and Lothian’s gain increases 
greatly.  But the picture overall is not very 
different.  In particular, the Clyde Valley’s losses 
continue to dominate at 60,000 over the 18 years, 
compared to a net Scottish loss of 42,000, with 
Greater Glasgow continuing to have the biggest 
loss, at 29,000.    
 
Figure 4 compares each HBA’s population change 
in 1981-96 with employment change (from the 
Census of Employment) over the same period.   
There is generally a fairly close relationship: areas 
gaining jobs gained people and areas losing jobs 
lost people.  The correspondence between 
employment and population change is not perfect 
because there are other flows, which are not related 
to employment.  In particular, Western Isles and 
Shetland both lost far more population than would 
be expected from their employment experience, 
presumably because of their remoteness.  The 
correlation between employment change and 
population change is 0.78 if they are excluded but 
comes down to 0.56 if they are included.  There 
has been strong net migration of retired people into 
Borders, Dumfries & Galloway, Fife and Tayside, 
and some decentralisation by commuters (Findlay 
et al. 1999); these flows also complicate the 
picture..   
 
Job gain or loss is reflected in unemployment and 
deprivation.  Table 1 shows that in 1971 
unemployment was generally relatively low.  The 
exception was Western Isles, where it was 12.3%; 
the Clyde Valley HBAs were also higher than the 
rest, in the 6%-8% range, with Greater Glasgow 
second highest at 7.6%.  By 1981 unemployment 
had risen greatly everywhere except Western Isles 
and Shetland, particularly in the industrial areas, 
with Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Ayrshire & 
Arran all rising by some 10 percentage points.  It is 
more difficult to track subsequent change.  Since 
1981, Census, claimant and Labour Force Survey 
unemployment figures have all become 
progressively more misleading because of the 
movement into other statuses of large numbers of 
people who want to work.  This issue has been 
discussed by a number of authors including Gregg 
& Wadsworth, Green and the TUC Economics 
Department.  The Sheffield Hallam University 
estimates of “real” unemployment are therefore 
shown in Table 1.  Based on empirical study of 
labour market adjustment in areas of job loss, they 
include estimates of those people on Incapacity 
Benefit or in other statuses (early retired, on 
government training schemes etc.) who would be 
employed in conditions of reasonably full 
employment (Beatty et al. 1997).   On this measure, 
it is striking how much worse are the Clyde Valley 
and especially Greater Glasgow than the rest of 
Scotland.  Greater Glasgow scores 28.9%, almost 
11 percentage points worse than the Scottish 
average.  This is due mainly to Glasgow City 
(30.6%).  Some people may baulk at the sheer 
magnitude of these figures.  But it should not be 
surprising, given the scale of the job losses which 
have been seen.  Glasgow lost one third of its 
manual jobs in 1981-91 alone, a larger number than 
the whole of the rest of Scotland put together.   
 
The 1991-based Carstairs deprivation scores in 
Table 1 mainly reflect the various consequences of 
unemployment.  They show how hugely deprived 
is Greater Glasgow by comparison to the rest of 
Scotland, with over half its population (almost all 
in the city of Glasgow and Clydebank) in the most 
deprived categories 6 and 7.  The other Clyde 
Valley HBAs have around one quarter of their 
populations in these categories, and Tayside one 
fifth, almost all in Dundee, while Western Isles 
also shows up strongly with 17% and Ayrshire & 
Arran has 11%, due particularly to the former 
coalfield area of Cumnock & Doon Valley.   
Reflecting general prosperity, the other HBAs have 
no or very small proportions of their populations in 
these categories.  Within the Clyde Valley, high 
levels of unemployment and deprivation in are in 
practice mainly confined to the inner Clyde Valley, 
from Motherwell, Coatbridge and Airdrie through 
Glasgow, Clydebank, Renfrew and Paisley to 
Dumbarton and Inverclyde.  The new towns of East 
Kilbride and Cumbernauld, as well as the 
prosperous Glasgow suburbs of Eastwood, 
Bearsden, Milngavie and Bishopbriggs, have 
relatively low levels of unemployment and 
deprivation.   
 
Figures 5A, 5B and 5C show the components of 
population change for each HBA.  As shown 
earlier in Figures 1 and 2, the overall rate and 
composition of population change in Scotland has 
varied, between three main time periods: 1974/75-
1988/89, 1989/90-1994/95, and 1995/96-1997/98.   
The three charts therefore show the components of 
change separately for each of these periods (to 
avoid problems resulting from the Glasgow 
population correction, for the international/error 
column only, the final period is 1995/96-1996/97). 
 Changes are expressed in terms of annual averages 
so that the three charts are directly comparable.   
Overall, apart from a rather unstable position in  
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relation to international migration, the geographical 
differences have remained similar over the whole 
1974-98 period, although losses from the losing 
areas and gains to the gaining areas are both 
generally smaller in 1995-98 than in 1974-89.  
 
The patterns of migration and natural change and 
their relationship to economic factors are now 
examined more closely. 
 
MIGRATION 
 
Scotland’s unfavourable migration experience is a 
consequence of relatively poor economic 
performance.  The levels of the net flows to the rest 
of the UK, and, perhaps more surprisingly, to the 
rest of the world, are predominantly determined 
from year to year by the capacity of the south of 
England to absorb migrants, as in turn determined 
by economic conditions there.   It was the inability 
of the south to absorb migrants during the 
recession of the early 1990s which created the 
more favourable Scottish migration experience of 
1989 to 1995.  Long-distance movements within 
Scotland play little economic role: the two halves 
of the country interact almost exclusively with the 
rest of the UK and with the rest of the world rather 
than with each other.  They have almost completely 
independent migration systems.   
 
DESTINATIONS FOR SCOTTISH NET OUT-
MIGRATION  
 
The net migration flow from Scotland is separated 
into its component destinations in Figure 6.   Net 
movement to and from the armed forces is only a 
small element, although, reflecting force manpower 
reductions, it accounted for a gain to Scotland of 
28,170 over the whole period 1974-98 and 
contributed significantly to the favourable 
migration experience in the early 1990s.   
Exchanges with the rest of the UK and with 
overseas countries are much more important, 
accounting for losses to Scotland of 83,800 and 
101,887 respectively in 1974-98.   
 
Scotland’s net migration loss to the rest of the UK 
is overwhelmingly to the south of England.  Over 
the 18 years 1980-97 net movement to the rest of 
the UK from Scotland was 37,000, but net 
movement to the three southernmost English 
regions (south east, East Anglia and south west) 
was almost double this, at 63,700.  Of this 
movement to the south, almost half (about 28,000) 
was to London and one third (about 21,000) to the 
rest of the south east.  Net movement to the 
Midlands and Wales was negligible, while 
Scotland actually gained 18,000 from the three 
northernmost English regions and 12,000 from 
Northern Ireland.  
 
MIGRATION EXCHANGE WITH THE REST 
OF THE UK 
 
Migration exchange with the rest of the UK is 
clearly related to changing job prospects.  There is 
a longstanding body of statistical work showing 
this (e.g. Oliver 1964; Adams 1980).  More 
recently, Forsythe (1995) has identified the north-
south movement of unemployed men directly, and 
studies in London of homeless people from 
Scotland have shown that job search is the main 
reason for their move south.  Jackman & Savouri 
(1992) have shown that long-distance migration 
increases when hiring by employers is taking place. 
  It rises when jobs are being created and falls 
during recessions.  The timing (as opposed to 
existence) of long-distance migration is therefore 
not determined by unemployment differentials but 
by changes in unemployment differentials.  In line 
with this, Figure 7 shows that there is a clear 
correlation (r = 0.62) over the period 1974-98 
between the annual change in the difference 
between the unemployment rates in Scotland and 
SE England, and the level of the net migration 
flow.  In most years, unemployment has fallen in 
SE England relative to Scotland, and migration has 
been from Scotland to the rest of the UK (which as 
we have seen means mainly to the SE).  The net 
flow to the rest of the UK was large until the mid-
1980s, accelerating as the Lawson boom took off in 
1987/88.  There has also been a net flow to the rest 
of the UK since 1994/95 as the economy in the 
south has recovered, falling off modestly in 
1997/98 as the Scottish economy briefly caught up. 
  At the time of writing, this relative economic 
improvement has already reversed again, and 
Figure 7 shows that the already known relative 
change in unemployment rates in 1998/99 implies 
that that year’s net migration flow (yet to be 
announced by the official statisticians) is likely to 
be barely positive.   
 
The striking exception to the general pattern of 
flow from Scotland to the rest of the UK was the 
recession years 1989/90 to 1992/93 when, 
unusually, Scottish unemployment was falling 
relative to the SE.  Green et al. (1994) have shown 
that the 1989-93 recession had a completely 
different geography from that of 1979-83.  The 
earlier recession, which was of the “structural” 
type, started in the north, reflecting the impact of 
sterling overvaluation on manufacturing, and much 
of the south remained relatively untouched.  The 
later recession, of the “debt deflation” type, started 
in the south, being due to unwinding of the over- 
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inflation of the service sector which had occurred 
during the later 1980s.  It only later spread to the 
north, again assisted by sterling overvaluation.     
There is a close parallel with 1932-33, when there 
was the same combination of a debt deflation 
recession originating outside Scotland and a 
favourable net migration flow.  At the time of 
writing we are again seeing the economy run in 
such a way as to favour the service economy of the 
south.  However the monetary regime is now much 
tighter and seems likely to prevent the excessive 
asset price inflation and growth of indebtedness 
which would be required for a recurrence of the 
1932-33 and 1989-93 experience.  It therefore 
appears likely that the relative buoyancy of the 
southern economy will continue to draw people out 
of Scotland. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
 
The international net outflow of migrants from 
Scotland has usually been broadly similar in 
magnitude to the net outflow to the rest of the UK. 
  It has been erratic, but the long-term trend is a 
steady reduction, although there have still only 
been three years when Scotland has actually gained 
population from the rest of the world - 1989/90, 
1993/94 and 1994/95.  Net movement to the rest of 
the world has a marked tendency to move inversely 
to migration to the rest of the UK, in particular 
rising strongly during the 1979-83 and 1989-93 
recessions, when net movement to the rest of the 
UK fell.  Inspection of the estimated international 
inflows and outflows (Figure 8) reveals that this 
inverse movement is due to changes in the outflow, 
not the inflow.  Similarly, the longer-term 
improvement in the balance is due to a slow rise in 
the inflow, not a fall in the outflow.  This is strong 
evidence that there is an underlying economic 
pressure to leave Scotland, and that movement to 
the rest of the world is regarded by migrants as a 
“second-best” compared to movement to the rest of 
the UK, presumably in view of higher financial and 
personal costs.  In other words, people leave for 
better opportunities; they get them in England if 
they can, otherwise they go further afield.   
 
PROJECTIONS OF SCOTTISH NET OUT-
MIGRATION 
 
The new official 1998-based projections assume 
that from 2001 the net Scottish migration loss to 
the rest of the UK and the rest of the world 
together will be 1,000 per year, compared to 3,000 
per year in the previous (1996-based) projection.  
These official projections take into account trends 
over the whole of the past decade and, unlike the 
present paper, do not consider an explicit model of 
the way migration is determined.  The analysis 
made here implies that there may be a continuation 
of the trend in 1995-98, when the net migration 
loss (including Armed Forces) was about 4,600 per 
year.  The argument of this paper does not depend 
on querying the official projections; however, it is 
worth being aware of the possibility that they may 
be overoptimistic.  
 
DIFFERING MIGRATION EXPERIENCE 
WITHIN SCOTLAND: DOMESTIC AND UK 
FLOWS 
 
The experience of migration, like population 
change as a whole, has been hugely different 
between different parts of Scotland.  Over the 
whole period 1974-98, the net migration loss to 
Scotland (excluding Armed Forces) was 186,390.  
But over four-fifths of this (152,745) was from the 
Clyde Valley, almost half of it (66,933) from 
Greater Glasgow, with Lothian also losing 26,255, 
while Grampian and Highland together gained 
21,361.  Changes elsewhere were relatively small.  
In the recent two years 1995-97 (a better guide 
than 1995-98 because avoiding the effects of the 
Glasgow correction), Scotland’s total migration 
loss was 16,278.  The Clyde Valley lost 4,457, with 
Grampian losing 8,428 and Tayside 2,488.  Lothian 
was the only significant gainer at 3,573 and the 
whole of the rest of Scotland lost only 4,478.   
While Lothian has performed better and Grampian 
worse in the most recent period compared to 1974-
88, the Clyde Valley has lost consistently.   
 
These geographical differences in migration reflect 
labour market differences.  Figures 9 to 11 show 
the relationship between changes in unemployment 
differentials and net migration to the UK outwith 
Scotland in 1974-98 separately for Greater 
Glasgow, Grampian and Lothian - the three HBAs 
with the largest net migration.  In each case, the 
claimant unemployment rate of the appropriate 
Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA) is used as a proxy 
for the true unemployment rate of the HBA, and 
compared with unemployment in the SE.  Not 
surprisingly, Greater Glasgow with its high 
unemployment shows the strongest dependence of 
migration on relative unemployment changes 
(correlation 0.67 for the migration rate, which 
adjusts for population change over the period, 
greater than the average of 0.62 for the rest of 
Scotland).  Grampian shows a fairly high 
correlation (0.59) and Lothian the lowest (0.46).   
Grampian’s low level of unemployment is reflected 
in the fact that it has far more observations lying in 
the top right quadrant of the chart than Lothian or 
(especially) Greater Glasgow. 
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Changes in unemployment therefore have a strong 
influence on migration flows between the different 
parts of Scotland and the rest of the UK.  However 
the same turns out not to be true of the flows that 
these different parts of Scotland exchange with 
each other, indicating that there is very little long-
distance labour market adjustment within Scotland. 
  The correlations of migration with relative 
unemployment change are weak for Greater 
Glasgow with Grampian (0.33) and Greater 
Glasgow with Lothian (0.43).  Figure 12 shows 
that apart from the exceptional years 1990/91 to 
1993/94, the flows between the Clyde Valley and 
the growing Grampian and Lothian HBAs have 
been very small by comparison with those between 
the Clyde Valley and the rest of the UK.  In other 
words, the east and west of Scotland have 
disconnected migration systems; they relate 
separately to the south of England but not to each 
other.  Migration losses from the Clyde Valley are 
losses to Scotland, not gains to the East.  This is 
particularly important because of the size of the 
Clyde Valley.  In spite of many years of population 
decline, the Clyde Valley’s share of Scotland’s 
population (Table 1) has fallen only from 41.2% in 
1974 to 37.1% in 1998.  In theory, Grampian and 
Lothian together might be big enough to absorb the 
Clyde Valley’s losses; together they accounted for 
29.4% of Scotland’s population in 1998, up from 
26.5% in 1974.  But in practice they do not (and 
the latest projections in any case suggest that 
Grampian will in future have little capacity to 
absorb net in-migration).  This leads to the 
important conclusion that Scotland’s loss of 
population through migration can be effectively 
stemmed only by improving employment 
performance in the inner Clyde Valley.   
 
This picture is different from that assumed by 
Scottish policy makers.  Since the Toothill Report 
(SCDI 1961) and the Scottish Office white papers 
of 1963 (Cmnd 2188) and 1966 (Cmnd 2864) 
which followed it, it has been assumed that people 
would migrate from the declining to the growing 
parts of Scotland, so that a strategy of promoting 
employment growth in what are considered to be 
the most competitive places will maximise the 
Scottish population.  As Parr (1999) notes, the 
assumption that people would migrate more readily 
to a growth centre in their own region than they 
would to places outside the region was made quite 
generally in the “growth pole” strategies which 
were fashionable at the time.  This idea continues 
to appeal.  In a recent paper on north east Scotland 
reported in The Herald (21 October 1997), Tony 
Mackay of Mackay Consultants argued that the 
“efficient” level of (claimant) unemployment for 
Aberdeen would be about 4%, higher than the then 
recorded 2.4%, and that people should therefore 
move from elsewhere in the country to live and 
work there.  But people evidently do not behave 
that way. 
 
Figures 5A to C show large within-Scotland net 
migration flows.  However this does not contradict 
the picture of small long-distance flows just 
outlined.  The within-Scotland flows are often 
dominated by short-distance moves.  For instance, 
in the case of Greater Glasgow, three-quarters of 
the net movement to “Rest of Scotland” since 1981 
have been to the adjacent HBAs of Lanarkshire, 
Argyll & Clyde and Ayrshire & Arran.  These local 
flows reflect residential choices and adjustment to 
decentralisation of employment.  They can 
therefore have important labour market effects, but 
not such as to affect the overall Scottish adjustment 
to employment change.  In the Clyde Valley, the 
usual situation has been that Argyll & Clyde and 
Lanarkshire gain population from Greater 
Glasgow, but lose population to England and 
overseas; the Clyde Valley in effect has an internal 
suburbanisation process overlaid on an underlying 
process of net migration outwith Scotland taking 
place from all three of its HBAs.   
  
DIFFERING MIGRATION EXPERIENCE 
WITHIN SCOTLAND: INTERNATIONAL 
FLOWS 
 
Net international migration for HBAs within 
Scotland is not estimated as such by the official 
statisticians and must therefore be calculated as a 
residual, by deducting all the separately measured 
components each year from the estimated change 
in mid-year population.  This procedure will 
generally give a reasonably reliable picture.  For 
1997/98, however, the resulting figures are badly 
distorted by the Glasgow population correction and 
they are therefore ignored here.   
 
All HBAs except Greater Glasgow and the islands 
have shown losses through international migration 
over the period 1974-97 taken as a whole.  In spite 
of an overall improvement, in most parts of 
Scotland the position actually worsened in 1995-97 
compared to 1974-88, with a very large loss in 
Grampian (reflecting the rundown of North Sea 
oil), and substantially increased losses in Tayside 
and Fife.  But these have been offset by Lothian 
and Greater Glasgow, which have moved from loss 
to gain.  Greater Glasgow’s better experience may 
seem surprising.  However, Champion (1999) 
shows that all the British conurbations except 
Merseyside had net gains in the 
“international/error” component in 1991-97.  For 
the UK as a whole, he shows that the largest single  
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component of the net inflow (84%) was students, 
with a much smaller number of people (22%) 
whose reason for coming was to accompany or join 
others.  The flows to Greater Glasgow and Lothian 
seem likely to be similar.  An expansion in the 
student body will show up as net in-migration even 
if all the students individually go home at the end 
of their course.  Some of those “joining others” 
may belong to the significant Asian minorities in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh.  Asylum seekers also 
figure.  These special flows to the two major cities 
are a relatively minor exception to the general 
picture of an unemployment-driven migration 
system.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF SCOTTISH NET 
MIGRATION LOSS 
 
This analysis shows that, as in the past, Scotland is 
continuing to see net out-migration because of poor 
economic growth.  Scottish policymakers appear 
however to have lost sight of this relationship and 
even to be arguing that the causation runs the other 
way.  The Secretary of State (1998, para.12-13) 
recently argued that the “static” Scottish population 
“explains in part why long term economic growth 
in Scotland at 1.75% per annum has been about 
0.5% per annum below the UK rate”.  This 
argument may seem attractive, but given the 
relationships examined here, it is not plausible.  No 
one is attempting to argue that Ireland’s current 
favourable experience - in which there has been 
both fast growth and net in-migration - is the result 
of a spontaneous reversal of migration flows 
producing faster economic growth.  It is too 
obvious that the causation is the other way round. 
 
NATURAL CHANGE 
 
Scotland’s continually worsening experience in 
natural change relative to the rest of the UK is due 
both to greater fall in the Scottish birth rate and 
lesser fall in the Scottish death rate.  Like the 
adverse migration trends, these adverse changes are 
mainly a feature of the Clyde Valley.   
 
Figure 13 shows the overall trends in fertility and 
mortality for Scotland and the UK.  Scottish 
women’s “total fertility rate” (TFR), or estimated 
total number of children on current fertility 
patterns, was higher than the UK’s up to 1981, but 
has fallen more and is now lower.  It fell from 2.53 
in 1971 to 1.84 in 1981 and 1.58 in 1997; over the 
same period, the UK TFR fell only from 2.41 to 
1.81 to 1.73.  Scotland’s age-standardised mortality 
rate per million population has fallen less than in 
the rest of the UK, from an already higher level, so 
that the differential has increased further.  It fell 
only by 2,821 between 1971 and 1997, from 
11,444 to 8,623, while the UK average fell by 
3,078, from an already lower 10,448 to 7,370.  In 
1997, Scotland’s standardised mortality ratios for 
men and women were respectively 17% and 15% 
higher than the UK average and higher than in any 
UK region by a wide margin.  Out of every 1,000 
men and women born in Scotland, only 640 and 
771 respectively could expect to live to age 70, 
compared to 701 and 810 in the UK as a whole. 
 
In respect of both fertility and mortality, the trends 
have been more adverse in the declining than in the 
prospering parts of Scotland.  Because the 
population age and sex structure differs both 
between areas and over time, the natural change 
shown in Figures 5A to C gives a misleading 
impression.  Valid comparisons must be made in 
terms of standardised birth and death rates, in other 
words the number of births or deaths per thousand 
population which each HBA would have had if it 
had had the same age and sex structure as Scotland 
as a whole.  There have been considerable 
fluctuations from year to year, but a good indicator 
of long-term trends can be obtained by comparing 
the mean rates for 1995-98 with the mean rates for 
1974-79 (Table 2).   
 
The overall fall in the birth rate across Scotland 
between these periods was 1.2 per thousand.  There 
were large falls in the islands, of 7.3, 3.7 and 1.6 
per thousand in Western Isles, Shetland and 
Orkney respectively.  But the islands have very 
small populations, a combined 1.8% of the Scottish 
total.  Much more important to the overall outcome 
are the above average falls in the Clyde Valley 
HBAs of Greater Glasgow (2.2), Lanarkshire (1.9) 
and Argyll & Clyde (1.3).  Ayrshire & Arran also 
had an above average fall, of 1.4.  All the other 
HBAs had average or below-average falls, with 
Tayside and Lothian having trivial falls of 0.1 and 
0.3 respectively, and Borders and Dumfries & 
Galloway showing no change at all. 
 
The geographical picture for standardised death 
rates is only a little less clear-cut.  The mean death 
rate for Scotland fell by 0.8 per thousand between 
1974-79 and 1995-98.  Once again, the islands 
show up particularly badly, with actual increases of 
0.3 in both Western Isles and Shetland, and a 
below average fall of 0.5 in Orkney.  Greater 
Glasgow had a fall of only 0.2 and Lanarkshire 0.6. 
  Tayside and Lothian (both 0.4) and Grampian 
(0.7) also had below average falls.  All the other 
HBAs had above-average falls, the largest being in 
Dumfries & Galloway (2.0) and Highland (1.8).   
 
In terms of standardised mortality ratios (SMRs) -  
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the ratio of the area’s standardised death rate to the 
Scottish average - Greater Glasgow has had much 
the worst experience.  In the 1970s all four west of 
Scotland HBAs had higher SMRs than the rest, at 
around 107.  Over the next 24 years Ayrshire & 
Arran did well, falling to the average of 100, while 
Lanarkshire and Argyll & Clyde remained about 
the same.  But Greater Glasgow has seen a big rise, 
particularly since 1989, to 112, putting it well 
above all the other HBAs.  There were also 
significant rises in the SMRs for Western Isles and 
Shetland, and for Lothian and Tayside, but these 
have brought them respectively only to an average 
100 and a still below average 97. 
 
Standardised birth rates and standardised death 
rates can be brought together to show standardised 
natural change - the overall rate of expansion or 
contraction of the population.  Here the results are 
stark indeed.  Between 1974-79 and 1995-98, mean 
Scottish natural change fell by 0.5 per thousand 
and turned from positive - growth by 4 people per 
10,000 per year - to negative - contraction by 1 
person per 10,000 per year.  But most areas had an 
improvement in natural change, or only a slight 
worsening.  Seriously adverse changes were 
confined to the Clyde Valley and the islands.   
Western Isles and Shetland had the largest falls, of 
7.5 and 4.0 respectively, but still had positive 
natural change and as already noted have very 
small populations.  The falls in the Clyde Valley 
are far more important to the Scottish outcome, 
especially Greater Glasgow’s fall of 2.0.  Figure 14 
compares the Clyde Valley and the islands with the 
average for the rest, showing how striking is the 
deterioration in the Clyde Valley, and especially in 
Greater Glasgow whose population by 1998 was 
contracting (on this standardised basis) at a rate of 
27 people per 10,000 per year.   
 
Such contraction indicates very severe economic 
and social distress.  Shaw et al. (1999) have shown 
that unemployment has a powerful effect on 
mortality and ill health, and that Glasgow has 7 out 
of the worst 10 constituencies in Britain for 
premature death.  McLaren & Bain (1998) have 
shown for Scotland that deaths from suicide, 
coronary heart disease, stroke and some cancers are 
all strongly related to deprivation, which as seen in 
Table 1 is worst in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley. 
  The Greater Glasgow Director of Public Health 
commented in 1998:  “A necessary and continuing 
theme of successive Directors of Public Health 
Annual Reports has been the association between 
socio-economic deprivation and ill-health.  For 
almost every significant condition this relationship 
holds.”  The fall in birth rates seems likely also to 
have been influenced by unemployment and 
poverty, although this relationship needs further 
research.  Such a connection could operate via such 
factors as marital and relationship breakdown and 
homelessness (which are known to be strongly 
related to unemployment), ill health and substance 
abuse.  
 
THE DECLINING SCOTTISH LABOUR 
FORCE 
 
With a declining population, it is to be expected 
that Scotland will have a declining labour force.   
However the labour force decline is larger than 
would be expected on the basis of population 
change alone.  This excess decline is again due 
primarily to the problems of the inner Clyde Valley 
and especially Glasgow.   
 
Table 3 splits the estimated and projected change in 
the Scottish and Great Britain labour force over 
three time periods since 1971 into its population 
and activity rate components or “effects”.  The 
Scottish labour force has been growing more 
slowly throughout, with cumulative growth 1971-
2006 of 8.9%, half the Great Britain increase of 
17.4%.  The difference is mainly accounted for by 
differential population change, with Scotland’s 
greater rise in (female) economic activity in 1984-
94 closing some of the gap.  
   
The gap between Scottish and Great Britain labour 
force change has however been growing and the 
1994-based projections to 2006 (the latest 
available) indicate that Scotland alone of all UK 
“regions” will see an actual fall in its labour force 
by 2006.  This is due to a projected static 
population and a declining male activity rate.   
When these projections were published, they 
caused some consternation (The Herald, 12 August 
1995).  Scottish Enterprise’s spokesman said 
forecasters “are obsessed with pessimism about the 
Scottish economy”.  But to date, the projection has 
turned out to be too optimistic about Scotland.  It 
showed an increase of 0.6% in the Scottish labour 
force, from 2.519m in 1994 to 2.534m in 1999.   
The outcome according to the Labour Force Survey 
has been an increase in economically active 
persons of 0.04%, from 2.496m in summer 1994 to 
2.497m in summer 1999.  Over the same period the 
total of economically active persons in Great 
Britain increased by 2.8%, exactly as projected.   
 
The less favourable Scottish labour force outturn 
has been due not to the population effect but to an 
unexpected further fall in economic activity from 
its already relatively low levels - Scotland’s 
working age economic activity rate has been 
consistently below that of Great Britain, currently  
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by some 1.6 percentage points, and is over 5 
percentage points below the South East.  This is 
shown in Figure 15.  The recent overall fall is 
mainly due to a large decline in economic activity 
in Glasgow.  In 1995, Glasgow’s working age 
activity rate as shown in the LFS was already some 
8 percentage points lower at about 68% than that 
for any other separately distinguishable area in 
Scotland.  It was almost 15 percentage points lower 
than Aberdeen.  Since then, Glasgow’s activity rate 
has fallen by about 5 percentage points, to about 
63%.  No other area has had a fall of more than 
about 3 points, Dundee being the next worst 
affected, but only to about 73%, 10 points better 
than Glasgow.  
 
The progressive decline in Glasgow’s working age 
economic activity over the last two decades is 
shown in Figure 16.  In 1971 Glasgow actually had 
a higher activity rate than the rest of Scotland, and 
almost as high as Great Britain;  it was still ahead 
in 1981.  But since then there has been a huge 
decline of about 14 points, while Scotland and 
Great Britain have seen a further rise of 2-3 points. 
  Between 1981 and 1991 the city moved from 
208th to 10th in the ranking of British local 
authority districts for working age economic 
inactivity (Green 1994).  Glasgow’s decline is so 
massive that by itself, on the basis of 1998 
population, it amounts to a reduction of over 2% in 
the Scottish labour force; if Glasgow had the 
average Scottish activity rate, the Scottish rate 
would almost equal that of Great Britain instead of 
being almost 2 points lower.  The rigorous labour 
market accounts by Bailey et al. (1999) indicate 
that this fall in activity is due to a straightforward 
collapse in local demand for labour rather than to 
labour supply factors.  By way of analogy, the 
pronounced spike in the GB (but not Scotland) 
activity rate in 1987-93 shown in Figure 15 was 
clearly due to the surge in labour demand in 
southern Britain created by the Lawson boom. 
 
The decline in the Scottish labour force is therefore 
a consequence of localised job loss, acting via out-
migration, excess mortality, and unemployment 
disguised in the form of economic inactivity.  But it 
has been misinterpreted by Scottish policy makers 
as a labour shortage.  The Secretary of State’s 
Strategy Guidance to Scottish Enterprise (1998) 
has already been quoted.  Continuing his line of 
argument that labour supply, not labour demand, is 
the leading factor, he argued that the “static” 
population requires that “productivity must 
therefore increase if our (growth) performance is to 
improve further.”  Referring to these comments by 
the Secretary of State, the Scottish Office’s 
Knowledge Economy Task Force (1999, para.1.3) 
took up the theme:  “given Scotland’s static 
population  and relatively high labour force 
participation rate (emphasis added), a large part of 
the burden of delivering (faster economic growth) 
must fall on technology, innovation and 
productivity improvements.”  But, as we have seen, 
Scotland does not have a high labour force 
participation rate except in some prospering areas 
such as Aberdeen; and it is losing population 
because of poor job opportunities, not the other 
way about. 
 
One of the reasons why Scottish policymakers have 
misinterpreted the evidence appears to be that they 
are unaware of the limitations of the official 
measures of unemployment.  The Scottish 
Executive’s new Scottish Economic Report 
(January 2000) gives a misleading picture of area 
variations in unemployment by quoting, without 
qualification, ONS local authority claimant “rates” 
which are invalid.  These purport to show the rate 
of unemployment among the “workforce” of each 
area by expressing the number of unemployed 
people resident in the area as a percentage of the 
sum of those working in the area plus the 
unemployed resident in the area.  But members of 
the purported “workforce” who are not resident in 
the area cease to be counted if they become 
unemployed.  Thus this “rate” is no more valid than 
would be a Scottish death rate calculated by 
reclassifying Scottish people who die as foreign 
upon decease.  As a result of this curious 
procedure, Glasgow’s unemployment rate is stated 
to be 5.9%, only 0.9% above the Scottish average 
and lower than that of nine other authorities.  But 
the Labour Force Survey shows its ILO 
unemployment to be the highest in Britain at 13.8% 
(Summer 1999).  Given the central importance of 
Glasgow’s unemployment to the whole evolution 
of the Scottish population and economy, such 
misrepresentation is bound to undermine 
policymakers’ ability to understand what is 
happening. 
 
A similar problem affects the official agencies’ 
perception of overall Scottish unemployment.  The 
Secretary of State (1998) has said that 
“unemployment is at its lowest for two decades” 
and Scottish Enterprise (1999a), referring  to the 
claimant rate, stated that Scotland’s unemployment 
is the lowest since the late 1970s and that the rate 
“is slightly above the UK average, but compares 
favourably with rates in continental Europe”.  But 
the claimant count cannot be used to make valid 
comparisons with the situation before 1979.  ONS 
recently published estimates enabling comparison 
of the LFS (ILO) rate today with that prior to 1984 
(Innes & Moralee 1999).  This shows that UK  
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unemployment in 1979 on today’s definition was 
5.2%-5.3%;  this compares with 6.1% at summer 
1999, with Scotland higher at 7.4%.  However, 
even this comparison does not make any allowance 
for the huge movement of unemployed people on 
to sickness benefits, which has occurred since 
1979, and was discussed earlier in relation to Table 
1.  Beatty et al. (1997) estimates that Scotland’s 
real unemployment is considerably worse than 
Great Britain as a whole - 18.1% compared to 
14.2% in 1997.  The TUC has produced a measure, 
the Want Work Rate (WWR), which can be used to 
make valid comparisons across time and between 
countries.  It shows the unemployed plus the 
inactive wanting work as a percentage of all those 
working or wanting work (TUC 1998).  The UK 
WWR was 14.0% at Autumn 1997 and 13.0% at 
Autumn 1999 compared to approximately 5.0% for 
1979.  In 1997, the WWR for France was 13.7% 
and Germany 12.9%.  Confirming this picture, the 
proportion of the UK’s inactive persons who 
wanted work was the highest in the entire EU at 
12.9%, compared to only 4.7% in Germany and a 
mere 1.6% in France.  This picture is much more 
easily reconciled with Scotland’s continuing 
migration losses than is the official view. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCOTTISH PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
 
The size of the population of Scotland relative to 
that of England is one of the determinants of 
Scottish public expenditure via the “Barnett 
formula”.  Kay (1998) described lucidly how this 
works.  The principle is that each year’s increase 
per head in public spending should be the same in 
Scotland as in England.  Over time this will reduce 
the currently higher spending per head in Scotland 
to the same level as in England.  There is thus a 
continuing “Barnett squeeze” on Scottish relative 
to English public spending. 
 
The major determinant of the size of the Barnett 
squeeze is the rate of increase of English spending 
in cash terms, which in practice is mainly 
determined by the rate of inflation.  But the 
shrinkage of the Scottish population relative to that 
of England is also significant.  Using Kay’s 
numbers (1998, Table 1), and assuming a 5% per 
year increase in English cash spending including a 
2.5% rate of inflation, the effect of the officially 
projected relative decline in the Scottish population 
would be to reduce Scottish spending in 2026/27 
by about £1,090m at 2001/02 prices, compared to 
what it would have been if the population relativity 
had remained unchanged.  The relative population 
reduction would account for approaching one fifth 
of a total “squeeze” of £5,870m (2001/02 prices) 
per year by 2026/27 (Figure 17).  This scenario is 
relatively palatable, in that Scotland would still see 
a real increase in spending of £6,566m compared to 
2001/02, albeit less than the £12,436m needed to 
keep up with the growth in England.  A less 
attractive prospect is given by assuming 2.5% per 
year inflation, but no real growth in public 
spending.  In this case Scottish spending in 
2026/27 would be £368m lower (2001/02 prices) 
than it would have been if the population relativity 
had remained the same.  The population reduction 
would account for about one sixth of a smaller 
£2,200m (2001/02 prices) “squeeze” - but in this 
case the whole of the squeeze would represent a 
real cut in spending compared to 2001/02 levels. 
 
Even if the Barnett formula were to be modified, 
the principle that expenditure should be 
population-related is unlikely to be abandoned, so 
that this element of the “squeeze” is likely to 
continue.  Scotland as a whole is therefore 
suffering to a significant degree the fiscal stress 
which usually accompanies, and intensifies, the 
economic decline of an area; as we have seen, this 
is mainly due to the decline of the inner Clyde 
Valley.  An important corollary is that additional 
expenditure in the inner Clyde Valley would cost 
Scotland nothing to the extent that it reduced its 
population decline, since the additional population 
would attract additional resources from the overall 
UK budget.  
 
The decline of the inner Clyde Valley has a further 
indirect impact on Scottish public expenditure.   
Scotland’s position in the debate over Barnett is 
weakened by the existence of a “fiscal deficit” - an 
excess of public spending over revenue (Scottish 
Executive 1999).   Most authors argue that this is 
because Scotland has higher needs, and indeed it is 
relatively easy to argue that some areas of 
expenditure need to be higher, such as agriculture, 
fisheries and forestry, education and water, or that 
lower population density has a pervasive effect in 
raising costs.  But the same is not true of health and 
personal social services, and social security (Figure 
18), which account respectively for £962m and 
£670m or almost half (44%) of the £3,729m by 
which identifiable Scottish spending in 1997/98 
was greater than it would have been on the basis of 
UK per capita levels (Scottish Executive 1999, 
Tables 3 and 4).   
 
This excess spending is strongly related to the 
distress of the inner Clyde Valley.  The Scottish 
Executive (ibid.) comments that “in health 
expenditure, Scotland’s needs are greater for a 
number of reasons, including high death rates from 
circulatory diseases and cancer”.  These high death  
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rates are to be found mainly in the inner Clyde 
Valley.  In addition, social work services costs are 
substantially driven by such activities as child 
protection and criminal justice; these are well 
established to be strongly related to unemployment. 
  For instance, the city of Glasgow currently has 
almost twice the Scottish proportion of children in 
local authority care.  The justification for extra 
spending on social security seems especially weak. 
 Overall, Scotland is not poor compared to Great 
Britain: its GDP per head is 98.6% of Great 
Britain’s (Bailey et al. 1999).  But the excess 
spending on social security is huge, and it goes not 
to pensioners or children, but to people who ought 
to be in work.  Scotland had 8.9% of the GB 
population in 1998, but accounted for only 8.7% of 
those receiving retirement benefits and 8.5% of 
children for whom child benefit was being paid.   
But it had a remarkable 12.2% of sickness and 
disability benefit claimants, 11.2% of 
unemployment benefit claimants, 11.6% of 
Housing Benefit claimants, 11.1% of Council Tax 
benefit claimants and 10.2% of those on Income 
Support.  Once again, these excess levels are 
mainly a feature of the inner Clyde Valley (Figure 
19).  The new DSS Cross Benefit Analysis shows 
that the Clyde Valley by itself accounts for 85% of 
Scotland’s excess working age benefit claimants; 
Glasgow City (post-1996 boundary) alone accounts 
for half (49.8%).  Monklands, Glasgow and 
Clydebank all had more than one fifth of their 
working age male population on Incapacity Benefit 
in 1996 (Bailey et al. 1999).   
 
SCOTTISH POLICY TOWARDS GLASGOW 
AND THE INNER CLYDE VALLEY 
 
Given the severity of the problems of Glasgow and 
the inner Clyde Valley, one would expect to find 
Scottish policy vigorously promoting employment 
growth in these areas.  But this is not the case.  
 
The fundamental assumptions which drive Scottish 
policy today are those introduced by the Toothill 
Report of 1961 and the subsequent White Paper 
Central Scotland: A Programme for Development 
and Growth (Cmnd 2188, 1963) in which the 
Scottish Office adopted its ideas.  Like the present 
paper, Toothill was focused on Scotland’s loss of 
population and on the relatively poor employment 
growth and high unemployment which it 
acknowledged were driving it.  Its thinking about 
the solution was very much of its time: it saw 
salvation in the concept of “growth areas”.  In the 
main, the chosen growth centres were New Towns, 
although Cmnd 2188 also listed North Lanarkshire, 
the area around Falkirk and Grangemouth, and the 
Vale of Leven.   
 
Parr (1999) comments, “a newcomer to the field at 
that time could have been excused for thinking that 
no matter what the nature of the regional problem, 
it would be most effectively overcome by the 
adoption of a growth-pole strategy”.  As in other 
growth-pole strategies of the period, the idea was 
that by concentrating infrastructure investment on 
new centres where mutually reinforcing 
development would occur, Scotland could be given 
a more competitive spatial structure.  This was 
linked in the Toothill case to a belief that both the 
Scottish cities themselves, and the industries 
located in them, were outmoded and needed to be 
replaced by something more modern.  Before 
Toothill, Glasgow overspill had a positive purpose 
towards the city.  It was designed to relieve 
excessive densities (although the validity of this 
was always disputed by the Corporation).  After 
Toothill, overspill was directed to the reduction of 
employment and population in Glasgow as an end 
in itself.  Whereas in relation to major centres such 
as Clydeside, the 1944 Employment White Paper 
had introduced a strong commitment to addressing 
unemployment through investment in the same or 
an immediately adjacent place, the Toothill strategy 
adopted the idea that investment should be targeted 
to the areas where it was hypothesised to be most 
productive, without regard to the location of the 
unemployed.  People would then be required to 
move there.   
 
The Toothill policies were adopted with 
unparalleled enthusiasm by the Scottish Office.   
Cmnd 2188 talked of a Scottish population of 
almost 6 million by 1981.  But Parr comments 
about growth-pole strategy in general that “in the 
light of subsequent experience......(it) can only be 
judged to have been unsuccessful”.  The Toothill 
strategy has been no exception.  People have not 
migrated to the new growth poles in the way 
intended.  The growth poles themselves have not 
produced faster growth; their manufacturing 
employment performance has been no better than 
the Scottish average (Henderson 1982) and 
inwardly locating overseas-owned plants have not 
become “embedded” in the local economy to any 
great extent, at least in electronics which has been 
the most studied (Jackson & Patel 1996).  Faster 
Scottish population growth has not been achieved, 
and, worse, the consequences for Glasgow in 
particular have been dire, with the severe 
worsening of unemployment, economic activity 
and relative mortality seen in this paper.    
 
The Toothill Committee did its work almost four 
decades ago and cannot be blamed for reflecting 
the ideas of its time.  What is remarkable is the way  
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Volume 25, No.2, 2000   52  
 
 
that policymakers have clung to the Toothill 
strategy for so long in the face of the mounting 
evidence of its failure and of the huge costs it has 
been imposing.  Infrastructure investment has 
continued to be channelled away from inner 
Clydeside, and especially Glasgow, to this day.  In 
spite of having no less than 9.1% of its land area 
vacant or derelict land, much of it superbly located 
on new motorways, Glasgow has never had a 
designated Enterprise Zone - uniquely among 
British industrial cities.  Inward investment has 
been directed away from Glasgow, to the extent 
that the city, with 12% of the Scottish population, 
has only 5% of manufacturing employment in 
overseas owned plants (Bailey et al. 1999).  Since 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and European 
funding are both primarily triggered by property 
projects, and these do not occur except on sites 
which have been prepared, the benefit of RSA and 
EU assistance has disproportionately gone to 
support the “growth areas” rather than to relieve 
unemployment in areas such as Glasgow.  In 
1998/99, for instance, Glasgow with 17.5% of 
Scotland’s ILO unemployment received only 9.7% 
of RSA (Hansard, 27 January 2000).  Scottish 
Enterprise Network funding allocations to LEC 
areas give no priority to areas of higher 
unemployment; Glasgow Development Agency 
expenditure per claimant unemployed in 1998/99 
was only 75% of that in Lothian, and lower than 
that of any other central Scotland LEC (Bailey et 
al. 1999).  The new Scottish Enterprise Strategic 
Framework for Economic Inclusion (1999b) 
proposes as a target for “jobs into regeneration 
areas” a mere 500 in 2000/01.  While there has 
been much discussion of policies on “social 
inclusion”, they do not involve any serious 
commitment of resources to promote employment 
(Webster 2000).  Finally, the M74 completion is 
regarded by all the public and business bodies in 
the west of Scotland as the highest priority 
infrastructure project in the entire region (Glasgow 
and the Clyde Valley Structure Plan Joint 
Committee 1999); it would unlock employment 
development across southern and eastern Glasgow, 
and is vital to the whole of Argyll & Clyde.  On the 
Scottish Executive’s own figures, it has a benefit-
cost ratio greatly exceeding that of any other 
Scottish strategic road project, including all of 
those approved in November 1999 – for instance 
eight times better than the A1 upgrade.  Yet it has 
received no funding from the Scottish Executive.  
The Executive has moreover indicated that it will 
block development projects that would put extra 
traffic on to the overstretched M8 - in other words 
any important project in the West of Scotland 
(Glasgow  Evening Times, 29 February 2000; 
Scottish Executive letter “Transport Impact of 
Developments in Glasgow” of 13 December 1999). 
  This is unmistakably a programme for the 
continued rundown of the inner Clyde Valley.  Its 
Toothill lineage is clear. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Scottish policymakers are operating with a view of 
the world in which many of the problems which 
dominated the country’s history in the twentieth 
century have supposedly been overcome.     
Economic growth may still be relatively slow, but 
it is thought that unemployment is low, out-
migration can be regarded as negligible, at least in 
quantitative terms, and there is a shortage rather 
than a surplus of labour; the population is static 
rather than declining, and the country is in good 
shape to embrace the “knowledge economy”.  The 
present analysis contradicts this sanguine 
perspective.  It shows that Scotland is suffering 
population decline, large localised labour 
surpluses, continuing unemployment-related net 
out-migration, declining fertility, excess mortality, 
low economic activity and fiscal stress; and that 
these are strongly interlinked and derive mainly 
from the economic distress of the inner Clyde 
Valley and especially Glasgow.  Continuing failure 
to recognise and address the problems of these 
areas through vigorous promotion of employment 
will undermine the whole future of the country.   
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APPENDIX 1:  THE 1998 GLASGOW 
POPULATION CORRECTION 
 
The Registrar General’s 1998 mid-year population 
estimate for Glasgow City showed a rise of 8,020 
compared to 1997.  This was in response to an 
increase in Glasgow City’s electoral roll of about  
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18,300, mainly caused by a more intensive 
electoral canvass and a registration promotion 
campaign in 1998 (Glasgow City Council 1999).  
The increase in population of 8,020 compares with 
an average decrease in the previous three years of 
3,960.  In effect, therefore, a one-off upward 
correction in the mid-year population estimate for 
Greater Glasgow of around 12,000 (8,020 + 3,960) 
has been made. 
 
The change in mid-year HBA population estimates 
from year to year is the net result of births, deaths, 
within-UK migration (including movement to/from 
the Armed Forces) and international migration.   
Births and deaths are very well recorded and 
within-UK migration is rather well recorded.   
International migration however is generally less 
well recorded, and no official estimates are 
published at HBA level.  In the estimation of net 
migration GRO(S) first establishes a net migration 
figure for Scotland, based on NHSCR data (for UK 
internal moves) and the results of the International 
Passenger Survey (for international migration), and 
then derives estimates for individual HBAs.  The 
12,000 adjustment for Greater Glasgow in 1998 
has been put by the GRO(S) into the “estimated net 
civilian migration” item and in the present paper it 
is contained in the “international migration/error” 
item.  The “net civilian migration” items for the 
other Scottish HBAs in 1997/98 have been 
adjusted by the GRO(S) also, to "compensate" for 
the adjustment to the figures for Greater Glasgow  
For this reason, Figure 4C does not use the 1997/98 
figures for “international migration/error”.  
 
The 1998 correction for Glasgow is open to various 
interpretations.  It is possible that net out-migration 
from Glasgow was overestimated in previous 
years.  In this case, the excessive loss will have 
been shown in the “international/error” item.   
Unfortunately there is no way of knowing how any 
correction should be made to earlier years.   
However, a correction to the estimated population 
at a point in time does not necessarily imply that 
any of the flow estimates have been incorrect, since 
the true size of the population is never known with 
certainty.  Another possibility therefore is that the 
correction for underenumeration in the 1991 
Census, although already large, was too low.  It is 
not possible to choose between the alternative 
explanations at this stage. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS, SOURCES 
AND METHODS 
 
Boundaries  Definitions of the Health Board 
boundaries can be found in the Registrar General’s 
Annual Report for Scotland.  They correspond to 
the 1974-96 Regions except within Strathclyde 
where they are groupings of 1974-96 Districts.   
The Clyde Valley as defined here in terms of the 
HBAs of Greater Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Argyll 
& Clyde coincides with the present Clyde Valley 
Structure Plan area except that the latter excludes 
the present Argyll & Bute council area.  All 
references to Glasgow City in this paper are to the 
1974-96 boundary (including Rutherglen and 
Cambuslang), unless clearly indicated to the 
contrary.  The DSS Cross Benefit Analysis uses 
post-1996 local authorities.  These correspond 
exactly to HBAs except in the Clyde Valley, for 
which benefit figures are therefore approximate.   
For these figures, W.Dunbartonshire has been split 
between Greater Glasgow and Argyll & Clyde 
using the population ratio given in the Scottish 
Office statistical guide to the new local authorities 
(1995);  E.Renfrewshire has been attributed wholly 
to Greater Glasgow, and N. and S. Lanarkshire 
wholly to Lanarkshire.  The effect is probably to 
overstate the extent of benefit dependency in 
Argyll & Clyde and Lanarkshire, and to understate 
it in Greater Glasgow.  The figures for the Clyde 
Valley as a whole are not affected.   
 
Population  UK and Scotland mid-year 
populations 1974-97 are from the ONS Annual 
Abstract of Statistics.  The 1998 mid-year 
population and components of change for Scotland 
in 1997/98 are from the Annual Report of the 
Registrar General for Scotland and the 1998 mid-
year UK population from ONS Population 
Estimates, Series PE No.1 (1999).  The 1998-based 
population projections for Scotland, England and 
the UK are from the Government Actuary’s 
Department at www.gad.gov.uk.  The components 
of population change 1974/75 to 1996/97 are from 
ONS  International Migration, Series MN Table 
1.1.  The components of population change for the 
UK for 1997/98 are from ONS First Release.  This 
latter source does not split “net civilian migration 
and other changes” into its components; the split 
for 1997/98 has been estimated by assuming that 
the mean ratio for 1995/96 and 1996/97 applies.   
 
Migration  Migration flows between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK, between Scotland and the 
Armed Forces, and within Scotland are taken from 
the National Health Service Central Register 
(NHSCR) data published by the GRO (Scotland).  
Migration flows from Scotland to different parts of 
the UK are taken from Regional Trends and/or 
Social Trends.  These data have only been 
published since 1980.  Net international migration 
flows for all years except 1997/98 are from ONS 
International Migration.  These figures are subject  
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to large revisions after publication and therefore 
the latest published figure for each year has been 
used.  Official international migration estimates are 
not published as such for areas smaller than the 
whole of Scotland.  The estimates for HBAs in this 
paper have been calculated as a residual from the 
officially published elements of population change. 
 This is the same procedure as used by Champion 
(1999).  Scottish international inflows and outflows 
for calendar years 1974 to 1997 are from 
International Migration.   These are estimated from 
the International Passenger Survey and are not 
revised subsequent to publication. 
 
Births and Deaths  Comparative data for Scotland 
and the UK on TFRs and age-standardised 
mortality rates are taken from Population Trends, 
on  standardised mortality ratios from Regional 
Trends, and on survival rates from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics.  Comparative age-
standardised mortality rates for Scotland and the 
UK use the European Standard Population. 
 
Rates for Scottish Health Board areas are 
standardised to Scottish experience.  They were 
sourced from the Annual Reports of the Registrar 
General for Scotland as follows.  Standardised 
birth rates per 1,000 population are from Table 
P2.1 (1974-78), Table A2.2 (1979-93) and Table 
1.3 (1994 onwards).  Death rates per 1,000 
population standardised for age and sex are from 
Table A2.2 (1974-93) and Table 1.4 (1994 
onwards).  Standardised mortality ratios are from 
Table C.2.29 (1974-93) and Table 1.5 (1994 
onwards).  Table C.2.29 was not printed for 1983-
85 but produced on microfiche;  copies of the 1983 
and 1985 tables were kindly supplied direct by 
GRO (Scotland) and of the 1984 table by Tricia 
Fraser of the ISD Library, Common Services 
Agency.   
 
Employment  Employment figures are from the 
Census/Annual Survey of Employment via 
NOMIS, kindly supplied by Fergus Cooper of 
DRS, Glasgow City Council.  1981-96 is the 
longest period for which comparable figures can be 
readily obtained.  These figures do not distinguish 
part-time from full-time jobs and therefore give an 
unduly favourable impression of employment 
change. 
 
Unemployment  Census unemployment figures for 
1971 are for all aged 15+;  for 1981 and 1991 they 
are for the population aged 16-64/59.  Real 
unemployment estimates for 1997 are from Beatty 
et al. (1997), with figures for the HBAs within 
Strathclyde calculated separately from additional 
data kindly supplied by Tina Beatty of Sheffield 
Hallam University.  One weakness of this measure 
appears to be that it overestimates real 
unemployment in areas which attract retirement in-
migration, because it estimates excess early 
retirement on the basis of a simple comparison with 
the South East region of England in 1991.  Beatty 
& Fothergill (1999) have computed an alternative 
measure of “hidden male unemployment” by 
comparing the number of Incapacity Benefit 
claimants at August 1996 with the number 
recorded as “permanently sick”in the 1981 Census. 
  The two measures are highly correlated, but the 
“hidden male unemployment” measure shows 
Argyll & Clyde as worse than Ayrshire & Arran, as 
would be expected on the basis of other 
information including employment change.  The 
ranking of the worst seven HBAs is otherwise 
unchanged.  The real unemployment relativities 
between HBAs are broadly the same as those 
shown by LFS ILO unemployment rates in all 
cases for which separate figures are published, i.e. 
all except Lanarkshire, Argyll & Clyde and 
Ayrshire & Arran. 
 
The unemployment series for regions and TTWAs 
are not fully satisfactory.  All the figures are from 
Labour Market Trends or its predecessor the 
Employment Gazette.  The unemployment figures 
for 1974-99 for Scotland and SE England are the 
unadjusted claimant count rate, which is expressed 
as a percentage of the total “workforce”.  The SE 
region in 1974-96 is the standard region, including 
Greater London, and thereafter it is the 
Government Office Region.   The TTWAs used to 
measure relative unemployment are Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Aberdeen.  From 1974 to 1989 the 
TTWA figures were published only on the “narrow 
base” denominator of “employees and 
unemployed”;  to promote continuity, this “narrow 
base” denominator (now renamed  “per cent 
employee jobs and claimants”) has been used for 
later years also.  For 1981, no March figures were 
compiled and February has been used instead.   
There were changes of TTWA boundary in 1985 
and 1999.  The comparisons between Scottish 
TTWAs and the SE region are between “broad” 
base figures for the SE and “narrow” base for the 
TTWAs;  since the focus here is on the change in 
the difference rather than the difference itself, this 
is not too serious a limitation. 
 
The relationship between the level and direction of 
migration and the change in the difference in 
unemployment rates is not very sensitive to the 
choice of time lag.  A range of quarterly lags has 
been tried.  The best, used here, is effectively a one 
quarter lag.  The change in unemployment is from 
March to March, while the migration flow is  
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estimated to be from June to June (patient 
registrations are recorded from September to 
September, and the NHS statisticians estimate that 
on average migrants take 3 months to register with 
a new doctor).   
 
In Figures 7 and 9 to 11 it is noticeable that the 
relationship between net migration to the rest of the 
UK and change in the unemployment differential 
has been more favourable during the 1990s than in 
previous years.  It is not possible to say whether 
this represents a real change (due for instance to 
changing population structure), or is merely an 
artefact of the changing coverage of the claimant 
unemployment count.  The projections of migration 
for 1998/99 use the already known changes in the 
unemployment differential, together with the 
unemployment-migration relationship as seen 
during the 1990s.  
 
A number of different statistical approaches can be 
taken to analysing the relationship between 
unemployment and migration.  That taken here, 
using the change in the difference in 
unemployment rates, is believed to be innovatory.  
It is supported by the analysis of Jackman & 
Savouri (1992).  It has been tested on the data for 
1951-61 used by Oliver (1964) and works well.   
There, a simple regression of the rate of net total 
in-migration to Scotland on the annual change in 
the difference in unemployment rates between 
Scotland and “London, etc.” produces an adjusted 
R-square of 0.92, better than the 0.76 produced by 
the best of Oliver’s own multiple regression 
models. 
  
Labour Force and Activity Rates  Labour force 
estimates and projections for Scotland and Great 
Britain are from the Employment Gazette, February 
1986, January 1990 and August 1995, and from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The activity rate 
figures for Glasgow are taken from the Census 
(1971, 1981 and 1991) and LFS, with the figures 
for 1992-94 from the ESRC Data Archive via a 
draft PhD dissertation, Dept of Urban Studies, 
University of Glasgow by Donald Houston, whose 
kind assistance is greatly appreciated.  Activity 
rates for 1971 are for those aged 15-64/59, and 
otherwise they are for those aged 16-64/59.  The 
LFS has some sampling error and also uses the 
latest population projections rather than mid-year 
estimates.  
 
Public Expenditure  In calculating the Barnett 
squeeze to 2026/27, the assumption has been made 
that the population relativity used in the Barnett 
formula will be that given by the mid-year 
estimates for the calendar year three years before 
the start of the financial year in question, i.e. for 
2000/01 the population relativity is that for 1997, 
for 2001/02 that for 1998, and so on.  This is in 
line with para.3.8 of HM Treasury’s Funding the 
Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales 
and Northern Ireland Assembly:  A Statement of 
Funding Policy (31 March 1999).  This lengthy lag 
is due to the time required to finalise the mid-year 
population estimates and to the need to plan public 
spending well before the start of each financial 
year. 
 
Social Deprivation  Carstairs deprivation category 
figures are 1991-based and are from McLaren & 
Bain (1998). 
 
Social Security  Claimant figures for Scotland and 
Great Britain are from Social Security Statistics 
1999, and for local authority areas from the 
Department of Social Security’s Cross Benefit 
Analysis for May 1999. 
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TABLE 1              
POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT CHANGE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION 
    
SCOTTISH HEALTH BOARD AREAS 1974-1998          
  Population      Employment Census  Census  Real  Population 
  1974  1998  change  unempl.  unempl.  unempl. in  Carstairs 
  No.  % of  No.  % of  1981-96  1971  1991  1997  categories 6 & 7 
   Scotland  Scotland %  %  %  %  1991% 
Gtr  Glasgow  1129387  21.6 911200 17.8  -13.0  7.6  16.2  28.9  51 
Lanarkshire  563138 10.8 560800 11.0  2.4  6.3  12.5  23.4  24 
Argyll  &  Clyde 460181 8.8 426900 8.3  -8.9  6.0  11.5  19.2  25 
CLYDE  VALLEY  2152706 41.2 1898900 37.1  -8.6  6.7  14.0  25.6  37 
               
Ayrshire  &  Arran  374423 7.2 375400 7.3  -4.7  4.9  11.7  21.8  11 
Borders  99105  1.9 106300 2.1  -0.4  3.2  6.1  8.1  0 
Dumfries  &  G. 143711 2.7 147300 2.9  -7.5  4.2  8.1  14.6  0 
Forth  Valley  267029 5.1 275800 5.4  -7.1  4.9  10.0  17.9  5 
Fife  337690 6.5 348900 6.8  -1.5  5.1  9.6  17.4  4 
Grampian  447935 8.6 525200  10.3  27.7  4.0  5.0  9.3  0 
Highland  178268 3.4 208300 4.1  5.8  5.7  8.8  15.0  0 
Lothian  758383 14.5 773700 15.1  10.8  5.1  8.8  13.6  5 
Tayside  401183 7.7 389800 7.6  -6.2  5.8  9.6  15.8  20 
Orkney  17462 0.3 19550 0.4  6.9  3.0  5.6  9.5  0 
Shetland  18445 0.4 22910 0.4  -2.0  3.9  4.8  7.2  0 
Western  Isles  30060 0.6 27940 0.5  5.5  12.3  11.6 15.6  17 
               
SCOTLAND  5226400 100.0 5120000 100.0  0.0  5.8  10.6  18.1  18 
               
Sources:  See Appendix 2                  
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TABLE 2        
STANDARDISED BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND NATURAL CHANGE    
SCOTTISH HBAs 1974-79 and 1995-98    
All rates are per 1,000 population      
     
SCOTLAND  Borders  Forth V.  D & G  Fife  Grampian  Highland  Lothian  Argyll & C.  Gtr Glasgow  Ayr & Arran  Lanarks  Tayside  Orkney  Shetland W.Isles 
STANDARDISED BIRTH RATES      
Mean  1974-79  12.8 12.4 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.3 14.3 11.1 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.7 12.0 14.9 16.8  19.2 
Mean  1995-98  11.5 12.4 11.8 12.7 11.6 11.5 13.1 10.8 12.0 11.0 11.8 11.8 11.9 13.3 13.1  12.0 
Difference -1.2  0.0  -1.1 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 -1.2 -0.3 -1.3 -2.2 -1.4 -1.9 -0.1 -1.6 -3.7  -7.3 
STANDARDISED DEATH RATES      
Mean  1974-79  12.4 11.3 12.6 12.3 11.9 11.1 12.6 11.7 13.3 13.3 13.1 13.2 11.5 11.4 11.1  11.3 
Mean  1995-98  11.6 10.1 11.4 10.4 11.0 10.4 10.9 11.3 12.4 13.1 11.6 12.6 11.1 10.9 11.4  11.6 
Difference  -0.8 -1.2 -1.2 -2.0 -0.9 -0.7 -1.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 -1.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 0.3  0.3 
STANDARDISED NATURAL CHANGE    
Mean  1974-79  0.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.7 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 3.5 5.7  7.9 
Mean  1995-98  -0.1 2.3 0.4 2.3 0.7 1.1 2.3 -0.5 -0.4 -2.1 0.2 -0.8 0.8 2.4 1.7  0.4 
Difference  -0.5 1.2 0.2 2.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.0 -0.4 -2.0 0.1 -1.3 0.3 -1.1 -4.0  -7.5 
     
Source:  Annual Reports of the Registrar General for Scotland    Quarterly Economic Commentary 
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TABLE 3      
      
SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN    
COMPONENTS OF CHANGE IN THE LABOUR FORCE 1971-2006 
      
 Population  Activity   Total    
 effect rate change  
MEN      
1971-84 change as per cent of 1971 labour force     
Scotland 7.5  -7.1 0.4   
GB 6.5  -7.1 -0.6   
      
1984-94 change as per cent of 1984 labour force     
Scotland 2  -4.8 -2.8   
GB 4.7  -4.5 0.2   
      
1994-2006 projected change as per cent of 1994 labour force   
Scotland -1.3  -2.4 -3.7   
GB 4.7  -2.5 2.2   
      
WOMEN      
1971-84 change as per cent of 1971 labour force     
Scotland 4.2  9.1 13.2   
GB 5.1  12.1 17.2   
      
1984-94 change as per cent of 1984 labour force     
Scotland -0.2  13.1 12.9   
GB 2.7  8.1 10.8   
      
1994-2006 projected change as per cent of 1994 labour force   
Scotland -2  6.2 4.2   
GB 3.8  6.7 10.5   
      
ALL      
1971-84 change as per cent of 1971 labour force     
Scotland 5.9  -0.5 5.3   
GB 5.8  0.3 6.1   
      
1984-94 change as per cent of 1984 labour force     
Scotland 1.1  2.5 3.6   
GB 3.9  0.7 4.6   
      
1994-2006 projected change as per cent of 1994 labour force   
Scotland -1.6  1.4 -0.2   
GB 4.3  1.5 5.8   
      
      
Sources:  Employment Gazette, Feb. 1986 and Aug. 1995   
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FIGURE 1  SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK:  POPULATION 1974-98 
AND 1998-BASED PROJECTIONS TO 2036                      1974=100
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FIGURE 2   SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK:  MIGRATION AND NATURAL CHANGE
as % of population at start of year
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FIGURE 3   SCOTTISH HBAs:  POPULATION CHANGE 1974-98 
AND PROJECTED POPULATION CHANGE 1998-2016 
per year
-10000
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
G
l
a
s
g
o
w
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
a
n
a
r
k
s
h
i
r
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
r
g
y
l
l
 
&
 
C
l
y
d
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
y
r
s
h
i
r
e
 
&
 
A
r
r
a
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
o
r
d
e
r
s
D
u
m
f
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
G
a
l
l
o
w
a
y
F
o
r
t
h
 
V
a
l
l
e
y
F
i
f
e
G
r
a
m
p
i
a
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
i
g
h
l
a
n
d
L
o
t
h
i
a
n
T
a
y
s
i
d
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
r
k
n
e
y
S
h
e
t
l
a
n
d
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
I
s
l
e
s
1974-98
1998-16
 
 
 
FIGURE 4    SCOTTISH HBAs:  EMPLOYMENT AND POPULATION CHANGE 1981-96
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FIGURE 5A  SCOTTISH HBAs:  COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1974-89
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FIGURE 5B  SCOTTISH HBAs:  COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1989-95
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FIGURE 5C  SCOTTISH HBAs:  COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, annual average 1995-98
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FIGURE 6    NET MIGRATION FROM/TO SCOTLAND 1974/75-1997/98
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FIGURE 7    UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION SCOTLAND AND REST OF UK 1974/75-97/98
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FIGURE 8    SCOTLAND:  INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS 1974-97
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FIGURE 9   UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION GREATER GLASGOW HBA AND REST OF UK 1974/75-
97/98
-6000
-5000
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Change in difference of unemployment rates Glasgow TTWA and SE Region %
N
e
t
 
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
R
o
U
K
 
t
o
 
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
G
l
a
s
g
o
w
 
H
B
A
1997/98
1998/99 projected:  -1740
1974-98:  R = 0.65, R-square = 0.42
1990-98:  R = 0.84, R-square = 0.71
 
 
 
FIGURE 10   UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION GRAMPIAN HBA AND REST OF UK 
1974/75-97/98
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FIGURE 11   UNEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION LOTHIAN HBA AND REST OF UK 1974/75-97/98
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FIGURE 12   NET MIGRATION FROM THE CLYDE VALLEY 
TO GRAMPIAN & HIGHLAND, LOTHIAN, AND REST OF UK, 1974/75-1997/98
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FIGURE 13  SCOTLAND AND UK:  FERTILITY AND MORTALITY, 1971-1998
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FIGURE 14    SCOTTISH HBAs:  STANDARDISED NATURAL CHANGE (per thou.) 1974-1998
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FIGURE 15     WORKING AGE ACTIVITY RATES 
SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN 1981-2006 estimated and projected
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FIGURE 16    GLASGOW, SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN: 
WORKING AGE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATE 1971-1999
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FIGURE 17    THE BARNETT SQUEEZE PROJECTED 2001/02-2026/27 (2001/02 prices)
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FIGURE 18    COMPOSITION OF SCOTLAND'S IDENTIFIABLE PUBLIC SPENDING 
IN EXCESS OF UK PER CAPITA LEVELS 1997/98
Agriculture etc £489m
Trade etc £370m
Transport £115m
Housing £168m
Other environment £50m
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Culture etc £52m
Health & personal social 
services £962m
Social security £670m
Miscellaneous £98m
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FIGURE 19    SHARE OF SCOTTISH EXCESS WORKING AGE SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMANTS 
BY HEALTH BOARD AREA, May 1999
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Greater Glasgow 47.8%
Lanarks 24.3%
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            Forth Valley 3.8%
Fife 5.2%
Tayside 4.7%                     W. Isles 0.5%
CLYDE VALLEY 85.0%
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
LONE PARENTHOOD:  TWO VIEWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
David Webster                                                                               30 August 1999 
_________________________________________________________________ 
As published in I.Anderson & D.Sim (eds), Social Exclusion and Housing,  
Chartered Institute of Housing, 2000 
 
 
The rise of lone parenthood in Britain has been interpreted in two completely 
different ways.  These different views lead to fundamentally different approaches to 
public policy. 
 
The view set out here is based on the full analyses now available of the 1991 Census 
and of geographical employment change in Britain.  It also reflects the mainstream of 
US academic research, which has addressed the issue of lone parenthood over several 
decades.  It sees the breakdown of family structures as mainly due to the stresses 
caused by prolonged high male unemployment in particular geographical localities, 
which has in turn been caused by disproportionate loss of manual jobs, mainly in 
manufacturing.  Both mothers and fathers live predominantly in areas with excess 
manual labour supply, where it is difficult for either of them to get a job.  Due to the 
loss of their employment base, these areas are suffering from comprehensive decline 
in terms of poverty, outmigration, dereliction and related problems.  Because of their 
manual employment background, their housing is predominantly council housing and 
has suffered from the underinvestment and residualisation of the Thatcher years.  This 
combination of circumstances shows why lone parents are poor and why their housing 
is bad.  It also suggests that little can effectively be done to get them into work or to 
raise more money from the non-resident fathers unless more jobs materialise in these 
areas.   
 
By contrast,  the British government view – which has shown great continuity 
betweeen administrations - is derived mainly from outdated analyses and ideological 
ideas from the 1980s, supported by some more recent British research which has 
overlooked the geography of lone parenthood.  It does not recognise the key role of 
geographically concentrated job losses, but sees lone parenthood as primarily an issue 
of attitudes and incentives.  The Welfare State is considered to have been providing 
perverse incentives, which have encouraged women to become unpartnered mothers, 
fathers to abandon their families and thereafter fail to support them, and lone parents 
to be dependent on social security instead of getting one of the jobs which are thought 
to be readily available in every locality. The main requirement therefore is thought to 
be to reconstruct the Welfare State to change the structure of incentives so as to 
encourage joint parenting and paid work.  Improvements in lone mothers’ incomes or 
housing are permissible only if they do not create perverse incentives.  As in the 
USA, there is a strong desire to cut the public cost of lone parenthood.   
 
It is argued here that because they are founded on an empirically mistaken view of 
lone parenthood, most of the present government’s policies will not succeed in 
reducing lone parents’ “social exclusion” except at the margin.  Some will make 
things worse. 
 
The chapter begins by outlining the scale of lone parenthood and explaining how  
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people come to be lone parents, stressing the dominant role played by relationship 
breakdown.  It goes on to show the weight of US and British evidence that the 
principal cause of rising lone parenthood in both countries is the exceptionally high 
and prolonged unemployment experienced in particular places.  The origins of the 
dominant, and contrasting, “New Right” interpretation are then explained.  This leads 
on to a critical examination of the different elements of the current public policy 
agenda.  Finally, an alternative way ahead is briefly outlined. 
 
 
THE RISE OF LONE PARENTHOOD AND ROUTES INTO LONE 
PARENTHOOD 
 
There were about 1.6 million lone parent families in Great Britain in 1996 (Haskey 
1998), a million more than in 1961.  As a proportion of families with dependent 
children, lone parents have risen from 8% in 1971 to 21% in 1996.  A slightly smaller 
proportion of children (19%) live in lone parent families, because lone parents tend to 
have fewer children than couples (1.7 on average compared to 1.9).  But the 
proportion of families affected by lone parenthood is higher than 21%, because in 
1996 another 8% had a step-parent (ONS 1998a).  Most of the children in these 
families will have been through a period of lone parenthood.  Lone parenthood 
therefore affects about one quarter of today’s children. 
 
Routes into Lone Parenthood:  The Key Role of Relationship Breakdown 
 
The great majority of lone parents (92.6% in 1991) are female.  In 1996, around three-
fifths of female lone parents were divorced or separated, and about a third had never 
been married, while only one in twenty was a widow.  Among the comparatively 
small group of male lone parents, far more are divorced or separated (three-quarters), 
or widowed (one in 7).  But these figures overstate the extent of unpartnered 
parenthood among both male and female lone parents.  The general trend towards 
cohabitation instead of marriage has resulted in many lone parents being classified as 
“single” or “never married” when with otherwise identical circumstances they would 
previously have been classified as “divorced or separated”.   
 
Between 1979 and 1996, the proportion of women aged 18-49 who were legally 
married fell from 74% to 57%, while the proportion cohabiting rose from 11% to 26% 
(ONS 1998a).  Seven out of ten first marriages in the early 1990s were preceded by 
cohabitation, compared with only one in ten in the early 1970s (Haskey 1995).  The 
proportion of births outside marriage has therefore also risen enormously, from under 
9% in 1971 to over 35% in 1996.  However, almost all of the increase has been 
accounted for by births jointly registered by mother and father, who in three-quarters 
of all cases are living together at the same address.  Kiernan et al. (1998) argue that 
these jointly registered extra-marital births have merely replaced previously numerous 
bridal pregnancies.  The proportion of births registered by the mother alone has 
increased only slightly, from about 5% to about 8% (ONS 1998b).  Nine-tenths of 
non-resident fathers report that they have at some time been married to, or cohabited 
with, the mother of their child (Pullinger & Summerfield 1997);  while 85% of lone 
mothers say they have previously married or cohabited (Haskey 1998).    
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Half of lone mothers are aged over 33, and half of lone fathers over 42 (Pullinger & 
Summerfield 1997).  Teenage lone mothers are less than one in 25 of all lone parents. 
 Births to unmarried teenagers have risen only from 2.0% of all births in 1964 to 5.7% 
in 1993 (Babb & Bethune 1995).  But even this small rise includes the effect of the 
declining popularity of marriage.  The actual number of births to teenagers registered 
by the mother alone scarcely changed between 1978 and 1996 (Botting et al. 1998).  
Conception rates for teenagers have fallen markedly, from 81.5 per thousand in 1971 
to 58.7 in 1995 (ONS 1998b).  The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) (1999) highlights the 
90,000 teenage conceptions per year, but also shows that these lead to only 42,000 
teenage births, of which only 16,000 are to under-18s and 3,700 to girls conceiving 
under 16.   
 
Lone mothers do not commonly have more children while on their own.  Over the 
four years 1991 to 1995, only one in 5 of a sample of lone mothers had a further baby 
and in only half these cases (i.e. one in 10) was there no new partner (Ford et al. 
1998). 
 
The great majority of lone parents therefore are in their situation because of 
relationship breakdown, with the ancient problem of widowhood still playing a role.  
Unpartnered parenthood is a relatively minor factor. 
 
 
LONE PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN:  HOW THEY LIVE 
 
It is well known that lone parents and their children are one of the most disadvantaged 
groups in today’s society.  Most fundamentally, they are poor.  Lone parents’ mean 
household income in 1996/97 was only £160, half the level for all households (£325) 
and even lower in relation to that for couples with children (around £410) (ONS 
1998b, p.93).  In 1996, one third of lone mothers and one quarter (27%) of lone 
fathers had a gross weekly household income under £100.  This was a far higher 
proportion than the 3% for married or cohabiting couples (ONS 1998a).  The gap in 
poverty rates between lone and couple mothers widened substantially between 1984 
and 1995 (Shouls et al. 1999).  A new Scottish Executive survey (1999) shows over 
one third (35%) of lone parents worried about money “all the time” and 27% “quite 
often”;   these proportions were much higher than for any other household type.  It 
shows two-fifths (39%) with no bank account, compared to 12% of all householders, 
and only 15% with any savings at all, compared to half of all households.  Berthoud 
& Kempson (1992) found one “problem debt” on average for every lone parent, far 
more than for other household types.   
 
These low incomes and related problems reflect lone parents’ dependence on social 
security benefits, and the inadequate level of these benefits given their extra needs 
(Berthoud & Ford 1996).  In 1995/96, 1m of the 1.6m lone parents were claiming 
Income Support.  This 63% proportion compares to only 10% of couples with 
dependent children (ONS 1998b, p.142).  In 1994-96, 58% of lone parents had no 
employment income, compared to 34% of married mothers, most of whom will have 
had husbands in work (ONS 1998a, p.56).    
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Lone Parents’ Housing Circumstances 
 
The Survey of English Housing (EHS) 1995/96 came up with the remarkable finding 
that almost one third (30%) of lone parents with dependent children had experienced 
homelessness within the previous ten years, compared to only 6% of all households.  
Three-quarters of these homeless lone parents had been given accommodation by 
their local Council (ONS 1998b).   
 
Lone parents are particularly dependent on renting.  Of the two-thirds who formed 
separate households in England in 1996, almost half (49%) were renting from local 
authorities or RSLs, compared to only 22% of all households, and 14% were renting 
privately compared to 9% of all households.  Only 37% were owner occupiers, far 
less than the 69% for all households (DETR 1998).  About one in six lone parent 
owner occupiers with dependent children in 1995/96 was in arrears with their 
mortgage, four times the proportion for couples with dependent children.  About one 
in eight lone parents was in rent arrears, but this was actually slightly less than for 
couple families, presumably because most had their full rent paid through benefit 
(Pullinger & Summerfield 1997). 
 
Lone parents tend to live in the worse parts of the rental sectors.  In England in 1996, 
almost one-fifth (18.0%) were living in “poor” housing conditions (unfit, in 
substantial disrepair or needing essential modernisation), significantly higher than the 
14.2% for all households.  Unemployed lone parents with infants were considerably 
worse off, over one quarter of them living in “poor” houses.  Lone parents were 
particularly likely to have poor security, to lack smoke alarms, and, in the local 
authority sector, to lack central heating (DETR 1998).  In Scotland, 40% of single 
parents had dampness or condensation on the surveyor’s assessment, well above the 
25% of all households (Scottish Homes 1997).  Almost one quarter (23%) of lone 
parents in Britain lived in a flat compared to only 6% of other families (ONS 1998a). 
 
Lone parents live disproportionately in poor neighbourhoods as well as in poor 
housing.  In England in 1996, one in seven (13.4%) of lone parent households with 
dependent children was living in a neighbourhood offering “poor” living conditions, 
twice the proportion for all households.  Willmott (1994) showed that in 1991 all but 
one of the British deprived areas had an above-average proportion of lone parent 
households and that between 1981 and 1991 their concentration in deprived areas 
increased.  This concentration is also shown by SEU (1998b, p.17).   
 
Those lone parents living in poor housing or neighbourhoods were much more 
concerned about the poor conditions than other types of household.  Almost two 
thirds wanted to move, compared to well under half of all households in similar 
conditions, and they were twice as likely to be dissatisfied with their housing as any 
other type of family (DETR 1998;  Pullinger & Summerfield 1997).  There is some 
evidence that a disproportionate number of lone parents are moving out of council 
into private rented housing, accounting for a third of such movers (Pawson & 
Bramley, forthcoming).  These moves are presumably to housing of better quality and 
would make sense given the poor accommodation they are getting from councils and  
 
 
 
 
 
5
their dissatisfaction with it. 
 
Lone Parents who live with their Parents 
 
In 1991, over one third (35.0%) of lone parent families lived with another household 
(Census 1991), almost always their family of origin (Haskey 1998, p.12).  The 
proportion of lone parent families sharing accommodation in 1991 varied quite 
widely, from 18.1% in Westminster to 70.5% in Dwyfor, north-west Wales, although 
it was mostly within the range 27%-45%.  The main reason for the variation is 
probably not the varying availability of social housing, but whether the lone parent’s 
own mother lives nearby.  Westminster has a shortage of social housing, but it also 
has a large furnished private rented sector and many of its lone parents are likely to be 
in-migrants with no family locally.  In rural Wales, social housing is also likely to be 
scarce but almost all lone parents are likely to be local. 
 
A much higher proportion of these sharing lone parents than of all lone parents are in 
the council sector.  Although it is difficult to obtain exact information, it is clear that 
these families are often very overcrowded.  While lone parent families living 
separately were less crowded than other households with children in 1991 (Atkins et 
al. 1996, p.192), 10% of lone parent families overall in 1995/96 had at least one room 
less than the bedroom standard, double the proportion for other families (ONS 
1998a).  This implies that the minority of lone parent families who were sharing must 
be much more crowded than this.   
 
The Health of Lone Parents and their Children 
 
The health of lone parents and their children is undermined by their disadvantaged 
living circumstances.  Lone mothers consistently have significantly worth health than 
couple mothers (Shouls et al. 1999).  In 1991, 15% of a sample of lone parents 
reported a long-term or limiting illness, and 13% that they had ill children.  By 1995 
twice as many of these same parents said they were ill themselves, and that they had 
ill children (29% in each case).  There was a strong association between the 
experience of physical hardship and the development of health problems among both 
parents and children.  In only four in 10 of these households had the mother and 
children remained free of long-term or limiting illness throughout the four years (Ford 
et al. 1998).   
 
The Non-Resident Fathers 
 
It is important to remember the non-resident fathers.  They also are a disadvantaged 
group.  In 1997, the Labour Force Survey showed only 76.6% of widowed or 
divorced men aged 25-49 in full or part-time jobs compared to 91.1% of married men. 
 Of the 530,400 non-resident parents (almost all men) with a Child Support Agency 
(CSA) full maintenance assessment at May 1997, only just over half (53.6%) were in 
a job (DSS 1997).  In 1995/96, most British non-resident fathers had not gone on to 
another permanent relationship:  nearly 60% were living without a partner (Bradshaw 
et al. 1999).  There is evidence that, like the lone parents with care of the children, 
they are particularly likely to be homeless.  SEU (1998a) noted that the single most  
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common reason for a first episode of rough sleeping is relationship breakdown, either 
with parents or partner, and that older homeless people were five times more likely to 
be divorced than the average for their age group.  Of 335 homeless men making 
contact with agencies in the Glasgow Rough Sleepers Initiative in 1998/99, half were 
fathers.  From the USA, Lindblom (1991) reported that “homelessness appears 
significantly more likely among extremely poor divorced or separated solitary males 
than among never-married single males”. 
 
Teenage fathers appear to be even rarer than teenage lone mothers.  In Allen & 
Dowling’s study (1998), only one fifth of the fathers of teenage mothers’ babies were 
teenagers themselves at the time of birth, the average age being 23. 
 
 
WHY HAS LONE PARENTHOOD INCREASED SO MUCH?  -  THE LINK WITH 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
It has long been known that marital behaviour depends strongly on the economy.  The 
English Registrar-General pointed this out as early as 1878 and an outstanding 
statistical study by R.H.Hooker (1901) showed the marriage rate in 1861-95 very 
closely correlated with the level of trade.  Southall & Gilbert (1996) have recently 
shown that the relationship between marriage and unemployment in 19th century 
England was so close that parish marriage registers are a better indicator of local 
unemployment rates than are the available data on unemployment.  Dorothy Thomas 
(1927, pp.100-02) showed that the illegitimate birth-rate rose and fell in England in 
1854-1913 in inverse proportion to the business cycle.  She suggested that this was 
“probably due to the restriction of the marriage-rate in times of depression”. 
 
Unemployment and Family Breakdown:  The American Evidence 
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s does not appear to have produced any statistical 
studies of lone parenthood.  The likelihood is that it was too short (around 7-8 years) 
to produce marked effects on family structure, and of course social restraints on lone 
parenthood were at that time extremely strong.  The Depression did however produce 
distinguished ethnographic studies (Bakke, 1940;  Komarovsky, 1940) showing the 
severity of the stresses placed on the parents’ relationship by unemployment of the 
father and the consequent severity of the threat of marital breakdown.  This evidence 
was drawn upon by Daniel Patrick Moynihan when he came to write his landmark 
report on The Negro Family (1965).   
 
It was among the black community in the USA in the 1930s to the 1960s that 
unemployment rates first rose high enough, for long enough, to have a marked effect 
on family structure.  Moynihan was concerned that the prevalence of lone parenthood 
would prevent the black minority from realising the benefits of the formal racial 
equality then being enacted under the Johnson administration.  He argued that high 
black lone parenthood was due to the “fundamental, overwhelming fact....that Negro 
unemployment, with the exception of a few years during World War II and the Korean 
War, has continued at disaster levels for 35 years” (p.20, author’s emphasis).  
Moynihan presented an elegant chart (p.22) showing a near-perfect one year lagged  
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relationship over the period 1951-63 between the non-white male unemployment rate 
and the proportion of non-white women separating from their husbands.  He also 
pointed out (p.47) that over the period 1948 to 1962 “male Negro unemployment and 
the number of new AFDC cases rose and fell together as if connected by a 
chain....The correlation between the two series of data was an astonishing 0.91”.
1 
 
Subsequent to Moynihan’s 1965 report, the US problem went on to get much worse, 
as “urban-rural manufacturing shift” intensified the shortage of blue collar jobs in the 
northern cities to which blacks had moved (Kasarda 1989).  Katz (1989, p.28) pointed 
out that “major newspaper accounts omitted Moynihan’s emphasis on unemployment 
as the great source of family disorganization”, and it has often been forgotten.  
Nevertheless, a large body of American research went on to confirm the strength of 
the unemployment-lone parenthood linkage.  In 1989, McLanahan and Garfinkel 
wrote (p.121):  “Despite some gaps and anomalies, there is now a strong body of 
empirical research that documents that one of the costs of increased unemployment is 
increased female headship”.  It is important to note that this research includes 
longitudinal studies of samples of people over time, such as that of Cherlin (1976), 
Lichter et al. (1992) and Testa et al. (1993) as well as aggregate studies such as that of 
South (1985) and Wilson (1987).  The evidence cannot be dismissed on the ground 
that “correlation does not prove causation”. 
 
Unemployment and Family Breakdown:  The British Evidence 
 
Recent British evidence has confirmed the causal link between unemployment and 
lone parenthood already seen in the USA.  Haskey (1984) found in a cross-section 
study that unemployed husbands are particularly likely to divorce.  A longitudinal 
study of 6 British towns (Lampard 1994) showed that a spell of unemployment during 
a year raised the chance of marital breakdown during the following year by about 
70%.  Kiernan & Mueller (1998) made a similar longitudinal finding using the British 
Household Panel Survey. The importance of unemployment is as obvious to 
researchers on the ground in Britain as it is in the USA.  Fotheringham’s comment 
about Birmingham’s Highgate estate in 1993, “With male unemployment running at 
almost 50 per cent in the local area traditional male roles as provider had.....been 
undermined”, is essentially the same as Rainwater’s quote from St Louis’ Pruitt-Igoe 
in 1970:  “The men don’t have jobs.  The woman, she starts nagging.  He don’t have 
the money so he leaves.  She ADC’s it.  If he had a job the family unit could come 
back together”.   
 
However the most powerful evidence comes from the 1981 and 1991 Censuses.  In 
April 1981, claimant unemployment in Britain was still under 10%.  It had risen 
above 6% for the first time since the war only in 1977, and then fallen again.  But by 
April 1991, it had been over 10% for 25 of the previous 40 quarters and over 7% for 
31 of them, with a peak of over 13% in 1983.   Moreover Beatty et al. (1997) showed 
that by 1991 recorded unemployment was seriously below the “real” level, which they 
estimated at 13.0%.  Not surprisingly in view of the American evidence, female lone 
parenthood in Britain as a proportion of all households with children doubled between 
1981 and 1991, from 5.6% to 11.6%.  Moreover, the higher the rate of unemployment 
in an area, the greater the increase in lone parenthood.
2  In 1981 there was already a  
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clear relationship between unemployment and lone parenthood across the 459 British 
local authority districts, but it was not especially strong (correlation 0.48) (FIGURE 
1).  By 1991 the relationship had become enormously stronger.  The correlation was 
now a very high 0.846, and an increase of 10% in the male unemployment rate was 
now associated with an increase of 8.5% in the proportion of lone parents - more than 
four times the effect seen in 1981.   By 1991, there were half as many lone parent 
households again (452,000) in local authority areas with above average 
unemployment as in areas with below average unemployment (312,300), even though 
the former group of areas had fewer households with children (2.95m compared to 
3.62m). 
 
It is sometimes argued that lone parenthood has increased because women have 
become more financially independent or less willing to put up with unsatisfactory 
partnerships.  Such changes may have played a minor role.  There are some more 
prosperous lone parents whose position owes little or nothing to unemployment.  
FIGURE 1 indeed shows that lone parenthood has risen even in areas of low 
unemployment.  But the idea that female emancipation has had much to do with most 
of the rise in lone parenthood cannot be reconciled with its concentration among the 
poorest women in the poorest areas.  FIGURE 2 shows that the areas with the highest 
 male unemployment and the most lone mothers also have the smallest proportions of 
 lone mothers in work, i.e. with independent incomes. 
 
The dominant influence of male unemployment on lone parenthood is also 
demonstrated by cross-section multiple regression studies of 1991 Census data for 
local authorities (Bradshaw et al. 1996, Gordon 1996, Webster 1998).  These show 
the statistical relationship between unemployment and lone parenthood after 
controlling for other factors.  They use different measures of lone parenthood and 
different explanatory variables, but produce similar results.  Male unemployment is 
shown to be the strongest influence on lone parenthood.  Communities with large 
Afro-Caribbean populations are shown to have somewhat higher rates of lone 
parenthood, and those with large Asian populations somewhat lower, after controlling 
for the effect of male unemployment.  Webster, like Johnston (1995), shows that 
higher education is not a significant factor. 
 
As in the USA, unemployment is concentrated in the cities, and for the same reason:  
their disproportionate loss of manual employment due to “urban-rural manufacturing 
shift” (Turok & Edge 1999).  However, all three regression studies suggest that there 
is a tendency for lone parenthood to be higher the larger the town or city, even after 
controlling for other factors.  In Webster (1998), big cities have lone parenthood 
around 2% higher than rural and small town areas, other things being equal, and inner 
London 4% higher.  It is sometimes suggested that this is due to cultural influences, 
but it seems more likely to result from differential migration after the birth of a child. 
 As Gordon (1996, p.418) suggests, couple families can more often afford to move out 
to the predominantly owner occupied housing in suburbs and exurban areas than can 
lone parents. 
   
Evidence since 1991 also supports the unemployment-lone parenthood causal linkage. 
 The best measure of “real” unemployment on an annual basis is the TUC’s “Want  
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Work Rate”, which shows those wanting work, whether unemployed or “inactive”, as 
a proportion of all those working or wanting work.  It peaked at 16.2% in 1993 and 
since then has fallen slowly to 15.1% in 1995 and 14.0% in 1997.  If there is a link 
between lone parenthood and unemployment, the growth of lone parenthood should 
have levelled off, with some delay, to reflect this fall.  This has indeed happened.  The 
number of lone parents claiming Income Support peaked in August 1995 at 1.06m and 
since then has been falling slowly, to 0.982m in November 1997.  This could in 
theory be due to falling claims rather than falling lone parent numbers.  However, 
levelling off is also suggested by the General Household Survey and the Scottish 
House Condition Survey, although their sample sizes are too small to permit precise 
estimates.  This incidentally implies that current official projections, based on blind 
extrapolation of trends from 1971 to 1991, are overestimating the future growth of 
lone parenthood.  It should be remembered however that both “real” unemployment 
and lone parenthood remain extremely high in many areas, such as Knowsley, 
Glasgow or Lambeth.   
 
 
THE BRITISH DEBATE ON LONE PARENTHOOD - MISSING THE POINT 
 
The combination of time series, cross section and ethnographic evidence in support of 
the view that the rise in lone parenthood has been mainly due to localised mass 
unemployment is extremely powerful.  Unfortunately, the British debate on lone 
parenthood has not reflected it.  In part, this is simply the result of bad luck:  minds 
were made up before analyses of the crucial 1991 Census results became available.  
For instance, the report of the Commission on Social Justice, central to the present 
government’s thinking, was finalised in July 1994.   
 
Much British research has also suffered from weak methodology.  In particular, the 
Programme of Research into Low Income Families (PRILIF) by the Policy Studies 
Institute, funded by the Department of Social Security, has used small national 
samples and has not attempted to investigate the impact of varying local labour 
market conditions.  Spurious findings have resulted to the effect that work is a 
realistic route of out of poverty for all lone parents, that child care is a sufficient 
rather than merely a necessary condition for lone parents to work, and that receipt of 
maintenance makes a lone mother better able to work (Ford et al. 1995, Marsh et al. 
1997).  A consideration of the geography shows how these findings have come about. 
Lone parenthood has increased most in areas of high unemployment, where lone 
parents cannot find work or afford childcare and where the non-resident father is 
unlikely to be in work and able to pay maintenance.  But there are also lone parents in 
areas of low unemployment.  They and their former partners find it much easier to get 
work, and maintenance is much more likely to be paid.  This is what  produces the 
observed positive relationships between working, receiving maintenance and having a 
higher income.  But it does not follow that lone parents in areas where jobs are scarce 
can replicate this favourable experience.   
 
Political ideology has also played a crucial role.  The British debate on lone 
parenthood has been dominated by the ideas of American conservative writers, 
notably Charles Murray, who argued in Losing Ground (1984) that the rise in lone  
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parenthood in the USA was caused by overgenerous welfare payments, not 
unemployment.  Katz (1989, p.152) shows how “Murray’s success illustrates the role 
of big money in the marketplace of ideas....’the quality of Murray’s intellectual 
goods’ was not the only reason for his success”.  The Sunday Times and the right-
wing Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) sponsored Murray to apply his arguments to 
Britain, starting with The Emerging British Underclass in 1990, followed by a second 
visit in 1994 to write Underclass:  the Crisis Deepens.  These volumes have been 
heavily promoted. The IEA has also published similar work by other authors 
including Lawrence Mead, whose Beyond Entitlement (1986) is the main source of 
the idea now espoused by Labour ministers that benefits ought not to be paid as of 
right but should be “earned”. 
 
It is surprising that so many people have taken Murray’s work seriously, given its 
overtly ideological character, intemperate language, and weaknesses of evidence and 
logic.  Like PRILIF, Losing Ground lacked any consideration of the changing 
geography of employment.  Moynihan (1986) commented that Murray had not “much 
addressed the data”.  He showed that the increase in US lone parenthood was actually 
accompanied by a fall in AFDC claims, contrary to what was logically required by 
Murray’s thesis.  A recent review (Lichter et al. 1997, p.136) concluded that “Little 
evidence exists to support the apparently widely held perception that welfare is 
largely responsible for the breakdown of the traditional married-couple family”.   
 
Murray’s papers on Britain have sought to establish the existence of an “underclass” 
defined by moral degeneracy, in the form of illegitimacy, violent crime, and supposed 
refusal to work.  As we have seen, births outside marriage are only loosely connected 
to lone parenthood, and as an analysis of the latter Murray’s work is correspondingly 
weak.  His 1990 paper on Britain was written before the 1991 Census and does not 
contain any serious statistical analysis.  In 1994, in so far as he did address it, Murray 
found himself actually confirming for England and Wales the unemployment-lone 
parenthood linkage discussed here:  “In 1991, the correlation between the male 
unemployment rate and the illegitimacy ratio in local authorities was a phenomenal 
+.85”.
3  Unfortunately, he did not allow this evidence to influence his position. 
 
Murray and the “New Right” have had a major influence on the policies of both 
Conservative and Labour governments.  Margaret Thatcher (1993, p.627-9) 
acknowledged the influence on her of “conservative thinkers in the United States on 
the growth of an ‘underclass’ and the development of a dependency culture....We 
were feeling our way towards a new ethos for welfare policy....comprising the 
discouragement of state dependency and the encouragement of self-reliance......and, 
most controversially, built-in incentives towards decent and responsible behaviour”.   
In relation to the Labour government, it is Frank Field, former Chair of the House of 
Commons Social Security Committee and Minister for Welfare Reform, who has been 
the key conduit for New Right ideas.  His book Losing Out (1989) - its very title a 
reflection of Murray’s - contained most of the ideas which are currently driving 
Labour government policy.  The government’s rhetoric has become more restrained 
since his departure in July 1998:  there have been no comments recently to match 
Field’s “a major consequence of welfare is now the cultivation of idleness, 
fecklessness and dishonesty” (1997).  However, the view that it is social security, not  
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lack of jobs, which is the main cause of worklessness is still present:  the “moral case 
for welfare reform” is that “the benefit system .....traps people on benefit.....And....is 
now part of the problem - when it should be part of the solution” (Alistair Darling, 
Social Security Secretary, July 1999).  
 
 
LONE PARENTHOOD:  THE PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA 
 
The public policy agenda in Britain has focused on removing supposed housing and 
social security incentives to becoming a lone parent;  raising incomes by getting lone 
parents into work;  raising more money from non-resident fathers, which in turn is 
also intended to deter lone parenthood;  and attempting to influence family structures 
and parenting more directly.   
 
Lone Parents and Housing 
 
We have seen that lone parents are badly housed.  Because they are so dependent on 
council housing, they need radical improvements to the neglected stock.  The present 
government has raised public housing investment to a modest extent, particularly if 
improvements via stock transfers, now at a peak, are considered, but investment 
remains no higher than it was in about 1994/95.  Lone parents also need greater 
preference in housing allocations;  at present they tend to get worse housing than 
other tenants.  This is partly because so many of them enter via homeless applications. 
 As McKendrick (1995) points out, homeless families accept worse accommodation 
because they do not have the same right as others to refuse an offer without penalty.  
A “one offer only” rule is very common.   
 
Better treatment of the homeless would therefore particularly benefit lone parents.  
But the New Right “incentives” theory of lone parenthood has played a major role in 
preventing such improvement.  Margaret Thatcher (1993) wrote “most 
important.....was to reduce the positive incentives to irresponsible conduct.  Young 
girls were tempted to become pregnant because that brought them a council flat and 
an income from the state.  My advisers and I were considering whether there was 
some way of providing less attractive - but correspondingly more secure and 
supervised - housing for these young people.  I had seen some excellent hostels of this 
sort run by the churches.”  There was an upsurge of such talk by Conservative 
politicians during 1993 (Inside Housing, 1/10/1993;  Housing, Dec/Jan 1993/94).  
Shortly thereafter, a DoE Consultation Paper (January 1994) implied that homeless 
single mothers were taking council houses away from “couples seeking to establish a 
good home in which to start and raise a family” (Cowan 1998). 
 
The attention paid to teenage mothers in council housing has been disproportionate.  
As shown earlier, there are very few teenage lone mothers;  most live with their own 
parents, rather than in a house of their own (SEU 1999);  when they do get council 
housing it is frequently of very poor quality;  and teenagers rarely, if ever, get or stay 
pregnant with the purpose of getting a house (Allen & Dowling 1998, SEU 1999).  
SEU (1999) notes that only 2,000 16-17 year old lone mothers have tenancies;  
including all aged under 20 increases the figure only to 13,000 (Wilson 1994).  An  
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Institute of Housing survey of local authority housing directors in 1993 found “no 
evidence that young single parents are being rehoused at the expense of two parent 
families”, but that lone parents fared less well in the type of properties they received, 
and that less than half of authorities would offer immediate access to permanent 
accommodation (Wilson 1994). 
 
Nevertheless, in a detailed historical analysis, Cowan (1998) has shown how the 
theme of queue-jumping teenage single mothers was used to prepare the ground for 
the removal of the right to permanent housing from all homeless people in England 
and Wales in the Housing Act 1996.   
 
The new Labour government has picked up Margaret Thatcher’s theme.  Local 
authorities are to be prohibited from giving an independent tenancy to under-18 lone 
mothers, and the Housing Corporation has been told to divert £10m to pilots for semi-
independent housing with support (SEU 1999).  There are some obvious objections to 
this (Winchester 1999).  While it is likely to work for some teenage mothers, it may 
not work for others.  They may be much better off with a council flat near their own 
mother.  We have seen that sharing lone parents - who are particularly likely to be 
teenagers - are very overcrowded.  Limiting their alternative to a hostel, possibly 
miles away, is likely to induce them to prolong these bad conditions.  However, the 
number of people involved is small.  Much more serious is the associated failure to 
address the issue of preference in housing allocations for lone mothers and the 
homeless in general.  The government, via regulations, not primary legislation, has 
restored “reasonable preference” for the homeless in the allocation of housing, and 
provided that any temporary private sector accommodation should be for a minimum, 
rather than a maximum, of 2 years.  But as Cowan (1998) comments, these are 
changes of form, not substance.  The government has not committed itself to restoring 
the right to permanent housing, nor taken any other action to improve the offers being 
made to lone parents.  It has proposed (Home Office 1998, para.1.60) that “due 
weight” in housing allocations should be given to the needs of grandparents and 
extended families.  The issue, however, is not usually the grandmother’s housing - she 
is normally well-established - but the lone mother’s.  
 
Lone Parents’ Incomes 
 
The government’s approach to lone parents’ incomes is to remove supposed 
incentives to lone parenthood, and to push lone parents into paid jobs of over 16 hours 
per week.   
 
The key early action of the Blair government was to implement in 1998 the abolition, 
already planned by the Conservatives, of the additional Lone Parent premiums (based 
on carefully-researched estimates of lone parents’ extra costs) paid within Income 
Support, Child Benefit, Housing and Council Tax Benefits.  It was made clear by Mr 
Blair after the parliamentary vote of December 1997 that the reason was the belief 
that these additional benefits provided an incentive to lone parenthood.  He has laid 
down the doctrine that “there will be no return to that approach”, i.e. of recognising 
lone parents’ higher costs.  
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Subsequently, the government has adopted a policy of increasing benefits equally for 
lone-parent and couple families, while removing support for the higher costs of older 
children.  It thinks that lone parents should not stay at home until their child has left 
school but should get a job.  The net effect of the various changes is that a new (or 
reclaiming) lone parent with one child over 11 will still be about £2.20 per week 
worse off in April 2000 than she would have been had the 1998 cuts never been made. 
 A new lone parent with one child under 11 will have had her benefits restored to the 
pre-cuts level only in April 1999.  Only in October 1999 will she be better off by 
more than a few pence.  Lone parent claimants who are private tenants have also (in 
1998) lost support for any difference between their actual rent and the local 
“reference rent”.  There is no sign of restoration of Single Payments for major 
household items, which would help to keep lone parents out of debt and make 
rehousing of the homeless easier.  Instead, the government remains among lone 
parents’ many creditors via the Social Fund inherited from the Thatcher years. 
 
Mr Brown’s three Budgets taken together will have made 15.1% of households with 
children in the poorest decile of equivalised post-tax household income worse off than 
they would have been under the policies prevailing prior to May 1997;  many of these 
are lone parents (Immervoll et al. 1999).  Income Support remains below the Family 
Budget Unit’s “low cost but acceptable level” (Parker 1999), and improvements are 
being substantially financed by redistribution between different categories of lone 
parent.  The doctrine that any extra help for children of lone parents must also go to 
children of couple families means both that the huge income differential between the 
groups cannot be closed and that the cost of any given improvement for lone parents 
is made much higher.  Moreover, because lone parents are geographically 
concentrated in the areas of highest unemployment, cuts to their benefits have a 
further “multiplier” effect in impoverishing these areas.   
 
Lone Parents and Work 
 
The government conceives the problem of getting lone parents into work as 
essentially an issue of labour supply (whether lone parents offer themselves for 
employment) rather than of demand for labour by employers.  Hence the supply-side 
“welfare-to-work” New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP).  But the evidence shows that 
lack of jobs is indeed the principal problem.  The relationship between the proportion 
of lone parents in work and the local unemployment rate in 1991 was extremely close 
(correlation -0.89).
4 The proportion in work varied from three-fifths (60.5%) in 
booming South Cambridgeshire, where male unemployment was only 4.7%, to one-
fifth or less (16.0%-20.5%) in the declining areas of Knowsley, Glasgow and 
Liverpool, where male unemployment was over 20% (FIGURE 2).  In other words, 
lone parents who want to work will get jobs if they are available in their area, 
otherwise they will not.  This is similar to the position in the USA:  “living in states 
with low rates of unemployment....increases the likelihood of working (of lone 
mothers) by nearly half” (IWPR 1995).  The problem is compounded by the fact that 
all of the New Deal target groups which the government wishes to get into work are 
disproportionately concentrated in the highest unemployment areas, making the 
strategy unrealistic unless more jobs are created there (Turok & Webster 1998).  But 
the government has few programmes to promote jobs in these areas.
5   
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There is abundant evidence from the USA that a welfare-to-work strategy for lone 
parents either does not work, or does so only at the cost of great hardship for the 
mothers and their children.  Pugh (1998) and Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist (1998) have 
established that, as in Britain, there is a deficit of “entry-level” jobs in the cities and 
that the existence of “spatial mismatch” prevents their residents from accessing jobs 
elsewhere.  Edin & Lein (1997) show that “In the present labour market, unskilled 
single mothers who hold jobs are frequently worse off than those on welfare”.  The 
Nobel prize-winning economist Robert Solow has pointed out (1998) that US welfare 
to work programmes, while placing a lot of people in jobs, have only tiny effects on 
their subsequent employment probabilities.  He derides the “Panglossian error” that 
all the problems lie on the supply side of the labour market:  the belief that “kennel 
dogs need merely act like bird dogs, and birds will come” (a “bird dog” is a retriever). 
 He argues that there is a need for more relevant jobs to be created in the right places. 
 
The initial results of the UK NDLP have been predictably poor.  Over the first 6 
months, 163,383 letters were sent to lone parents, of which one quarter (23.9%) led to 
an interview, one fifth (19.6%) to an agreement to participate, and - most important - 
only 3.8% in an actual job (DfEE Press Release 99/052, 5/3/1999).  Many of the 3.8% 
would have got a job anyway, so the true success rate was even lower. 
 
In June 1997, when Tony Blair launched the NDLP on the Aylesbury estate in 
Southwark, Downing Street “insisted there was no question of single parents being 
‘hauled’ into job centres and forced to take part in interviews.” (The Scotsman, 
2/6/1997).  However by 10 February 1999 the Daily Mail was proclaiming “Mr Blair 
has been dismayed by the low take-up of the Government’s New Deal package by 
lone parents.  The vast majority - about 94% (sic) - simply ignore invitations to 
voluntary interviews”.  Mr Blair himself, writing exclusively in the same edition, 
stated “It marks the end of a something-for-nothing welfare state.  The days of an 
automatic right to benefit will go.  It’s tough, but the right thing to do......In future, 
lone parents will have to come for an interview or risk losing their benefits.”   
 
There has been relatively little protest about these proposed benefit “sanctions” under 
the new “ONE” service or “single gateway”.  But evidence from the New Deal for 
Young People suggests that they could cause serious problems.  There, sanctions have 
risen to an annual rate of 18,500, including a full one quarter of those allocated to the 
Environmental Taskforce, and are concentrated on the most socially excluded in high 
unemployment areas (Bivand 1999).  These “sanctions” will operate alongside those  
in the government’s Sure Start Programme for the under-3s.  A Maternity Grant worth 
£200 will be paid to Sure Start mothers, but only on condition that they keep 
appointments for child health advice and check-ups.  It is difficult to reconcile this 
with the reference in the Home Office’s consultation paper “Supporting Families” 
(1998, para.1.41) to “parents (who) lack confidence initially to visit more formal 
services”.  It is precisely the most disadvantaged mothers who are likely to lose grant. 
 
The direct persuasion of the NDLP and “ONE” is being backed up by increasingly 
large financial inducements to work.  A new Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) is 
to be paid from October 1999 to every family with an earner working over 16 hours a  
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week, giving a minimum income guarantee of £200 per week to those on 35 hours. 
The WFTC will include more help with childcare costs than the existing Family 
Credit.  Lone parents will also now continue to receive Income Support in their first 
two weeks in a job.  Married couple’s allowance is to be replaced (after a 12-month 
gap) by a children’s tax credit which will benefit those few lone parents who are both 
working and earning enough to incur a sufficient tax liability.  The “poverty trap” 
created by Housing Benefit (HB) for those in work is being considered in a 
government review in progress at the time of writing.  The obvious approach is to 
reduce social housing rents, which have been raised enormously since 1979 and have 
been the main cause of increased HB expenditure.  But indications are that the 
government is more likely to reduce HB than to reduce rents. 
 
Bearing in mind their “supply-side” nature and experience to date, the whole package 
of government measures seems likely to increase the number of lone parents in work 
very little.  The Institute for Fiscal Studies has estimated that the WFTC, as originally 
announced, would add only 10,000 to 45,000 workers to the labour pool (Financial 
Times, 11/2/1999).  But since the in-work benefits go to all lone parents in work, 
including those already in a job, they have a high public expenditure cost and will 
effect a substantial redistribution of income to lone parents in full-employment areas, 
mainly in the south of England, leaving those in high unemployment areas relatively 
unaffected.   
 
Even if lone parents can be got into paid work, there is a question whether they ought 
to.  Half of lone parents on Income Support have a child under school age (Hansard, 
7/12/1998) and even where children are older, loss of time with the child can be 
particularly damaging where there is only one parent for most of the time, and where 
the family is living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood where a parent’s presence is 
especially important in keeping children out of trouble.  It has also been argued that 
work on top of child care can often be too stressful (e.g. Shouls et al. 1999).  Edwards 
and Duncan (1997) show that different groups of lone mothers have differing, but 
deeply held, views on this question.   
 
The government’s emphasis on expanding child care provision has been generally 
welcomed, although it has been objected that it is not being well targeted to lone 
parents (Financial Times 18/12/1997).   But there has been criticism of the idea that 
“the government values the act of looking after strangers’ children, but puts none on 
the demanding work by a parent looking after his or her own child” (Financial Times 
18/2/1999).  Many lone parents cannot earn enough to make paid childcare 
worthwhile;  is the combination of 16+ hours’ paid work for the mother and 
professional childcare for the children so beneficial as to justify extensive public 
subsidy?  
 
The message from lone parents themselves seems to be that many really do want 
opportunities for work, training, and child care.  Almost half (44%) of those 
voluntarily signing up for NDLP have children under 5.  However, some think they 
either ought not to work or should not work so much as to detract from their role as 
parents;  this may mean working less than the arbitrary lower limit of 16 hours a week 
applied to WFTC and Child Care Tax Credit.  It would be sensible to take more notice  
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of what they think.   
 
Non-Resident Fathers and Maintenance 
 
The treatment of non-resident parents is still bedevilled by the misconceptions of the 
1980s.  Margaret Thatcher wrote (1993, p.630):  “I was.....appalled at the way in 
which men fathered a child and then absconded, leaving the single mother - and the 
taxpayer - to foot the bill and condemning the child to a lower standard of 
living......So.....I insisted that a new Child Support Agency (CSA) be set up, and that 
maintenance be based not just on the cost of bringing up a child but on that child’s 
right to share in its parents’ rising living standards” (emphasis added).  The CSA, 
which commenced operations in 1993,  was designed on the basis of these views, 
before the 1991 Census results came out, and in the almost complete absence of 
research on non-resident parents.  None of the key assumptions on which it was based 
are correct.   
 
Most non-resident fathers do not appear to be irresponsible in fathering their children; 
 only 9% have never lived with the mother (Bradshaw et al. 1999).  Most do not have 
“rising living standards”.  The “drastic decline in levels of child maintenance that 
occurred during the 1980s” which the CSA was “intended to stop” (DSS 1999, p.1) 
was not due mainly, if at all, to irresponsibility but to the fact that the additional lone 
parent families were mostly the product of mass unemployment of the children’s 
fathers, who thus had far less money to pay.   Bradshaw et al. showed that, far from 
“absconding”, almost three-quarters (72%) of British non-resident fathers were in 
contact with their children’s mother, with over half (55%) claiming an amicable 
relationship with her.  Two-thirds (68%) were seeing their children at least once a 
month and almost half (47%) at least once a week.   
 
They were also paying a significant amount of maintenance without any urging from 
the CSA.  Over half (57%) were currently paying maintenance and three-quarters 
(77%) had ever paid.  Only just over half of payers (57%) had ever had a formal 
arrangement (CSA, Court etc.) to do so.  Payers were giving £60 per week on average 
in formal and informal support, 21% of their income.  Most non-payers were giving 
some informal support, with only 14% of fathers having never given some informal 
support.  The fact that three-quarters of current payers had jobs, compared to only a 
quarter (28%) of those who had never paid, goes a long way to explain why the 
proportions paying and amounts paid are not higher.  Bradshaw et al. classified only 
half (49%) of non-resident fathers as having “certain” or “probable” paying potential, 
and two-fifths (38%) as having none.   
 
The CSA’s own statistics for May 1997 confirm the extent of non-resident fathers’ 
poverty.  In respect of the better-off group of 149,700 lone parents who were not 
themselves on Income Support, two-thirds of former partners had jobs and one quarter 
(26.3%) were on social security.  However, of the 380,700 former partners of lone 
parents who were on Income Support, less than half (47.8%) had jobs, and almost as 
many (46.6%) were themselves on social security.  The level of maintenance 
assessments reflected this.  Two-fifths (212,900) were nil, and a further one in 7 was 
for under £5 per week, so that overall, half were for less than £3.34.    
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The CSA has been one of the greatest administrative disasters of recent times.  The 
proportion of lone parents on Income Support receiving maintenance is no greater 
now than before the CSA was introduced (DSS 1998).  In 1997/98, administration 
costs took 41p out of every £1 collected or arranged - much of which would have 
been paid anyway.  The Treasury received so little (£141m or about 3% of lone parent 
IS costs) that the CSA operation had a net public cost of £85m.  Over one third 
(38.3%) of absent parents with an assessment were in arrears or not paying at all, and 
there was a backlog of 407,000 unprocessed cases.  Finally, one quarter (26%) of 
maintenance assessments were inaccurate (1996/97figures, Guardian, 23/7/1997).  
 
Experience in the USA, which provided the model for the CSA, has been similar:  
“Federal efforts to improve the collection of child support from fathers appear to have 
little effect on payments” (Garfinkel et al. 1998).  Johnson et al. (1999) point out that 
US noncustodial parents have often been vilified as “deadbeats” who have dropped 
out of their children’s lives, and have been the target of largely punitive enforcement 
policies.   They argue on the basis of experience that they are likely to respond better 
to a less adversarial and more supportive approach which gives more consideration to 
the complex circumstances of their lives.  The same is likely to be true in Britain. 
 
However, the government has not seen the need to question the fundamental 
assumptions.  “We know why (the CSA) failed.  The formula for calculating 
maintenance was too complicated, and too little benefit.....went to the children” (DSS 
1999, p.viii).  It proposes to simplify the maintenance formula, raising more money 
generally from poorer fathers and bringing more poor fathers into the net;  to toughen 
the sanctions for non-payment, introducing fines and even prison;  and to allow lone 
parents on Income Support, for the first time,  to receive some benefit - the first £10 
per week - from the maintenance paid.  But in the commonest case - particularly in 
high unemployment areas - the non-resident parent will be on benefit himself and 
only liable to pay £5, and in many cases he will already be paying at least this much 
unofficially.  In the usual case where there is no second family, the £10 figure will 
only be reached when the father’s income reaches £110-£118.  The actual benefit to 
children, and any reduction in the over 70% of lone mothers on Income Support who 
seek to avoid making a child support application, are likely to be small.  Working lone 
parents on WFTC, by contrast, will keep all maintenance paid, and will not even have 
to cooperate with the CSA.  This will further widen the gap between poor people in 
high unemployment areas and better off people in prosperous areas. 
 
 
A MORE REALISTIC WAY AHEAD  
 
The government has a great deal of policy on lone parenthood.  But too little of it will 
achieve its objectives, while much will be experienced by lone parents as positively 
threatening, adding new stresses to what is already one of the most stressed social 
positions in modern Britain.   
 
Whatever other policies are followed, it is essential quickly to raise lone parent 
benefits:  today’s generation of children are only young once. With the “incentives”  
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theory of lone parenthood discredited, there is no reason to fear that this will make the 
problem worse.  In the longer term, the real issue is not the Welfare State but the male 
unemployment and related undermining of men’s economic role which this paper has 
shown is the principal cause of increased relationship breakdown.  “Supporting 
Families” (para.6.6) does in fact get to the root of the issue in a single brief paragraph 
about the problems facing young men - what is jocularly referred to in Whitehall as 
the “lads and dads” agenda.  “Increasingly, boys and young men seem to have 
difficulty maturing into responsible citizens and fathers.  Declining educational 
performance, loss of traditional ‘male’ jobs, the growth of a ‘laddish’ anti-social 
culture, greater use of drugs, irresponsible teenage fatherhood, and the rising suicide 
rate may all show rising insecurity and uncertainty among young men”.  With the 
exception of “irresponsible teenage fatherhood” - shown above to be rare - this is 
mainly an accurate list of problematic reactions to men’s worsened economic 
prospects.  But to mention the main cause of the problems - loss of traditional “male” 
jobs - within this list of effects reveals the lack of a coherent analysis.   
 
Reasons have already been given for thinking that the purely supply-side approach of 
the government’s New Deal is not going to work for the areas where lone parents are 
concentrated, which are those with the greatest shortage of jobs.  An effective policy 
on employment requires to operate on two levels:  first, to address the overall loss of 
blue collar jobs resulting from the rundown of manufacturing, and second, to deal 
with the problems which have caused the cities, coalfields and some other places to 
lose disproportionate numbers of blue collar jobs.  The issue of British policy towards 
manufacturing involves considerations which go well beyond the scope of this book.  
All that can be done here is to flag up its importance.  The same however is not true 
of “urban-rural manufacturing shift”.  This is a question of spatial planning which is 
intrinsically related to housing, since any housing system must be based on a well-
functioning home-workplace relationship.  
 
Turok & Edge (1999) comment that their study of the geographical pattern of 
employment change “has revealed the overriding importance of taking action to 
increase labour demand in and around the cities.....there is a particular need to expand 
employment opportunities for blue collar workers, and greater effort and resources 
should be devoted to this important challenge by all levels of government”.  This 
mainly requires more spending on derelict land and infrastructure, since Fothergill et 
al. (1985) and others have shown that the main factor driving blue collar jobs out of 
the cities is the lack of suitable sites and premises.  This in turn would help to relieve 
the problems of declining demand for housing in the cities, and excessive pressure for 
new housebuilding in the shires.  A reduced rate of family breakdown would reduce 
household growth, relieving pressure for new housebuilding all round.  At the end of 
the day, policies for lone parenthood are a second-best.  Ideally, we want families to 
stay happily together. 
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NOTES 
 
1 AFDC stands for “Aid to Families with Dependent Children”.  Although this 
benefit, introduced under Roosevelt, was available to all low income mothers, most 
claimants in the last few decades until its abolition in 1996 were black lone parents. 
 
2 For most districts, male unemployment was almost the same in 1991 as in 1981 so 
that either figure is a good guide to the level over the decade.  See Webster (1998).  
 
3 See Webster (1997) for a discussion of Murray’s attempt to avoid the obvious 
implication of this finding.   
 
4 This correlation is between the proportion of lone parents in work and the logarithm 
of the unemployment rate.  The adjusted R
2 (i.e. proportion of variation in the 
percentage of lone parents in work explained by the log of the unemployment rate) is 
0.79.  The unemployment rate has been logged to produce the straight-line 
relationship required to calculate a correlation coefficient. 
 
5 The “New Deal for Communities” does very little to promote jobs as such;  it is 
mainly a labour “supply-side” programme, like the other New Deals. 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
David Webster MA MBA FCIH is Chief Housing Officer (Policy Review and 
Development), Glasgow City Council.  The views expressed are not necessarily those 
of the Council.   
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FIGURE 1:  GB DISTRICTS:  FEMALE LONE PARENTHOOD BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT, 1981 AND 
1991
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FIGURE 2:  PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE LONE PARENTS IN WORK 
BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT - BRITISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1991
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MALE WORKLESSNESS  
AND THE RISE OF LONE PARENTHOOD IN BRITAIN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Deindustrialisation has eliminated  many traditionally male jobs in Great Britain.  Using 
geographical comparisons based on Census data, this paper estimates that the resulting 
fall in male employment explains between 38% and 59% of the 1.16m increase in lone 
parent families over the period 1971-2001. The impact was greatest in the areas which 
suffered most from industrial decline. Higher male employment would help to contain, 
and maybe reverse, the growth of lone parenthood, by reducing inflows into lone 
parenthood and increasing outflows through re-partnering and consequent stepfamily 
formation.  Female employment is found to have no consistent net effect on lone 
parenthood.   
 
Keywords:  Lone parents, lone parenthood, lone motherhood, female headed families, 
family structure, unemployment, worklessness. 
JEL classifications:  I32, J11, J12, J16, J68, J69 
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The large and rapid increase in lone parenthood since the 1970s is one of the most 
profound social and demographic changes in modern Britain.  The Census shows an 
increase from about 4.3 % of families with dependent children in 1961 to 25.6 % in 2001, 
or in absolute terms from 0.294m to 1.788m.  The change relates almost entirely to 
female lone parenthood:  male-headed lone parent families increased only from 0.9 % to 
2.6 % over this period.
    Britain now has a very high level of lone parenthood by 
international standards.  A recent comparison, by Bradshaw and Finch (2002), including 
22 countries comprising most of the OECD, found that Britain had the third highest 
proportion of lone parent families. National census data for 2000/01 indicate that in the 
UK lone parent families were 25% of all families with dependent children as compared to 
27% in the USA and 29 % in New Zealand.  
 
 
Stepfamilies, including those with unmarried partners, have also increased.  In 2001, 
9.7% of families with dependent children in Great Britain were stepfamilies, up from 
6.7% in 1991 (Haskey 1994).  By 2001 over one third (35.3 %) of dependent children 
were in lone parent families or stepfamilies.  In eight local authorities, including the big 
cities of Manchester, Glasgow, Nottingham and Liverpool, more than a half of dependent 
children were living with a lone parent or in a stepfamily. 
 
Lone parenthood is generally agreed to be problematic because of its close linkage with 
poverty, for both parents and children (Kamerman et al. 2003).  In the UK, although the 
majority of poor children are in couple families, children in lone parent families are at 
much greater risk of being in poverty than those in couple families, 50% compared with 
23% on the After Housing Costs measure and 35% compared with 18% on the Before 
Housing Costs measure (Table 1).   
 
There is a large body of evidence that the children of lone parents are statistically 
disadvantaged, in terms of lower educational attainment, worse health and involvement in 
crime or antisocial behaviour, although there is continuing debate as to how far this is due 
to poverty and how far to other factors, such as weak supervision or the absence of a male 
role model (Ginther and Pollak 2004; Amato 2005; Spencer 2005; Walker and Zhu 
2005).  Much distress results from the separation of children from one of their parents, 
while there are strong indications that living apart from their families has damaging 
effects on men’s behaviour (Akerlof 1998; Nock 1998).  There is also a great deal of 
evidence that, even if a lone parent finds a stable partner, children fare less well on 
average in a stepfamily than they do with both their natural parents (e.g. Daly and Wilson 
1998; Case, Lin, and McLanahan 2000; Ginther and Pollak 2004).  
 
The rise in female lone parenthood in Britain has coincided with a large fall in male 
employment and a large rise in female employment.  Not surprisingly, a number of 
authors have suggested that these employment trends have had a causal impact on lone 
parenthood.   Evidence reviewed below suggests that being out of work or in unstable 
employment has powerful effects on the father’s position in the family, through such 
things as his lack of financial contribution, lowered status, and increased interpersonal   4
tensions, and that this tends to undermine stable partnering. It also makes men into less 
desirable future partners, thereby reducing the incentive for women to enter into long-
term commitments such as marriage. There is a large literature arguing this link, 
especially for the USA.  It has also been suggested, on the basis of less strong evidence, 
that female employment prospects can influence lone parenthood.  
 
In Britain, there has been to date no comprehensive statistical investigation of the link 
between the changing employment prospects of men and women, and increasing female 
lone parenthood.  This paper sets out to fill the gap, using data on local authority areas 
and sub-regions  from the four Censuses of 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001.  This data source 
does not provide longitudinal information, but it has the advantage of covering a much 
longer time span than micro-surveys such as the BHPS which began too late to capture 
the effect of the big employment shocks of the 1970s and 80s.  The paper concludes that 
the rise in male worklessness has been a major factor behind the rise in lone parenthood.  
It also finds that, on balance, rising female employment has not significantly affected the 
rate of lone parenthood. 
 
The paper is laid out as follows.  Section 1 gives some definitions.  Section 2 explains the 
focus of the study and reviews the earlier literature on the links between employment and 
lone parenthood, in the USA and Britain.  Section 3 gives a statistical description of the 
changes in lone parenthood and employment in Britain in 1971-2001.  Section 4 reports 
an econometric investigation of the link between lone parenthood, male and female 
employment, and certain other variables. It also investigates briefly the factors that 
influence the formation of stepfamilies. Finally, Section 5 considers briefly the 
implications of our findings.  An appendix gives details of methods and data. 
 
1. Definitions 
 
In this paper lone parenthood is defined as the proportion of families with dependent 
children who are headed by a parent who has no partner living with them.  This definition 
is considered to be the most relevant to public policy.  The data refer to Great Britain and 
are drawn from the decennial Census of Population.  Census definitions therefore apply.  
“Families with dependent children” include both married and cohabiting couples as well 
as lone parents.  They also include families living as part of another household.  In 2001, 
there were 237,000 such lone parent families, out of a total of 1.788 million lone parent 
families. Ideally, this paper would consider only female-headed lone parent families, but 
the necessary data are not available (see Appendix).  In practice the inclusion of male 
lone parents makes no material difference since, as already noted, their numbers are small 
and have changed little; most male lone parenthood has always been due to the death of 
the mother. 
 
This paper does not consider marital status, which is no longer an adequate indicator of 
the family structure of children born outside marriage (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan 
2002).  In Britain, the proportion of couples with dependent children who are cohabiting 
rather than married has increased from 4 % in 1986 (Haskey 2001) to 15.5 % in 2001.  
Cohabitation is not completely unrelated to lone parenthood, because on average   5
cohabitations are less stable than marriages, and are more likely to lead to lone 
parenthood (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000).  But this issue is not explored here.  To the 
extent that marital status plays a role in our analysis it functions behind the scenes as an 
unspecified intermediate variable.  
 
Because it uses Census data, this paper is concerned with the stock of lone parents at 
discrete points in time.  Flows into and out of lone parenthood are considered only 
indirectly through their impact on the stock.  However, such flows are important for 
interpreting our findings.  There are three routes into lone parenthood:  partnership 
breakdown (divorce, marital separation or termination of a cohabiting relationship); 
having a child outside a partnership; and death of a partner.  In 2001, half (52.5 %) of 
female lone parents were separated or divorced, 4.4 % were widowed, and 43.1 % had 
never been married.   Since many of the latter must have conceived their children during 
a previous cohabiting relationship, it is clear that partnership breakdown is the major 
route into lone parenthood.   There are also three routes out of lone parenthood: re-
partnering by the lone parent, into a marriage or cohabitation; exit of the child(ren) from 
dependency by growing up;  and departure of parent or child from the family through 
death, adoption or some other route.  Repartnering is the major route out of lone 
parenthood.  For a 1991 British cohort, it accounted for approaching two-thirds of final 
exits by 1995 (Kiernan, Land and Lewis 1998), although by 2001 this proportion had 
fallen, and 43 % of the cohort had not exited at all (Marsh and Vegeris 2004).   
 
It is sometimes suggested that some reported lone parent families are not really lone 
parent families at all, but are actually couple families where the presence of the male is 
being concealed in order to improve the mother’s position in relation to state benefits or 
tax credits.  However, all of our data are drawn from the Census, whose strict 
confidentiality rules make such concealment unnecessary.  None of the extensive work 
undertaken to investigate underestimation of population in the 2001 Census has suggested 
that any significant number of ‘usually resident’ men were omitted from Census 
estimates of lone parent families. 
 
2. The Link Between Worklessness and Lone Parenthood:  Previous 
Evidence 
 
There is pre-existing evidence that male worklessness can affect all three of the routes 
into female lone parenthood, by increasing partnership breakdown, by reducing the 
attractiveness for the woman of establishing a partnership in the first place, and by 
increasing male mortality.  Female employment prospects have been argued to affect lone 
parenthood, but different authors have suggested effects  which work in opposite 
directions:  some have argued that rising female employment would increase partnership 
breakdown, while others have argued that it would reduce un-partnered births.   
 
Empirical academic work suggesting a causal link between male worklessness and female 
lone parenthood goes back a long way, in both Britain and the USA.  A summary of the 
pre-second world war research evidence for both countries is in Webster (2000).  There 
are also a number of theoretical reasons why there might be such a link. In an area where   6
male worklessness is widespread, many men are 'not worth marrying' in a narrowly 
economic sense.  It is better for women to maintain their own benefit entitlement as a 
lone parent. Also, if the supply of ‘marriageable’ men is very limited, why delay having a 
child in the hope of finding a suitable partner, if there is sufficient welfare support 
available to make life tolerable as a lone mother?  These points are not considered further 
here.  For an extended discussion of them see Morgan (1999) and Willis (1999);  for an 
up-to-date review of the theoretical economics of the family, see Ermisch (2003).  
 
In recent times, the bulk of relevant empirical work has been in the USA, focusing 
particularly on the black minority.  It was among this group that unemployment rates first 
rose high enough, for long enough, to have a marked effect on family structure. The 
landmark study was by Moynihan (1965), who drew on interwar ethnographic studies and 
his own statistical work to argue that high black lone parenthood was due to the 
“fundamental, overwhelming fact...that Negro unemployment, with the exception of a few 
years during World War II and the Korean War, has continued at disaster levels for 35 
years”(p. 20).  This lead was followed by later researchers.  In particular, Wilson (1987) 
concluded from time series evidence that the rise of black female-headed families could 
be substantially explained by a fall in the availability of economically attractive 
(“marriageable”) men caused by rising inner city unemployment and related factors.  This 
view has been challenged, for instance by Wood (1995), and a lot of attention has been 
given to the alternative argument by Murray (1984) that female lone parenthood has been 
encouraged by welfare payments.  In a wide-ranging review and meta-analysis, Moffitt 
(1997) concluded that welfare does have incentive effects on marriage and fertility, 
although findings differ widely about the scale of the effect.  Curtis (2006) points out that 
American studies typically ignore housing costs and subsidies and hence underestimate 
the scale and impact of welfare benefits. Avoiding this pitfall, she finds strong evidence 
that housing subsidies and other welfare benefits encourage lone parenthood. 
Nevertheless, there is still strong academic support for the importance of male 
unemployment in raising female lone parenthood in the USA. In their study of fragile 
families, Carlson et al (2002) found that “economic stability of the male partner appears 
to be an important criteria (sic) for whether mothers are willing (or able) to set up a 
household with the father of their child(ren)”(p. 17), echoing earlier findings by Edin and 
Lein (1997) and Cherlin (1998).  Moehling (2005), in an unusual study using data from 
1910 to 1970, finds that, for whites at least, welfare policy has been a causal factor 
behind the growth of lone parenthood over the past fifty years. However, she also argues 
that other factors were more important, especially for the black population, of which she 
singles out particularly the worsening of the male labour market and consequent decline 
in the returns to marriage. Neal (2004) argues that labour market conditions act in combination 
with the welfare system.  A severe decline in the supply of “marriageable” less educated black 
men in the USA from the 1960s onwards coincided with an expansion of welfare programs for 
never-married mothers.  As the supply of suitable men dried up, these welfare programs made it 
feasible for women to raise children without a male partner.  Thus, the trigger which set off the 
explosion in extramarital childbearing was the collapse of male employment, but this explosion 
was made possible by the presence of an alternative form of support in the form of welfare 
benefits.  A similar argument may also apply in Britain, where there was already an extensive 
welfare system in place when the collapse of male employment in traditional activities such as 
mining and manufacturing occurred.   7
New Zealand is the other country that has a higher rate of lone parenthood than Britain.  
Morgan (2004) argues that important factors behind the modern increase in lone 
parenthood in New Zealand were the collapse in employment opportunities for less-
skilled men during the 1980s and 1990s together with a switch in welfare policy towards 
means-tested benefits that favour lone parenthood.  Most affected by these developments 
was the Maori population amongst whom lone parents now account for approximately 
44% of families with dependent children, as compared to 23% for Europeans
1.  Between 
1986 and 1991, due to the crisis in manufacturing industry, the Maori unemployment rate 
rose from 12% to 24% for men and from 19% to 24% for women (Statistics New Zealand 
1998).  For the non-Maori population as a whole the increase was much smaller – from 
6% to 9%.   
 
In postwar Britain, unemployment did not affect any population group on a large scale 
until the later 1970s, while really big increases in lone parenthood did not occur until the 
1980s.  It is not surprising therefore that the thesis that male worklessness is a factor in 
lone parenthood did not emerge in Britain until the 1990s, when for the first time the 
1991 Census gave a full picture of what was happening.  In recent years the view that 
lone parenthood is related to male unemployment has gained ground.  In studies on the 
most important route into lone parenthood, Haskey (1984), Lampard (1994) and Kiernan 
and Mueller (1998), using different sources, all found that a husband’s unemployment 
makes marital breakdown much more likely.  On the  alternative route of non-marital 
childbearing, studies by Ermisch (1991; 2002) produced evidence that unemployment has 
a positive effect.  Del Bono (2004), using longitudinal data based on Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs), produced stronger findings than Ermisch. She found that area-
specific male unemployment rates were both positively related to out-of-wedlock births 
and negatively related to the formation of a cohabitation or marriage.   
 
Turning to studies on stocks, Gordon (1996), reporting a cross-section analysis of 1991 
Census data for LEAs, found that male unemployment was much the most significant of 
the variables affecting the proportion of lone parents, and observed that this tended to 
support Wilson’s (1987) hypothesis.  Bradshaw et al. (1996) drew similar findings from 
the 1991 Census.  .  Bradshaw et al. (1999) found that 17 % of their 1995 sample of 
“absent” fathers were officially unemployed, and that a total of 34 % were workless; 
these are much higher rates than in the general population.  Kiernan et al. (1998) drew 
attention to the rise in male unemployment  as a factor promoting divorce and reducing 
the attractiveness of men as marriage partners. The latter observation was confirmed by 
Borooah (2002), who showed that men without employment are less likely to be married, 
and more likely to cohabit or to be unpartnered. 
 
Evidence on the influence of women’s employment on lone parenthood is less clear.  In 
the USA, Ross and Sawhill (1975) argued, as indeed did Wilson, that increased lone 
parenthood among white women was due to improved employment prospects, because it 
enabled them to do without an unsatisfactory male partner.   This type of argument is 
often heard also in Britain.  It is also argued that higher female employment reduces lone 
                                                 
1 These figures are authors’ estimates based on data contained in Tables 1.02 and 1.05 of Statistics New 
Zealand (2003).    8
parenthood, because the availability of an attractive alternative to early motherhood 
discourages un-partnered births.  The findings of Olsen and Farkas (1990) are consistent 
with this view.  Ermisch (2002) notes that his own findings on pre-marital births, 
mentioned earlier, are capable of interpretation in terms of either male or female 
employment prospects.     
 
The overall conclusion from earlier studies is that declining male employment has 
encouraged lone parenthood, but that any impact of rising female employment is likely to 
be smaller and of uncertain sign.  This is because two effects are postulated which would 
work in opposite directions. 
 
In spite of the fragmentary, but consistent, evidence for the importance of declining male 
employment in the rise of lone parenthood, such a link is far from generally accepted in 
Britain.  To our knowledge, no UK government analysis has investigated, let alone 
accepted, the possibility that the rise in lone parenthood might be causally related to the 
decline in male employment.  Typically, it has been presented as an independent 
demographic trend, for instance in HM Treasury/Department of Work and Pensions 
(2001) (p.16).  Essentially, the British debate remains inconclusive because 
comprehensive statistical analysis has been lacking.  
 
3. Lone Parenthood and Employment in Great Britain 1971-2001:  
Statistical Description 
 
To explore the relationship between employment and family change, we use the 
decennial Census of Population to focus on the geographical variation in lone parenthood 
over the period 1971-2001.   This period is long enough to include both the great 
industrial decline and the massive growth in lone parenthood. We divide Great Britain 
into 120 areas with consistent boundaries. In 2001, these had a median population of 
284,000, ranging from 67,735 (Scottish Islands) to 2,208,609 (Strathclyde region). 
Details are given in the appendix.   
 
Looking first at the national level, the rise of lone parenthood has been matched by 
equally striking changes in male and female employment.  The employment rate for 
working age men (16-65) was already falling in the 1960s but was over 90 % until 1975.  
It fell to 77.5 % and then to 75 % in the deep recessions of 1979-83 and 1991-94; since 
then it has recovered only to 79 %.  By contrast, the female working age (16-59) 
employment rate has risen from under 50 % in 1963 to 70 % by 2005.  The increase in 
lone parenthood has closely matched these changes.  This is shown in Figure 1, which 
includes Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimates for lone parenthood in 1992-2006 as well 
as Census figures for 1971-2001.  To make the relationship clearer, this chart is presented 
in terms of non-employment rates rather than employment rates.  
 
In the local level analysis, we restrict our attention to persons in the age group 16-49 who 
are not full-time students.  We describe anyone in this group who did not have a declared 
employment in the Census as “workless”. Official unemployment statistics provide a 
misleading picture, because they have been affected by the large movement of   9
unemployed men on to sickness benefits since the late 1980s (Beatty et al. 2000; Bell and 
Smith 2004).  Particularly for men, “worklessness” offers a more consistent measure.  To 
a considerable extent, it is a proxy measure, since not all the relevant men are without 
work at a point in time.  There is a large segment of the labour force for whom the 
experience is intermittent worklessness, interspersed with low paid jobs (Summers 1990).  
Official unemployment series also fail to reflect the secular rise in female labour force 
participation which has accompanied the growth of employment opportunities for women 
in the service sector.  
 
Between 1971 and 2001, male worklessness increased in all of the 120 areas considered 
in this paper - by between 3.6 percentage points in Surrey and 21 points in Newham.  By 
the end of the period, in many large conurbations, it was over 20 %.  At the same time, 
female worklessness has fallen in almost all areas, by up to 27 percentage points in 
Highland region and 34.8 points in the Scottish Islands.  Only in six inner London 
boroughs has there been an increase in female worklessness.  Changes in lone parenthood 
are strongly correlated with changes in both male (0.78) and female worklessness (0.66), 
and lone parenthood is now heavily concentrated in the areas which have both high male 
and high female worklessness.  
 
The national changes in employment and family structure therefore conceal a great 
diversity of local experience.  On the one hand there are areas which have seen only 
modest falls in male employment, large increases in female employment and relatively 
small increases in lone parenthood.  On the other hand there are areas which have seen 
large falls in male employment, small increases or actual falls in female employment, and 
large increases in lone parenthood.  Underlying these differences there is a consistent 
geographical contrast between rural and urban areas.  Taking quartiles as a measure of 
extreme experience in both groups, the fortunate rural areas include the southern counties 
of Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Suffolk, Kent, Surrey, Hampshire, Dorset, 
Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Hereford and Worcester, Warwickshire and 
Lincolnshire, together with North Yorkshire, Grampian and the Scottish Islands.  The less 
fortunate urban areas include eight inner London boroughs, Birmingham and Sandwell, 
Liverpool and Knowsley, and Manchester and Salford.  These contrasts underline the 
importance of going behind the national aggregates and studying local variations in lone 
parenthood. 
 
Worklessness and lone parenthood are both well above average in the old industrial areas 
of Britain. Since they are major determinants of child poverty, it is to be expected that 
child poverty must also be relatively high in these areas. This is confirmed by the official 
statistics on low-income households in Table 1. With the exception of London, the 
incidence of child poverty is on average lower in the Southern regions than elsewhere in 
Britain. The differences are muted by the fact that the regions concerned are large and 
contain many localities and subgroups that have suffered from economic decline and 
have been left behind by the modern service boom.  Unfortunately, usable child poverty 
data are not available at a lower geographical level.  The most striking feature is perhaps 
the high level of child poverty in London, especially inner London, where 51 percent of 
children live in poverty, but even in outer London the figure is 35 percent.  Although   10
other factors, such as ethnicity, contribute to the widespread poverty in London (Magadi 
and Middleton, 2007), these very high figures are consistent with our argument since 
inner and outer London have both suffered severely from the past loss of industry and 
contain large subgroups that have not shared in the new wealth of the capital. Both have 
high rates of worklessness and lone parenthood.   
 
4. Econometric Analysis  
 
The above description suggests that changes in male and/or female employment may 
have been a major factor behind the rise in lone parenthood.  Other factors may also have 
played a role.  In order to investigate the relative importance of the various factors, a 
regression analysis was carried out.  The variables used were as follows (see Table 2 for 
summary statistics): 
 
•  Lone Parenthood: Lone parent families with dependent children as a percentage 
of all families with dependent children.   
 
•  Male (Female) Worklessness: The percentage of males (females) aged 16-49, 
excluding full-time students, who are not in employment.   
 
•  Population Density: The number of usually resident persons per hectare in 2001.  
This variable approximately indicates the position of an area in the urban 
hierarchy.  It may therefore provide a measure of migratory effects, and perhaps 
behavioural or lifestyle factors connected with big cities and larger towns.  Moffitt 
(1997) notes that urban residence has a positive effect on female lone parenthood 
in the USA.   
 
•  Rented Accommodation: The percentage of households in permanent structures 
which rent their home.  Housing tenure is relevant to the present study for several 
reasons.  Low incomes typically prevent lone parents from buying into owner 
occupation, and they therefore have a greater tendency to remain in, or migrate 
into, areas where rented housing is plentiful (Gordon 1996).  The General 
Household Survey 2002/03 showed that 64% of lone parent families with 
dependent children lived in rented accommodation, compared to only 22% of 
other families.  Rising home ownership may be an indicator of “gentrification”, 
the movement of better-off people into former working-class areas of cities.  It is 
also often argued that the availability of rented housing in itself promotes the 
formation of lone parent families (Social Exclusion Unit 1999).  
 
•  Manual: The percentage of economically active males with skilled or unskilled 
manual occupations. This variable is designed to capture the influence of social 
class on reproductive and partnering behaviour.  
 
•  Female Education:  The percentage of women aged 18-59 with degrees or 
professional qualifications.   There are some suggestions in the literature that 
better qualifications might encourage lone parenthood because they make women   11
more independent by improving their employment prospects.  Alternatively, they 
may discourage lone parenthood by increasing the opportunity cost of career 
disruption through motherhood.  The British Millennium Cohort Study showed a 
strong inverse relationship between the level of a woman’s education and the 
likelihood of a non-partnered birth (Kiernan and Smith 2003).  Data on this 
variable are only available from 1981 onwards. 
 
•  Black: the percentage of the population belonging to a black ethnic group, and 
Asian: the proportion of the population belonging to a non-Chinese Asian ethnic 
group.  Ethnicity is a well-established correlate of family structure.  Lone 
parenthood is far more prevalent among black ethnic groups, and far less 
prevalent among Asian ethnic groups, than among Whites (Rowlingson and 
McKay 2002; Kiernan and Smith 2003).  These variables are only available in the 
Census for 1991 and 2001; values for 1981 were estimated by backward 
extrapolation.  
 
Our basic regression equation is of the following “fixed effects” form: 
 
,0 , 1 , 1 0 ,
j
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where y is lone parenthood,  x is male worklessness, the
j z are additional variables to 
control for spurious correlation and  , it ε  is an error term. The dummy variables  i α  and  t β  
are included to control for area-specific and time-specific effects.  The area dummies 
allow for the possibility that some areas may have persistently higher or lower rates of 
lone parenthood than is implied by our main explanatory variables. The time dummies 
allow for changes in social norms, welfare benefits and the like that may exert an 
independent, nation-wide influence on reproductive and partnering behaviour.  Lagged  
values of male and female worklessness are included to allow for the fact that  these 
variables may influence the stock of lone parents with a considerable delay.  This is to be 
expected since the stock of lone parents is governed by the inflows and outflows 
discussed earlier, particularly partnership breakdown and repartnering, which take time; 
the duration of lone parenthood for many of those concerned is known to be over a 
decade (Marsh and Vegeris 2004).  Reproductive and partnering behaviour may also be 
slow to respond when economic conditions alter. 
 
The geography used here gives a good representation of areas with high and low rates of 
lone parenthood and worklessness.  There is a strong urban-rural dimension to both lone 
parenthood and unemployment, with higher rates in the cities and lower rates in the 
country.  The travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) used in some earlier studies (e.g. Lampard 
1994; Ermisch 2002) correspond to the labour catchment areas of employment centres.  
They involve merging big cities with a wide commuting hinterland, thus eliminating the 
high rates of lone parenthood and unemployment found in the urban cores.  Conversely, 
many TTWAs comprise small town and rural areas with small populations and relatively 
low rates of unemployment and lone parenthood.  The extent of variation in lone 
parenthood and worklessness captured by TTWAs is therefore limited.  Some of the areas 
used here – the London boroughs and metropolitan boroughs – are small enough for some   12
relevant interactions to occur between them, for instance women’s pre-partnership 
behaviour might be affected by the availability of potential partners in a neighbouring 
area.  But it is clear that most of the lone parenthood inflows and outflows would not be 
affected.  In particular, partnership breakdown, or termination through death, occurs 
between people living in the same place, while re-partnering would appear to be most 
likely with people living or working nearby.  The Census shows that for the great 
majority of employed people, home and workplace are co-located in the areas used here.  
There is also clear evidence that areas with weak labour markets tend to be adjacent to 
each other (Coombes and Raybould 2004).  In addition, typical migration patterns have 
been controlled for through inclusion of the population density and rented 
accommodation variables.  
 
We do not examine econometrically the role of the welfare system in promoting lone 
parenthood.  In Britain, in contrast to the USA, there is no significant variation in 
payment levels or eligibility between areas, making the present study design unsuitable 
for exploring this question.  However, as González (2007) points out, the British welfare 
system is comparatively generous to lone parents by international standards, and this is 
the background against which employment change would impact on family structure.  
Over time, there have been variations in the generosity of welfare benefits for lone 
parents as compared to couples.  In 1976 the Labour government introduced a special 
lone parent benefit that was increased substantially during the 1980s by the 
Conservatives, but later frozen and eventually abolished altogether for new claimants by 
Labour in 1998.  The major innovations in tax credits have occurred too late to have 
much effect on the figures included in our study, where the latest data refer to 2001.  
Otherwise, to the extent that welfare benefits have exerted an independent influence on 
the evolution of lone parenthood, these effects should be picked up by the time dummies 
in our regressions. 
 
Table 3 presents the main regression results for the pooled data 1971-2001. In this table, 
the basic fixed effects equation is estimated both by ordinary least squares and by the 
method of instrumental variables, as discussed below.  As a cross-check, the equation is 
also re-estimated by dropping the area-specific dummies and using the method of 
“random effects” to allow for geographical variations.  This is regarded as more efficient 
than the fixed effects approach, but it has the drawback that the resulting estimators may 
not be consistent.  The standard method for choosing between fixed and random effects is 
to apply the Hausman test.  Unfortunately, this method is not applicable in the present 
context because our time series are extremely short (4 observations for each area) and we 
are therefore left with no formal statistical criterion for choosing between fixed and 
random effects.
 2  We also experimented with  alternative logarithmic versions of the 
regression equations, and tried using feasible generalized least squares to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.  The results are not reported here because they were similar to those 
presented in the table.   
                                                 
2 Let b and B be the coefficients derived by regression using fixed and random effects respectively, and let 
V(b) and V(B) be their estimated variance-covariance matrices. The Hausman test uses V(b) -V(B) to 
estimate V(b-B). This requires that V(b) – V(B) be positive definite.  This condition is not satisfied for the 
pairs of equations 3&5 and 4&6 in Table 3.    13
Most of the equations shown in Table 3 include unlagged female worklessness as an 
explanatory variable.  The inclusion of this variable (though not of lagged female 
worklessness) raises the issue of simultaneity.  Employment opportunities for women 
may influence their reproductive and partnering decisions, but the causality may also run 
in the opposite direction.  For example, over most of our period, childcare facilities were 
limited and the welfare system did not encourage lone parents to seek work, thus 
establishing a causal link from lone parenthood to female worklessness.  To allow for 
simultaneity some of the equations are estimated using two-stage least squares with an 
instrument for unlagged female worklessness.  The instrument we use is SWPOP, which 
is defined as the number of people employed in service activities expressed as a 
percentage of the working age population (16-64/59).  This instrument is always highly 
significant in the first stage regression equations (see Appendix Table A1).  It is also 
likely that SWPOP has a low correlation with the error term in the equations that explain 
lone parenthood. It is true that SWPOP is highly correlated with lone parenthood, but this 
is because it is correlated with a number of the explanatory variables included in the 
equations used to explain lone parenthood. It seems unlikely that SWPOP exerts a 
substantial influence in its own right on lone parenthood. The implied low correlation of 
SWPOP with the error term in the equations used to explain lone parenthood, together 
with its  high correlation with unlagged female worklessness, should make SWPOP an 
acceptable instrument for the latter variable.  
 
4.1. Results 
 
The regression results shown in Table 3 indicate a strong statistical relationship between 
lone parenthood and male worklessness, even after controlling for other variables and 
area-specific and time-specific effects. In every equation, the coefficients of lagged and 
unlagged male worklessness are positive, and in most cases highly significant.  In every 
case, the coefficient is larger for the lagged than for the unlagged variable.  The long-run 
effect on lone parenthood of a permanent change in male worklessness is measured by 
the sum of coefficients for the lagged and unlagged values.  This sum indicates that a 
permanent rise of 1 percentage point in the rate of male worklessness leads to an eventual 
increase of between 0.60 and 1.13 percentage points in the rate of lone parenthood. 
 
The picture with regard to female worklessness is mixed.  In the equations using fixed 
effects, the sum of coefficients for lagged and unlagged female worklessness is positive, 
whereas in other equations it is negative.  In all cases, this sum is relatively small.  These 
findings suggest that the net causal impact of female worklessness on lone parenthood 
has been minor. This may be the result of offsetting forces.  For example, the lack of job 
opportunities for women in a certain area may have caused un-partnered women to have 
children, but it may have also encouraged unemployed lone parents to re-partner. 
 
Most of the coefficients for the other variables have the expected sign.  Other things 
being equal, areas with high populations of Asians or female graduates have low rates of 
lone parenthood.  Conversely, areas with high black populations or a high population 
density have high rates of lone parenthood.  Housing tenure does not have a well-defined 
relationship to lone parenthood; its coefficients are of low significance and of differing   14
signs.  By contrast, population density always has a significant and positive coefficient, 
suggesting that cities have higher rates of lone parenthood as a result of particular 
migration flows, or  else they encourage certain kinds of behaviour. 
 
An interesting finding is that the coefficient for “manual” is always negative and 
sometimes highly significant. This suggests that the above average rate of lone 
parenthood in traditional working-class areas is not directly due to class-related cultural 
factors. On the contrary, working-class areas where employment is plentiful tend to have 
lower than average rates of lone parenthood. As we discuss below, this could be due to 
the fact that, other things being equal, lone parents are more likely to re-partner in such 
areas than elsewhere. 
 
4.2. Numerical Implications 
 
Table 4 shows what some of the regression equations imply in numerical terms for the 
contribution of male worklessness to the national increase in lone parenthood.  The 
method used to derive these numbers is described in the appendix. Over the period 1971-
2001, the total number of lone parents rose by 1,161,000. Of this total, the increase in 
male worklessness accounted for between 38% and 59%, which in absolute terms is 
equivalent to between 445,000 and 690,000 families. These estimates are based on the 
coefficients of male worklessness in equations (3) – (6) which allow for the influence of 
exogenous geographical factors.  Equations (1) and (2) yield even larger estimates. To 
illustrate what our estimates imply for some of the areas most damaged by industrial 
change, we have calculated how the decline in male employment has affected lone 
parenthood in some major conurbations: Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Strathclyde (which includes Glasgow).  The total number of 
lone parent families in these areas rose from 71,000 in 1971 to 191,000 in 2001. Equation 
(6) implies that half (60,000) of the increase of 120,000 was due to lower male 
employment, and more than one tenth of all families with dependent children in these 
conurbations are now without a resident father (or stepfather) because of the growth in 
male worklessness.  Other equations yield estimates that are somewhat higher or lower 
than these figures. 
 
 
4.3. Reversibility 
 
The above regression results imply that the growth of male worklessness since 1971 has 
led to more lone parenthood.  This raises an important policy question.  Could the 
increase in lone parenthood due to male job loss be reversed if extra jobs were created for 
men?  This is a difficult question to answer since male worklessness operates with a 
considerable lag and virtually all of the reductions in this variable occurred in the final 
decade of our sample, which is too late to estimate their long-term impact on lone 
parenthood. However, we can estimate their short-term effects.  To this end, we use the 
following equation 
   15
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j
it it it it it j it it yd d x x w , α γγ γ δ
−+
− Δ= + + − Δ+ Δ + + η ∑ ,    (2) 
 
where   are changes in lone parenthood and male worklessness respectively 
over the ten year period between Censuses, the 
 and  y Δ x Δ
j w are other variables, comprising time 
dummies, population density and ten-year changes in the control variables shown in 
Table 3, and η  is an error term.  Finally,   is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
when   and zero otherwise. If the coefficient 
, it d
, 0 it x Δ< 0 γ
−  is positive, the estimated 
equation implies that a reduction in male worklessness during a given decade (mostly 
1991-2001) resulted in a lower rate of lone parenthood in the area concerned than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
 
Table 5 reports two alternative estimates of the above equation. In each case the 
coefficient for unlagged reductions in male worklessness ( 0 γ
− ) is positive and highly 
significant.  These estimates suggest that a reduction in male worklessness helps to 
reduce the rate of lone parenthood. This does not mean that there will be an actual fall in 
lone parenthood, since there may be other factors that prevent such an outcome, such as 
changing social attitudes; Ermisch (2006) discusses how these might affect the out-of-
wedlock birth element of lone parenthood.  However, it does seem that falling male 
worklessness will at least slow down the rise in lone parenthood.  Such a conclusion is 
consistent with evidence from the LFS, which indicates that the national rate of lone 
parenthood has now stopped rising after three decades of rapid growth (Figure 1). 
 
 
4.4. Stepfamilies 
 
Table 6 extends the above analysis by examining the factors that influence the formation 
of stepfamilies.  The results shown in these tables refer to cross-section ordinary least 
squares regressions for 2001, the first year when data on stepfamilies were collected by 
the Census. The dependent variable in equation (9), “Repartnered”, refers to stepfamilies 
as a percentage of lone parent families plus stepfamilies.  This is a proxy for the 
likelihood that a lone parent will exit from lone parenthood by finding a new partner.  For 
comparison, equation (10) in this table gives the equivalent regression results when lone 
parenthood is the dependent variable.  
 
In the equation for re-partnering, the coefficients of male worklessness are negative and 
highly significant.  These results are consistent with the argument that male worklessness 
reduces the number of men who are attractive as new partners.  The existence of a large 
coefficient for unlagged male worklessness is consistent with the fact that repartnering 
occurs comparatively late in the course of lone parenthood and would therefore be most 
affected by men’s recent labour market status.   
 
An interesting finding is that, other things being equal, the formation of stepfamilies 
seems to be more common in areas with a high proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual workers.  The “manual” coefficient is positive and highly significant.  This   16
reinforces our earlier conclusion that the above average rate of lone parenthood in the old 
industrial areas is not directly due to class-related cultural factors, but to other factors 
such as a low rate of male employment.  Of course, culture may have an indirect 
influence on lone parenthood through its effect on educational achievement and other 
factors that may affect the amount of employment in an area. 
 
The results on lone parenthood in equation (10) are mostly similar to our previous 
findings.  In particular, they indicate that lagged and unlagged male worklessness have a 
powerful influence on lone parenthood. However, unlike in the previous findings, there is 
also some indication that female worklessness does have an influence on lone 
parenthood, although its long-term impact is comparatively weak: the sum of the two 
coefficients for female worklessness is -0.435 as compared to 1.164 for the sum of the 
two male coefficients.  This finding should be interpreted in the light of the more 
comprehensive panel regressions where the estimated impact of female worklessness is of 
varying sign and is always small. To allow for simultaneity, we tried estimating both 
equations using SWPOP as an instrument for unlagged female worklessness, but the 
coefficients were all of such low significance that the results are not reported here.  We 
were unable to find a better instrument. 
  
5. Conclusions and Implications 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that male worklessness has been a major causal 
factor behind the past rise in female lone parenthood.  The impact was greatest in the 
areas which suffered most from industrial decline. Our econometric analysis also 
suggests that higher male employment would help to contain, and maybe reverse, the 
growth of lone parenthood, by reducing inflows into lone parenthood and increasing 
outflows through re-partnering and the consequent formation of stepfamilies.  
 
Changes in female employment are found to have no consistent net effect on the level of 
lone parenthood.  This may be because improved female employment opportunities have 
offsetting effects on inflows and outflows, affecting un-partnered births, separation and 
re-partnering in different ways. Higher female educational qualifications are found to be 
associated with reduced lone parenthood. 
 
Our findings have implications for UK government policy towards lone parenthood, 
which has focused almost exclusively on efforts to get more lone parents into work 
through tax credits, employment promotion and training.  This policy has had some 
success, although in 2006, the LFS indicated that 43.5% of lone parents were still without 
a job. In addition, subsidising lone parents in work through tax credits is expensive.   It 
may also encourage lone parenthood by improving the financial situation of lone parents 
relative to that of  couple families, as argued for instance by Field and Cackett (2007).  
By comparison with preventing lone parenthood in the first place, it is clearly a second 
best.  Nor does it appear to be better than the additional stepfamily formation that would 
result from improved male employment. 
   17
The findings of this paper suggest that more emphasis should be put on the promotion of 
employment for men.  This in turn requires a focus on the former industrial areas of the 
country, particularly the cities.  Our econometric results suggest that, in Great Britain as a 
whole, perhaps a half of the rise in lone parenthood between 1971 and 2001 has been due 
to higher male worklessness.  Although subject to a considerable margin of error, such an 
estimate underlines the wider benefits of raising male employment, especially in deprived 
areas.     18
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Fig. 1.
  Male and Female Non-Employment and the Growth of Lone Parenthood
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Table 1 
An Overview of Child Poverty: UK 2005/6 
 
      Risk of Poverty (%)
1/    Number  of Children in 
Poverty (thousands)
2/ 
                
    Before 
Housing 
Costs 
 After 
Housing 
Costs 
 Before 
Housing 
Costs 
 After 
Housing 
Costs 
 
Lone Parent: 
  
35 
  
50 
  
1100 
  
1600 
     of which               
  In full-time work  7    14    50    100 
  In  part-time  work  17    30   150  300 
 Not  working  56    75    950    1250 
             
Couple  with  children:  18    23    1700  2200 
  of which             
  Self-employed  28    33   400  500 
  Both in full-time work  1    2    < 50    50 
  One in full-time work, 
other in part-time work 
4    7    100  200 
  One in full-time work, 
other not working 
17    26   350  550 
  One or more in part-time 
work 
44    53   250  300 
  Both not in work  64    74    500    600 
 
England  
  
22 
  
29 
  
2400 
  
3150 
     of which               
 North  East    28    32    150    150 
 North  West    24    31    350    450 
  Yorks. & Humber    25    30    300    350 
 East  Midlands    23    27    200    250 
 West  Midlands    26    32    300    400 
 Eastern    16    24    200    300 
 London    26    41    400    650 
   of which             
   Inner    35    51    200    250 
   Outer    21    35    200    350 
 South  East  13    22    200    350 
 South  West  17    26    150    250 
Scotland 22    25    200    250 
Wales 24    28    150    150 
Northern Ireland  25    27    100    100 
              
Source: DWP (2007), tables 4.5, 4.6. 
1/ Poverty is defined as below 60% of equivalised median income). 
2/ Absolute numbers are derived by multiplying the total number of children in each category by the risk of 
poverty in this category, as given in DWP (2007) tables 4.5 and 4.6. All numbers are rounded to the nearest 
50.  Totals may not add because of rounding errors.   25
Table 2 
Description of Variables 
Note: The summary statistics refer to the entire sample from 1971 to 2001. 
 
Name 
 
Definition 
 
 
Median 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Lone Parent 
Percentage 
 
 
Lone parent families with dependent children as a 
percentage of all families with dependent children 
 
15.8 
 
5.3 
 
47.9 
Male 
Worklessness  
Percentage of males aged 16-49 not in full-time 
education who are not in full-time employment  
12.4 2.6 37.6 
Female 
Worklessness 
Percentage of females aged 16-49 not in full-time 
education who are not in full-time employment  
34.9 20.8 57.0 
Population 
Density 
 
Number of usually resident persons per hectare  12.9  0.1  131.0 
Rented 
Accommodation 
 
Percentage of households which do not own their 
own home 
39.4 20.8 97.6 
Manual  Percentage of economically active males, whether 
employed or unemployed, who are in semi-skilled 
or unskilled socio-economic groups (see Appendix 
for exact definition for 2001) 
 
17.7 5.0 36.7 
Female Education  Percentage of women aged 18-59 with degrees or 
professional qualifications 
17.7 1.9 53.1 
Black  Percentage of the population belonging to a black 
ethnic group 
 
0.6 <  0.1  25.9 
Asian  Percentage of the population belonging to an Asian 
ethnic group other than Chinese  
1.5 <  0.1  36.6 
SWPOP  100 × total persons employed in services ÷ 
working-age population 
41.4 21.6 63.3 
Repartnered  100 × the number of stepfamilies divided by the 
sum of lone parent families & stepfamilies 
 
27.5 11.6 37.7 
T91  = 1 in 1991; = 0 otherwise 
 
   
T01  = 1 in 2001; = 0 otherwise 
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Table 3 
Regression Results:  Pooled Data 1971-2001 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Lone Parent Percentage 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
LS 
(2) 
LS 
(3) 
LS 
Fixed 
Effects 
(4) 
IV 
Fixed 
Effects 
(5) 
LS 
Random 
Effects 
(6) 
IV 
Random 
Effects 
 
Male Worklessness  0.217** 
(0.083) 
0.227* 
(0.104) 
0.317** 
(0.094) 
0.215 
(0.145) 
0.317*** 
(0.063) 
0.311*** 
(0.088) 
Male Worklessness 
(Lagged) 
 
0.911*** 
(0.064) 
0.704*** 
(0.086) 
0.394*** 
(0.080) 
0.386*** 
(0.089) 
0.613*** 
(0.052) 
0.478*** 
(0.048) 
Female Worklessness    0.052 
(0.089) 
0.143* 
(0.060) 
0.269† 
(0.152) 
0.011 
(0.048) 
0.111 
(0.089) 
Female Worklessness 
(Lagged) 
 
 -0.313*** 
(0.081) 
-0.010 
(0.049) 
-0.028 
(0.070) 
-0.211*** 
(0.040) 
-0.093* 
(0.041) 
Population Density    0.056*** 
(0.011) 
0.162*** 
(0.023) 
0.175*** 
(0.027) 
0.076*** 
(0.011) 
0.132*** 
(0.017) 
Rented Accommodation    0.043* 
(0.019) 
-0.065 
(0.041) 
-0.081† 
(0.043) 
0.033† 
(0.019) 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
Manual   -0.135† 
(0.072) 
-0.175 
(0.142) 
-0.089 
(0.161) 
-0.216*** 
(0.061) 
-0.202* 
(0.080) 
Female Education    -0.037 
(0.037) 
-0.303*** 
(0.049) 
-0.311*** 
(0.052) 
-0.112*** 
(0.030) 
-0.232*** 
(0.030) 
Black   0.404*** 
(0.053) 
0.334* 
(0.132) 
0.335** 
(0.127) 
0.370*** 
(0.048) 
0.330*** 
(0.062) 
Asian   -0.135*** 
(0.032) 
-0.270* 
(0.123) 
-0.305* 
(0.126) 
-0.144*** 
(0.031) 
-0.222*** 
(0.047) 
T1991 
 
 
 -1.226* 
(0.612) 
2.489† 
(1.341) 
3.700† 
(2.018) 
-0.722 
(0.668) 
1.345 
(0.975) 
T2001   0.959 
(1.040) 
10.636*** 
(2.191) 
12.516*** 
(3.286) 
2.897** 
(1.071) 
7.828*** 
(1.530) 
R
2  0.709 0.939 0.981 0.980 0.935 0.907 
Number  of  obs.  360 360 360 360 360 360 
Notes:  
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All equations contain a constant which is not reported in 
this table. Cols (4) and (6) are estimated using two stage least squares with current female worklessness 
instrumented (see text).  † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001   27
Table 4 
Numerical Impact of Male Worklessness on Lone Parenthood 1971-2001 
 
 
 
 
Equation 
Number and Type 
 
Total Change in 
Number of Lone 
Parent Families  
1971-2001 
 
Effect of  
Male Job 
Loss 
 
 
Proportion  
of Total 
Change  
        
(3)  Fixed effects, LS  1,161,000  519,000  45% 
(4)  Fixed effects, IV  1,161,000  445,000  38% 
(5)  Random effects, LS  1,161,000  690,000  59% 
(6)  Random effects, IV  1,161,000  580,000  50% 
Note:   
This table shows various estimates of the impact on lone parenthood of higher  
male worklessness since 1971. Each estimate is based on the coefficients of lagged  
and unlagged male worklessness in the corresponding equation shown in Table 3.   28
Table 5                             
Regression Results: First Differences 1981-2001 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Change in Lone Parenthood  
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
(7) 
OLS 
 
(8) 
IV 
Negative Change in Male Worklessness   0.618*** 
(0.129) 
0.513* 
(0.203) 
Positive Change in Male Worklessness   0.227* 
(0.103) 
0.149 
(0.149) 
Lagged Change in Male Worklessness  
 
0.419*** 
(0.070) 
0.391*** 
(0.090) 
T2001  5.482*** 
(0.713) 
4.747*** 
(1.249) 
    
Number of observations  240  240 
R
2 
 
0.626 0.618 
Notes:  
Both equations contain lagged and unlagged changes in female worklessness, plus changes in the 
other control variables listed in Table 3. Column (8) is estimated using two stage least squares 
with the unlagged change in female worklessness instrumented by ΔSWPOP.  For other notes see 
Table 1. 
† p <.10; * p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  29
Table 6 
Cross-section Regressions for 2001 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
(9) 
 
Dependent Variable  
= 
Repartnered 
 
 
(10) 
 
Dependent Variable  
= 
Lone Parenthood  
Male Worklessness  -0.865** 
(0.291) 
0.636** 
(0.227) 
Male Worklessness (Lagged)  -0.399† 
(0.224) 
0.528** 
(0.171) 
Female Worklessness  -0.171 
(0.279) 
0.220 
(0.187) 
Female Worklessness (Lagged)  0.418† 
(0.223) 
-0.655*** 
(0.164) 
Population Density  -0.057† 
(0.029) 
0.042* 
(0.019) 
Rented Accommodation  0.126 
(0.079) 
0.124* 
(0.052) 
Manual 0.608** 
(0.204) 
-0.231† 
(0.138) 
Female Education  -0.120 
(0.089) 
-0.110† 
(0.060) 
Black -0.123 
(0.086) 
0.319*** 
(0.058) 
Asian -0.098 
(0.081) 
 
-0.150*** 
(0.045) 
Constant 
 
 
42.417*** 
(10.546) 
36.275*** 
(7.229) 
Number of Observations 
 
 
120 120 
R
2 
 
0.829 0.911 
Notes:  
Estimation is by OLS.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
† p<.10; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  30
  
Appendix:  Methods and Data 
 
Counterfactual 
 
Every regression equation in Table 3 is of the form, 
,0 , 1 , 1 0 ,
j
it it it j it it yx x w , γ γφ − =+ + + ε ∑ ,                                           (3) 
where y is lone parenthood,  x is male worklessness, the
j w are other variables, including 
area-specific and time-specific effects, and  , it ε  is an error term.  In particular, 
,2001 0 ,2001 1 ,1991 ,2001 ,2001
j
ii i j i yx x w γγ φε =+ + + i ∑ ,                              (4) 
Consider a counterfactual situation in which male worklessness remains permanently at 
the 1971 rate, but all other variables and the error term have their actual values.  Then, 
lone parenthood will have a new value in 2001 given by 
*
,2001 0 ,1971 1 ,1971 ,2001 ,2001
j
ii i j i yx x w γγ φε =++ + i ∑ ,                            (5) 
By subtraction, 
() ( )
*
,2001 ,2001 0 ,2001 ,1971 1 ,1991 ,1971 ii ii i i yy xx xx γγ −= −+ − ,                  (6) 
This formula indicates how much the lone parenthood rate in area i was increased by the 
change in male worklessness after 1971.   The associated numerical increase in lone 
parenthood is given by (  where   is the total number of families 
with dependent children in area i.  Aggregating across all areas yields the national 
increase in the number of lone parents due to higher male worklessness as shown in Table 
4. 
)
*
,2001 ,2001 ,2001 ii i yy N − ,2001 i N
 
Geographical Areas 
 
The whole of Great Britain was included, except for the very small City of London, and 
divided into the following areas:  32 London boroughs, 36 English metropolitan districts, 
39 English shire counties, 9 pre-1996 Scottish regions, three Scottish islands areas as a 
further single unit, and three areas in Wales.  Of the pre-1996 Welsh counties, only Dyfed 
has data available throughout.  The remaining counties were combined into North and 
East Wales (Clwyd, Gwynedd and Powys), and South East Wales (Gwent and Mid-, 
South and West Glamorgan).  The main deficiencies in this set of areas are the merging 
of some of the big cities with high rates of lone parenthood, such as Glasgow, 
Nottingham, Hull, and Cardiff, into their surrounding areas, and under-representation of 
Scotland and Wales.   
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The Variables 
  
Lone Parenthood: The variable used is the best available measure of the extent of 
family breakdown.  Ideally, only female-headed lone parent families would be included, 
but the relevant information was not published for 1981.    For 1981, local authority data 
were available only for lone parent families living in households with one family, 
resulting in the exclusion of 6.4% of lone parent families.  Figure 1 uses the correct GB 
total.    
 
The definition of a dependent child has changed slightly over time.  The broad 
effect has been to reduce the proportion of middle class families within the total, but this 
is unlikely to be significant in relation to the present study. 
 
The lone parenthood estimates from the Labour Force Survey 1992-2006 in 
Figure 1 were supplied by Annette Walling of ONS, whose assistance is gratefully 
acknowledged.  They are for Spring each year. 
 
  Male and Female Worklessness: Apart from taking into account unemployed 
people who have moved into the status of long-term sickness, the definition used also 
takes into account increasing participation in higher and further education, and removes 
the distorting effect of the change in enumeration of students in 2001 from home to term-
time address.  People aged 50 + have been excluded in order to eliminate the effect of 
early retirement, which is known to vary geographically quite differently from other 
forms of worklessness (MacKay 1999).  Moreover, the bulk of men and women who are 
actual or potential parents or step-parents of dependent children are less than 50 years of 
age. For example, in 2001, only 6.5% of lone mothers were 50+.  Treatment of full-time 
students has varied over time.  The male variable for 1971 and 1981 was calculated as: 
 
() employed + temporarily sick males
100 1
(all males - economically inactive students)
⎛⎞
×− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
 
In 1981 those “on a government training course” were treated by the Census as full-time 
students.  For 1991 they have been included with the workless.  The male variable for 
1991 was calculated as: 
 
total economically active males - unemployed 
- on government scheme - employed students
100 1
all males except students
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎜⎟ ×−
⎜⎟
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
 
The male variable for 2001 was calculated as:  
 
(total employed males - economically active students)
100 1
all males except students
⎛⎞
×− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.   32
 
The female variables were calculated in the same way as for males. 
 
  Population Density:  Estimated Census 2001 populations were subsequently 
officially increased for 13 of the areas used here (ONS 2004) and the revised figures have 
been used.  Using separate measures for the four individual Censuses would have 
introduced irrelevant changes.  The only available population base in 1971 was the 
enumerated population whereas in 2001 only the estimated resident population was 
available.  The switch to term-time address for students in 2001 will also have affected 
density.   
 
  Rented Accommodation: For 2001 shared ownership has been included with home 
ownership. 
 
  Manual: “Semi-skilled or unskilled” has been defined as socio-economic groups 
(S.E.G.s) 10 and 11.  In 2001, Census S.E.G.s were replaced by the National Statistics 
Socio-Economic Classification (NS-Sec).  The conversion to S.E.G. was carried out using 
Table 9 of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification User Manual, Version 
No.1, April 2002.  S.E.G. 10 equates to NS-Sec L11.2, L12.2, L12.4 and L13.2 and 
S.E.G. 11 to NS-Sec L13.4. This approximation is stated by ONS to achieve a continuity 
level of 87 %.   
 
For 2001, the published breakdown for NS-Sec by the detailed categories required 
for the conversion to S.E.G. includes some economically inactive as well as economically 
active men.  Most of these economically inactive men would in earlier years have been 
economically active and included in the Census tabulations of S.E.G.  To maximise 
continuity with earlier years, it was decided to retain them and to define the variable for 
2001 as:  
(All in L11.2, L12.2, L12.4, L13.2 and L13.4 
for whom NS-Sec is shown)
100
Total for whom NS-Sec is shown 
+ Economically active not classified for other reasons
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ×
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
 
A separate note on our procedure is available from the authors.   
 
  Female Education:  This is available only for 1981-2001.  Similar information 
was collected in 1971 but not published at local authority level.   For 1981 and 1991 the 
data are only available in three age bands:  18-29, 30-44 and 45-59.  Truncating the data 
at age 44 would not have had any clear advantage and the whole range 18-59 was 
therefore used.  For 1981 there was no source for the exact female population aged 18-59, 
and the age group 16-19 had to be split by assuming that those aged 18-19 were half of 
those aged 16-19.  The switch to recording students at their term-time address in 2001 
will have altered the apparent geographical distribution of qualified women, because 
postgraduate students are usually already qualified, although many of them will already 
have been recorded at their term-time address in earlier Censuses. Use of the whole age   33
range 18-59 will have helped to smooth the change;  there is no other way of adjusting 
the figures to remove the discontinuity, 
 
  Black and Asian: The “mixed” categories introduced in 2001 have not been used. 
Otherwise, all black groups have been included in BLACK, while ASIAN includes 
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and “other Asian” (England and Wales) or “other South 
Asian” (Scotland).  Ethnic group was recorded in the Census only in 1991 and 2001.  
Estimates for 1981 were obtained by multiplicative backward extrapolation of the 1991-
2001 trend, to reflect the changing size of the populations concerned, and the 
geographical dispersal that has been occurring.  The formulae used were as follows: 
 
BLACK(1981) BLACK(1991) ASIAN(1981) ASIAN(1991)
=,  =
BLACK(1991) BLACK(2001) ASIAN(1991) ASIAN(2001)
. 
In calculating this variable the population of all ages was used.  For this control variable, 
a broad measure of ethnicity was sought.  Extracting the data for a narrower age range 
would be a substantial task and there is no clear case for selecting one rather than another. 
 
SWPOP:  Employment in services was obtained from the Census tables showing 
industry of persons in employment, and working age population from the economic 
position tables used for the male and female worklessness variables.  For 1971-91 
services are as defined by LCT; for 2001 all services are included. 
 
Re-partnering: This variable probably understates the rate of re-partnering in 
cities and overstates it in smaller settlements, because re-partnered couples are more 
likely to move out of cities into owner occupation elsewhere.  Any such effect should be 
captured by the density variable. 
 
Data Sources   
 
The following sources were used:  NOMIS;  ONS England & Wales 2001 Census 
National Report Part 2 CD-Rom, revised February 2004, and GRO Scotland 2001 Census 
CD-Rom 5, Vol.2 Version 2 December 2004;  Census County Reports, 1971 and 1981;   
and the Linking Censuses Through Time (LCT) website at http://cdu.mimas.ac.uk/lct/.  
The LCT datasets and interface were created as part of ESRC Award H507255151 by 
Danny Dorling, David Martin and Richard Mitchell.  NOMIS and LCT both use the 
original electronic small area statistics and deal with boundary changes by making a “best 
fit” of Census enumeration districts to the required boundaries.   
   34
First Stage Results  
Table A1 
First Stage Results for Instrumental Variable Regressions in Tables 3 and 5 
 
Equation 
number in text 
(4) (6)    (8) 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Female 
Worklessness 
Female 
Worklessness 
  ΔFemale 
Worklessness 
Independent 
Variables 
   Independent 
Variables 
 
SWPOP -0.571*** 
(0.067) 
-0.501*** 
(0.049) 
ΔSWPOP -0.448*** 
(0.061) 
Male 
Worklessness 
0.494*** 
(0.082) 
0.497*** 
(0.061) 
Negative ΔMale 
Worklessness 
0.590*** 
(0.122) 
     Positive ΔMale 
Worklessness 
0.440*** 
(0.079) 
Male 
Worklessness 
(Lagged) 
0.162* 
(0.070) 
0.040 
(0.052) 
ΔMale 
Worklessness 
(Lagged)  
0.302*** 
(0.062) 
Female 
Worklessness 
(Lagged) 
0.069 
(0.049) 
0.149*** 
(0.039) 
ΔFemale 
Worklessness 
(Lagged) 
-0.253*** 
(0.043) 
Population 
Density 
0.023 
(0.027) 
-0.035* 
(0.018) 
Population 
Density 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
Rented 
Accommodation 
0.119*** 
(0.034) 
0.101*** 
(0.023) 
ΔRented 
Accommodation 
0.070† 
(0.036) 
Manual -0.517*** 
(0.107) 
-0.642*** 
(0.067) 
ΔManual -0.327** 
(0.099) 
Female 
Education 
0.057 
(0.044) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
ΔFemale 
Education 
-0.087† 
(0.051) 
Black -0.038 
(0.099) 
-0.003 
(0.068) 
ΔBlack -0.178 
(0.108) 
Asian 0.306*** 
(0.075) 
0.225*** 
(0.046) 
ΔAsian 0.362*** 
(0.083) 
T1991 
 
-6.546*** 
(0.968) 
-5.832*** 
(0.743) 
  
T2001 -8.181*** 
(1.740) 
-6.669*** 
(1.305) 
T2001 5.699*** 
(0.535) 
R
2  0.952     0.626 
Number of obs.  360  360    240 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All equations contain a constant which is not reported in this table. In the 
case of equation (8), the first differences of all variables shown in this table were used, with the exception of Population Density 
and T2001. † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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Introduction 
 
This paper argues that supply-side policies of “welfare to work” and welfare reform 
are inadequate given the nature of Britain’s unemployment problem.  There are very 
large differences in joblessness between local labour markets and it is much higher 
overall than indicated by the unemployed claimant count or Labour Force Survey.  
Joblessness is heavily concentrated north west of a line from the Bristol Channel to 
the Wash.  It is also a particular feature of the former industrial cities and coalfields, 
although the cities’ problem is often obscured by the misleading nature of the official 
claimant unemployment statistics at sub-regional level.  All the target groups for 
welfare to work programmes are concentrated in the same areas as the unemployed.  
Policy cannot therefore be fully effective unless programmes aimed at improving 
“employability” and work incentives are complemented by demand side policies to 
bring work to these areas.  A realistic appraisal indicates that this means much more 
spending on derelict land reclamation, industrial property development and associated 
road and public transport infrastructure.   
 
The first section of the paper outlines the geography of British unemployment and its 
true scale, and shows that when joblessness is defined to include inactivity as well as 
unemployment, spatial convergence is not occurring.  The second section looks at the 
geographical distribution of the welfare to work target groups - youth unemployed, 
long-term unemployed, lone parents, the long-term sick, and partners of the 
unemployed.   The third section considers the argument recently mounted by the 
Treasury and DfEE that there are sufficient job vacancies in every area.  The next 
section briefly looks at the reasons for the spatial patterns of joblessness.  The 
limitations of migration and commuting as mechanisms of labour market adjustment 
are then briefly discussed.  The paper concludes by briefly sketching what would be a 
more effective set of policies. 
 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF UNEMPLOYMENT  
 
Official commentators argue that there has been a high degree of geographical 
convergence in unemployment rates during the 1990s (HM Treasury 2000;  DfEE 
1999b;  Bank of England 1999).  But the differences are still very large, and 
systematic.  Variation is on both a regional and an urban-rural dimension, with cities 
and the north having higher unemployment.  Former coalfields and some coastal and 
remote rural areas also have higher unemployment.  The Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
figures for counties and larger local authority districts can be used to bring out this 
pattern.  When these are grouped into 73 areas in such a way as to identify separately 
the urban cores, outer conurbations, freestanding cities and other areas, a very wide 
range of ILO unemployment rates is revealed (FIGURE 1).  At Winter 1998/99 the 
range was from 2.6% to 14.0%.  The highest unemployment rates (all above 10.0%) 
were in urban areas :  Sunderland, Liverpool and Merseyside, Glasgow, Cleveland, 
Hull, and S.Yorkshire excluding Sheffield.  All of these are former industrial areas in 
the north, with very large populations.  Conversely, the lowest unemployment rates 
(below 4%) were in rural or small town areas, mainly in the south (further details in 
Webster 1999c).    
   3
These unemployment rates greatly understate the spatial variations in joblessness 
because inactivity (i.e. non-participation in the labour force) also varies enormously 
across the country.  It has long been established that across areas, inactivity is strongly 
correlated with unemployment (e.g. Armstrong & Taylor 1993).  FIGURE 1 plots 
LFS inactivity rates against unemployment for the 73 areas at Winter 1998/99, 
showing a correlation of 0.76.  The high unemployment cities of Liverpool, Glasgow 
and Manchester had economic activity rates (aged 16+) respectively of 50.0%, 51.5% 
and 52.0%, far below the GB average of 62.3%.  These very low activity rates have 
emerged during the 1980s and 1990s and reflect a movement of unemployed people 
into other statuses such as sickness and early retirement (Beatty et al. 1997a).  Gregg 
& Wadsworth (1998) noted that overall economic inactivity among working age men 
rose from 9% in 1977 to 16% in 1997.  Green (1994) showed that the increases in 
inactivity between 1981 and 1991 were strongly concentrated in cities, industrial and 
mining areas.  Glasgow moved from 208
th to 10
th in the ranking of local authority 
districts, Manchester from 233
rd to 13
th, and Liverpool from 239
th to 16
th. 
 
While there has been some geographical convergence of unemployment rates in the 
upswing since 1993, inactivity rates have actually diverged.  Between Winter 1993/94 
and Winter 1998/99, the standard deviation of unemployment rates fell across the 73 
areas, while that for inactivity rates rose (TABLE 1).  
 
Spatial concentrations of joblessness are not randomly distributed around the country, 
but have a pronounced regional pattern.  FIGURE 2 shows the percentage of the 
working age population not in employment in each region at Winter 1998/99.  The 
range was almost 15%, from a low of 19.6% in the south east outside London, to 
34.1% in the north east.  All three southern regions, excluding London, were below 
22% and all of the north and west above 27%.  For the least qualified, the differences 
in non-employment between regions are much greater (Glyn & Erdem 1999).  The 
non-employment rate of the lowest educational quartile of men aged 25-64 in 1997 
was 21.9% in the south east outside London but over 50% in South Yorkshire and 
Merseyside and over 40% in Greater Manchester, the North, Wales and Scotland.  
The “north-south divide” is therefore still evident.  HM Treasury (2000) argues that 
“There is a tail of around 15-20 local authority districts with very low employment 
rates, high unemployment rates, or, typically, both”.  Although true, this greatly 
understates the scale of the problem. 
 
The TUC has devised a useful “broad” indicator of involuntary worklessness which 
takes into account both unemployment and inactivity.  This “Want Work Rate” 
(WWR) can be produced readily from the LFS and can validly be used for both 
historical and international comparisons (TUC 1998).  It shows the unemployed plus 
the inactive wanting work as a percentage of all those working or wanting work.  At 
January 1997 the GB WWR stood at a little over 14%.  This was almost exactly the 
same as the estimate of “real” unemployment produced by Beatty et al. for the same 
date using a different methodology.  The TUC has recently updated its estimates to 
Autumn 1999, giving a UK WWR of 13.0%, a total of 4m people.   
 
By contrast to these measures, claimant unemployment rates give a misleading picture 
of unemployment.  The claimant count omits many people who are unemployed on 
the internationally agreed “ILO” definition, currently showing a total of only 1.1m 
compared to 1.7m in the LFS.  It was for this reason that on coming to office, the   4
present government accepted the recommendation of the Bartholomew report (1995) 
that the LFS should be the primary measure.  It is less generally realised that claimant 
count rates are particularly problematic below regional level where figures for both 
“Travel to Work Areas” (TTWAs) and local authorities are very distorted by 
commuting (Green & Coombes 1985;  Webster 1998;  Briscoe 1999).  Some 
examples of how misleading this can be will be given below.  The decennial Census 
of Population however shows the unemployment relativities between areas with a 
high degree of accuracy and the comparisons below are mostly taken from it. 
 
 
THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF WELFARE TO WORK TARGET 
GROUPS 
 
The government’s “New Deals” target five particular groups with programmes aimed 
at raising their “employability” and placing them in jobs.  Two of these groups - the 
longer-term (over 6 months) 18-25 unemployed and the long-term older unemployed - 
are included in the claimant count.  The other three - lone parents, the long-term sick, 
and partners of the unemployed - are mostly classed among the economically inactive.  
However all five groups are spatially concentrated in the areas which already have the 
highest unemployment and inactivity.  This highlights a basic problem:  an attempt is 
being made to place the largest number of people into jobs in exactly the places where 
jobs are scarcest. 
  
Youth Unemployment 
 
FIGURE 3, using 1991 Census data, shows that across areas the proportion of men 
aged 20-24 who are unemployed is very strongly correlated (0.96) with the overall 
male unemployment rate.  The correlation for males aged 16-19 (including those on 
government training schemes as unemployed) is presumably more affected by 
variations in the numbers in full-time education and is lower at 0.88.  This is still very 
high.  In other words, although young people have a higher incidence of 
unemployment than adults in their middle years, the incidence varies geographically 
in almost exactly the same way.  Areas with high total unemployment have high 
youth unemployment.  The OECD (1999) commented “(young people’s) employment 
and unemployment rates are highly responsive to the overall state of the labour 
market”. 
 
Long-Term Unemployment 
 
Contrary to what has usually been argued, there is also a very close relationship 
between total unemployment and long-term unemployment (now conventionally 
defined as a year or more).  A given level of total unemployment, as a percentage of 
the labour force (U), is always associated with approximately the same level of long-
term unemployment, as a percentage of the labour force (L) (Webster 1997).  
FIGURE 4 shows this relationship using claimant count data for the 60 Scottish 
TTWAs in October 1995.  At this spatial level, differences in the proportion of 
seasonal unemployment are important, because seasonal workers can by definition 
never be long-term unemployed even if in practice they are unemployed most of the 
time.  The figures here have therefore been adjusted for the degree of seasonality 
measured in 1990-96, and the appropriate 9-month lag between long-term and total   5
unemployment has been applied.  The overall correlation is once again very high, at 
0.95.  Because of the commuting errors in TTWA unemployment rates already 
mentioned, the true correlation between L and U will actually be somewhat higher 
than shown here.  The unemployment rate for the Forres TTWA - an outlier in 
FIGURE 4 – has a particularly large error due to a separate problem in relation to the 
treatment of armed forces personnel.   
 
Machin & Manning (1998), Meager & Evans (1998) and Robinson (1999) have also 
drawn attention to the close and stable correlation between long-term and total 
unemployment. 
 
Lone Parents 
 
FIGURE 5 uses 1991 Census data to show the relationship across local authority areas 
between male unemployment and the proportion of households with dependent 
children which are headed by a non-working female lone parent.  The correlation is 
once again close (0.89).  This close relationship is the result of two other strong 
relationships, between male unemployment and the proportion of households with 
children who are female lone parents (correlation 0.85), and between male 
unemployment and the logarithm of the proportion of female lone parents who are in 
work (correlation -0.89). This latter negative log correlation means that as the 
unemployment rate rises, the proportion of lone mothers who are in work falls but at a 
falling rate.   
 
In 1991 there were half as many lone parent households again (452,000) in local 
authority areas with above average unemployment as in areas with below average 
unemployment (312,300), even though the former group of areas had fewer 
households with children (2.95m compared to 3.62m).  The proportion of lone parents 
in work varied from three-fifths (60.5%) in booming South Cambridgeshire (“Silicon 
Fen”), where male unemployment was only 4.7%, to one-fifth or less (16.0%-20.5%) 
in the declining areas of Knowsley, Glasgow and Liverpool, where male 
unemployment was over 20%.  Lone parenthood appears to have continued increasing 
after 1991, but peaked about 1995. 
 
The Long-Term Sick 
 
Long-term illness is also correlated with unemployment.  FIGURE 6, again using 
1991 Census data, shows the relationship across local authority areas between male 
unemployment and the proportion of the working age population who had a long-term 
illness.  The correlation with male unemployment is weaker than for the other 
variables looked at here, mainly due to particularly high rates of long-term sickness in 
some former coal and steel areas where industrial illnesses would be expected to be 
high.  But it is still fairly strong at 0.67.  The strength of the correlation with 
unemployment reflects the movement of unemployed people with some kind of health 
problem on to sickness benefits, drawn by the higher rates of payment and lack of 
means-testing.  Beatty et al. (1997a) reported that the numbers of  long-term sick in 
Great Britain actually increased by a further 707,000 between 1991 and 1997, more 
than over the decade 1981-91.  On their estimates, there were 1.26m people on 
sickness benefits in January 1997, who, in circumstances of full employment, would   6
have been in work.  This increase during the 1990s goes a long way towards 
explaining why inactivity has diverged when unemployment has converged.   
 
Workless Households 
 
FIGURE 7 uses 1991 Census data to show the relationship across local authorities 
between male unemployment and the proportion of households who had no earner.  
This is a good measure of  “work-poor” households.  Although there are many 
workless one-adult, and even multi-adult, households with no partner, it also gives a 
reasonable approximation to the distribution of workless partners of the unemployed.   
 
A high proportion of workless households comprise pensioners, whose geographical 
distribution is very uneven.  To minimise distortion, pensioner-only households have 
been excluded from FIGURE 7.  However, some pensioners are in work and therefore 
excluding all pensioner-only households gives figures which are slightly too low for 
most areas.  This is why Isles of Scilly is shown with a negative percentage.   
 
Despite this minor limitation of the figures, the picture is clear.  At 0.95, the 
correlation with male unemployment is approximately as strong as for the youth and 
long-term unemployed and stronger than for the long-term sick and lone parents.  
Disregarding Isles of Scilly, this measure has a low of 3.6% in South Cambridgeshire 
and a high of 33.1% in Knowsley on Merseyside.   
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND VACANCIES 
 
Given this concentration of the welfare to work target groups in areas of job scarcity, 
it is not surprising to find early monitoring of the “New Deal” showing worse 
employment outcomes for participants in high than in low unemployment areas 
(Martin et al., forthcoming).  Indeed this could have been predicted from the US 
experience of similar programmes (Solow 1998).  But the government is now arguing 
on the basis of data on vacancies notified to the Employment Service (ES) that there 
really are adequate employment opportunities everywhere.  This case has been put 
formally by the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) (1999a and 
1999b) and HM Treasury (2000).  There are essentially three parts to the 
Treasury/DfEE argument, based on decline over time in the ratio of unemployed to 
vacancies (the “u/v ratio”);  geographical convergence in this ratio;  and the 
geographical invariance of the ratio of vacancies to total jobs with respect to the local 
unemployment rate. 
 
Before considering these, it is important to note that vacancy data are less reliable 
than those on unemployment.  Newman & Denman (1995) put forward a formidable 
list of compilation-related factors which may invalidate comparisons of ES vacancy 
figures across areas or over time.  Bivand (2000) notes specific evidence that ES 
vacancies have recently risen sharply compared to other vacancies data, suggesting an 
increase in the ES market share.  Also, the ratio of vacancies to total employment 
differs markedly between industries and occupations.  Layard et al. (1991, p.327) 
indicated that in 1982 this ratio varied from 0.12 in mining and quarrying to 1.36 in 
services, and from 0.49 for managerial and professional jobs and 0.84 for skilled 
manual jobs to 1.93 for “other non-manual” jobs.  Thus if the employment structure of   7
an area changes, its vacancy rate is likely to change, for reasons unrelated to the 
balance of supply and demand for labour.  In particular, it appears that the rise in 
service activities relative to manufacturing and mining is in itself likely to have raised 
vacancy rates.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the large shift towards part-time 
employment during the 1990s will have increased vacancies, although there appears 
to be no research on this issue.  Finally, the number of vacancies claimed by the 
government is a hypothetical figure, grossed up from the actually recorded vacancy 
count at Jobcentres.  The grossing factor of 3 is based on surveys from the 1970s and 
1980s which themselves showed not only that the proportion of vacancies reported to 
Jobcentres varied markedly by region and occupation, but also that the regional 
differentials changed between surveys (Balls et al. 1991).  The Treasury and DfEE 
have not attempted to control for factors of this kind and their arguments are 
correspondingly insecure.    
 
Turning to the arguments themselves:- 
 
Decline over time in the ratio of unemployment to vacancies (the “u/v ratio”)  
HM Treasury (2000) argues that “The u/v ratio is now lower than at any time since 
1975”.  It appears to be referring to the ratio of the claimant unemployed count of 
1.1m to an estimate of approximately 1m vacancies, obtained by grossing up as 
explained above.  In the light of the foregoing discussion, the problems in drawing 
conclusions from a change in the u/v ratio are evident.  The large movement of 
unemployed people into other statuses has reduced unemployment as measured by 
both the LFS and the claimant count, and the claimant count has additionally been 
reduced by administrative changes.  Vacancies are likely to have been affected by 
changes in industrial structure, turnover rates and recording rates.  Moreover, a low 
u/v ratio does not mean that unemployed people have a correspondingly good chance 
of getting a job.  Gregg & Wadsworth (1998) note that about half (45%) of moves 
into work come from those inactive in the preceding quarter.  Reflecting this, analysis 
of the LFS shows that across areas, employment change has a much clearer and 
stronger effect on activity rates than on unemployment rates (Webster 1999c).   
 
Geographical convergence in the u/v ratio  HM Treasury (2000) presents a chart 
showing that the number of unemployed per vacancy has both fallen and converged 
across regions between 1990 and 1999, stating “unemployment has fallen fastest, and 
vacancies risen fastest, in those regions that were the hardest hit in the 1980s.  
Vacancies are now close to record levels in every region of the country and more than 
one-and-a-half times their 1990 level in Scotland, Wales and throughout the North of 
England”.  As noted earlier, it is correct to say that unemployment has converged 
across regions.  But the divergence of inactivity rates undermines the inference that 
labour surpluses have reduced.  The statement that vacancies have risen fastest in the 
highest unemployment regions is simply incorrect, indeed the reverse of the truth.  All 
of the regions in the North (Scotland, North, North West, Yorks & Humberside and 
Wales) had higher ILO unemployment in 1990 than any in the South (E. and W. 
Midlands, E.Anglia, London, Rest of the SE and South West).  On unchanged 
boundaries, the ratio of average vacancies in 1999 to average vacancies in 1990 was 
only 1.7 in the North compared to 1.9 in the South.  Although it is true that vacancies 
have risen by about half in Scotland and Wales, these were the smallest increases.  
The ratio was 2 or more for four of the regions in the South but for only one (Yorks & 
Humberside) in the North.     8
 
The Treasury presents a similar argument in relation to TTWAs, to which similar 
points apply. 
 
Geographical invariance of the ratio of vacancies to employment with respect to 
the local unemployment rate    The DfEE (1999b) presents charts for October 1998 
showing that each TTWA has approximately the same level of vacancies as a 
proportion of its workforce, across the whole range of claimant unemployment rates.  
The DfEE argues (1999a, para.33-7) that the “lack of concentration amongst 
Jobcentre vacancies taken together with the concentration of unemployment and 
joblessness suggests that any problem of mismatch is within local labour markets not 
between local labour markets”.   
 
There are two problems with this argument.  On a simple level, it is still true that the 
higher the unemployment rate, the more unemployed workers are competing for each 
vacancy.  FIGURE 8 presents the same data as used by the DfEE to show that across 
TTWAs there was a strong positive correlation (0.74) between the u/v ratio and the 
claimant unemployment rate (the date here is July 1999 rather than October 1998 but 
this difference is not material).  Twice the unemployment rate means about twice as 
many competing unemployed.  This indeed must be the case if vacancies are evenly 
distributed but the unemployed are unevenly distributed.  
 
A more sophisticated version of the DfEE’s argument, well-rehearsed in the economic 
literature (e.g. Balls et al. 1991), would be that areas with high unemployment should 
have lower vacancy rates (as a proportion of total employment), due to pressure from 
the unemployed workers.  The fact that this is not observed is argued to indicate the 
absence of such pressure.  The problem here is whether such unemployment-related 
variation in vacancy rates would be observable, given all the other influences on 
vacancy rates already discussed, and given the spatial and skills mismatches resulting 
from the large changes which have occurred in both the location and the structure of 
employment. 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF JOBLESSNESS 
 
The DfEE (1999b) sees joblessness as part of a “trend - running since the late 1970s - 
towards greater income inequality and the persistence of low income.....the lack of 
jobs is a key manifestation - both cause and effect - of low income....No one knows 
for sure what lies behind the twenty year trend to greater income inequality”.  The 
misleading nature of the claimant unemployment statistics as to both the scale and 
geographical incidence of joblessness is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for this 
sort of agnosticism about the origins of the problem.  The map presented by the 
Treasury (2000), for instance, is hopelessly misleading.  This is based on “workforce” 
claimant statistics whose denominator adds the number of those working in the area to 
the number of unemployed resident in the area.  Areas with large numbers of in-
commuters, usually cities, have the incidence of unemployment among their residents 
understated, often to an extreme degree, as is readily seen by comparison with the 
LFS.  Of the 20 local authorities in the Treasury’s list of those with the highest 
claimant unemployment rates, about 9 should not be there.   
   9
However, when the spatial pattern is correctly described through the LFS, census or 
corrected claimant figures for local authorities (Webster 1999b), the underlying 
processes are not difficult to discern.  Armstrong & Taylor (1993) comment that the 
basic inverse relationship between the participation rate and the unemployment rate 
“is a clear indication that demand factors play a substantial part in determining a 
region’s participation rate”.  Other relationships looked at here also indicate a primary 
role for labour demand, in particular the very close tracking of total unemployment by 
both youth and long-term unemployment.  Given the spatial distribution of the 
problem, the obvious underlying factor is the loss of manual jobs in manufacturing 
and mining, which has not only been very large overall, but has also clearly been 
concentrated in the cities and coalfields.  The anomalously large British loss of 
manufacturing and its broad spatial impact has been charted by Rowthorn (1999).  
More particularly, the process of urban-rural manufacturing shift has been analysed 
by authors such as Keeble (1980), Townsend (1993) and Gudgin (1995).  As a result 
of this shift, most big cities have lost two-thirds or more of their manufacturing 
employment since 1979, compared to a national loss of around a third.  By contrast, 
small towns and rural areas have maintained or even gained manufacturing 
employment.  
 
“Labour market accounts” by  Turok and Edge (1999) for the cities in 1981-96 have 
shown what has happened to unemployment, inactivity, commuting and migration as 
a result of the loss of jobs.  Overall, 12.2% of male jobs were lost.  Outmigration 
made the largest contribution to adjustment (7.4% of economically active men), with 
net change in commuting (1.2%) playing little role - contrary to what is often 
assumed.   The biggest effect was on male inactivity - disguised unemployment - 
which rose 5.4 percentage points, while claimant unemployment actually fell by 
1.2%.  The conurbation cores, particularly Merseyside, Clydeside, Manchester and 
Inner London, did much worse than the other cities.  A later paper shows that 
migration and commuting adjustment is particularly difficult for manual workers 
(Bailey & Turok 2000). 
 
Beatty et al.’s (1997b) study of the coalfields in 1981-91 had very similar findings.  
They showed that the 39 “principal coalfield Districts” in England and Wales on 
average lost a net 14.1% of their male jobs after allowing for labour force growth.  On 
average there was net outmigration equivalent to 4.2% of their male workforce and an 
increase in net outcommuting of 1.4%, leading to an increase in the total of 
unemployment and economic inactivity of 8.6%.  In other words outmigration 
compensated for under one third (29.8%) of job loss and outcommuting for one tenth, 
leaving most (three-fifths) of the job loss feeding directly into “real” unemployment.   
 
The fact that some seaside towns and remote rural areas have high unemployment and 
inactivity may appear to contradict this picture, and indeed probably has contributed 
to the impression that withdrawal from the labour force is a supply-side phenomenon 
which may occur anywhere.  There has often been substantial local loss of jobs in 
tourism, fishing and manufacturing, but this appears insufficient to account for the 
observed joblessness.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that migration by the unemployed 
has probably played an important role, as was suggested by Gudgin (1995).  People 
who expect to be out of work for a long time, perhaps permanently, are likely to want 
to move to somewhere pleasant, and housing has often been readily available in 
redundant hotels and bedsits, financed by Housing Benefit, or as a result of low house   10
prices.  Unfortunately no one has to date attempted to compile labour market accounts 
for the seaside towns or to investigate their migration flows.   
 
There is strong evidence that the relationship between male unemployment and 
female lone parenthood is causal.  Time series, cross section and ethnographic 
evidence both in Britain and the USA indicates that unemployment produces marital 
and relationship breakdown (Webster 2000).  In Britain, lone parenthood is similar to 
inactivity in that the big increase is comparatively recent.  Lone parents as a 
proportion of households with children doubled between 1981 and 1991, and the 
increase across areas was directly proportional to the local level of unemployment.  
For the USA, McLanahan & Garfinkel (1989) wrote “Despite some gaps and 
anomalies, there is now a strong body of empirical research that documents that one 
of the costs of increased unemployment is increased female headship”.   
 
The close spatial relationship between unemployment and workless households 
appears to be the result of three factors.  The increase in lone parent households is 
itself a factor, because the increase itself, and the likelihood of lone parent’s 
worklessness, both vary in direct proportion to unemployment.  Among couples, there 
is an obvious labour demand effect, since if the local labour market makes it difficult 
for one partner to get a job it will tend to be difficult for the other.  Finally, there is a 
tendency for partners to have similar levels of education, which in turn are strongly 
related to unemployment probability.  Official analyses tend to argue that the benefits 
system has had important effects in increasing the prevalence of workless households, 
but this cannot explain the geographical pattern.  
 
 
LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT:  MIGRATION AND COMMUTING 
 
This analysis shows that worklessness has persisted in the areas where jobs have been 
lost, and that spatial labour market adjustment through migration and commuting, 
while real, has been relatively weak.  But official policy has placed a heavy emphasis 
on these types of adjustment. 
 
The Treasury’s UK Employment Action Plan (1997) embraced labour migration 
uncritically as a way of “making markets work better”.  Since then, as controversy has 
raged over whether and how to make the necessary housing provision in the south 
east, and the huge scale of housing abandonment in the north has come to light, the 
costs of this approach have become steadily more apparent.  Indeed the official claims 
that there are enough job vacancies everywhere in the country, which date from 
October 1999, could be seen as a retreat from this stance - in effect an attempted 
reassurance that people do not need to move en masse from north to south.   
 
Advocacy of adjustment by commuting is however a constant.  HM Treasury (2000) 
argues that “Almost without exception, areas of high unemployment lie within easy 
travelling distance of areas where vacancies are plentiful.  This is particularly clear 
cut in London, where the areas of highest unemployment lie within a few miles of two 
of the ten areas of lowest unemployment in the country”.  The statement about 
London is incorrect.  The two areas referred to are the Cities of London and of 
Westminster.  Both are very badly affected by the errors in the “workforce” claimant 
unemployment rates discussed earlier, having respectively 109 times and 6 times as   11
many workers as employed residents in 1991.  Westminster was shown by ONS as 
having 1.1% unemployment in July 1999.  But corrected for commuting error, the true 
resident rate was actually about 6.2%, well above the national average.  Indeed some 
340 local authorities had lower rates;  Westminster was nowhere near the best 10.  At 
the same date, the City of London’s unemployment rate was shown as “0.0”, its 94 
unemployed claimants being swamped by the huge in-commuting “workforce”.  On 
the basis of its 1991 economically active resident population of 2,635, its true rate 
would be about 3.6%, the same as Telford, below the national average but again 
nowhere near the lowest 10.  Of course the two Cities do have a lot of vacancies, but 
for the most part these merely represent turnover among the commuter workforce.  
Most other British cities also have central business districts with numerous, mainly 
white collar vacancies.  This is why it is often true that “areas of high unemployment 
lie within easy travelling distance of areas where vacancies are plentiful”.  But the 
vacancies have to be set against the labour force in the city’s whole commuting 
catchment area.   
 
Although the Treasury clearly considers that the London example self-evidently 
shows unemployment needlessly persisting in the presence of high demand for labour, 
the labour market accounts of Turok & Edge show that this is not the case.  London’s 
employment losses have been particularly bad.   
 
 
POLICIES 
 
This analysis indicates that the unemployment problem lies mainly on the demand 
side of the labour market rather than on the supply side;  and on the demand side in 
particular places, namely the former industrial cities and coalfields together with some 
other places affected by local manual employment decline.  It follows that the main 
thrust of policy needs to be to promote relevant employment in these places. 
 
There is no mystery about the loss of jobs from the coalfields.  The cities however are 
a more complex case.  Their recent particularly poor employment experience appears 
to have been the result of their initial heavy dependence upon manufacturing, 
combined with a greatly disproportionate loss of manufacturing due to property 
constraints (Fothergill et al. 1985).   Cities which have been proactive in providing 
property in order to maintain their manufacturing jobs base have been more successful 
in doing so.  A good example is Leeds.  Although widely known for its success in 
services, this city has in fact also done comparatively very well in manufacturing and 
its relatively low unemployment reflects this (Turok & Edge 1999).  It had the 
smallest loss of male and of manual employment in 1981-91 of any of the British 
industrial cities, and the smallest decline in male economic activity.  This good 
performance is not an accident.  The city has a proactive policy of land banking and 
development to anticipate local firms’ property needs (Leeds City Council 1997).  
Urban Development Corporations such as those in Sunderland, Sheffield, the Black 
Country and Trafford Park have also been strikingly successful in bringing derelict 
sites back into use.  “Brownfield” land is the great asset that most high unemployment 
areas have in abundance.  For instance, 9% of Glasgow’s total land area is currently 
vacant or derelict.  Experience shows that in order to open up sites for development, 
substantial investment is required to consolidate fragmented ownerships, deal with 
contamination and unstable ground conditions, improve the environment and provide   12
site infrastructure and access.  There is also usually a need for strategic road and 
public transport investment.  British industrial cities have rarely inherited a good road 
infrastructure, because they were rail-based. 
 
Within a conurbation, commuting patterns conform to the well-known “gravity 
model”.  The share of jobs in each area held by the residents of a given area declines 
exponentially with distance, in other words very fast indeed.  Most commentators 
have focused on what they see as the barriers to employment of the jobless even if 
new jobs were located nearby.  But the implication of the observed patterns is that 
unless new jobs are located within about 3 miles of the target unemployment 
blackspots, their residents will not get any significant share of them (Webster 1999d).  
Leaving the location of development entirely to the market is therefore not a realistic 
option. 
 
Such a switch of strategy - in effect a return to the approach of the previous Labour 
government’s inner cities white paper of 1977, carried on as a subordinate theme by 
Michael Heseltine and Peter Walker throughout most of the intervening period - 
would require a switch of resources.  This could well be achieved by redirecting 
money from the labour supply-side programmes.  But it also needs to be remembered 
that huge sums are going to be spent on infrastructure anyway.  If there is no serious 
programme of physical renewal of the cities, development pressures in the exurban 
south will force government spending on infrastructure there, and indeed the 
government has already found itself shifting Regional Development Agency resources 
to the south for this reason.  It would make sense to head off such development by 
spending the same money proactively in the areas where it would have most benefit in 
reducing joblessness.  The programme put together by the Coalfields Taskforce is of 
this type, but it is thinly funded.  There is no parallel programme for the cities.  
“Employment Zones” and the New Deal for Communities are supply-side 
programmes, not development programmes;  they target the employability of the 
labour force rather than the lack of jobs.  Roads and transport infrastructure 
investment is running at a very low level, and there is now widespread agreement that 
it needs to be increased.  From an employment point of view it will be essential to 
ensure that it supports job growth in high unemployment areas. 
 
Physical investment is required to promote any kind of additional employment growth 
in the cities. But this analysis also raises the issue of policies towards manufacturing.  
Manufacturing is the main source of manual jobs and particularly of male manual 
jobs.  Being almost always part of an area’s export base, it brings additional jobs in its 
train through supplier linkages and the local income multiplier.  Gudgin (1995) 
showed that manufacturing remained the major part of the export base for all British 
regions except the south east.  The recent example of the US mid-west shows how big 
an impact a revival of manufacturing employment has on urban problems, and Ireland 
has demonstrated the effectiveness of discriminatory corporate taxation in promoting 
manufacturing employment.  While a great deal could be achieved simply by 
addressing the causes of the urban-rural contrast in manufacturing employment 
change, without improving overall British manufacturing performance, it is difficult 
to see anything like full employment being reached without such an improvement.  
This would require a fundament reappraisal of attitudes to both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic policy.   13
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TABLE  1       
GB REGIONS: DISPERSION OF  ILO UNEMPLOYMENT    
AND WORKING AGE INACTIVITY RATES     
73 areas, Winter 1993/94 and Winter 1998/99     
       
  1993/94  1998/99     
Unemployment %      
Mean  10.1  6.7    
Standard 
deviation  0.36  0.31    
Inactivity %       
Mean  38.6  38.1    
Standard 
deviation  0.53  0.57    
       
Source:  LFS Quarterly Bulletin/Supplement     
Note:  The 73 areas have been selected to highlight the urban/rural 
dimension  
and constitute complete and mutually exclusive coverage of GB. 
 
Source:  LFS QuarterlyBulletin/Supplement 
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FIGURE 1  ECONOMIC INACTIVITY (all 16+) BY ILO UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, LFS Winter 1998/99
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FIGURE 2  GB REGIONS:  PROPORTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION NOT IN EMPLOYMENT 
Winter 1998/99, seasonally adjusted
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FIGURE 3  GB DISTRICTS 1991:  YOUTH (age 20-24) MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
BY TOTAL MALE UNEMPLOYMENT
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FIGURE 4  SCOTTISH TTWAs:  LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT October 1995 CORRECTED FOR 
SEASONALITY (mean quarterly deviation in U), BY TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT January 1995
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FIGURE 5 FEMALE LONE PARENTS
WITHOUT JOBS AS A PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN, 
BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT, GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1991
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FIGURE 6  PROPORTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION
 LONG-TERM SICK BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1991
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FIGURE 7 PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO EARNER (excluding pensioner-only h/h) 
BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT - GB LAs 1991
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FIGURE 8 U/V RATIO BY CORRECTED CLAIMANT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 
GB TTWAs July 1999 
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Welfare Reform:  
Facing up to the Geography of Worklessness   
 
 
David Webster 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The government’s green paper on welfare (DWP 2006) has been widely welcomed, 
particularly for its centrepiece, a constructive approach to supporting the return to 
work of people out of the labour market through long-term sickness or disability.  But 
does it amount to an adequate policy to address what it acknowledges is still a major 
problem of worklessness?  Like earlier government papers, it is very confident that 
the problem lies entirely on the supply side of the labour market.  In other words it is 
caused by the characteristics or motivation of workless people and not by any 
shortage of demand for labour:  “The problem is not a lack of jobs” (p.18).    
 
Unfortunately there is a great deal of evidence that much of the problem is indeed a 
lack of jobs.  The two deep recessions of 1979-83 and 1991-4 devastated the 
economies of the former industrial areas, particularly the cities and coalfields.  Since 
1997 a further million jobs have been lost in manufacturing.  To a remarkable extent, 
the areas of large scale worklessness are the same today as in 1979. 
 
How much improvement in the last decade? 
 
There has been an almost unprecedented long boom since 1994.  But FIGURES 1 and 
2 show how limited has been the progress in the decade 1995-2005 towards 
eliminating these concentrations of worklessness.  Employment rates have risen 
across the board.  For men, the increase in rates has been around 1% in what were 
already the best areas in 1995, rising to around 5%-6% in the worst areas.  For 
women, the increase in rates has been around 4% in the best areas, rising slightly to 
6% in the worst areas.  But these increases, welcome though they are, still leave a 
very large gap between the best and worst areas.  Male and female employment rates 
in the worst areas are still some 20% below those in the best areas now.  Employment 
rates in the worst areas are still some 15%-20% below what they were in the best 
areas in 1995.  There is a consistent pattern in which larger settlements have 
systematically lower employment rates than smaller settlements, across the whole 
range, although London is better overall than the other conurbations (Coombes & 
Raybould 2004).   
 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Over time, the position for men has become worse both absolutely and relative to 
women. A downward trend in employment for men and an upward trend for women 
were already present from the 1960s, but the really big change came with the two 
great recessions.  They both resulted in large falls in employment, of 8-10 percentage 
points for men, and around 2 percentage points for women.  While women’s 
employment quickly recovered each time and resumed its rise, the male employment 
rate has not yet returned to the 82% reached at the end of the Lawson boom in 1991, 
let alone the 88% of 1979.  It has been on a plateau since 2000.    
 
Some of the fall in men’s employment has been due to increased participation in 
higher education, and some to increased early retirement associated with the growth 
of occupational pension schemes.  However these factors do nothing to alter the 
picture of severe concentrations of male worklessness.  FIGURE 3 tracks levels of 
worklessness across 120 areas of Britain in the four Censuses from 1971 to 2001, for 
men aged 16-49 who were not full-time students.  This chart is scaled using male 
unemployment for the same age group in the Census 2001.  It shows that in 1971 
male worklessness was typically around 5%, while only in 7 out of the 120 areas was 
it above 10%.  There was a huge rise in worklessness between 1971 and 1991, when 
there were two areas (Knowsley and Liverpool) above 35% and another 3 areas 
(Hackney, Manchester and Tower Hamlets) above 30%.  By 2001 worklessness had 
fallen back from these peak levels, but was less than halfway to regaining the levels 
even of 1981, let alone 1971.  Liverpool was still above 30%, along with Glasgow 
(not shown separately on this chart) which was the worst local authority area in Great 
Britain at 31%.  Altogether 19 London or metropolitan boroughs, plus the large areas 
of Strathclyde and Cleveland, were above 20%.  These are dire figures for the prime 
age group.  This reality must be set alongside the green paper’s comment (p.14) that 
“The UK now has one of the highest employment rates in its history”.   
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The causes of the problem:  deindustrialisation and decentralisation 
 
These great concentrations of worklessness are primarily due to two processes:  
deindustrialisation and decentralisation.  Deindustrialisation, partly due to 
productivity gains and partly to overseas competition, has seen the disappearance of 
millions of jobs in manufacturing, mining and transport, mainly held by men.  At the 
same time, decentralisation since the 1970s has seen movement of employment and 
population out of the cities into smaller settlements.  This has been partly driven by 
land constraints – responsible for London’s larger and earlier loss of manufacturing 
than other cities – and partly by residential choice, as people able to buy houses have 
preferred to move to smaller places.   
 
In many cases, local job losses have been large and rapid.  In Glasgow’s case, for 
instance, almost two-thirds of manufacturing jobs were lost in only 15 years 1978-93.  
Of course, adjustment can take place through migration, commuting or upskilling.  
But research indicates that the adjustment processes are generally too small and slow 
to prevent decades of elevated worklessness in cases where job loss has been very 
large.  In the Glasgow case, no adjustment by commuting has effectively been 
possible because the rest of the Clyde Valley has had a similar employment 
experience;  and until the late 1990s, little adjustment by upskilling was possible   5
because growth in white collar jobs was small.  Most adjustment has been by 
outmigration.  But as Jackman & Savouri (1992), have shown, this works strongly 
only during times of boom. 
 
There are many studies charting the processes of deindustrialisation and 
decentralisation and their effects in increased worklessness.  The most important are 
Turok (1999) for the cities, Beatty et al. (1997) for the coalfields, and Rowthorn 
(2000) for the North.  Kasarda (1989) is the classic study providing a parallel analysis 
for cities in the USA.  Beatty & Fothergill (2004) have shown that the apparently 
anomalous case of raised worklessness in seaside towns can be explained in a similar 
way.  Although their employment has expanded, it has been outstripped by in-
movement of working age population. 
 
Further evidence that concentrations of worklessness are substantially due to 
weaknesses in labour demand, rather than to the characteristics of individuals such 
lack of qualifications, has recently been put forward by Erdem & Glyn (2001) and 
O’Leary et al. (2005) for regions, and by Coombes & Raybould (2004) for the local 
authority level. 
 
Parallel Processes:  Sickness, Disability and Lone Parenthood 
 
The green paper’s concern with working age sick or disabled people reflects the 
enormous increase in this group since the mid-1980s.  This is intrinsically related to 
the geography of job loss.  In response to the rise in unemployment in the first great 
recession of 1979-83, unemployment benefits and their conditions were made less 
favourable, in the belief that this would push people back into work.  But in areas 
where prospects of a job were poor, people moved on to sickness benefits instead, 
because they remained more generous.  The process has been explained by Beatty et 
al. (2000).  For a long time this was not accepted by central government.  However, 
the paper by Bell & Smith (2004) marked a belated official recognition of the process, 
at least within the Bank of England.   
 
FIGURE 4 shows the percentage of the working age population claiming sickness or 
disability benefits in May 1995 and February 2005, again with local authorities scaled 
using Census unemployment in 2001.  The position has worsened across the board by 
around 1 percentage point, with only a slight relative improvement in the worst areas 
compared to the best.   
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The green paper’s second main target group is lone parents.  As in earlier government 
papers, there is no awareness that lone parenthood is to a substantial extent a 
consequence of declining male employment.  Being out of work has powerful effects 
on the father’s position in the family, through such things as his lack of financial 
contribution, lowered status and increased tensions, and this tends to produce family 
breakdown.  This process has already been charted for the USA by authors such as 
Wilson (1987), and equally strong evidence has now emerged in Britain.  Rowthorn & 
Webster (2006) estimate that around 30% of the 1,161,000 increase in lone parents 
over the period 1971-2001 can be attributed to the decline in male employment. 
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Across areas, the level of lone parenthood is therefore strongly related to the level of 
unemployment.  It is not surprising that lone parents have a low rate of employment, 
since they have to contend not only with their competing responsibilities as parents, 
but also with the fact that they are disproportionately concentrated in areas where it is 
difficult to get a job.   
 
The government view 
 
There has been great continuity between the present and the previous governments in 
their belief that the continuing concentrations of worklessness are a supply-side, not a 
demand-side phenomenon.  A whole series of papers has come out of the Treasury 
and DWP since 1997 arguing this case.  For a long time, many of these arguments 
drew on the misleading ‘workforce’-based local unemployment statistics, which 
thoroughly confused the issue by showing high unemployment in the wrong places 
(Webster 2002).  Fortunately, due to excellent work by ONS in withdrawing these 
statistics and in improving the availability of LFS-based measures at local level, this 
problem is now resolved.  Leaving this aside, there have been two main types of 
argument. 
 
Aggregate comparison of job vacancies and numbers of unemployed   
 
The first main argument was that the aggregate number of claimant unemployed was 
roughly equal to the aggregate number of job vacancies, so that there was no reason 
for anyone to be unemployed if they took the jobs on offer.  This is no longer tenable.  
The vacancy figures which were used were disowned by ONS (Bentley 2005) and 
fresh estimates of vacancies based on a new national employers’ survey produced a 
much lower total than that of claimant unemployed, some 650,000 rather than the 1m 
claimed by the Treasury (Financial Times 14/12/2002).  There are other problems 
about vacancy data, in particular that vacancy levels are affected by different rates of 
turnover of staff in different industries, not just by the balance of demand and supply 
(Webster 2000).  In addition, people on sickness benefits who want to and could work 
– effectively estimated by the green paper at around one million – have to be added to 
the claimant count.   
 
Local comparison of jobs with population or numbers out of work   
 
The other principal argument that there is no shortage of jobs is based on the 
apparently abundant availability of jobs in high unemployment areas, particularly 
cities.  This appears in two versions.  One points to nearby jobs growth, as in the 
statement ‘something like 90% of Britain’s long-term unemployed live within 45 
minutes of a jobs growth area’ (Observer, 7/12/1997).   Coombes & Raybould (2004) 
have shown that it is simply not true that areas with low jobs growth are generally 
found near to areas with high jobs growth.  The reverse is the case.     
 
The other version, repeated in the green paper (p.18), points out that cities have high 
ratios of jobs to population (‘job ratios’): ‘employment rates are lowest in the major 
cities, where there is at least one job per person’.  But the availability of jobs to 
unemployed people at a particular location cannot be measured in such a simple way.  
Labour markets have a spatial structure conforming to the gravity or spatial 
interaction models used to analyse migration, shopping and travel (Webster & Turok   7
1997).  There is a ‘friction of distance’, created by the money and non-money costs of 
travel, which limits people’s ‘employment field’, particularly if their earning capacity 
is low. This same friction also means that people face less competition for jobs in 
their own area than elsewhere, because of the costs faced by incoming competitors.  
These two factors together mean that people’s commuting propensity conforms to an 
inverse exponential ‘power function’;  the further away an area is, the less likely 
people are to work there.  If the true availability of jobs at a particular location is to be 
calculated, the relevant power function must be taken into account not only for the 
area’s residents, but also for the residents of all the other areas from which 
commuting to this area or to the other areas in the primary area’s employment field 
takes place.  This is a complex but perfectly feasible computation (Shen 1998).   
 
Such an analysis discloses the poor employment opportunities available to many city 
residents.  Conversely, it reveals the good employment opportunities often available 
to people living in areas such as suburbs which have low job ratios.  One of the main 
attractions of these areas is precisely the fact that they are almost purely residential.  
Housing markets as well as labour markets play a role.  To a large extent, it is the city 
workers who are successful in obtaining jobs who have the money to exercise a 
choice for suburban living, and then commute back into the city.  This creates the 
appearance that city residents have a greater tendency to be unemployed, when the 
reality is that it is the unemployed who have a greater tendency to be city residents.   
 
Supply-side policies 
 
The government focus on supply-side explanations of worklessness has led to supply-
side labour market policies.  The development of a more proactive employment 
service, oriented towards identifying people’s labour market handicaps and helping to 
remedy them, has been universally welcomed.  But the effectiveness of mass 
programmes targeted at particular groups is much more doubtful.  The findings 
already presented indicate that in the aggregate, these programmes have had rather 
little effect to date in narrowing the differences between high unemployment and low 
unemployment areas.  The main targets of the early programmes were young people 
and the long-term unemployed.  Sunley et al. (2001) showed that the New Deal for 
young people was much less effective in high unemployment areas, and recent 
evidence suggests that the programme has made little difference to youth 
unemployment measured on the LFS rather than claimant count (Financial Times, 
15/12/2005).  There is strong evidence that long-term claimant unemployment would 
have come down anyway, with the general fall in unemployment (Webster 2005).   
 
There are similar reasons to question the likely effectiveness of purely supply-side 
programmes aimed at the green paper’s target groups.  LFS data first published in 
2002/3 show that across areas, employment rates for disabled people fall 
systematically with rising unemployment – in other words a disabled person’s 
employment prospects depend on the state of the local labour market, and not only on 
their disability.  While, as the green paper says, there has been a substantial increase 
in lone parents’ employment, it has been evenly spread so that high unemployment 
areas – where most lone parents are concentrated – have seen increases no greater 
than those of low unemployment areas, leaving the gap between them as large as 
before.  Similarly, figures to 2002 show that the take-up of working tax credits has 
increased much less for lone parents in high unemployment areas than for those in   8
low unemployment areas.  This almost certainly reflects the greater buoyancy of 
women’s jobs in the prosperous areas. 
 
Conclusion:  The need for urban and regional policy 
 
It is important to acknowledge the constructive steps that the government has taken.  
It is now in agreement with its critics in giving top priority to people on sickness and 
disability benefits who could be in work.  In successive stages, it has brought about 
dramatic improvements in the financial incentives to take a job, and removed many 
obstacles to the transition from benefits to work. But there is a much stronger case for 
demand-side action than the government acknowledges.  This essentially lies in the 
slowness of the processes of adjustment to job loss.  Where the economic and social 
costs of worklessness are very large and are going to be prolonged, it makes sense to 
promote jobs by hastening the processes of recovery.   Investing in transport, water 
and sewerage and other infrastructure together with dealing with the exceptional costs 
of derelict land reclamation are often the most important, but really what is needed is 
a specific recovery plan for each area worked out between central and local 
government and other interests.  This case has recently been ably put by the House of 
Commons ODPM Committee (2003) and by Fothergill (2005).  It makes sense to 
acknowledge that lack of labour demand is often a particularly large factor in the local 
situation, and to look with an open mind for the opportunities which would enable this 
to be addressed. 
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FIGURE 1  MALE EMPLOYMENT RATES, GB LAs, 1995 & 2005
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Source:  LFS 4-quarter averages (NOMIS) 
 
FIGURE 2   FEMALE EMPLOYMENT RATES, GB LAs 1995 & 2005
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Source:  LFS 4-quarter averages (NOMIS)   12
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3  PROPORTION OF MEN AGED 16-49, NOT FULL-TIME STUDENTS, WHO WERE NOT 
EMPLOYED
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Source:  Census. For details of sources and methods see Rowthorn & Webster (2006). 
 
 
FIGURE 4  SICK & DISABLED CLAIMANTS AS % OF WORKING AGE POPULATION 
GB LAs May 1995 & Feb 2005
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Source:  DWP Cross-Benefit Analysis.  The population figures for 1995 have not 
been updated to the post-2001 Census estimates.  If this was done the increase in 
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Introduction 
 
The New Deal is Labour's flagship programme to "end the tragic waste of youth and 
long-term unemployment" by getting people off welfare benefits and into work. The scale 
of resources involved (£3,500 million) and the high profile consultative events held with 
private employers, public bodies and voluntary organisations suggest a clearer 
commitment from a UK government to tackle unemployment than has been seen for 
many years. It deserves serious consideration by practitioners and researchers, even if for 
no other reason than if it fails, precious popular support for public action on 
unemployment may be set back a long way. 
 
The New Deal has several key features to be borne in mind at the outset.  It is financed by 
a one-off windfall tax on the excess profits of the privatised utilities, rather than a 
recurring commitment of public funds. It is intended to operate on a large scale, initially 
covering all those under 25 and registered unemployed for over 6 months, then extended 
to long-term unemployed adults, those under 25 and short-term unemployed, lone parents 
out of work, and ultimately people on incapacity benefit. In the classic tradition of 
initiatives of this kind, it has been introduced essentially as a stand-alone national 
programme with its own rules and procedures. 
 
Much of the public discussion to date has focused on these rules (particularly the issue of 
compulsory participation), technical details (such as the restricted duration of the training 
available), the target groups (the possibility that the most disadvantaged will get 
marginalised by output-related funding), the limited recruitment incentives for private 
employers and the quality of the work experience on the environmental task force and 
voluntary sector options (which may suffer from underfunding). 
 
Little attention has been given to the fundamental rationale and policy orientation of the 
programme - the focus of this paper. We argue that the principal weakness of the New 
Deal is that it seeks to influence the character of labour supply (ie the motivation and 
skills of the unemployed) while neglecting the state of labour demand, which varies 
greatly between places.  The uneven geography of unemployment in the UK is likely to 
have a crucial bearing on the programme's impact and effectiveness, but this has been 
largely ignored in its development. The paper outlines some of the practical 
consequences of this imbalance and suggests how it could be rectified for the programme 
to be more effective. 
 
During its first 6 months in office Labour has shown tentative signs of willingness to 
adjust details of the New Deal. They may allow self-employment to become an additional   2
option and the public sector to be included within the employer option, and may alter the 
balance between youth and adult target groups in recognition of the recent falls in 
registered youth unemployment.  However, the overwhelming supply-side emphasis has 
persisted. There has been no acknowledgement of the need to address the deficient 
demand for labour in many places by supporting projects which actually expand 
employment there. 
 
Elements of the New Deal 
 
The New Deal consists of a range of measures to equip the long-term unemployed to 
compete better in the labour market (DfEE, 1997a). The first "Gateway" stage aims above 
all to get people directly into work through help with intensive job searching, careers 
advice and guidance lasting for up to 4 months. If they fail to get a job at this stage they 
are offered one or more of four options: a subsidised placement with an employer, work 
experience on an environmental task force or with the voluntary sector (all last for up to 6 
months and include an element of training), or full-time education or training (for up to 
12 months). They are also offered follow-up support during and after these options to 
help them find employment. People who fail to take up offers of specific places on the 
options lose their unemployment benefit for 2 weeks initially; with each subsequent 
refusal the length of the loss of benefit increases. According to the euphemism, there is 
"no fifth option". 
 
The Employment Service has lead responsibility for implementation. They aim to deliver 
the programme through "local partnerships", including local authorities, voluntary 
organisations, TECs/LECs, colleges and private training providers. The specific 
arrangements are expected to vary from area to area according to local needs and 
institutional structures. An immediate area of uncertainty is how and why local agencies 
should come together, since the contracts for delivery of most elements are to be 
allocated through competitive bidding and many of them will be rivals for funds, 
participants and employer placements. This, coupled with the emphasis on delivery in the 
local partnerships, means that issues of programme design and balance are bound to be 
determined centrally. Local flexibility may be limited to the detailed organisational 
arrangements. Consequently, it is likely to prove difficult to integrate the New Deal 
properly into existing provision. The heavy imprint of the Employment Service is already 
clear from the early documentation. There is a strong emphasis on detailed operational 
rules and prescriptive procedures, with little apparent scope for local discretion and no 
consideration of the underlying rationale, policy principles or vision of what the 
programme might achieve (see eg DfEE, 1997a). One has to look elsewhere for any 
discussion of these. 
 
Underlying Assumptions 
 
It is apparent from the origins and current content of the New Deal that it is based on a 
view of long-term unemployment which attaches overwhelming emphasis to aspects of 
labour supply, such as the lack of skills or work incentives on the part of the unemployed 
(for its origins, see eg CSJ, 1994, Chapter 5). There are two theories of long-term   3
unemployment that could, if correct, provide a justification for the programme. 
Ministerial statements and press releases have echoed these ideas, indicating their 
resonance with the New Deal. The implication of both theories is that a temporary 
programme to raise people's employability and get them off benefits will permanently cut 
unemployment. 
 
One theory states that the experience of unemployment makes people less employable, 
through depletion of skills, erosion of work habits, discrimination by employers and less 
intensive job searching the longer people are unemployed (Budd et al, 1988; Layard et al, 
1991; OECD, 1988). The Treasury press notice announcing the New Deal stated: "Long 
spells of unemployment at a young age have a serious scarring effect on people, 
detrimental to both their motivation and future employability" (HM Treasury, 1997). If 
true, this "withering flowers" theory is very important because it implies that the long-
term unemployed have become detached from the labour force, forming a large pool of 
people who are basically unemployable, which has been "ratcheted up" over time. This is 
said to cause the overall economy to run at an unnecessarily high "natural rate of 
unemployment" because the long-term unemployed are poor "inflation-fighters". If the 
long-term unemployed could be reskilled and reconnected to the labour force, they would 
put downward pressure on wage inflation and allow the economy to operate at a higher 
level of employment. Before the election, Labour's New Deal adviser, Richard Layard, 
suggested that unemployment could be brought down by 440,000 over 5 years by a 
programme of precisely this kind costing £1,500 million (Layard, 1997). 
 
The second theory states that people remain unemployed for longer because welfare 
benefits give them an incentive to do so (Layard et al, 1991; OECD, 1988). The above-
mentioned press notice also stated that unemployment "entrenches a culture of 
dependency" (HM Treasury, 1997). If true, this "replacement ratio" theory suggests that 
countries will have higher levels of long-term unemployment where the ratio of benefits 
received by people out of work is relatively high in relation to net wages in work, and/or 
where the duration of benefits is longer. The obvious policy implication is that benefits 
need to be reduced in scale or duration in order to ensure that the long-term unemployed 
have sufficient incentive to take whatever jobs are available. The link with the New Deal 
is clear, both in terms of the benefit sanctions for failure to participate and the low level 
of allowances on the environment and voluntary sector options. This was recommended 
at existing benefit level plus £20 to ensure that participants are "impatient to get into 
regular jobs" (Layard, 1997, p 4). 
 
In fact, there is little evidence of a distinct long-term unemployment problem separate 
from the overall unemployment problem. "While people's morale and self-esteem may 
well be influenced by the experience of unemployment, there is little evidence that this in 
itself has a significant impact on their future employment status, or that it creates a lasting 
problem of long-term unemployment which is not resolved by an increase in 
employment. A detailed study looking at a wide range of cross-section and time-series 
data found that the rate of long-term unemployment is closely related to the overall rate 
of unemployment (Webster, 1997a). The relationship between long-term unemployment   4
and total unemployment does not change as unemployment rises, as the theories suggest 
it should. Long-term unemployment also falls as unemployment falls, in the same way as 
it rises. Comparing the position across different localities, regions and nations, long-term 
unemployment also emerges consistently as a simple function of overall unemployment. 
 
What basically happens is that as the balance between labour demand and supply worsens 
in an area, more people become unemployed and they stay unemployed for longer. The 
reverse is true when employment conditions improve. The main explanation for long-
term unemployment must therefore be the shortage of jobs, which is more acute in some 
places than in others, and at some times than at others. The same conclusion was reached 
about youth unemployment in a recent study for the Council of Churches for Britain and 
Ireland: "the main explanation for youth unemployment is the deficiency of demand for 
labour overall" (CCBI, 1997, p 38). The clear implication of all this is that special 
supply-side measures focused on the youth and long-term unemployed are less important 
than efforts to create suitable jobs for the unemployed in the places where unemployment 
is high. 
 
Geographical Variations in Labour Demand and 
Supply 
 
The New Deal and the theories on which it is based are seriously weakened by their 
neglect of the geography of unemployment and economic performance. Labour market 
conditions and the causes of unemployment vary between places, so the policy solutions 
and packages of relevant measures should differ accordingly. Some local labour markets 
are relatively tight, in which case supply-side barriers to employment may be a 
significant constraint on growth, perhaps in the Aberdeen or Cambridge areas. Wage 
inflation may possibly be an issue here, and measures to enhance the employability of the 
long-term unemployed may have a part to play in facilitating economic expansion.
1  
However, in many British towns and cities the fundamental problem is insufficient 
demand for labour, with a particular shortage of manual jobs. 
 
The places which need the New Deal most are areas which have experienced a steady 
decline in traditional industries and limited compensating job growth. These relatively 
depressed local economies are the very places where it will be most difficult to help 
people get jobs through the provision of basic training, work experience or employer 
subsidies. It will also be hardest here for them to price themselves into jobs given the 
scale of existing competition for vacancies. The national minimum wage may contradict 
the logic of this adjustment process too. The priority in these areas should be to create 
additional permanent jobs, and the considerable resources of the New Deal should be 
made available for this purpose. 
 
In the rest of this section we show how the geographical distribution of all four New Deal 
target groups — unemployed youth, long-term unemployed, lone parents and the long-
                                                 
1 Note that the barriers to employment in these localities typically involve shortages of highly skilled 
workers more than unskilled labour.  The 12 month time limit on the New Deal education and training 
option  is unlikely to do much to alleviate the problem of skills mismatch.   5
term sick - appears to match that of total unemployment, with minor variations. In areas 
of high unemployment, the programme will be trying to push all four groups into jobs in 
local labour markets already suffering from an acute over-supply of labour. Moreover, 
these areas have already had considerable experience of government supply-side labour 
market programmes (Gardiner, 1997). We discuss the practical consequences of this later. 
 
Figure 1 shows the rate of unemployment for young men (20-24) plotted against that for 
all men for local authority districts in Britain, drawing on Census of Population data for 
1991. It demonstrates that youth unemployment is closely related to overall 
unemployment: areas with high total unemployment have high youth unemployment, and 
vice-versa. This finding is supported by a recent international study of youth 
unemployment across 15 countries which concluded that "the most likely cause for the 
adverse labour market experiences of youths is the high overall rate of unemployment" 
(Blanchflower and Freeman, 1996). 
 
Suitable data for comparing long-term unemployment are more difficult to obtain from 
national sources, so they must generally be secured from individual local authorities. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between long-term and total unemployment for the 19 
Districts of Strathclyde at five different points in time. The Districts have moved up and 
down roughly the same path on the graph, depending on the business cycle. Glasgow has 
always had one of the highest unemployment rates and East Kilbride one of the lowest. In 
a year when unemployment was cyclically low, such as 1996, Glasgow had a very similar 
level of long-term unemployment to East Kilbride when its unemployment rate was at the 
same level, in 1986. The conclusion that long-term unemployment is closely linked to 
total unemployment is supported strongly by data from other localities too (Webster, 
1997a). 
 
In terms of lone parents, Figure 3 shows an important link between the proportion of 
households with children which are headed by female lone parents, and male 
unemployment. The connection actually goes much further, since the proportion of 
female lone parents who are out of work and the proportion who are economically 
inactive are also closely linked to male unemployment (Webster, 1997b). Put simply, in 
prosperous areas where male unemployment is low, a high proportion of lone parents are 
in work, but in depressed areas where a lot of other people are also looking for jobs, only 
a small proportion of lone parents manage to get work. If jobs are scarce, women may 
stay at home or get involved in voluntary work or other unpaid activities and not bother 
to declare themselves as unemployed. An implication is that the challenge to the New 
Deal for lone parents clearly goes well beyond the provision of childcare and training. 
 
Figure 4 shows that long-term illness is also strongly related to unemployment.  The 
scale of registered long-term sickness has risen enormously since 1980, and the rate of 
increase has accelerated since 1991. This goes a long way towards explaining the 
discrepancy in many areas between the large fall in registered unemployment since 1991, 
and a small increase in employment. It has been estimated that the number of people on 
sickness benefits who would have been in work, in circumstances of full employment, 
more than doubled between 1991 and 1997 to 1.26 million (Beatty et al, 1997). As an   6
aside, the level of New Deal resources initially earmarked for people on incapacity 
benefit (£200 million), lone parents (£200 million) and long-term unemployed 
adults (£350 million) seem paltry compared with those devoted to unemployed youth 
(£3,150 million) (HM Treasury, 1997), given the relative scale of these problems. 
 
Unemployment and Job Loss 
 
Huge geographical shifts in employment have taken place in the last two decades, 
particularly in manufacturing. Figure 5 shows the change in total jobs for Scottish 
districts between 1981 and 1991. There was a huge range, from an increase of over two-
thirds in Skye and Lochalsh to a fall of a third in Cumnock and Doon Valley. A general 
"urban-rural shift" of manufacturing jobs in Britain is well documented. It has been 
superimposed on the national fall in manufacturing employment of over 50 per cent since 
the late 1960s. In the worst-affected areas, such as Cumnock and Glasgow, blue-collar 
jobs - those most relevant to the unemployed — have fallen far more than total 
employment:  by 30 per cent in Glasgow between 1981 and 1991, compared to under 3 
per cent in Scotland outwith the Clydeside conurbation. The fall in Liverpool was 40 per 
cent. 
 
Unemployment is closely related to changes in employment. Figure 6 shows that across 
all the large British cities, male unemployment in 1991 was strongly linked to the change 
in employment between 1981 and 1991. Cities which gained jobs — such as Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and Leeds — had far lower unemployment rates than cities which had large 
job losses - such as Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow. High unemployment has 
persisted in precisely the areas which lost most jobs, indicating the adjustment difficulties 
facing displaced workers and their families. The intimate connection between changes in 
employment and unemployment serves to emphasize the importance of policies which 
affect labour demand as well as labour supply. 
 
Given their importance, how should the geographical variations in employment 
conditions be analysed and treated? In particular, what spatial units are appropriate? 
Attempts to properly understand and tackle unemployment are hampered by a lack of 
reliable data. The only regular government statistics on local unemployment are for 
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs). These are treated officially as the key building blocks 
for comparing labour market conditions in different places and defining priority areas 
under UK and EU regional policies. 
 
In fact, TTWAs conceal the most important concentrations of unemployment within 
average rates for artificially large areas (Webster and Turok, 1997). The latest revisions 
using the 1991 Census have created even larger areas than before, particularly in and 
around the major cities. Edinburgh's latest TTWA includes West and East Lothian for the 
first time. Glasgow's includes Cumbernauld, Coatbridge, Airdrie, East Kilbride, parts of 
Renfrewshire (Bridge of Weir and Kilmalcolm) and Stirlingshire (including Drymen and 
Balmaha). Their scale may have confused policy makers about the very high levels of 
unemployment in the inner cities and peripheral estates, since they are averaged with low 
rates for the prosperous suburbs and some of the surrounding towns. They could also   7
have given a misleading impression of the distances which most of the unemployed are 
able to travel to work. As a result, TTWAs may have contributed to the diversion of 
economic development efforts away from the locations where jobs are needed most. The 
New Deal should be developed on the basis of smaller geographical units than this to 
ensure they focus on unemployment hotspots. 
 
Employment Zones 
 
The New Deal lacks a spatial perspective, with one exception – Employment Zones. The 
initial intention is that up to five such Zones are to be selected in a competition open to 
eight areas of high long-term unemployment across the country (DfEE, 1997b). Judging 
from the prospectus, these seem to have peculiar boundaries based on Employment 
Service districts which bear no consistent relationship to functional regions, local 
unemployment concentrations or meaningful administrative units for local authorities or 
other development bodies. They are described as Glasgow, North Wales, Plymouth, 
Liverpool, Teeside, Wakefield/Doncaster, Birmingham and North West London. 
 
The emphasis in the Zones will be on offering long-term unemployed adults a slightly 
wider range of options than available generally under the New Deal. They include 
additional scope for education and training (Learning for Work), temporary work 
experience and training on intermediate labour market-type projects (Neighbourhood 
Match), and assistance with business planning to facilitate self-employment. The 
additional resources available are very modest in relation to the wider New Deal (£33 
million, or about 1 per cent of the total budget). For each Zone there will be £1,000 per 
participant for up to 1,000 participants at any one time (DfEE, 1997b). Assuming that the 
average length of time spent by participants on projects is between 6 and 12 months, the 
total sum available for each Employment Zone will be about £1-2 million per annum. Yet 
a city such as Glasgow expects to get between £70-90 million (or about £15-20 million 
per annum) under the main programme, on the basis of its share of long-term 
unemployment. 
 
Another feature of the Zones is the encouragement to use welfare benefits and existing 
training programmes with more flexibility to improve the quality of support to job 
seekers. "At present legislation does not permit flexible pooling of money voted by 
Parliament for separate purposes. Ministers are, therefore, seeking to test the approach 
within the limits of existing legislation" (DfEE, 1997b, p 4). Local partnerships are to be 
set up and urged to develop an integrated strategy involving all public, private and 
voluntary bodies concerned in some way with long-term unemployment. An indicative 
list is provided of 20 different kinds of organisation that might be included, ranging from 
the police and probation service to religious groups, schools, local authorities and 
development agencies. In fact, the financial incentives and timescale for these agencies 
to collaborate are hardly serious. The prospectus emphasizes that:  "Employment Zone 
provision should not compete with or duplicate what is already in place and successful" 
(DfEE, 1997b, p 6). This is laudable but unrealistic in what is already a crowded 
marketplace for services of this kind. The initiative has insufficient leverage over the 
range of existing funding streams and policies to bring about any significant (and   8
genuinely needed) realignment, coordination or integration of existing national and local 
employment schemes. 
 
The main reservation about the Zones is that they do not address the shortage of labour 
demand in these places. Except for helping people to become self-employed (which 
seems likely to become more widely available anyway), they are similar to the New Deal 
options and involve only temporary work and training opportunities for participants. The 
quality of support may be slightly better because of the extra funding and flexibility, but 
the approach is fundamentally unchanged. "The objective is to improve individuals' 
employability and if possible secure their sustainable employment" (DfEE, 1997b, p 7, 
emphasis added). The key unanswered question is what happens to people 6 months or a 
year after completing their support programme if there are no more jobs available in their 
areas? Starting a business is not realistic for most people in the target groups, who lack 
the necessary financial resources, assets for collateral and managerial/marketing skills. 
The conditions for high rates of new firm formation are generally weakest in the areas of 
highest unemployment in Britain (Ashcroft et al, 1991). Experience suggests that 
business start-up programmes have modest employment effects when targeted towards 
the unemployed in areas of low income, especially taking into account displacement 
effects (Storey, 1994; Turok and Richardson, 1991).   
 
Some of the academic exponents of the New Deal appear to recognise that there are not 
enough jobs in some places. Layard himself has stated: "In an isolated labour market the 
adjustment process can of course be difficult ... In such areas there will have to be major 
job-creation projects as well" (Layard, 1997, p 3). This advice is not reflected in the Zone 
proposals. Yet these would appear to be precisely the situations in which major additional 
job-creation programmes are required. The Employment Zone emphasis on benefit 
constraints, skill deficiencies and individual employability seems particularly misplaced 
in these areas. 
 
Practical Consequences of the New Deal 
 
Implementing the New Deal unchanged in areas of high unemployment is likely to fail 
expectations and may even prove counter-productive. The shortage of jobs relative to the 
numbers unemployed is bound to mean fewer opportunities under the prized "employer 
option" than available elsewhere, requiring greater reliance upon the voluntary, 
environmental and education options. These are likely to prove less effective at getting 
people into permanent jobs than equivalent projects in other places, for the same reason, 
thereby reinforcing the impression of a second-class programme in these areas.  Coupled 
with the threat of benefit sanctions, this may make many people reluctant participants on 
projects, with detrimental consequences for management styles, discipline, the quality of 
people's shared experience and scope for mutual support. It will also undermine the 
schemes' ability to retain participants for the full duration and expose them to the range of 
opportunities designed to help them make progress in the job market. Subsequent blame 
for failure might be attributed wrongly to the unemployed themselves or to the local 
organisations running these projects. Understandable disaffection and resistance to the 
revolving door of one scheme after another would also lead to larger-scale benefit   9
sanctions than elsewhere. This would reduce incomes and increase hardship in the 
poorest communities, and might contribute to other problems such as homelessness and 
possibly crime. Areas of low unemployment would not be affected to the same extent, so 
geographical disparities across Britain for all sorts of variables and unintended 
consequences would widen further. 
 
An additional consideration is how the new programme relates to the large number of 
existing supply-side measures common in areas of high unemployment.  Many are 
similar in broad respects to those of the New Deal. Some are high-volume national 
programmes with standard terms and conditions, little flexibility and low unit costs, such 
as Training for Work, Youth Training, and a host of schemes geared to job search, 
recruitment incentives and benefits in- and out-of-work. Important doubts have 
surrounded their economic impact and quality for many years (for recent analyses, see 
Bewick, 1997; Fletcher, 1997; Gardiner, 1997). It remains unclear to what extent the 
New Deal will be different or better, since much depends on implementation in practice. 
 
Other initiatives are smaller-scale and tailored to local circumstances, having developed 
in a more organic fashion over the years. Some are spatially targeted and part of 
comprehensive area-based regeneration programmes. Others are linked into demand-side 
measures and devised with particular employment opportunities in mind to ensure client 
progression. Available evidence suggests that at least some of them are working 
reasonably well in difficult circumstances (eg Emmerich, 1997; Grimes, 1996; Marshall, 
1997; Turok and Healy, 1994). Many offer a wider range of support and better integrated 
provision, including independent guidance and counselling, personal development and 
vocational training in flexible packages, customised training for specific vacancies, work 
experience paying the rate for the job and providing transferable skills, complementary 
child-care, intensive assistance with job seeking, and progressive wage and training 
subsidies to private employers with some obligation to keep recruits on afterwards. The 
ethos is voluntary rather than compulsory participation for the unemployed, which 
enhances motivation and channels it constructively. If the New Deal simply substitutes 
for, or crowds out, these schemes it will be providing nothing new. Indeed it will 
probably be replacing existing quality services with an inferior programme, and causing 
irresponsible disruption to provision since its funding is only temporary. 
 
Given its considerable resources and separate administration, the New Deal could end up 
merely adding a raft of new volume programmes to existing provision. Substantially 
expanding the scale of supply-side measures in areas of high unemployment could prove 
a waste of money and produce adverse effects in increased "churning" of people into and 
out of temporary projects and work placements, with no lasting reduction in 
unemployment. In fact, it will create greater instability and uncertainty for the people 
concerned, promoting further disillusionment with government "schemes". This could 
affect their commitment to education and training more generally, and prompt some to 
withdraw from the labour market completely for the underground economy. It is very 
difficult to see how any putative macro-economic benefits may arise in these areas 
through downward wage adjustment and consequential employment growth, since their 
economic problems are far more structural than wage-related. Inundated with requests for   10
placements from employment agencies and the unemployed, but offered only a relatively 
small, flat-rate recruitment subsidy, many but the lowest-paying employers may simply 
ignore what they perceive to be another cynical government scheme to remove people 
from the unemployment register. Desperate for placements, agencies may turn a blind eye 
to employer abuse through displacing existing workers by New Deal recruits and 
replacing one of these after another at the end of the subsidy. 
 
Modifications to Increase Labour Demand 
 
Ministers may need to be reminded of earlier statements accepting the need for local 
variations, particularly to redress the supply-side emphasis in areas of high 
unemployment. The Employment Minister, Andrew Smith, has stated: "Rigid blueprints 
parachuted in from Whitehall are not the answer. The New Deal will be flexible in design 
... It will rely on communities pulling together, meeting local needs with local solutions 
through local partnerships ... It will include building on the best of those local 
programmes and partnerships already working" (Financial Times, 17th July 1997). The 
current policy reviews being undertaken of urban regeneration and regional development 
in England provide an opportunity for more imaginative integration of the New Deal 
resources with other departmental funds to establish genuine comprehensive 
approaches to urban unemployment and economic development. Announcing the review 
of the Single Regeneration Budget, John Prescott said: "We want to promote employment 
and investment for sustained economic growth and at the same time promote opportunity 
and fairness" (quoted in London Housing Unit, 1997). A reinvigorated Scottish urban 
policy is just as urgent. 
 
The priority in areas of high unemployment is to create additional jobs. These should be 
durable, not dependent on an ongoing subsidy, because the New Deal resources are one-
off. This tends to militate against work-experience and training projects engaged in 
socially useful activities in the environmental, health, education, social work and related 
fields - that might otherwise have important attractions - unless they can be converted 
into self-financing enterprises generating income from beyond their areas. The New 
Deal needs to prioritise efforts to strengthen and diversify the productive base of these 
areas, with a particular focus on increasing manual employment within easy reach of 
unemployment concentrations. 
 
Increasing the "additionality" of the New Deal should not be too difficult in some 
respects, from what has already been said. There is certainly potential for much more to 
be achieved. Two of the institutional requirements are greater flexibility at national level 
and trust in local organisations, so they can build on their understanding of local 
development needs and priorities, and strengthen their capacity to implement policies 
effectively. Local scope to determine expenditure priorities is important to ensure 
relevance and responsiveness to key demands for services and investment. Local control 
would make it possible to package the funds with other public, and indeed private, 
sources of finance to ensure they go further and maximise their economic impact. The 
nature and scale of the resources offer a unique opportunity for major investment projects 
that have hitherto been neglected because of financial constraints or risk-averse decision   11
making afflicting funding authorities and development agencies in recent years. A further 
guiding principle should be for New Deal projects to complement, and be properly 
integrated with, existing development strategies and regeneration programmes, not 
competing with, duplicating or replacing them, unless deficient. 
 
The traditional instruments of regional and urban development are important in many old 
industrial towns and cities, including improvements in basic economic infrastructure, 
strategic roads and industrial estates. They could have a lasting impact in attracting, 
retaining and facilitating economic development in areas suffering from industrial 
decline, decentralisation and dereliction. They lack the appeal of glamorous flagship 
property schemes and ad hoc events favoured by competitive sources of capital spending, 
such as the Lottery or Challenge Funds. Yet they may have a bigger economic impact, 
initially through construction jobs, but more importantly by establishing the conditions 
for inward investment and self-sustaining development. Cities with an old Victorian 
physical layout, such as Glasgow, need modern infrastructure and improved transport 
links to open up large areas of vacant land for economic development and new housing, 
thereby helping to retain and recentralise employment and population, producing physical 
environmental spin-offs, savings in travel and energy consumption, and improved job 
access for the unemployed. 
 
Integrated into broader regeneration strategies, it soon becomes clear how a flexible New 
Deal could serve a valuable purpose in economic, social and human resource terms. For 
example, an environmental taskforce could play an important role in reclaiming and 
upgrading brownfield sites. Some of this work involves fairly straightforward 
landscaping that could be done by unskilled labour on temporary projects, but some 
would require more complex treatment to decontaminate the land for productive after-
uses. A carefully planned environmental initiative with proper training for participants 
and a phased work programme across the city could maximise the opportunity for 
progression between sites, help people to advance their skills and experience over time, 
and lead to long-term positions for many of them. The contrast with a short-lived 
proliferation of unconnected schemes covering activities such as litter removal, stone 
paving and tree planting, with little regard to the longer-term economic and human 
consequences, could not be clearer. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The New Deal provides an important opportunity to do something significant about 
unemployment in the UK. Evidence about the nature and geography of long-term 
unemployment implies that its rationale requires reconsideration and its supply-side 
emphasis needs to change. In particular, it needs to be modified to become more relevant 
and responsive to diverse labour market conditions in towns and cities across the country. 
Two fundamental changes are required. First, the scope needs to be broadened to 
encourage projects that lead to an increase in the number of permanent jobs in areas of 
high unemployment. Second, greater flexibility should be permitted to allow the 
resources to be incorporated more effectively into better balanced and properly integrated 
local economic development and urban regeneration strategies.   12
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Figure 1 
GB DISTRICTS 1991:  YOUTH (age 20-24) MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
BY TOTAL MALE UNEMPLOYMENT
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Source:  Census 1991, Key Statistics for Local Authorities 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
STRATHCLYDE DISTRICTS:  LONG-TERM BY TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
(unlagged - various dates 1983 - 1996)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 5 10 15 20 25
% labour force unemployed (U)
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
a
s
 
%
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
(
L
)
October 1983 - solid diamonds
January 1986 - solid squares
January 1989 - solid circles
October 1991 - hollow diamonds
January 1996 - hollow circles
Glasgow 86
E.Kilbride 86
Glasgow 96
E.Kilbride 96
 
Source:  Strathclyde Economic Trends, Strathclyde Regional Council Chief Executive’s 
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Figure 3 
 
FEMALE LONE PARENTS (% of households with children) BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
GB LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1991
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Figure 4 
 
LONG-TERM ILLNESS BY MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
GB DISTRICTS 1991
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Figure 5 
 
SCOTTISH LOCAL AUTHORITY DISTRICTS:  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 1981-91
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Source:  Census Workplace and Transport to Work Scotland, 1981 and 1991 
Note:  There was a slight change in the coverage of the Census employment figures by workplace between 
1981 and 1991, but not enough to affect the comparison significantly. 
 
Figure 6 
MAJOR BRITISH CITIES:  MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 1991 BY CHANGE IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 1981-
91
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________________________________________________________________ 
 
Today’s problem of geographically concentrated unemployment and poverty is 
mainly due to concentrated blue collar job losses since the 1970s, in manufacturing, 
mining and some other activities including transport and fishing.   Turok & Edge 
(1999) and Beatty et al. (1997) have recently described the scale of manual job losses 
from the cities and coalfields respectively.  The closure of coalmines is a familiar 
story, but the much larger job losses from manufacturing are less well understood.  
Most people are aware that deindustrialisation has occurred on a huge scale, 
especially since 1979, but not how geographically uneven it has been.  As in the US 
north-east, British cities have been hit by massive “urban-rural manufacturing shift” 
due to property constraints (Fothergill et al. 1985), on top of the general 
deindustrialisation.  This has caused their manufacturing job losses to be around 
double the national average of some 40%.  By contrast, many rural and small town 
areas such as North Yorkshire have actually been gaining manufacturing jobs.  
Bearing in mind that manufacturing carries a lot of local service activity with it, at 
least half of the urban unemployment problem is due to geographical maldistribution 
rather than disappearance of manual jobs.  In Scotland, for instance, there was almost 
no loss of manual jobs between 1981 and 1991 anywhere outside the Clydeside 
conurbation.  More than half the loss was in Glasgow alone, which lost a third of its 
manual jobs.  Manchester’s experience was similar, and Liverpool’s even worse.   
 
Concealment of the problem by official statistics 
 
Geographically reliable unemployment statistics, such as the Census figures for 1991, 
Sheffield Hallam University’s “real unemployment” figures for January 1997, the 
monthly House of Commons Library claimant figures for constituencies, or the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), confirm that the unemployment picture is dominated by 
the places which have disproportionately lost manual jobs - inner London and the 
northern industrial cities, and also the coalfields.  The close spatial correspondence of 
unemployment with manual job losses has however been obscured by the main 
official unemployment statistics. “Travel-to-Work Areas” (TTWAs) reflect the 
lengthy commutes of higher paid white collar workers, not those of the manual 
workers who endure almost all the unemployment.  They conceal the cities’ high 
unemployment by averaging it out with that of their prosperous commuter hinterlands 
(Webster 1998).  Since 1996, ONS has made matters worse by publishing “workforce 
unemployment rates”, showing resident unemployed as a percentage of people with a 
workplace in the area plus the resident unemployed.  In cities, in-commuters 
outnumber resident workers, so that this procedure often hugely understates their 
unemployment rates.  For Birmingham Ladywood, for instance, ONS gave the rate as 
3.7% in May 1999 compared to the true 17.7% (Briscoe 1999).    
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Most of the available statistics also conceal the overall scale of unemployment.  The 
claimant count is far more of an underestimate than it was before the many changes 
since 1983.  Also, during the 1980s and 1990s there has been a large movement of 
people from unemployment to sickness benefits and early retirement.  Consequently 
even the relatively inclusive LFS greatly understates the true level of unemployment.  
A good measure of real unemployment is the TUC’s “want work rate”, which shows 
those wanting work as a proportion of all those working or wanting work.  This was 
standing at 13.4% in 1997 compared to only about 5% in 1979.  The “want work rate” 
also reveals that Britain’s unemployment is not really lower than that of France and 
Germany, contrary to the impression given by the LFS.  While much of rural and 
small town Britain is genuinely close to full employment, many industrial cities and 
former coalfields remain in an era of mass unemployment, ranging up to 25%-30% of 
their labour force.   
 
Job losses cause unemployment locally 
 
Job loss and unemployment are closely related geographically because most people 
still live very close to their work - around 90% within 6 miles.  Consequently the 
spatial impact of concentrated job losses is itself very concentrated.  It is the 
neighbourhoods where the manual workers live whose jobs have been lost which have 
experienced the resulting unemployment.  In these neighbourhoods, this has led to 
poverty, outmigration and marital or relationship breakdown.  These in turn have led 
to other consequences:  poverty to ill health, low educational attainment, crime, drug 
abuse and condensation in housing;  outmigration to empty housing, neighbourhood 
decline and demolitions;  and marital or relationship breakdown to an increase in lone 
mothers and to homelessness for them and for their separated partners and their 
teenage and young adult offspring.  As Peter Hall wrote recently:  “huge tracts of our 
Midland and Northern cities are dying.....We are suddenly facing an American-style 
outcome:  the nightmare spectre of Detroit is now stalking the streets of Manchester 
and Newcastle”. 
 
How policy has developed 
 
Both in the USA and in Britain, the initial analytical responses to the emerging urban 
problem were usually correct.  In the USA, the Kerner Commission (1968) for 
instance accepted the “spatial mismatch hypothesis” of John Kain, which attributed 
urban unemployment to the decentralisation of blue collar jobs to suburbs and 
exurban areas which low income inner city residents could not reach.  A flowering of 
research on the spatial mismatch hypothesis during the 1990s in the USA, recently 
reviewed by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998), has vindicated their view.  In Britain, the 
last Labour government’s Inner Cities white paper of 1977 accepted that the basic 
problem was spatial mismatch and set out a programme to attempt as far as possible 
to restore the local employment base of the cities.  Unfortunately British policy since 
1979 has largely rejected this approach.  It is important to understand how this has 
come about. 
 
The “characteristics approach” to urban unemployment 
 
There was a very specific backlash against the 1977 white paper by a group of mainly  
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London-based economists (the “London group”) including David Metcalf, Ray 
Richardson, Alan Evans and Paul Cheshire.  Their argument was that commuting 
within urban areas is so convenient and extensive that loss of jobs from a particular 
area, such as the London docklands, would quickly lead to the displaced workers 
themselves displacing other workers further away, who would in turn displace yet 
others, so that within a couple of years unemployment would be equalised across the 
whole conurbation for each type of worker.  Any remaining area concentrations of 
unemployment would be due solely to the characteristics of the area’s residents, 
which in turn would be due to housing factors such as the presence of large council 
estates, and not to the labour market.  According to this “characteristics approach”, 
nothing should be done to replace the lost jobs at their original location or indeed 
anywhere in particular.   
 
One key weakness of this line of argument has been revealed by the “labour market 
accounts” of Turok & Edge and Beatty et al.  These have shown that the loss of jobs 
from the cities and coalfields was so great that little adjustment has been possible 
through commuting or migration.  In other words mass unemployment (albeit often 
disguised in the form of economic inactivity) was unavoidable in these places.  This is 
nowhere more true than in London, which contrary to popular impression has had a 
particularly bad employment performance.  
 
Advocates of the “characteristics approach” also neglected to examine empirical 
evidence on commuting patterns.  Within a conurbation, the share of jobs in each area 
held by the residents of a given area declines exponentially with distance, in other 
words very fast indeed (FIGURES 1 and 2). In Glasgow in 1991, for instance, 
residents would typically hold a fifth of the jobs in their own area but only 2% of 
those as little as three miles away.  London is often believed to represent the ultimate 
in fluid commuting patterns, but in Camden in 1991, 84% of employed residents 
worked either in Camden itself or in one of the seven contiguous boroughs.  These 
commuting patterns conform to the well-known “gravity model”.  This is partly due 
to the costs of travel - especially important for the low paid workers who are most 
likely to be unemployed - but also to spatial competition.  Most people prefer jobs 
closer to home, and will compete harder for them.  Therefore people seeking jobs 
outside their home area will face stiffer competition the further they away they try to 
get a job.  
 
Much of the literature on urban regeneration written by economists and consultants in 
the 1980s reflected ignorance of the spatial nature of urban labour markets.  There 
was a hugely influential argument that because the share of jobs in a particular area 
held by the area’s residents is so much less than 100%, creating local jobs is too 
inefficient to be worth doing.  This was said for instance of Tyneside and also in the 
official evaluation of Glasgow’s East Area Renewal (GEAR) project.  “Only around 
30% of the (2,000) jobs ‘created’......in GEAR would be filled by GEAR 
residents.....even if these jobs had located elsewhere in Glasgow, some would have 
been filled by GEAR residents.  Thus the net change in employment of GEAR 
residents.....will have been very small - of the order of a few hundred.”  Unfortunately 
the authors of these comments had never looked at the actual figures.  In fact GEAR 
residents would on average have obtained only about 3% (60) of the jobs had they 
been randomly spread across Glasgow, ten times fewer than the 600 or so which they 
did get.  Nevertheless, on the basis of this “employment leakage” argument, the  
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Scottish Office and Scottish Development Agency abandoned employment-focused 
urban renewal and in the “Urban Partnerships” launched in 1988 adopted the 
“characteristics approach” model advocated by the London group.  Housing, 
environment, training and job placement were to be addressed but there was to be no 
significant local employment promotion or transport investment.  English policy is 
now moving in the same direction. 
 
Hostility to “property-led” approaches 
 
The Thatcher governments generally exacerbated urban-rural manufacturing shift by 
weakening spatial planning and intervention.  But, against the trend, Michael 
Heseltine and Peter Walker were responsible respectively for the Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs) and English Partnerships.  At their best - as in Sheffield’s 
Lower Don Valley, Trafford Park or on Wearside – these did attempt to carry through 
the approach of the 1977 white paper, by reclaiming the derelict land left by 
industrial, mining, dock and rail closures and opening up decaying areas to 
development by modernising road systems and improving the environment.  This 
“property-led approach” attracted widespread hostility, especially among left-leaning 
academics.  This was mainly due to governance issues.  UDCs were designed to take 
powers away from local government, and tended to be weak on community 
consultation.  Another major objection was their tendency to focus on white collar, 
service development rather than industry.  In fact there was a great deal of variation in 
this respect, but the biggest and most visible, London Docklands, was also the most 
extreme in ignoring local employment needs and other UDCs were tarred with its 
brush.   
 
“Supply-side” economic theories  
 
“Supply-side” economic theories have also played an important role.  In particular 
Richard Layard, Alan Budd and others have built the longstanding idea that being 
unemployed makes people less “employable” into a full-scale theory - a 
macroeconomic counterpart of the “characteristics approach” - purporting to show 
that unemployment is actually caused by long-term unemployment rather than by loss 
of jobs.   This has led directly to the “New Deal” which assumes that raising 
“employability” will lead to more employment.  In fact, the evidence relied on by 
Layard and Budd is out of date (see for instance the June 1999 issue of New Economy, 
p.85).  Areas with higher total unemployment uniformly have more people in all the 
New Deal target groups  - long-term unemployed, youth unemployed, long-term sick, 
lone parents, and non-working partners of the unemployed - so that “employability” 
programmes cannot work unless more jobs are created in those areas (Turok & 
Webster 1998).   
 
The Blair administration 
 
As a result of these various influences - bad unemployment statistics, the 
“characteristics approach”, ignorance of commuting patterns, hostility to “property-
led approaches” and supply-side economic theories - the present government has 
allowed itself to be persuaded that the problem is one of concentrations of people of 
low “employability”, rather than of acute local labour supply-demand imbalances.  
Consequently its policies do not seriously emphasise the promotion of relevant local  
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jobs.   
 
The New Deal, as noted, is purely concerned with “employability”.  UDCs have been 
allowed to die, English Partnerships’ funding has been cut, transport infrastructure 
investment is at a historic low, and a combination of fiscal, monetary and taxation 
(energy tax, fuel tax escalator) policies is being followed which specifically 
disadvantages manufacturing, the main source of manual jobs.  Programmes which 
are targeted on unemployment blackspots do not actually aim to promote jobs.  
“Employment Zones”, their title a misnomer, are yet another “employability” 
programme.  The “New Deal for Communities” follows the model called for by critics 
of “property-led” approaches - “small scale”, “fine-grained”, “community-based” and 
“holistic” - and does not aim to produce more jobs.  It is also thinly funded (building 
up only to £450m per year in 2001/02).  Meanwhile the Working Families Tax Credit 
will benefit low unemployment areas disproportionately.   
 
At first sight, it might appear that the new proposals for Assisted Areas constitute an 
exception to the supply-side emphasis.  For the first time, they are being designated at 
ward level and the government’s aim is said to have been “to combine areas of need 
with major areas of opportunity for employment creation, investment and 
regeneration”.  But wards have been identified using among other criteria the ONS 
“workforce” unemployment rates and the percentage of manufacturing employment, 
with more manufacturing being regarded, revealingly, as a sign of “labour market 
weakness”.  The result is that high unemployment city areas do not do particularly 
well - “workforce” rates understate their unemployment and they have already lost 
their manufacturing.  In Glasgow, for instance, key industrial sites adjacent to super-
high unemployment areas have been made ineligible for regional aid for the first time 
since the war, while prosperous neighbouring New Towns with low unemployment 
have retained eligibility.  The outcome of the review of EU Objective 2 areas - those 
suffering from industrial decline - appears likely to be similar.  The “reference date” 
to qualify as an industrial area is 1985;  this was after the great Thatcher-Howe 
deindustrialisation, so that cities which had already lost most of their manufacturing 
by 1985 and are still suffering the consequences are treated as if they had never been 
industrial centres at all.   
 
The government’s only genuine demand-side policy is the programme for the 
coalfields. With a chair from English Partnerships and Steve Fothergill, a leading 
analyst of the local job loss-local unemployment connection, as a member, the 
Coalfields Taskforce has a different intellectual parentage from the rest.  It 
recommended a strongly property and transport oriented approach. Unfortunately, 
progress on implementation appears to be rather slow. 
 
The case of Castlemilk  
 
The issue of labour demand versus labour supply approaches can be well illustrated 
by the example of Castlemilk in Glasgow, an “Urban Partnership” embodying the 
rejection of employment-focused urban renewal in line with the “characteristics 
approach”.  In its emphasis on community participation, the Partnership looks very 
like the New Deal for Communities, and indeed Scottish Labour ministers have 
claimed that it has put Scotland “ahead of the game” in urban regeneration.  The 
Social Exclusion Unit, in its report on neighbourhood renewal (1998), recently  
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endorsed it as an example of “what works”. 
 
But while housing and environment have improved, the Partnership has not “worked” 
in terms of employment and poverty.  After 10 years, Castlemilk has the highest 
proportion of households on Income Support in Glasgow, at 60%, well over twice the 
Scottish rate of 27%.  In 1995 Castlemilk had the highest percentage of babies with 
low birthweight in Glasgow - double the rate for Albania.  The proportions of 
children receiving free school meals and clothing grants in Castlemilk in 1997/98 
were the second highest in Glasgow.  The Scottish area deprivation index showed 
Castlemilk's two postcode sectors improving between 1991 and 1998 only from 4th 
worst and 6th worst out of 990 to 9th worst and 11th worst.  And a Scottish Office 
study in 1995 found that 59% of those leaving training programmes never 
subsequently found a job at all. 
 
The basic problem is that the Partnership never attempted to tackle the area's 
employment base.  FIGURES 1 and 2 show that Castlemilk’s residents hold one 
quarter of jobs located in Castlemilk but that this share falls rapidly with distance.  
While some jobs are held in areas ranging across much of the conurbation, only in 
areas on the south side of Glasgow is the share at all significant.  The Scottish Office 
has hoped that Castlemilk people would get jobs in East Kilbride New Town, but at 
6km away and with almost no public transport links it is too inaccessible and there is 
too much competition for the jobs from other areas.  It is around 60 times more 
efficient  to promote jobs in Castlemilk itself, and failing this, 3 to 10 times more 
efficient elsewhere on the south side.  The topography and lack of sites rule out most 
of Castlemilk and immediately neighbouring areas.  But there is a huge opportunity in 
the swathe of land from Govan through Gorbals, Dalmarnock and Rutherglen to 
Cambuslang where Castlemilk people used to work in large numbers and where they 
still hold significant shares (1%-2%) of the jobs which remain.  This area accounts for 
a large part of the 10% of Glasgow’s land area which is vacant or derelict.  This is 
where the money needs to go, on derelict land reclamation, infrastructure and road 
access:  two already designed roads would unlock huge development potential.  But 
these are the budgets which are being starved of cash in favour of “supply-side” 
employment initiatives, and little is being done.   
 
This is where the government is going wrong.  Yes, work is the best form of welfare.  
But there has to be work.  It has to be of the right kind, and local.   If the government 
is to attain its poverty targets, this is the issue it must address. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
7
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
SHARE OF JOBS HELD BY RESIDENTS OF CASTLEMILK, GLASGOW IN 1991 
BY DISTANCE OF AREA
Share = 18.264(distance) 
-1.7739
R
2 = 0.72
0.01
0.10
1.00
10.00
1 10 100
Airline distance km (log scale)
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
j
o
b
s
 
%
 
(
l
o
g
 
s
c
a
l
e
)
Rutherglen 4.1%
Cathcart/Pollokshields 2.8%
Gorbals/Govanhill 2.2%
Bridgeton/Dalmarnock 1.2%
Govan/Kinning Park 1.2%
Hamilton 0.06%
Airdrie 0.08%
Clydebank 0.08%
For technical reasons, Castlemilk itself is omitted from this chart.  Castlemilk residents held 24.7 per cent of the jobs 
located in Castlemilk, which by extrapolation were on average about 0.8km distant from their homes.
East Kilbride 0.4% 
 
 
 
8
 
REFERENCES 
 
Beatty, C. et al. (1997b)  ‘Geographical variation in the labour-market adjustment 
process:  the UK coalfields 1981-91’, Environment and Planning A, Vol.29 
 
Briscoe, S. (1999)  ‘ONS figures can only confuse the issue’, Financial Times, 24 
August 
 
Fothergill, Stephen, Kitson, M. & Monk, S. (1985)  Urban Industrial Change:  The 
causes of the urban-rural contrast in manufacturing employment trends, Dept of the 
Environment and Dept of Trade & Industry Inner City Research Programme No.11, 
London, HMSO 
 
Ihlanfeldt, K.R. & Sjoquist, D.L. (1998)  ‘The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis:  A 
Review of Recent Studies and their Implications for Welfare Reform’, Housing Policy 
Debate, Vol.9 Issue 4 
 
Turok, I. & Edge, N. (1999)  The Jobs Gap in Britain’s Cities:  Employment Loss and 
Labour Market Consequences, Bristol, The Policy Press 
 
Turok, I. & Webster, D. (1998)  ‘The New Deal:  Jeopardised by the Geography of 
Unemployment?’, Local Economy, February 
 
Webster, D. (1998)  Local Unemployment Statistics and the Diagnosis of Britain’s 
Unemployment Problem, BURISA 134 (British Urban and Regional Information 
Systems Association), September 
   
 
SCOTTISH SOCIAL INCLUSION POLICY: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
David Webster        
The argument of this paper is that, to date, policies on 'social inclusion' in 
Scotland are placing a wholly insufficient emphasis on promoting jobs that 
are accessible to the unemployed in terms of both skills and location. This is 
happening  for  two  reasons:  first,  the  dominance  of 'supply-side' economic 
theories  among  the  government's  advisers,  and,  second,  the  inheritance  of 
Scottish policies on economic development and area regeneration since the 
1960s. The paper argues that to be effective, Scottish policy will need to shift 
radically in the direction of heavier investment in derelict land reclamation 
and urban transport infrastructure, along the lines followed by the English, 
Welsh  and  Northern  Irish  urban  development corporations. This would in 
itself be a more environmentally sustainable development strategy than that 
currently being pursued.  
The discussion focuses particularly on Glasgow, which accounts for half of 
measured  'social  exclusion'  in  Scotland,  but  the  analysis  applies  to  most 
disadvantaged areas and reference is made to many of them. 
                                                            
  David Webster MA MBA FCIH is Chief Housing Officer (Policy Review and 
Development), Glasgow City Council. He has previously worked on industrial 
location at the Board of Trade (1969), labour markets at the London School of 
Economics (1969-72), and housing at the London Boroughs Association (1972-76) 
and Centre for Environmental Studies (1976-80). He carried out a study on 
Glasgow's strategic future for the Chief Executive's Department in 1990 and led 
interagency groups developing the strategy of the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance in 
1993-96. He has recently acted as a specialist adviser on poverty-related issues to 
Committees of the House of Commons. This paper arises out of a programme of 
research into the validity of prevailing assumptions about urban regeneration. An 
earlier version was presented at the Local Government Information Unit/Warwick 
Business School Seminar 'Local Authorities and Social Exclusion' at Hamilton on 2 
July 1999. The views expressed are not necessarily those of Glasgow City Council. Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
THE SCOTTISH 'SOCIAL INCLUSION' PROGRAMME 
In the Scottish Office Social Inclusion strategy paper (1999b), the term 'social 
exclusion'  for  the  most  part  means  the  same  as  the  more  traditional  term 
'social  deprivation',  comprising  unemployment,  low  income, poor housing, 
high crime environments, poor health and family breakdown. Homelessness 
and neighbourhood decline have already been the subject of reports by the 
Social Exclusion Unit and should be added to this list. 
The  Scottish  Office  paper  does  not  discuss  the  causes  of  the  problems. 
However  the  intellectual  basis  of  the  Blair  government's  policies  is  well 
known. Neoclassical supply-side economists, notably Richard Layard (now 
an  adviser  to  the  Department  for  Education  and  Employment),  have  won 
ministers to their view that high unemployment is due to a combination of 
two factors: the supposed deleterious effects on the labour force in terms of 
skills and motivation of the experience of high unemployment in the 1970s 
and 1980s resulting from the 'shocks' of the oil price hike and the overvalued 
pound; and the supposed encouragement of 'idleness' by the social security 
system.  The  Labour  front  bench  has  been  persuaded  by  American 
conservative writers such as Charles Murray that the rise in lone parenthood 
is  due  to  the  supposed  perverse  incentives  created  by  the  social  security 
system. The other problems are seen as mainly resulting from these, with for 
instance low incomes impacting directly on health (as well outlined in the 
1998 Scottish green paper on health) and a combination of unemployment 
and family breakdown causing multiple problems for young men. 
Given  this  perspective,  the  main  thrust  of  'social  inclusion'  policy  lies  in 
Westminster programmes - the New Deals and 'welfare reform'. These aim to 
raise  'employability'  and  persuade  people  into  jobs,  and  to  remove  the 
supposed incentives to lone parenthood. The New Deals involve substantial 
expenditure - roughly £70m per year in Scotland - and 'welfare reform', while 
intended to save money, is shifting very large sums around. The Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC), for instance, costs £182m gross per year in 
Scotland. By contrast, policies which will be under the control of the Scottish 
Parliament are to date comparatively minor and inexpensive. They involve 
such things as 'new community schools' (£27m per year); low budget area- 
and  client-group  based  'Social  Inclusion  Partnerships'  (SIPs),  of  which  26 
new SIPs share £16m per year (£0.6m per SIP); the small New Futures Fund 
(£3.3m per year), which is essentially an extension of New Deal programmes 
to  the  most  disadvantaged  younger  people;  exploration  of  ideas  for  local 
management of services ('Pathfinders' in Easterhouse and Wester Hailes); and 
local anti-poverty action. This programme has been financed to the extent of   
 
some £12m per year by redirecting money from similar Urban Programme 
projects, leaving some £25m per year of new money (Scottish  Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
   
 
 
Office  1999a)  (Figure  1).  This  picture  reflects  the  general  point made by 
Ashcroft (1999) that the Comprehensive Spending Review has not produced 
any substantial re-allocation of resources between Scottish programmes. 
At  the  same  time,  large  cuts  have  been  made  in other budgets which are 
impacting  seriously  on  the  areas  of  greatest  deprivation.  Glasgow  City 
Council  alone  had  to  cut  £180m  per  year  in  revenue  spending  and  raise 
Council  Tax  58%  in  the  three  years  following  reorganisation  in  1996 
(Carmichael and Midwinter 1999). Consequent service cuts have led among 
other  things  to  an  increase  in  children  in  care  and  closure  of  Glasgow's 
Citizens Advice Bureau (Glasgow Evening Times, 8 December 1998, 18 June 
1999).  Across  Scotland  councils  are  estimated  to  have  cut  their  private 
housing renewal programmes by almost two-thirds or £73m per year between 
1995/96 and 1998/99 (Chartered Institute of Housing 1998).  
Scottish Enterprise total gross expenditure – a key element in regeneration – 
has fallen yearly from £476.9m in 1996/97 to £430.2 in 1999/00 and although 
rising  thereafter  will  not  have  regained  the  1996/97  level  even  by  2002. 
Scottish Enterprise total land development has been reduced from a target of 
570ha, with an outturn of 390ha, in 1998/99 to a target of 350ha. in 1999/00, 
while  its  renewal  of  land  'to  support  the  regeneration  of  areas  of  high 
unemployment and deprivation' has bumped along with targets of 70ha. in 
1996/97 (outturn 40ha.), 60ha. in 1997/98 (outturn 45ha.), 88ha. in 1998/99 
and 90ha. in 1999/00. A Scottish Office/PIEDA study Towards a Strategy 
for  Vacant  Land  (1997,  para.7.31)  pointed  out  that  in  Scotland,  unlike 
Wales, there are no targets for land treatment. It recommended targets to deal 
with all dereliction considered to have serious adverse environmental effects 
by 2010, and to ensure that no local authority in Scotland has more than 0.5% 
of vacant land by 2010. However, no such targets have been set, while the 
only road scheme with serious benefits in terms of derelict land development 
- the M74 completion from Cambuslang to Kingston - received no funding in 
the Scottish roads programme announced in November 1999.  
Proposals for large-scale investment in council housing renewal through stock 
transfer with accompanying debt write-off are seen by Scottish ministers as a 
key element of social inclusion policy. In Glasgow's case, the proposal is for 
some £1bn of spending on some 75,000 remaining houses, commencing in 
about 2001. But in spite of continuing verbal commitment to 'comprehensive 
regeneration', this is not being accompanied by similar proposals in relation 
to  other  elements  of  regeneration.  The  Secretary  of  State's  letter  to  the 
chairman of the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance (12 December 1997) stated Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
that 'there is no prospect of any significant increase in the resources available 
to Glasgow' and requested that a new strategy be drawn up 'on the assumption 
that no additional public resources can be provided'. Given that the strategy 
was for implementation (by the renamed Glasgow Alliance) from April 1999, 
when the government started to increase public expenditure after the cuts of 
1997-99, this actually implies that regeneration in Glasgow is being planned 
on the basis of a declining share of public resources.  
THE ROLE OF JOB LOSS 
The analysis on which the government's policies are based has overlooked the 
evidence that it is the loss of blue collar jobs from the cities and coalfields 
which is the overwhelmingly important cause of 'social exclusion'. In the USA 
in  the  later  1980s,  John  Kasarda  and  William  Julius  Wilson  showed  the 
relationship between the disproportionate loss of jobs from the cities and the 
growth of the so-called 'urban underclass'. In Britain, a similar analysis has 
now been provided by Turok and Edge (1999) for the cities and Beatty et al 
(1997b) for the coalfields. There has been a net loss of 500,000 jobs in the 20 
largest cities in 1981-96 and 160,000 male jobs in the English and Welsh 
coalfields 1981-91, at a time when employment has grown elsewhere. These 
authors' 'labour market accounts' show that little adjustment to this loss has 
been possible through migration and commuting. Most of the effect has taken 
the  form  of  a  rise  in  economic  inactivity,  particularly  among  men.  The 
problems  have  been  exacerbated  both  in  Britain  and  the  USA  by  the 
unbalanced  nature  of  job  change.  Losses  of  male  manual  jobs  have  been 
much the largest, while white collar jobs and employment for women have 
actually increased (Figure 2). Comparison of the changes in the employment 
base of, for instance, Glasgow and Philadelphia over the last two decades 
shows a virtually identical picture in these terms; it is not surprising that very 
similar problems have emerged.  
The story behind the decline of coal is well known. The loss of manufacturing 
employment from the cities is much less widely understood. Two processes 
have been at work. First, the general deindustrialisation which was at its peak 
in the Thatcher-Howe recession of 1979-83 but has continued in the Lawson 
recession of 1990-93 and now in the manufacturing recession of the past year. 
This has affected the industrial cities disproportionately because they grew up 
as  manufacturing  centres  and  had  so  many  manufacturing  jobs  to  lose 
(although the current recession has impacted less on cities because they have 
already lost so much of their manufacturing). But there has been a second, 
equally important process, known as 'urban-rural manufacturing shift', well 
documented  in  both  Britain  and  the  USA,  in  which  manufacturing  has   
 
steadily moved out of cities to smaller towns and rural areas as a result of 
property constraints (Fothergill et al 1985).  
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The Scottish Office analyses of social deprivation in 1991 (Duguid 1995) and 
1998 (Gibb et al 1999) show a clear spatial pattern reflecting these processes. 
Much the largest concentration of deprivation (half the total) is in Glasgow, 
as a direct result of the city's huge loss of manual jobs. This loss in 1981-91 
was more than that in the rest of Scotland put together, although Glasgow had 
only 18.5% of Scottish employment in 1981. MacInnes (1995) has outlined 
the huge scale of Glasgow's deindustrialisation. Other major manufacturing 
centres  such  as  Dundee  and  the  inner  Clyde  valley  from  Motherwell, 
Coatbridge and Airdrie through to Greenock also show up strongly as do 
former  mining  areas  such  as  Cumnock  and  Doon  Valley  -  which had the 
misfortune to lose not only all its remaining mining jobs between 1981 and 
1991 but 85% of its manufacturing as well. It might seem that Edinburgh 
contradicts this simple picture. Here employment has grown well yet there are 
large concentrations of deprivation. The basic explanation is straightforward: 
the nature of job change has been similar to that in other cities, so that even as 
white collar jobs have multiplied, manual jobs have declined (Figure 2). It is 
these latter jobs which provided the employment base of the deprived areas. 
Meanwhile the New Towns, beneficiaries of large infrastructure investments 
and heavy promotion of inward investment, were virtually free of measured 
social deprivation in 1991. And while frequent references are made to the 
presence of 'social exclusion' in rural areas, the reality is that most, with the 
exception  of  the  Western  Isles,  have  had  prospering  economies  and 
populations  growing  as  a  result  of  in-migration  by  relatively  prosperous 
people (Findlay et al 1999). 
Official  claimant  unemployment  statistics  give  a  thoroughly  misleading 
picture  of  the  geographical  pattern  of  unemployment  and  this  has  led  to 
widespread confusion about the links between job loss and unemployment 
and  between  unemployment  and  other  aspects  of  deprivation  (Webster 
1998a). Beatty et al (1997a) have produced estimates of 'real' unemployment 
taking into account the concealment of much unemployment in the form of 
economic  inactivity,  especially  long-term  sickness.  They  reveal  a  pattern 
corresponding closely to that of job loss and social deprivation. At January 
1997, Glasgow had estimated 'real' unemployment of 30.6%, Cumnock and 
Doon Valley 28.7%, Monklands 27.8%, Motherwell 26.8% and Clydebank 
26.7%. 
The  geographical  distribution  of  lone  parenthood  closely  mirrors  that  of 
unemployment. Glasgow's Housing Plan 1996 pointed out that across the 
Scottish local authorities, lone parenthood had risen between 1981 and 1991 
closely in line with the level of unemployment. Since then, further research 
on the Census data by several authors has confirmed that this relationship 
applies right across Britain (Figure 3). A weight of time series, cross section,   
 
longitudinal and ethnographic evidence has been assembled in support of the 
view that in both Britain and the USA the rise in lone parenthood has been 
mainly due to localised mass unemployment (Webster 1997b, 1999). Carruth 
and Oswald (1991) have also estimated on the basis of English evidence that 
a doubling of the unemployment rate in an area raises the number of children 
in local authority care by about two thirds. 
Unemployment  and  family  breakdown  in  their  turn  lead  to  homelessness. 
Since the 1960s, explanations of homelessness in the British literature have 
mainly stressed housing shortage or personal inadequacy. It is, however, clear 
from  the  Glasgow  evidence  that  unemployment  plays  a  fundamental  role 
(Glasgow's  Housing  Plans  1993,  1996,  1998;  Fitzpatrick  1999).  In  more 
prosperous  parts  of  Scotland  with  growing  populations,  the  homeless  are 
commonly families hit by shortage of social housing. But in Glasgow and 
similar declining areas most homeless people are single, with lone parents 
much  more  numerous  than  couple  families,  and  there  is  no  shortage  of 
mainstream social housing. The single people are usually older men who have 
separated from their spouses – the husbands of the lone parents - or young 
people hit by both family breakdown and their own unemployment. This type 
of causation is borne out by systematic statistical study of homelessness in the 
USA (Burt 1991). 
Low demand for housing with associated neighbourhood abandonment has 
been a dominating problem in Glasgow, Dundee and a few other Scottish 
areas for a decade or so. It has recently been acknowledged as a problem in 
most of the northern English cities and coalfields. Research has shown that a 
fundamental  cause  is  employment  loss  and  the  resulting  unemployment, 
which has led to outmigration (Webster 1998b). The significance for social 
exclusion is that the neighbourhood decline resulting from population exodus 
leads to a raft of unpleasant consequences for the remaining residents in terms 
of empty housing, rundown of facilities and loss of security; those residents 
themselves are likely to be those least able to leave - the elderly and those 
who find it difficult to compete in the labour market - leading to a further 
concentration of deprivation.  
THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
PROCESS 
These  various  processes  form  a  complete  causal  structure  linking  all  the 
important  aspects  of  social  exclusion  (Figure  4).  At  the  apex  is  job  loss, 
particularly manual. This leads to unemployment. Unemployment in its turn 
leads to the trio of poverty, outmigration and marital/relationship breakdown. Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
These  in  turn  lead  to  other  consequences:  poverty  to  ill  health,  low 
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educational  attainment,  drug  abuse,  crime  and  condensation  in  housing; 
outmigration to empty housing, neighbourhood decline and demolition; and 
marital or relationship breakdown to lone parent families and to homelessness 
among  these  families,  the  separated  male  partners,  and  their  teenage  and 
young adult offspring.  
This  picture  of  the  causal  structure  of  social  exclusion  is  not  completely 
different from that held by the government. In particular the links between 
unemployment and poverty, and between poverty and ill health, and poverty 
and  condensation,  are  accepted  by  the  government,  and  there  is  also  a 
readiness to connect poverty with crime. However, the government does not 
think that there is any important link between job loss and unemployment 
(which  it  sees  as  a  'supply-side'  issue),  or  between  job  loss,  marital 
breakdown and the growth of lone parent families, or between unemployment 
and homelessness. It accepts that unemployment leads to outmigration and 
indeed this is seen as the main way in which workers should adapt to job loss 
(HM  Treasury  1997).  However  it  rarely  makes  the  connection  between 
outmigration, empty housing and demolitions. Finally, it puts little weight on 
the link between poverty and low educational attainment. Influenced by the 
'school effectiveness' movement, it argues that children can perform much 
better even while they and their families remain poor and local employment 
prospects  weak.  This  links  back  to  the  'supply-side'  beliefs  about 
unemployment.  If  as  a  result  of  'education,  education,  education'  young 
people have more skills, then it is thought that more jobs will materialise for 
them to fill.  
The  fact  that  the  government's  account  of  the  causal  linkages  underlying 
social exclusion differs from that outlined here is largely because its thinking 
does not reflect recent evidence. Layard's views are based on data running 
only to 1986 and were published in their final form in 1991; Frank Field 
published  his  influential  book  Losing  Out,  which  contains  most  of  the 
government's significant ideas on social policy, in 1989; the Social Justice 
Commission report was finalised in the summer of 1994; and the Labour front 
bench  adopted  the  ideas  of  'welfare  to  work'  in  1995.  This  timetable  has 
meant that little or no later research has yet been seriously considered, in 
particular that based on the 1991 Census results which only became available 
in  1993  and  1994.  The  assumption  has  been  made  that  a  strategy  for 
government could be drawn up well before taking office, and that thereafter 
the only issues are implementation and marketing of the 'message'.   
 
THE OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL EXCLUSION UNDER CURRENT 
POLICIES 
The trends in employment and migration in most of the deprived areas of 
Scotland  remain  unfavourable.  In  Glasgow,  for  instance,  a  fall  of  37,800 
(44%)  in  manufacturing  employment  in  1981-91  has  been  followed  by  a 
further fall (on the new boundary) of 11,500 (27%) between 1991 and 1997. 
Service employment grew in 1991-97 by 22,800 (9%), but, as the Glasgow 
Economic  Monitor  recently  pointed  out,  these  jobs  are  often  female and 
part-time. Overall, female part-time jobs rose by 12,800 (21%) but male full-
time jobs - the basis of the traditional family structure - fell by 14,500 (9%) 
over these six years. Total employment growth was only 4,277 (1.3%), well 
below the Great Britain figure of 5.9%. All of these figures refer to jobs 
located within Glasgow rather than to the employment of Glasgow residents. 
Sample evidence from the Labour Force Survey suggests that employment of 
Glasgow residents actually fell between 1994 and 1999 (by an estimated 4%) 
against  a  Great  Britain  increase  of  7.1%.  While  the  number  of  Glasgow 
resident unemployed also fell, the total number of non-employed residents - a 
more reliable measure in view of the processes discussed by Beatty et al - 
actually rose by an estimated 2% against a Great Britain fall of 5.4%. The 
LFS results for Summer 1999 show Glasgow with the lowest working-age 
economic activity rate in the whole of Great Britain, and the joint highest 
unemployment  rate.  The  rest  of  Scotland  has  also  done  relatively  poorly 
(Figure 5; Webster (forthcoming)).  
Some  other  areas  with  severe  deprivation  have  also  performed  badly  in 
employment  terms.  While  Inverclyde,  fortunate  in  having  Enterprise Zone 
status, almost doubled its manufacturing employment (by 4,800 or 95%) in 
1991-97 and had a modest overall increase in jobs of 4.2%, E.Ayrshire lost a 
quarter  of  its  manufacturing  jobs  and  S.Ayrshire,  N.Ayrshire  and 
W.Dunbartonshire  had  total  job  losses  respectively  of  12.5%,  8.8%  and 
16.3%.  
The difficulty of implementing 'supply-side' labour market policies in these 
labour demand conditions is easily seen from Figure 2 (above). In 1981-91, 
Glasgow and Dundee both had losses of junior non-manual jobs as well as of 
manual jobs, so that upskilling would have had to shift substantial numbers of 
blue collar workers into the managerial and professional category – a tall 
order.  
Migration patterns continue to reflect the loss of jobs from the urban areas of 
the west of Scotland. In 1989-98, most Health Board areas gained population, 
with Lothian gaining 26,600 and Grampian 17,600. But Greater Glasgow, Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
Argyll  and  Clyde,  Lanarkshire,  Ayr  and  Arran  and  Western  Isles  all  had 
losses, of 21,500, 13,100, 1,400, 1,000 and 2,060 respectively. Population 
projections for Scottish council areas show a similar pattern, with a striking 
18% fall for Inverclyde in 1996-2013, 10% for Glasgow and E.Ayrshire, 9% 
for Dundee and W.Dunbartonshire, and 8% for Western Isles. 
Against this unfavourable background the New Deals cannot be expected to 
increase  employment  levels  significantly,  however  many  people  may  be 
placed into jobs, while neighbourhood decline can be expected to continue. 
Moreover,  a  powerful  critique  of  the  welfare  to  work  approach  has  been 
emerging. In the USA, which is some five years ahead of the UK on the 
'welfare to work' road, Pugh (1998) and others have established that there is a 
deficit  of  'entry-level'  jobs  in  the  cities  and  that  the  existence  of  'spatial 
mismatch' prevents their residents from accessing jobs elsewhere. The Nobel 
prize-winning  economist  Robert  Solow  (1998)  has  pointed  out  that  US 
welfare to work programmes, while placing a lot of people in jobs, have only 
tiny effects on their subsequent employment probabilities – the true measure 
of success. He derides the 'Panglossian error' that all the problems lie on the 
supply side of the labour market: the belief that 'kennel dogs need merely act 
like bird dogs, and birds will come'.  
In Great Britain, Turok and Webster (1998) have shown that all the New Deal 
target  groups  -  youth  unemployed,  long-term  unemployed,  long-term  sick, 
lone  parents  -  are  concentrated  in  the  same  areas  of  high  unemployment, 
indicating  that  they  cannot  all  be  got  into  work  unless  employment  is 
increased in these areas. Webster's analysis (1997a) showing that long-term 
unemployment is not a separate problem from that of unemployment itself, 
contrary to the assumptions underlying the New Deal, has been corroborated 
by Machin and Manning (1998). The OECD (1999) has joined the critics: 
'[young people's] employment and unemployment rates are highly responsive 
to  the  overall  state  of  the  labour  market ... few remedial or employment-
insertion programmes targeted at disadvantaged young people appear to have 
resulted  in  significant  gains  in  employment  or  earnings  after  they  have 
participated in the programmes'.  
The government's approach to 'welfare reform' poses risks for deprived areas. 
The concept of 'work for those who can, security for those who cannot' could 
in principle be satisfactory if the supply-side assumptions about worklessness 
were correct. But the danger is that because of the lack of jobs, the deprived 
areas  will  get  reductions  in  social  security  incomes  without  the  desired 
increases  in  employment  incomes.  The  Working  Families  Tax  Credit  will 
disproportionately benefit prosperous areas with high employment rates, not    
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disadvantaged areas with few people in work. Benefit 'sanctions', currently 
being greatly extended in scope and severity, may also prove troublesome. 
Fairley (1998) noted that these have been widely criticised in Scotland, by the 
Scottish Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons among others. It 
has already emerged that a quarter of all the young people assigned to the 
Environmental Taskforce are being 'sanctioned' and also that men - whose 
employment  problems  are  already  worse  -  are  over  twice  as  likely  to  be 
'sanctioned' as women (Bivand 1999).  
In spite of its dominant position in the Scottish social inclusion programme, 
there has been little discussion about the concept of the 'New Community 
School' and the government has not sought to consult about it. The American 
concept of the 'Full Service School' from which it is borrowed is openly said 
to be at least as much about making the most of declining resources as about 
improving services. While it is generally popular, there appears to be little or 
no evidence that it actually works. For instance, a recent evaluation (April 
1998)  in  Florida  (which  is  specifically  mentioned  in  the  Scottish  Office's 
1998 'prospectus') did not find any difference in performance between 'full 
service'  and  ordinary  schools.  There  is  a  risk  of  counterproductive 
stigmatisation. The alternative concept of the 'magnet school' is based on the 
idea that extra spending on schools in deprived areas to develop particular 
specialisms such as music or maths will attract parents of able children, thus 
improving the balance of ability and parental support in the school's intake 
(and  reducing  'social  exclusion').  The  'New  Community  School',  with  its 
emphasis on remedial social work and health intervention, could drive away 
these parents. 
AREA SOCIAL INCLUSION PARTNERSHIPS (SIPS) 
SIPs do not in practice embody a new approach to deprivation but continue 
the ideas of the largely palliative Urban Programme, dating from the 1960s, 
and of the Urban Partnerships introduced by the Conservative government's 
New Life for Urban Scotland in 1988. Scottish Office descriptions of SIPs 
have been in very general terms, referring to 'a more flexible, modern tool' 
whose key characteristics are 'to focus on the most needy members of society, 
to co-ordinate and fill gaps between existing programmes to promote social 
inclusion and seek to prevent social exclusion happening in the first place'. 
Their funding is so small that they cannot, as such, embrace major physical 
projects.    
 
Continuity rather than change in policy is indicated by the endorsement of the 
Castlemilk Partnership by the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) (1998) as being 
an  example  of  'what  works'  and  by  the  comments  of  the  former  minister 
Calum MacDonald (15 September 1998) that the existing Scottish approach 
is 'seen as a model for the rest of the UK' and that Scottish ministers are 
determined  that  Scotland  'stays  ahead  of  the  game'  (emphasis  added)  in 
community regeneration.  
SEU cites the drop in Castlemilk's claimant unemployment since 1989 from 
22% to 10.6%, close to the Glasgow average. This is misleading. Claimant 
unemployment figures do not take into account the large movement on to 
Incapacity Benefit since 1989 described in Beatty et al (1997a). On the basis 
of  their  estimate  that  at  January  1997  real  unemployment  was  30.6%  in 
Glasgow when claimant unemployment was 11.8%, the Castlemilk figure of 
10.6% claimant unemployment quoted by SEU would equate to a real rate of 
27.5%. This is much closer to what is indicated by DSS figures, which show 
that after 10 years of the Partnership, Castlemilk in August 1998 still had the 
highest proportion of households on Income Support in Glasgow, at 60%, 
well over twice the Scottish rate of 27% (Glasgow City Council 1999a). The 
Scottish Executive evaluation (Cambridge Policy Consultants 1999) shows 
that Castlemilk's already low employment rate actually fell further during the 
Partnership,  from  38%  to  36%  of  the  working  age  population,  half  the 
national average of 74%. 
Bearing  out  this  picture  further,  in  1995  Castlemilk  had  the  highest 
percentage of babies with low birthweight in Glasgow, double the Scottish 
average  (14%  compared  to  7%)  and  therefore,  according  to  data  in  The 
Herald  (1  June  1999),  double  the  rate  for  Albania.  The  proportions  of 
children  receiving  free  school  meals  and  clothing  grants  in  Castlemilk  in 
1997/98 were the second highest in Glasgow after Drumchapel (69.8% and 
69.9%, and 86.8% and 89.7% respectively). The Glasgow averages for these 
indicators  were  41.0%  and  58.3%  respectively  while  in  Scotland  the 
percentage  taking  free  school  meals  at  January  1996  was  only  20.0% 
(Glasgow  City  Council  1998a,  1998b).  These  measures  are  very  reliable 
indicators of poverty: for instance, birthweight reflects the mother's diet and 
health in pregnancy.  
Gibb  et  al  (1998)  showed  that  in  terms  of  deprivation  Castlemilk's  two 
postcode sectors (G45 9 and G45 0) improved between 1991 and 1998 only 
from 4th worst and 6th worst out of 990 in Scotland to 9th worst and 11th 
worst. These and the figures for other areas led The Scotsman (16 August 
1995 and 13 October 1998) to conclude that Scotland's urban policies have 
failed and that the reasons must be established before carrying on. In June Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
1999 the homeless magazine The Big Issue, drawing on these and further 
health  data,  argued  in  a  reworking  of  the  Partnership's  slogan  that  in 
Castlemilk  it  is  poverty  and  poor  health  that  are  'on  the  up  and  up' 
(McDougall 1999).  
The basic problem is that the Partnership has been intrinsically unable to raise 
employment  and  incomes  because  it  only  set  out  to  address  housing, 
environment  and  training/job placement and never attempted to tackle the 
area's  employment base, which lies mainly on the south side of Glasgow, 
much of it in the swathe of now largely derelict land from Govan through the 
Gorbals,  Dalmarnock  and  Rutherglen  to  Cambuslang  which  will  not  be 
redeveloped effectively until the M74 is completed (Figure 6). If this 'jobless 
regeneration' approach is continued, in Glasgow and elsewhere, then there is 
every reason to expect similar results.  
The  reasons  for  the  Urban  Partnerships'  neglect  of  employment  lie  in  the 
intellectual history of Scottish urban policy, whose key arguments need to be 
revisited.  
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN PARTNERSHIP MODEL 
The  Urban  Partnership  model  has  often  been  described  as  distinctively 
Scottish. Its origins, however, lie in the work of a group of London-based 
economists  (particularly  Metcalf,  Richardson,  Evans  and  Cheshire)  dating 
from the 1970s (Webster 1994). At that time it was taken for granted (for 
instance in the previous Labour government's Inner Cities White Paper of 
1977) that the main cause of inner city decline was local manual job loss. 
These economists reacted against this view, arguing, without direct evidence, 
that commuting patterns were so extensive and flexible that the effects of any 
job  loss  would  quickly  'ripple'  out  through  the  conurbation  so  that  any 
remaining  concentrations  of  unemployment  would  be  due  purely  to  the 
characteristics  of  local  residents.  What  this  'characteristics  approach' 
overlooked  was  that  if  employment  was  falling  dramatically  across  the 
conurbation,  and  particularly  if  the  loss  was  of  manual  jobs,  then 
unemployment was bound to rise in the areas where manual workers lived, 
and that the only solution therefore would be to restore these jobs or jobs 
similar enough for the displaced workers to get.  
At that time - the later 1970s and early 1980s - Scottish urban regeneration 
policy  was  focused  on  the  GEAR  (Glasgow  East  Area  Renewal)  model, 
which was in essence a physically-oriented approach similar to that of the 
later  English  Urban  Development  Corporations.  When,  however,  GEAR   
 
came up for evaluation in 1986, the Scottish Development Agency adopted 
the ideas of the London group and asserted not only that GEAR had been 
unsuccessful in job creation, but that it should not even have attempted it. It 
recommended that future urban regeneration projects should be confined to 
housing, environment, training and job placement. This recommendation was  
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then turned – without consultation with local government - into the New Life 
programme,  leading  to  the  adoption  of  a  Castlemilk  renewal  programme 
defined  in  such  a  way  that  nothing  significant  could  be  done  to  restore 
Castlemilk's, or Glasgow's, employment base.  
This turn away from physical renewal and job promotion fitted easily with 
what had been the basic thrust of Scottish Office policy going back to the 
Toothill Report of 1961, which had recommended a focus on 'growth areas' 
outwith the cities. The Toothill-based 1963 White Paper Central Scotland: 
A Programme for Development and Growth heralded what became a 30-
year preoccupation with New Towns and neglect of the cities. In the event the 
New Towns never did deliver the superior employment performance which 
was their post-Toothill rationale (Henderson 1982). Nevertheless the Scottish 
Office  remained  firmly  committed  to  them.  The  case  made  by  the  West 
Central Scotland Plan (WCSP) in 1974 that responsibility for New Town 
development should be vested in the new Strathclyde Regional Council in 
order to ensure that it did not take place at the expense of the existing urban 
areas was rejected. The Scottish Office maintained control itself and in effect 
ensured  that  the  plan  was  not  implemented,  by  continuing  to  pump 
infrastructure investment into the New Towns and to subsidise movement of 
firms  out  of  Glasgow  (the  discussion  by  MacInnes  (1995)  of  Glasgow's 
deindustrialisation omitted the important role of firm movements because his 
data  source,  SCOMER,  does  not  record  them  as  such).  The  WCSP's 
prediction that a New Town focus would result in the loss of 50,000 jobs 
from Greater Glasgow proved all too accurate. GEAR itself, though widely 
seen  at  the  time  as  indicating  a  shift  back  to  support  for  the  cities,  was 
pursued  half-heartedly  in  that  its  most  important  land  reclamation  and 
transport  projects  were  never  carried  out,  although  the  £30m  invested  in 
smaller industrial properties was still having a strikingly beneficial effect on 
employment when assessed in 1994 (Webster 1994).  
Perhaps the most conclusive evidence that the Scottish Office agenda up to 
the  present  day  has  remained  that  of  Toothill  is  that  Glasgow,  uniquely 
among  British  industrial  cities,  has  never  been  given  an  Enterprise  Zone. 
Robertson (1998) commented that 'currently one part of the Scottish Office 
funds  a  housing  regeneration  strategy,  while  another  part  manages  an 
economic strategy which operates to the detriment of the city'. Meanwhile, 
the  environmental  sustainability  requirement  that  development  should  be 
concentrated  within  existing  built-up  areas,  well-articulated  in  Strathclyde 
Regional Council's final Structure Plan and in the new draft Glasgow and 
the Clyde Valley plan (October 1999), has yet to be reflected in any major   
 
Scottish  Office  or  Executive  decisions  on  the  physical  pattern  of 
development.  
WHAT IS NEEDED 
While the Urban Partnership approach has left employment problems largely 
untouched, urban development corporations such as those in Tyne and Wear, 
Sheffield,  the  Black  Country  and  Trafford  Park  have  been  strikingly 
successful in bringing derelict sites back into use. Most cities in England and 
Wales are now placing strong emphasis on the promotion of manufacturing 
employment through site development. It is surely not accidental that most 
comparable  English  cities  –  Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Sheffield, Bradford, Leeds, Birmingham – have benefited more than Glasgow 
from  the  economic  upswing  in  1994-99  according  to  the  Labour  Force 
Survey. Leeds has done particularly well through actively looking after its 
manufacturing  firms'  property  needs  over  a  long period. MacInnes (1995) 
also emphasised the importance of promoting blue collar jobs. 
The importance of physical renewal for jobs has been recognised by Glasgow 
City Council – as indeed it already was in the forceful early critique of the 
1963  White  Paper  by  the  joint  Glasgow  Corporation/Glasgow  University 
Springburn Study of 1967. Councillor Charlie Gordon, Leader of Glasgow's 
Administration, recently commented 'We have an over emphasis on getting 
professional jobs and sending professionals into deprived areas to look after 
the  poor  and  I  would  like  to  see  manufacturing  opportunities  which  will 
provide our people with work' (Evening Times, 28 May 1999). This, in a 
nutshell, is the argument of the present paper.  
Glasgow's Regeneration Strategy Sub-Committee recently adopted a report 
(1999c) setting out a number of strategic priorities of which the first was 
'accelerated  development  of  derelict  and  contaminated  land  to  meet  city 
regeneration objectives'. The city currently has some 4,000 acres of vacant or 
derelict land, almost 10% of its land area and twice the proportion in the next 
worse  Scottish  local  authority  area.  The  experience  of  the  English  UDCs 
shows that, in order to open up sites for development, substantial investment 
in roads and public transport infrastructure is also required. In Glasgow, this 
means  projects  such  as  the  M74  completion,  the  East  End  Regeneration 
Route,  improved  links  between  Easterhouse  and  new  employment  sites 
including Gartcosh and Cardowan, and the Glasgow Airport rail link. There is 
currently  some  feeling  against  road  investment  even  in  cities,  but  the 
environmentally sustainable refocusing of development within existing built-
up areas can only be achieved if access is improved where necessary.  Scottish Social Inclusion Policy: a Critical Assessment 
 
Similar arguments apply to most of Scotland's other deprived urban areas. 
Many,  such  as  Lanarkshire,  Clydebank  and  Inverclyde  have  had  more 
investment in industrial infrastructure than Glasgow. It is wrong, however, to 
assume  that  renewal  can  be  a  once-for-all  process  so  that  for  instance 
Clydebank has 'had its Enterprise Zone' and can expect no more 'help'. Public 
investment in infrastructure requires to be continuous, just as it always was in 
the New Towns. 
This switch of strategy would require a switch of resources to achieve it, in 
particular an increase in funding for derelict land reclamation and industrial 
and  transport  infrastructure.  This  could  well  be  achieved  by  redirecting 
money from the labour supply-side programmes including the New Deal – 
though  not  New  Futures,  whose  client  group  has  genuine  labour  market 
disadvantages. Slowing down the development of New Community Schools, 
allowing more time for evaluation of the concept, could also release resources 
for physical renewal. 
The analysis of the present paper has an outstandingly important implication 
for the new Scottish Parliament. The government's view implies that the most 
important measures in relation to social inclusion in Scotland lie within the 
reserved  powers  of  the  New  Deal  and  social  security,  as  well  as 
macroeconomic  management  of  the  economy,  with  the  devolved  powers 
playing a less important role except perhaps in education. But on the analysis 
here,  it  is  the  devolved  powers  over  physical  and  economic  development 
which will play the greater role. There is no more important issue for the 
Parliament to address. 
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